Marielle Brunette, A. Corcos, S. Couture, François Pannequin
Nous etudions l’effet de l’inobservabilite par l’assureur de l’effort d’auto-assurance de l’assure sur la relation de substitution entre assurance et auto-assurance. Nous apprehendons l’effet de cette inobservabilite d’abord dans un contexte de risque, puis nous etendons l’analyse au cas ou l’assure, contrairement a l’assureur, n’a qu’une connaissance ambigue de son risque d’accident. Nous trouvons que l’information quant au niveau d’effort ne revet de dimension strategique ni dans le risque ni dans l’ambiguite : les assures choisissent des niveaux d’effort identiques que l’effort soit observable ou non. Il en resulte que la propriete de substituabilite entre assurance et auto-assurance est robuste a la fois a l’asymetrie d’information et a l’ambiguite. Les implications pour les pouvoirs publics et pour les assureurs sont discutees. Code JEL : D81
{"title":"Substituabilité entre assurance et auto-assurance : une propriété robuste à l’asymétrie d’information et à l’ambiguïté","authors":"Marielle Brunette, A. Corcos, S. Couture, François Pannequin","doi":"10.3917/redp.304.0111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.304.0111","url":null,"abstract":"Nous etudions l’effet de l’inobservabilite par l’assureur de l’effort d’auto-assurance de l’assure sur la relation de substitution entre assurance et auto-assurance. Nous apprehendons l’effet de cette inobservabilite d’abord dans un contexte de risque, puis nous etendons l’analyse au cas ou l’assure, contrairement a l’assureur, n’a qu’une connaissance ambigue de son risque d’accident. Nous trouvons que l’information quant au niveau d’effort ne revet de dimension strategique ni dans le risque ni dans l’ambiguite : les assures choisissent des niveaux d’effort identiques que l’effort soit observable ou non. Il en resulte que la propriete de substituabilite entre assurance et auto-assurance est robuste a la fois a l’asymetrie d’information et a l’ambiguite. Les implications pour les pouvoirs publics et pour les assureurs sont discutees. Code JEL : D81","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"1 1","pages":"615-632"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88843583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper assesses the non-linear effects of monetary policy in the euro area since the global financial crisis on both asset prices and their imbalances component, for the stock and housing markets. We compute these imbalances as the difference between asset prices and a benchmark value that we approximate with fundamentals in a discounted cash-flow model, the fitted value of asset prices in a data-driven model or the trend in a standard trend/cycle filtering model. We find that ECB monetary policy has affected both stock and house prices in the euro area since?2008. However, we show that monetary policy influences stock price imbalances but not house price imbalances. Exploring further the mechanism, we find that this response of stock price imbalances is driven by central bank information shocks, not by pure policy shocks.
{"title":"Monetary policy and asset prices in the euro area since the global financial crisis","authors":"Christophe Blot, P. Hubert, Fabien Labondance","doi":"10.3917/redp.302.0257","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.302.0257","url":null,"abstract":"This paper assesses the non-linear effects of monetary policy in the euro area since the global financial crisis on both asset prices and their imbalances component, for the stock and housing markets. We compute these imbalances as the difference between asset prices and a benchmark value that we approximate with fundamentals in a discounted cash-flow model, the fitted value of asset prices in a data-driven model or the trend in a standard trend/cycle filtering model. We find that ECB monetary policy has affected both stock and house prices in the euro area since?2008. However, we show that monetary policy influences stock price imbalances but not house price imbalances. Exploring further the mechanism, we find that this response of stock price imbalances is driven by central bank information shocks, not by pure policy shocks.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"78 1","pages":"257-281"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78693709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Affirmative action policies are a widely used tool for policy makers. One of their objectives is to improve the welfare of a targeted group of students during a school admission procedure. However, it is well-know in the matching literature that these policies can lead to perverse effects: the targeted students can be hurt by the policy intended to help them. In this paper, we take an interim-welfare perspective and show that, in the particular framework of aligned preferences and indifferent schools, the well-known Deferred Acceptance algorithm never hurts the minority students’ welfare once an affirmative action policy is implemented. We also highlight the welfare effects of the ordering defining how the seats of a school are allocated throughout the matching procedure, known as a precedence order. Our main proof elicits two effects of a reinforcement of an affirmative action policy. A direct effect where the policy increases the probability to be assigned to the schools where the policy was reinforced. And an indirect one: in decreasing the competition from other minority students, the policy increases the expected utility of a student, even if this latter has been rejected by the schools where the policy was reinforced. We provide counter examples to show that the environment that we consider is a tight domain for the positive effects on minority students. Last, we perform simulations to study the interim-welfare effects of affirmative actions when we depart from the framework of i) aligned preferences preferences ii) indifferent schools. With indifferent schools, they support that the more correlated are the preferences, the better the affirmative action policy performs. They also show that the rules used to break the indifference of the schools perform differently: a Multiple Tie Breaking rule tends to hurt less the minority students then the Single Tie Breaking rule.
