Abstract This paper proposes a model of a continuum of industries in which some industries are monopolistically competitive, the others are oligopolistic, and they interact in a labor market. We use this model to examine the effects of entry of oligopolistic firms. We show that this raises the equilibrium wage and induces exit of monopolistically competitive firms. Then, we find that the profits of each oligopolistic firm and the whole oligopolistic industry decrease. Finally, we establish that if the elasticity of substitution is the same in all industries, welfare improves as a result of an increase in the oligopolistic firms.
{"title":"The Effects of Entry when Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly Coexist","authors":"K. Fujiwara","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2017-0161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2017-0161","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper proposes a model of a continuum of industries in which some industries are monopolistically competitive, the others are oligopolistic, and they interact in a labor market. We use this model to examine the effects of entry of oligopolistic firms. We show that this raises the equilibrium wage and induces exit of monopolistically competitive firms. Then, we find that the profits of each oligopolistic firm and the whole oligopolistic industry decrease. Finally, we establish that if the elasticity of substitution is the same in all industries, welfare improves as a result of an increase in the oligopolistic firms.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2017-0161","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41735775","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We investigate firms’ behavior in demand-enhancing product R&D. We consider and compare a cooperative and non-cooperative R&D investment setting by firms. In a non-cooperative scenario (R&D competition), firms decide on their R&D investments and outputs unilaterally. In a cooperative scenario (R&D coopetition), firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. Firms through bargaining can reach an R&D agreement which specifies their R&D investment levels. The investment levels under R&D coopetition are higher compared with the investment levels under R&D competition. Firms’ profits are also higher under R&D coopetition compared with R&D competition. We conclude that R&D coopetition can alleviate the individual R&D investment disincentive and work as a strategic instrument that enhances product innovation and firms’ profits.
{"title":"Product R&D Coopetition and Firm Performance","authors":"M. Ramsza, A. Karbowski","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2018-0141","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0141","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We investigate firms’ behavior in demand-enhancing product R&D. We consider and compare a cooperative and non-cooperative R&D investment setting by firms. In a non-cooperative scenario (R&D competition), firms decide on their R&D investments and outputs unilaterally. In a cooperative scenario (R&D coopetition), firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. Firms through bargaining can reach an R&D agreement which specifies their R&D investment levels. The investment levels under R&D coopetition are higher compared with the investment levels under R&D competition. Firms’ profits are also higher under R&D coopetition compared with R&D competition. We conclude that R&D coopetition can alleviate the individual R&D investment disincentive and work as a strategic instrument that enhances product innovation and firms’ profits.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2018-0141","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46522397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
If jurors care about reaching the correct verdict, but also experience costs to paying attention during the trial, even a small effort cost generates interesting interactions between pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy. I demonstrate the existence of a strong free riding effect; jurors respond to a more informative prior by reducing their probabilities of paying attention, to the extent that over a non-empty range, a more informative prior will be associated with poorer verdicts. Pretrial beliefs can depend on several factors: I consider two – the extent of discovery during the pre-plea bargaining process, and the efficiency of the police. My results imply that more liberal discovery rules, which result in a less noisy plea bargaining process, will actually be complemented by greater juror effort over a range, resulting in more accurate verdicts. In contrast, greater police efficiency will, over a range, elicit a sufficient drop in juror effort such that verdicts are less accurate. Thus, improving discovery has added benefits over a range, while the benefits of exogenous improvements in policing may be dampened. I briefly extend the model to cases where attentive jurors receive an imperfect public signal instead of a perfect one, and to cases where jurors’ utilities from convicting a guilty defendant differ from their utilities from acquitting an innocent one.
