International Journal of Economic Theory最新文献

We introduce a distinction between additive risky benefits and additive risky costs, showing that it is relevant in determining decision maker choices in the presence of changes in risk. Results obtained show the specific role of the order of risk change when facing the two types of risk. Similarities and differences with the case of multiplicative risks are discussed. Moreover, the analysis is performed in two models studying respectively saving and self-protection and provides new applied results for both, some with reference to background risks.

The comparison of the central rules for claims problems, according to the Lorenz order, has been studied not only on the entire set of problems but also on some restricted domains. We provide new characterizations of the adjusted proportional rule as being Lorenz-maximal or Lorenz-minimal within a class of rules on the half-domains. Using this result, we rank the adjusted proportional, the minimal overlap, and the average-of-awards rules by analyzing whether or not these rules satisfy progressivity and regressivity on the half-domains. We also find that the adjusted proportional rule violates two well-known claim monotonicity properties.

We study the growth process among a large group of economies where consumption relative to a reference group determines the discount factor of the household agents. We characterize all possible balanced growth paths and their stability properties. The model can explain why two economies having similar production technologies, preferences, and total factor productivity growth rates can differ in labor supply behavior and have diverging growth paths depending on their initial conditions. Numerical analysis of the model suggests that growth path divergence is plausible based on cross-country differences in savings rates. History dependence on time preference also generates realistic transitional dynamics.

We consider a model of monopolistic competition where producers can manipulate an elasticity parameter at an early stage. We interpret this as a choice of product specialization. Lower marginal costs of production lead to more generic products in all equilibria, which lead to fewer varieties under free-entry. Entry of a new firm increases overall specialization and increases prices, that is, the environment exhibits price-increasing competition. The loss of consumer surplus due to higher prices and lower consumption is compensated by the value of additional variety, hence entry also increases consumer surplus. Therefore, price-increasing competition need not be anticompetitive under endogenous specialization.

In the setting of the market portfolio, the impacts of preferential corporate income tax treatments through the valuational reduction for risk are opposite to and offset the impacts through the expected proceeds. This suggests that focusing on the absolute valuation of tax-favored firms results in the undermeasurement of implicit taxes on returns on investments in tax-favored firms and the relative valuation with reference to fully taxed (i.e., tax-disfavored) benchmark firms be used. In addition, corporate income taxes imposed on entities and capital income taxes imposed on investors have opposite valuational effects through the endogenously derived market-aggregate aversion to risk.

The paper models a uniform-price Bertrand-price-competition in a differentiated product oligopoly market, where the buyers' preference shows “love for variety.” The buyers differ from each other in their valuation of the differentiated product with a common outside option available to all. The model endogenously determines both the extensive and intensive margin of demand and the equilibrium number of varieties in the differentiated product market. It shows that in such a framework complementarity exists at the extensive margin of demand even in the presence of demand substitutability between the varieties. The results apply to the competition between brick and mortar shops and malls.

I model the role of strategic defaults and informal moneylenders on multiple-installment loan contracts offered by microfinance institutions (MFIs). The results show that a single-installment loan is not viable due to MFIs' vulnerability to strategic defaults and borrowers' lack of collateral. In contrast, a multiple-installment contract requires borrowers to borrow from the moneylender, who is immune to strategic default, in order to repay the MFI's early installments that are due before the project yields a return. Consequently, both default costs and borrowing costs increase and incentives to commit strategic default decline, making the multiple-installment contract profitable for MFIs.