{"title":"Are Affirmative Action Policies so Impossible","authors":"Julien Combe","doi":"10.3917/REDP.286.1123","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.286.1123","url":null,"abstract":"Affirmative action policies are a widely used tool for policy makers. One of their objectives is to improve the welfare of a targeted group of students during a school admission procedure. However, it is well-know in the matching literature that these policies can lead to perverse effects: the targeted students can be hurt by the policy intended to help them. In this paper, we take an interim-welfare perspective and show that, in the particular framework of aligned preferences and indifferent schools, the well-known Deferred Acceptance algorithm never hurts the minority students’ welfare once an affirmative action policy is implemented. We also highlight the welfare effects of the ordering defining how the seats of a school are allocated throughout the matching procedure, known as a precedence order. Our main proof elicits two effects of a reinforcement of an affirmative action policy. A direct effect where the policy increases the probability to be assigned to the schools where the policy was reinforced. And an indirect one: in decreasing the competition from other minority students, the policy increases the expected utility of a student, even if this latter has been rejected by the schools where the policy was reinforced. We provide counter examples to show that the environment that we consider is a tight domain for the positive effects on minority students. Last, we perform simulations to study the interim-welfare effects of affirmative actions when we depart from the framework of i) aligned preferences preferences ii) indifferent schools. With indifferent schools, they support that the more correlated are the preferences, the better the affirmative action policy performs. They also show that the rules used to break the indifference of the schools perform differently: a Multiple Tie Breaking rule tends to hurt less the minority students then the Single Tie Breaking rule.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"20 1","pages":"1123-1173"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86255205","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Empirical evidence has shown that married men generally earn more and married women earn less than their unmarried counterparts. However, the control group of “not married” differs between studies, over time and between countries, such that the message remains somewhat fuzzy. It is not clear whether the type of union or the fact of being in a union is responsible for these wage penalties and premiums. This article aims to analyze whether marriage pays more than cohabitation in a country such as France, where cohabiting and married partnerships have both coexisted for years. Thanks to a rich dataset with information on both the marital and work history of both partners, we are able to estimate the effect on hourly wages of being married relative to being in a cohabiting union. Taking into account selections into marriage (rather than cohabitation) and into the labor market with a possible differential in sharing of paid work within the couple, our results show that the men’s marriage premium is due entirely to a positive selection into marriage. While the process of within-couple marital specialization strongly reduces a woman’s hourly wage, there is no evidence of any additional marriage penalty for women. The within-couple gender wage gap is similar for married and cohabiting partners, after controlling for selection into marriage.