{"title":"Pretrial Beliefs and Verdict Accuracy: Costly Juror Effort and Free Riding","authors":"Guha Brishti","doi":"10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0020","url":null,"abstract":"If jurors care about reaching the correct verdict, but also experience costs to paying attention during the trial, even a small effort cost generates interesting interactions between pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy. I demonstrate the existence of a strong free riding effect; jurors respond to a more informative prior by reducing their probabilities of paying attention, to the extent that over a non-empty range, a more informative prior will be associated with poorer verdicts. Pretrial beliefs can depend on several factors: I consider two – the extent of discovery during the pre-plea bargaining process, and the efficiency of the police. My results imply that more liberal discovery rules, which result in a less noisy plea bargaining process, will actually be complemented by greater juror effort over a range, resulting in more accurate verdicts. In contrast, greater police efficiency will, over a range, elicit a sufficient drop in juror effort such that verdicts are less accurate. Thus, improving discovery has added benefits over a range, while the benefits of exogenous improvements in policing may be dampened. I briefly extend the model to cases where attentive jurors receive an imperfect public signal instead of a perfect one, and to cases where jurors’ utilities from convicting a guilty defendant differ from their utilities from acquitting an innocent one.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"1-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0020","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67197484","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Based on insights from psychology, we argue that individual well-being has two incommensurable dimensions, gratification and flourishing. We provide a model in which the individual’s vitality is tunneled to different goals/practices. Gratification is represented by discharge of flow, while flourishing corresponds to generated power. The two dimensions are correlated in a way that depends on the characteristics of the available goals/practices, and their relationship need not be monotonic. We also extend the model to social interaction, prove existence of an equilibrium and show the possibility of ‘flourishing traps’.
{"title":"Flourishing as Productive Tension: Theory and Model","authors":"A. Heifetz, E. Minelli","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2018-0162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0162","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Based on insights from psychology, we argue that individual well-being has two incommensurable dimensions, gratification and flourishing. We provide a model in which the individual’s vitality is tunneled to different goals/practices. Gratification is represented by discharge of flow, while flourishing corresponds to generated power. The two dimensions are correlated in a way that depends on the characteristics of the available goals/practices, and their relationship need not be monotonic. We also extend the model to social interaction, prove existence of an equilibrium and show the possibility of ‘flourishing traps’.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2018-0162","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47619524","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This study investigates infinitely repeated games of a prisoner’s dilemma with additive separability in which the monitoring technology is imperfect and private. Behavioral incentives indicate that a player is not only motivated by pure self-interest but also by social preference such as reciprocity, and that a player often becomes naïve and selects an action randomly due to her cognitive limitation and uncertain psychological mood as well as the strategic complexity caused by monitoring imperfection and private observation. By focusing on generous tit-for-tat strategies, we characterize a behavioral version of Nash equilibrium termed behavioral equilibrium in an accuracy-contingent manner. By eliminating the gap between theory and evidence, we show that not pure self-interest but reciprocity plays a substantial role in motivating a player to make decisions in a sophisticated manner.
{"title":"Behavioral Theory of Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma: Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy","authors":"Hitoshi Matsushima","doi":"10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study investigates infinitely repeated games of a prisoner’s dilemma with additive separability in which the monitoring technology is imperfect and private. Behavioral incentives indicate that a player is not only motivated by pure self-interest but also by social preference such as reciprocity, and that a player often becomes naïve and selects an action randomly due to her cognitive limitation and uncertain psychological mood as well as the strategic complexity caused by monitoring imperfection and private observation. By focusing on generous tit-for-tat strategies, we characterize a behavioral version of Nash equilibrium termed behavioral equilibrium in an accuracy-contingent manner. By eliminating the gap between theory and evidence, we show that not pure self-interest but reciprocity plays a substantial role in motivating a player to make decisions in a sophisticated manner.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0030","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48679006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes how capital concentration affects wage inequality through the channel of financial frictions. Higher capital concentration can be regarded as the Piketty effect. Under the framework of cost constrained financial frictions, we find that higher capital concentration will expand (resp. narrow down) wage inequality if the asset-liability ratio in the skilled sector is high (resp. low) enough relative to that in the unskilled sector.
{"title":"Capital Concentration and Wage Inequality","authors":"Jiancai Pi, Yanwei Fan","doi":"10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0049","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes how capital concentration affects wage inequality through the channel of financial frictions. Higher capital concentration can be regarded as the Piketty effect. Under the framework of cost constrained financial frictions, we find that higher capital concentration will expand (resp. narrow down) wage inequality if the asset-liability ratio in the skilled sector is high (resp. low) enough relative to that in the unskilled sector.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"48 1","pages":"1-9"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0049","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67197317","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2019-11-01Epub Date: 2019-08-19DOI: 10.1681/ASN.2019020150
Rory J Olson, Katharina Hopp, Harrison Wells, Jessica M Smith, Jessica Furtado, Megan M Constans, Diana L Escobar, Aron M Geurts, Vicente E Torres, Peter C Harris
Background: Autosomal recessive polycystic kidney disease (ARPKD) and autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (ADPKD) are genetically distinct, with ADPKD usually caused by the genes PKD1 or PKD2 (encoding polycystin-1 and polycystin-2, respectively) and ARPKD caused by PKHD1 (encoding fibrocystin/polyductin [FPC]). Primary cilia have been considered central to PKD pathogenesis due to protein localization and common cystic phenotypes in syndromic ciliopathies, but their relevance is questioned in the simple PKDs. ARPKD's mild phenotype in murine models versus in humans has hampered investigating its pathogenesis.
