An essential component of any theory of team reasoning is a formal definition of group rationality and of the collective interests that motivate the reasoning of team players. Eschewing the need to endow a group with its own preferences, this paper argues that an operational notion of coordination can serve such a role. Coordination is an intrinsically group-level concept that is complementary to, but distinct from, the intrinsically individual notion of performance. Both group rationality as manifest by coordination and individual rationality as manifest by performance are necessary for a full understanding of group behavior in social environments. Conditional game theory provides a flexible mathematical framework within which individuals may modulate their preferences in response to the social influence that others exert on them. As social influence diffuses throughout a social network, a comprehensive social model emerges that provides an operational definition of group rationality as well as an operational concept of augmented individual rationality that together establish a concept of coordinated reasoning.
{"title":"Coordinated Reasoning and Augmented Individualism","authors":"W. Stirling, Luca Tummolini","doi":"10.3917/REDP.283.0469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.283.0469","url":null,"abstract":"An essential component of any theory of team reasoning is a formal definition of group rationality and of the collective interests that motivate the reasoning of team players. Eschewing the need to endow a group with its own preferences, this paper argues that an operational notion of coordination can serve such a role. Coordination is an intrinsically group-level concept that is complementary to, but distinct from, the intrinsically individual notion of performance. Both group rationality as manifest by coordination and individual rationality as manifest by performance are necessary for a full understanding of group behavior in social environments. Conditional game theory provides a flexible mathematical framework within which individuals may modulate their preferences in response to the social influence that others exert on them. As social influence diffuses throughout a social network, a comprehensive social model emerges that provides an operational definition of group rationality as well as an operational concept of augmented individual rationality that together establish a concept of coordinated reasoning.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"136 1","pages":"469-492"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86419402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Partant du constat d’un enseignement de l’economie a l’universite fonde sur des methodes principalement passives, cet article plaide en faveur d’une pedagogie active fondee sur les jeux pedagogiques experimentaux avec une application a la thematique des structures de marche. Il fournit les cles pour l’utilisation de tels jeux en exposant les bases de l’economie experimentale et les elements pratiques de la mise en œuvre d’un jeu pedagogique. L’enseignement des trois principales structures de marche (concurrence pure et parfaite, monopole et oligopole) est propose a travers la presentation d’un jeu detaille par structure, complete par une revue de la litterature liee aux experiences pedagogiques existant sur chacune d’entre elles.
{"title":"Enseigner les structures de marché et stratégies de concurrence avec les jeux pédagogiques","authors":"Yannick Gabuthy, E. Lambert","doi":"10.3917/REDP.281.0001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.281.0001","url":null,"abstract":"Partant du constat d’un enseignement de l’economie a l’universite fonde sur des methodes principalement passives, cet article plaide en faveur d’une pedagogie active fondee sur les jeux pedagogiques experimentaux avec une application a la thematique des structures de marche. Il fournit les cles pour l’utilisation de tels jeux en exposant les bases de l’economie experimentale et les elements pratiques de la mise en œuvre d’un jeu pedagogique. L’enseignement des trois principales structures de marche (concurrence pure et parfaite, monopole et oligopole) est propose a travers la presentation d’un jeu detaille par structure, complete par une revue de la litterature liee aux experiences pedagogiques existant sur chacune d’entre elles.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"26 1","pages":"1-39"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84150928","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The concept of utility has played a major role in the history of economic thought, and it is still pivotal in most contemporary economic studies. But what is the meaning of utility? Here we take advantage of the philosophical literature to develop a theoretically robust answer to this question. Based on an analysis of the very diverse philosophical understandings of ?meaning?, we introduce a general definition encompassing this diversity. According to this definition, any account of a given act that can be endorsed by the agent performing this act qualifies as a ?meaning?. We argue that the concept of utility qualifies as economic meaning. This idea has two aspects. First, at a general level, because the axioms of the theory of choice are, in essence, easily understandable, utility can, in general, be conceived as a meaning. Second, more specifically, this very idea allows to define a standard to adjudicate whether specific instances of utility representation qualify as meanings. The main theoretical implication is that, when a given utility modelling fulfils the requirements to qualify as a meaning, then the stipulation of the axioms of the theory of choice is justified. This implication translates into concrete recommendations for applied economics.
{"title":"Utility as Economic Meaning","authors":"Yves Meinard, J. Gharbi","doi":"10.3917/REDP.282.0225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.282.0225","url":null,"abstract":"The concept of utility has played a major role in the history of economic thought, and it is still pivotal in most contemporary economic studies. But what is the meaning of utility? Here we take advantage of the philosophical literature to develop a theoretically robust answer to this question. Based on an analysis of the very diverse philosophical understandings of ?meaning?, we introduce a general definition encompassing this diversity. According to this definition, any account of a given act that can be endorsed by the agent performing this act qualifies as a ?meaning?. We argue that the concept of utility qualifies as economic meaning. This idea has two aspects. First, at a general level, because the axioms of the theory of choice are, in essence, easily understandable, utility can, in general, be conceived as a meaning. Second, more specifically, this very idea allows to define a standard to adjudicate whether specific instances of utility representation qualify as meanings. The main theoretical implication is that, when a given utility modelling fulfils the requirements to qualify as a meaning, then the stipulation of the axioms of the theory of choice is justified. This implication translates into concrete recommendations for applied economics.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"29 1","pages":"225-249"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89148952","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In France, subsidies in favour of energy efficiency are numerous and diverse. Most of them are ad valorem – proportional to the price of the targeted good or service – as the income credit for energy transition, the reduced rate VAT for building thermal retrofitting, the zero-rate loan or the ANAH subsidies. Others are specific i.e. independent from the price: automobile bonus and energy efficiency certificates. We review the arguments for each subsidy type. Compared to specific subsidies, ad valorem ones suffer from four drawbacks: they cause more public spending for a given impact, they distort goods’ quality, they benefit more to wealthier households and they encourage more fraud. However, specific subsidy are not without drawbacks either: the fiscal basis must be defined for every type of good and in case of an unexpected drop in the production cost of the subsidised good, the price of the latter risks becoming virtually zero.