{"title":"Wage Premium and Wage Penalty in Marriage versus Cohabitation","authors":"Carole Bonnet, B. Jeandidier, Anne Solaz","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0745","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0745","url":null,"abstract":"Empirical evidence has shown that married men generally earn more and married women earn less than their unmarried counterparts. However, the control group of “not married” differs between studies, over time and between countries, such that the message remains somewhat fuzzy. It is not clear whether the type of union or the fact of being in a union is responsible for these wage penalties and premiums. This article aims to analyze whether marriage pays more than cohabitation in a country such as France, where cohabiting and married partnerships have both coexisted for years. Thanks to a rich dataset with information on both the marital and work history of both partners, we are able to estimate the effect on hourly wages of being married relative to being in a cohabiting union. Taking into account selections into marriage (rather than cohabitation) and into the labor market with a possible differential in sharing of paid work within the couple, our results show that the men’s marriage premium is due entirely to a positive selection into marriage. While the process of within-couple marital specialization strongly reduces a woman’s hourly wage, there is no evidence of any additional marriage penalty for women. The within-couple gender wage gap is similar for married and cohabiting partners, after controlling for selection into marriage.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"55 1","pages":"745-775"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87479501","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this lecture we argue that important aspects of the growth process cannot easily be accounted for using models where capital accumulation is the main source of growth. The four aspects we emphasize in this lecture are: the transition trap, secular stagnation, the recent rise in top income inequality, and firm dynamics. The lecture argues that by contrast these aspects can be addressed by the Schumpeterian growth paradigm in which: (i) growth results primarily from innovation; (ii) innovation responds to incentives shaped by economic policies and institutions; (iii) new innovations replace old technologies (creative destruction).
{"title":"Innovation and Growth from a Schumpeterian Perspective","authors":"P. Aghion","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0693","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0693","url":null,"abstract":"In this lecture we argue that important aspects of the growth process cannot easily be accounted for using models where capital accumulation is the main source of growth. The four aspects we emphasize in this lecture are: the transition trap, secular stagnation, the recent rise in top income inequality, and firm dynamics. The lecture argues that by contrast these aspects can be addressed by the Schumpeterian growth paradigm in which: (i) growth results primarily from innovation; (ii) innovation responds to incentives shaped by economic policies and institutions; (iii) new innovations replace old technologies (creative destruction).","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"20 1","pages":"693-711"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76490075","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
this editorial presents the main contributions of the theory of team reasoning in game theory, and the issues that remain to be solved before this theory could become a credible alternative to ?orthodox? game theory. I argue in particular that an approach based on collective agency rather than rational choice theory and social preferences offer a scientifically preferable theory of unselfish behaviours, both in terms of parsimony and empirical validation. I review the economic literature on team reasoning, and highlight the contributions of the papers of the present volume to tackle the open issues of the theory of team reasoning.
{"title":"What does “we” want? Team Reasoning, Game Theory, and Unselfish Behaviours","authors":"Guilhem Lecouteux","doi":"10.3917/REDP.283.0311","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.283.0311","url":null,"abstract":"this editorial presents the main contributions of the theory of team reasoning in game theory, and the issues that remain to be solved before this theory could become a credible alternative to ?orthodox? game theory. I argue in particular that an approach based on collective agency rather than rational choice theory and social preferences offer a scientifically preferable theory of unselfish behaviours, both in terms of parsimony and empirical validation. I review the economic literature on team reasoning, and highlight the contributions of the papers of the present volume to tackle the open issues of the theory of team reasoning.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"18 1","pages":"311-332"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-07-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82938294","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There are public projects which many people welcome because they are expected to be beneficial for society at large. On the other hand, however, these projects may generate larger negative externalities for certain parts of society. One example is the erection of a nuclear power-plant, a measure that is widely considered to render a country?s energy provision less dependent on supply from outside. On the other hand, it possibly causes a feeling of insecurity among people who live in the vicinity of such a power station, and can furthermore have negative economic consequences in so far as the price of land and of houses may decline in this area. How should decisions on public projects with larger negative externalities be taken? Assuming that the benefits for all those who are directly or indirectly affected by such a project are roughly the same, a cost-sharing or burden-sharing method is proposed that focuses on a weighted difference between the economic performance of a particular region and the average performance of all regions concerned. The weight is to be determined by an impartial observer.