Methods: To study the interaction between Pkhd1 and Pkd1, including dosage effects on the phenotype, we generated digenic mouse and rat models and characterized and compared digenic, monogenic, and wild-type phenotypes.
Results: The genetic interaction was synergistic in both species, with digenic animals exhibiting phenotypes of rapidly progressive PKD and early lethality resembling classic ARPKD. Genetic interaction between Pkhd1 and Pkd1 depended on dosage in the digenic murine models, with no significant enhancement of the monogenic phenotype until a threshold of reduced expression at the second locus was breached. Pkhd1 loss did not alter expression, maturation, or localization of the ADPKD polycystin proteins, with no interaction detected between the ARPKD FPC protein and polycystins. RNA-seq analysis in the digenic and monogenic mouse models highlighted the ciliary compartment as a common dysregulated target, with enhanced ciliary expression and length changes in the digenic models.
Conclusions: These data indicate that FPC and the polycystins work independently, with separate disease-causing thresholds; however, a combined protein threshold triggers the synergistic, cystogenic response because of enhanced dysregulation of primary cilia. These insights into pathogenesis highlight possible common therapeutic targets.
{"title":"Synergistic Genetic Interactions between <i>Pkhd1</i> and <i>Pkd1</i> Result in an ARPKD-Like Phenotype in Murine Models.","authors":"Rory J Olson, Katharina Hopp, Harrison Wells, Jessica M Smith, Jessica Furtado, Megan M Constans, Diana L Escobar, Aron M Geurts, Vicente E Torres, Peter C Harris","doi":"10.1681/ASN.2019020150","DOIUrl":"10.1681/ASN.2019020150","url":null,"abstract":"<p><strong>Background: </strong>Autosomal recessive polycystic kidney disease (ARPKD) and autosomal dominant polycystic kidney disease (ADPKD) are genetically distinct, with ADPKD usually caused by the genes <i>PKD1</i> or <i>PKD2</i> (encoding polycystin-1 and polycystin-2, respectively) and ARPKD caused by <i>PKHD1</i> (encoding fibrocystin/polyductin [FPC]). Primary cilia have been considered central to PKD pathogenesis due to protein localization and common cystic phenotypes in syndromic ciliopathies, but their relevance is questioned in the simple PKDs. ARPKD's mild phenotype in murine models versus in humans has hampered investigating its pathogenesis.</p><p><strong>Methods: </strong>To study the interaction between <i>Pkhd1</i> and <i>Pkd1</i>, including dosage effects on the phenotype, we generated digenic mouse and rat models and characterized and compared digenic, monogenic, and wild-type phenotypes.</p><p><strong>Results: </strong>The genetic interaction was synergistic in both species, with digenic animals exhibiting phenotypes of rapidly progressive PKD and early lethality resembling classic ARPKD. Genetic interaction between <i>Pkhd1</i> and <i>Pkd1</i> depended on dosage in the digenic murine models, with no significant enhancement of the monogenic phenotype until a threshold of reduced expression at the second locus was breached. <i>Pkhd1</i> loss did not alter expression, maturation, or localization of the ADPKD polycystin proteins, with no interaction detected between the ARPKD FPC protein and polycystins. RNA-seq analysis in the digenic and monogenic mouse models highlighted the ciliary compartment as a common dysregulated target, with enhanced ciliary expression and length changes in the digenic models.</p><p><strong>Conclusions: </strong>These data indicate that FPC and the polycystins work independently, with separate disease-causing thresholds; however, a combined protein threshold triggers the synergistic, cystogenic response because of enhanced dysregulation of primary cilia. These insights into pathogenesis highlight possible common therapeutic targets.</p>","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"19 1","pages":"2113-2127"},"PeriodicalIF":13.6,"publicationDate":"2019-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6830782/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89310330","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper studies the supply-side distortions and the consequences resulted from provider-side cost containing universal health insurance (UHI) scheme. A two-sector overlapping generations model of endogenous physicians’ specialty choice is presented. We find that the general public is possible to be benefited from the cost containing UHI if the quality of medical services does not deteriorate too much. However, physicians in the medical service sector suffer from such scheme and end up earning lower incomes, regardless of one’s specialty and talent. Inequality among physicians also increases.
