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Nonparametric identification and estimation of all-pay auction and contest models 全付费拍卖与竞赛模型的非参数辨识与估计
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-09-15 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00309-3
Ksenia Shakhgildyan
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引用次数: 0
Difference-form group contests 不同形式的小组竞赛
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-09-05 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00312-8
María Cubel, Santiago Sanchez-Pages

This paper is the first to study difference-form group contests, that is, contests fought among groups where their probability of victory depends on the absolute difference of their effective efforts. We show that key equilibrium variables in these contests can be expressed as a function of a modified version of the Watts poverty index. We use the properties of this index to study the impact of heterogeneity, both within and between groups. In the case of homogeneous groups, we show that multiple groups can be active in equilibrium and that more groups are active and aggregate effort is higher the more similar their valuations of victory are. We then characterize equilibria under heterogeneous groups. We show that within-group heterogeneity is typically detrimental to the success of a group in the contest. Groups may have an incentive to become more homogeneous in order to increase their chances of victory.

本文首次对差异性群体竞争进行了研究，差异性群体竞争是指群体之间的竞争，其获胜概率取决于其有效努力的绝对差异。我们表明，这些竞争中的关键均衡变量可以表示为瓦特贫困指数的修改版本的函数。我们使用该指数的性质来研究组内和组间异质性的影响。在同质群体的情况下，我们证明了多个群体可以在均衡状态下活跃，并且他们对胜利的评价越相似，活跃的群体越多，总努力越高。然后，我们描述了异质群体下的平衡。我们表明，群体内部的异质性通常不利于群体在竞争中取得成功。为了增加获胜的机会，群体可能有变得更加同质化的动机。
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引用次数: 0
Resource allocations with guaranteed awards in claims problems 在理赔问题中保证赔偿的资源分配
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-09-02 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00310-w
José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Josep E. Peris, María-José Solís-Baltodano
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引用次数: 0
Contest divisioning 竞赛部门
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-08-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00311-9
Philip Brookins, Paan Jindapon

In this paper, we ask a fundamental design question in the theory of contests: Should contestants and reward money be pooled into a single grand contest, or should they be divided into parallel subcontests? We theoretically explore optimal divisioning using Tullock’s lottery contest framework and compare the performance, i.e., total effort generated, of the grand contest to the performance of contest divisioning based on players’ ability or risk attitude. When all players are risk neutral, contest divisioning is never optimal. However, given that players are heterogeneous in either ability or risk attitude, we find that contest divisioning is optimal when the degrees of absolute risk aversion are sufficiently large. Importantly, our results support the widespread use of divisioning seen in practice.

在本文中，我们提出了一个竞赛理论中的基本设计问题:参赛者和奖金应该集中到一个大竞赛中，还是应该分成平行的子竞赛?我们利用Tullock的彩票竞赛框架从理论上探讨了最优划分，并比较了基于玩家能力或风险态度的大竞赛绩效(即总努力)和基于玩家能力或风险态度的竞赛绩效。当所有的玩家都是风险中立的时候，比赛的划分从来都不是最优的。然而，考虑到参与者在能力或风险态度上的异质性，我们发现当绝对风险厌恶程度足够大时，竞赛划分是最优的。重要的是，我们的结果支持在实践中广泛使用的除法。
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引用次数: 0
Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray 精心设计的激励计划：纪念塞米赫·科雷的特刊介绍
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-08-04 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00307-5
M. Sanver
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引用次数: 0
Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle 三种公共产品与词典编纂偏好:替代原则
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-07-20 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00306-6
Lars Ehlers
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引用次数: 2
Robust implementation in sequential information design under supermodular payoffs and objective 超模收益和目标下序列信息设计的鲁棒实现
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-07-12 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00304-8
Hiroto Sato
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引用次数: 0
Entitlements to continued life and the evaluation of population health 继续生活的权利和人口健康的评价
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-06-17 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00303-9
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, L. P. Østerdal
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引用次数: 1
Compromising as an equal loss principle 作为同等损失原则的妥协
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-05-11 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00302-w
O. Cailloux, Beatrice Napolitano, M. Sanver
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引用次数: 0
Almost-truthful interim-biased mediation enables information exchange between agents with misaligned interests 近乎真实的中间偏见调解使利益不一致的代理人之间能够进行信息交换
IF 0.7 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
Review of Economic Design
Pub Date : 2022-04-19 DOI: 10.1007/s10058-022-00301-x
Dmitry Sedov
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引用次数: 0
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