{"title":"Decisions on Public Projects with Negative Externalities: Veil of Ignorance or Impartial Spectator?","authors":"Camilla Colombo, W. Gaertner","doi":"10.3917/REDP.282.0251","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.282.0251","url":null,"abstract":"There are public projects which many people welcome because they are expected to be beneficial for society at large. On the other hand, however, these projects may generate larger negative externalities for certain parts of society. One example is the erection of a nuclear power-plant, a measure that is widely considered to render a country?s energy provision less dependent on supply from outside. On the other hand, it possibly causes a feeling of insecurity among people who live in the vicinity of such a power station, and can furthermore have negative economic consequences in so far as the price of land and of houses may decline in this area. How should decisions on public projects with larger negative externalities be taken? Assuming that the benefits for all those who are directly or indirectly affected by such a project are roughly the same, a cost-sharing or burden-sharing method is proposed that focuses on a weighted difference between the economic performance of a particular region and the average performance of all regions concerned. The weight is to be determined by an impartial observer.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"1 1","pages":"251-265"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-05-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89321908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Le passage au prelevement a la source de l’impot sur le revenu en 2018 en France pose deux difficultes. D’abord, puisque les impots preleves en 2017 le seront sur la base des revenus 2016 et ceux de l’annee 2018 sur ceux de l’annee 2018, les revenus 2017 pourraient ne pas etre fiscalises, laissant ainsi place a une « annee blanche » . Ensuite, les contribuables perdraient l’avantage du paiement de l.’impot avec une annee de decalage, caracterisant ainsi une hausse implicite d’impot. Dans cet article, nous evaluons differentes options de la reforme selon le traitement specifique des deux points soulignes. Si l’annee 2017 n’est effectivement pas .fiscalisee mais que la hausse implicite est neutralisee, nous montrons que la reforme se traduirait par une perte fiscale pour l’Etat de l’ordre de 75 milliards d’euros. A l’inverse, si l’annee blanche est bien accompagnee de la hausse fiscale, alors l.’ Etat verrait ses rentrees fiscales totales augmenter relativement au taux de croissance nominal de l’economie. Pour ce qui est des contribuables, nous montrons que quelque soient les modalites de la reforme, cette derniere aboutirait a un impact inegalitaire, toujours en faveur des generations les plus âges au detriment des nouveaux et potentiellement des futurs contribuables. Nous proposons une procedure qui permettrait de neutraliser l’effet generationnel inequitable associe au passage au prelevement a la source.
{"title":"Prélèvement à la source de l’impôt sur le revenu et année de transition","authors":"Gilles Le Garrec, V. Touzé","doi":"10.3917/REDP.286.1199","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.286.1199","url":null,"abstract":"Le passage au prelevement a la source de l’impot sur le revenu en 2018 en France pose deux difficultes. D’abord, puisque les impots preleves en 2017 le seront sur la base des revenus 2016 et ceux de l’annee 2018 sur ceux de l’annee 2018, les revenus 2017 pourraient ne pas etre fiscalises, laissant ainsi place a une « annee blanche » . Ensuite, les contribuables perdraient l’avantage du paiement de l.’impot avec une annee de decalage, caracterisant ainsi une hausse implicite d’impot. Dans cet article, nous evaluons differentes options de la reforme selon le traitement specifique des deux points soulignes. Si l’annee 2017 n’est effectivement pas .fiscalisee mais que la hausse implicite est neutralisee, nous montrons que la reforme se traduirait par une perte fiscale pour l’Etat de l’ordre de 75 milliards d’euros. A l’inverse, si l’annee blanche est bien accompagnee de la hausse fiscale, alors l.’ Etat verrait ses rentrees fiscales totales augmenter relativement au taux de croissance nominal de l’economie. Pour ce qui est des contribuables, nous montrons que quelque soient les modalites de la reforme, cette derniere aboutirait a un impact inegalitaire, toujours en faveur des generations les plus âges au detriment des nouveaux et potentiellement des futurs contribuables. Nous proposons une procedure qui permettrait de neutraliser l’effet generationnel inequitable associe au passage au prelevement a la source.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"133 1","pages":"1199-1234"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85362538","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Valérie Bérenger, J. Deutsch, J. Silber, I. Soloaga
Asset indices based on durable goods ownership and housing characteristics are widely used to proxy wealth when income or expenditure data are not available. In this paper, we propose an ordinal approach to using data on assets when estimating the wealth of a household (or individual). Using Correspondence Analysis, we derive a ranking of the correlations between the various assets and the first factor, a latent variable assumed to represent the standard of living. We then use this correlation ranking of the assets to derive indices of ordinal inequality that have been recently proposed in the literature. We also use the information on the proportion of individuals holding each type of assets to derive again ordinal measures of inequality in asset ownership. Our empirical analysis, based on data covering the various states of Mexico in?2000?and 2010, shows that the correlation between measures of ordinal inequality in asset ownership derived from correspondence analysis and traditional Gini indices of household income is high, and even higher than that between these Gini indices and ordinal inequality indices based on the percentage ownership of the different assets.