{"title":"Winners and Losers of Universal Health Insurance: A Macroeconomic Analysis","authors":"W. Ng, Yin-Chi Wang","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2018-0064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0064","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper studies the supply-side distortions and the consequences resulted from provider-side cost containing universal health insurance (UHI) scheme. A two-sector overlapping generations model of endogenous physicians’ specialty choice is presented. We find that the general public is possible to be benefited from the cost containing UHI if the quality of medical services does not deteriorate too much. However, physicians in the medical service sector suffer from such scheme and end up earning lower incomes, regardless of one’s specialty and talent. Inequality among physicians also increases.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2018-0064","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44287245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We study indeterminacy of indicative meanings (disagreements about meanings of messages among players), a kind of language vagueness examined in Blume and Board (2013. “Language Barriers.” Econometrica 81 (2): 781–812). They, using a cheap talk model in which the state-distribution and the players’ language competence were ex-ante uncertain, demonstrated that this vagueness occurs as an equilibrium language. We expand the work of Blume and Board by using a model between an uninformed decision maker and an informed agent in which the state-distribution and the state are both ex-ante uncertain. We show that this two-dimensional uncertainty also leads to indeterminacy of indicative meanings, that is, to a set of conditions in which an agent with different perceptions of the state-distribution intentionally uses the same symbol for the different extents of information on the state. The vagueness, contrary to common expectations, can actually lead to welfare improvement.
{"title":"Vagueness of Language: Indeterminacy under Two-Dimensional State-Uncertainty","authors":"Saori Chiba","doi":"10.1515/bejte-2018-0093","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0093","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We study indeterminacy of indicative meanings (disagreements about meanings of messages among players), a kind of language vagueness examined in Blume and Board (2013. “Language Barriers.” Econometrica 81 (2): 781–812). They, using a cheap talk model in which the state-distribution and the players’ language competence were ex-ante uncertain, demonstrated that this vagueness occurs as an equilibrium language. We expand the work of Blume and Board by using a model between an uninformed decision maker and an informed agent in which the state-distribution and the state are both ex-ante uncertain. We show that this two-dimensional uncertainty also leads to indeterminacy of indicative meanings, that is, to a set of conditions in which an agent with different perceptions of the state-distribution intentionally uses the same symbol for the different extents of information on the state. The vagueness, contrary to common expectations, can actually lead to welfare improvement.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/bejte-2018-0093","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46219349","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies optimal incentives in the presence of an agent’s preference for generosity, where the principal optimally chooses the level of generosity (rent) as well as the performance-based pay. We show that some minimum level of reciprocity is required for generous contracts to become attractive. More reciprocal agents exert greater effort, but they may not necessarily receive more generous offers, as our model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between generosity and the reciprocity parameter. This means that moderately reciprocal agents tend to receive a premium relative to weakly or strongly reciprocal agents. Generosity and performance-based pay are likely to behave as complements when risk-sharing motives (determined by noise in the environment and the agent’s degree of risk-aversion) are strong, and they are likely to behave as substitutes when risk-sharing motives are relatively moderate. Moreover, base-wage gifts are always optimal, whereas piece-rate or composite gifts are only optimal in a low-noise environment.
{"title":"Optimal Incentives Under Gift Exchange","authors":"Khansa Hayat","doi":"10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0041","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies optimal incentives in the presence of an agent’s preference for generosity, where the principal optimally chooses the level of generosity (rent) as well as the performance-based pay. We show that some minimum level of reciprocity is required for generous contracts to become attractive. More reciprocal agents exert greater effort, but they may not necessarily receive more generous offers, as our model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between generosity and the reciprocity parameter. This means that moderately reciprocal agents tend to receive a premium relative to weakly or strongly reciprocal agents. Generosity and performance-based pay are likely to behave as complements when risk-sharing motives (determined by noise in the environment and the agent’s degree of risk-aversion) are strong, and they are likely to behave as substitutes when risk-sharing motives are relatively moderate. Moreover, base-wage gifts are always optimal, whereas piece-rate or composite gifts are only optimal in a low-noise environment.","PeriodicalId":44773,"journal":{"name":"B E Journal of Theoretical Economics","volume":"20 1","pages":"1-11"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2019-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1515/BEJTE-2018-0041","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"67197496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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