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A note on the impossibility of multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders 关于预算有限的竞标者不可能进行多单位拍卖的说明
4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00342-w
Jianxin Yi
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引用次数: 0
Characterization of maxmed mechanisms for multiple objects 多目标最大化机制的表征
4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-10-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00341-x
Ranojoy Basu, Conan Mukherjee
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引用次数: 0
Efficient mask allocation during a pandemic 大流行期间有效分配口罩
4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-10-03 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00340-y
Wei-Cheng Chen, Lin Chen, Yi-Cheng Kao
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引用次数: 0
Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey 偏好提交时间和大学录取结果:来自土耳其的证据
4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-09-28 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00339-5
Hayri Alper Arslan, Yang Song, Tong Wang
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引用次数: 0
The asymptotics of price and strategy in the buyer’s bid double auction 买方竞价双重拍卖中价格的渐近性与策略
4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-09-18 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00338-6
Steven R. Williams, Konstantinos E. Zachariadis
Abstract In a model with correlated and interdependent values/costs, we identify for the buyer’s bid double auction the asymptotic distributions of the price and of two order statistics in the first order conditions for optimal bidding/asking, all of which are normal. Substitution of the asymptotic distributions into the first order conditions can permit the solution for approximately optimal bids/asks that provide insight into what is “ first order” in a trader’s strategic decision-making, which has been difficult to obtain through analysis of equilibrium.
摘要在一个具有相关和相互依赖的价值/成本的模型中，我们确定了买方出价双拍卖的价格和两个订单统计量在最优出价/要价一阶条件下的渐近分布，它们都是正态分布。将渐近分布替换为一阶条件，可以允许求解近似最优出价/报价，从而深入了解交易者战略决策中的“一阶”，这很难通过均衡分析获得。
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引用次数: 0
Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction 在日英拍卖中选择不同出价水平对收入的影响
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-07-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7
Ricardo Gonçalves, I. Ray
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引用次数: 0
Generalized consistent ranking and the formation of self-enforcing coalitions 广义一致排序与自我执行联盟的形成
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-07-25 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00335-9
K. Jandoc, R. Juarez
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引用次数: 1
Communication and coordination with constraints 有约束的沟通和协调
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-07-22 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00336-8
Raghul S. Venkatesh

I study incentives for communication and policymaking in the presence of information asymmetry and constraints on the set of feasible policies. An informed and an uninformed agent both take decisions in a coordination game such that their actions exhibit positive spillover and are imperfectly substitutable. When agents communicate via cheap talk prior to the coordination stage, there is full information revelation as long as constraints are not binding. When constraints bind, communication results in threshold equilibria and partial revelation of information. The most informative threshold equilibrium maximizes the welfare of both agents. This paper is the first in the literature to establish a relationship between action constraints and incentives for strategic communication.

我研究了在信息不对称和可行政策集约束存在的情况下，沟通和决策的激励。一个知情的和一个不知情的代理在协调博弈中都做出决策，使得他们的行为表现出积极的溢出效应，并且是不完全可替代的。在协调阶段之前，agent通过廉价谈话进行沟通时，只要约束不具有约束力，就存在充分的信息披露。当约束约束存在时，通信会导致阈值均衡和信息的部分披露。信息量最大的阈值均衡使两个主体的福利最大化。本文在文献中首次建立了战略沟通的行动约束与激励之间的关系。
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引用次数: 0
Mapping an information design game into an all-pay auction 将信息设计游戏映射到全付费拍卖
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00334-w
Oleg Muratov
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引用次数: 0
Dynamic team contests with complementary efforts 充满活力的团队以互补的努力进行竞争
4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2023-06-29 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-023-00332-y
Maria Arbatskaya, Hideo Konishi
In this paper, we study dynamic team contests. In the framework of a Tullock contest between two teams that are generating impacts according to the Cobb–Douglas effort aggregation function, we examine how equilibrium efforts and winning probabilities depend on the timing of the actions. We show that in contrast to synchronous contests, asynchronous contests with publicly observable actions do not result in the same equilibrium outcome as the one-stage contest; they are strategically unbalancing, leading to more lopsided contests. The results have implications about the design of team contests in which efforts are complementary.
本文研究动态团队竞赛。在根据Cobb-Douglas努力聚合函数产生影响的两个团队之间的Tullock竞赛框架中，我们研究了平衡努力和获胜概率如何依赖于行动的时间。我们发现，与同步竞赛相比，带有公开可观察行为的异步竞赛不会产生与单阶段竞赛相同的均衡结果;它们在战略上不平衡，导致更多不平衡的竞争。研究结果对努力互补的团队竞赛设计具有启示意义。
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引用次数: 0
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