{"title":"An ordinal approach to the measurement of inequality in asset ownership: methodology and an application to Mexican data.","authors":"Valérie Bérenger, J. Deutsch, J. Silber, I. Soloaga","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0969","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0969","url":null,"abstract":"Asset indices based on durable goods ownership and housing characteristics are widely used to proxy wealth when income or expenditure data are not available. In this paper, we propose an ordinal approach to using data on assets when estimating the wealth of a household (or individual). Using Correspondence Analysis, we derive a ranking of the correlations between the various assets and the first factor, a latent variable assumed to represent the standard of living. We then use this correlation ranking of the assets to derive indices of ordinal inequality that have been recently proposed in the literature. We also use the information on the proportion of individuals holding each type of assets to derive again ordinal measures of inequality in asset ownership. Our empirical analysis, based on data covering the various states of Mexico in?2000?and 2010, shows that the correlation between measures of ordinal inequality in asset ownership derived from correspondence analysis and traditional Gini indices of household income is high, and even higher than that between these Gini indices and ordinal inequality indices based on the percentage ownership of the different assets.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"130 1","pages":"969-1012"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-02-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74146595","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Animal breeds are intangible resources created and maintained by selection activities aimed a ?genetic progress?, and they are continuously transformed as a result of these activities and farming practices. Animal breeds (at least for cattle and sheep) have a status of common ownership. The way these common resources are managed, and the genetic progress is generated, controlled and distributed, is based in different national and historical contexts on ?breeding regimes?, made up of rules and political, scientific, informational, technical and organizational devices. Bundles of property rights analytical framework proposed by Schlager and Ostrom [1992] is implemented to distinguish these regimes, considering first the one that is structured in the?1960s in France with the support of the national policy of modernization of agriculture, then the one which today results of recent developments in scientific and technical knowledge, in the context of liberalization of agricultural policies. Each of these regimes got institutionalized in the context of technological breakthroughs: artificial insemination for the first one and genomic selection for the second one. In this article, we analyse the complexity of common resources systems and the evolution of the property rights applied to the case of animal genetic resources and the industry of livestock selection in agriculture. In our analysis of bundle of rights, we add a right of contribution, taking into account the definition of collective breeding objectives aiming at changing the breed?s orientation (leading to an ?alteration? of the breed). While only one breeding organism used to have the monopoly of this right for each breed, it is now threatened by the more competitive emerging regime. The economic stakes are different at each of the two periods.
{"title":"Complexité des communs et régimes de droits de propriété : le cas des ressources génétiques animales","authors":"G. Allaire, J. Labatut, G. Tesnière","doi":"10.3917/REDP.281.0109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.281.0109","url":null,"abstract":"Animal breeds are intangible resources created and maintained by selection activities aimed a ?genetic progress?, and they are continuously transformed as a result of these activities and farming practices. Animal breeds (at least for cattle and sheep) have a status of common ownership. The way these common resources are managed, and the genetic progress is generated, controlled and distributed, is based in different national and historical contexts on ?breeding regimes?, made up of rules and political, scientific, informational, technical and organizational devices. Bundles of property rights analytical framework proposed by Schlager and Ostrom [1992] is implemented to distinguish these regimes, considering first the one that is structured in the?1960s in France with the support of the national policy of modernization of agriculture, then the one which today results of recent developments in scientific and technical knowledge, in the context of liberalization of agricultural policies. Each of these regimes got institutionalized in the context of technological breakthroughs: artificial insemination for the first one and genomic selection for the second one. In this article, we analyse the complexity of common resources systems and the evolution of the property rights applied to the case of animal genetic resources and the industry of livestock selection in agriculture. In our analysis of bundle of rights, we add a right of contribution, taking into account the definition of collective breeding objectives aiming at changing the breed?s orientation (leading to an ?alteration? of the breed). While only one breeding organism used to have the monopoly of this right for each breed, it is now threatened by the more competitive emerging regime. The economic stakes are different at each of the two periods.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"1 1","pages":"109-135"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77249012","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：