{"title":"Aides publiques à l’efficacité énergétique. Mérites respectifs des subventions ad valorem et spécifiques","authors":"Philippe Quirion, L. Giraudet","doi":"10.3917/redp.286.1089","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.286.1089","url":null,"abstract":"In France, subsidies in favour of energy efficiency are numerous and diverse. Most of them are ad valorem – proportional to the price of the targeted good or service – as the income credit for energy transition, the reduced rate VAT for building thermal retrofitting, the zero-rate loan or the ANAH subsidies. Others are specific i.e. independent from the price: automobile bonus and energy efficiency certificates. We review the arguments for each subsidy type. Compared to specific subsidies, ad valorem ones suffer from four drawbacks: they cause more public spending for a given impact, they distort goods’ quality, they benefit more to wealthier households and they encourage more fraud. However, specific subsidy are not without drawbacks either: the fiscal basis must be defined for every type of good and in case of an unexpected drop in the production cost of the subsidised good, the price of the latter risks becoming virtually zero.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"24 1","pages":"1089-1100"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83252083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article, we propose a method to build a stock of global capital ? la Piketty for China on a long period from?1952?to?2012?(part?1). The elasticities associated to such a capital are econometrically estimed though specifications integrating, along with it, human capital, research-and-development and a variable of institutional change, within the framework of modern macrodynamic neo-classical models???a framework which is that of this author, even if not exlusively. On this basis, we calculate a rate of implicit rentability of this global capital in order to test the validity of what Piketty presents as a ?fundamental unbalance?, comparing in the long term the rate of return of capital and the growth rate of income. Piketty?s ?economic law?, linking the coefficient of capital to the ratio savings rate?-?growth rate, is then examined (part?2). The results previously obtanined are confronted to new estimations on the subperiod?1978-2012, corresponding to what many authors call a ?capitalism ? la Chinese? (part?3). Finally, we briefly discuss the issue of inequality in China.
{"title":"Piketty à Pékin. Les lois du Capital au XXIe siècle à l’épreuve de la Chine","authors":"Zhiming Long, R. Herrera","doi":"10.3917/REDP.281.0059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.281.0059","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, we propose a method to build a stock of global capital ? la Piketty for China on a long period from?1952?to?2012?(part?1). The elasticities associated to such a capital are econometrically estimed though specifications integrating, along with it, human capital, research-and-development and a variable of institutional change, within the framework of modern macrodynamic neo-classical models???a framework which is that of this author, even if not exlusively. On this basis, we calculate a rate of implicit rentability of this global capital in order to test the validity of what Piketty presents as a ?fundamental unbalance?, comparing in the long term the rate of return of capital and the growth rate of income. Piketty?s ?economic law?, linking the coefficient of capital to the ratio savings rate?-?growth rate, is then examined (part?2). The results previously obtanined are confronted to new estimations on the subperiod?1978-2012, corresponding to what many authors call a ?capitalism ? la Chinese? (part?3). Finally, we briefly discuss the issue of inequality in China.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"57 1","pages":"59-108"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85221550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
La disparition de 90 % de la superficie du lac Tchad a conduit les Etats riverains a elaborer un projet de restauration de cet actif naturel. Nous proposons ici de mesurer le consentement a payer des beneficiaires de ce projet. La demarche methodologique a fait recourt aux donnees d’une enquete d’evaluation contingente menee en 2011 dans la partie camerounaise du lac Tchad et aux procedures statistiques et econometriques adequates. Tout d’abord, nous revelons que 70 % au moins des enquetes sont favorables a la realisation du projet. Ensuite, nous estimons le consentement a payer a 55 240 FCFA par menage, soit un benefice social de 3 606 572 049 FCFA. Ces resultats sont ainsi la preuve que, du point de vue de la population riveraine, il y a un benefice reel a preserver le lac Tchad.
{"title":"Évaluation du consentement à payer des riverains pour la restauration du lac Tchad","authors":"Patrick Arnold Ombiono Kitoto","doi":"10.3917/redp.286.1175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.286.1175","url":null,"abstract":"La disparition de 90 % de la superficie du lac Tchad a conduit les Etats riverains a elaborer un projet de restauration de cet actif naturel. Nous proposons ici de mesurer le consentement a payer des beneficiaires de ce projet. La demarche methodologique a fait recourt aux donnees d’une enquete d’evaluation contingente menee en 2011 dans la partie camerounaise du lac Tchad et aux procedures statistiques et econometriques adequates. Tout d’abord, nous revelons que 70 % au moins des enquetes sont favorables a la realisation du projet. Ensuite, nous estimons le consentement a payer a 55 240 FCFA par menage, soit un benefice social de 3 606 572 049 FCFA. Ces resultats sont ainsi la preuve que, du point de vue de la population riveraine, il y a un benefice reel a preserver le lac Tchad.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"7 1","pages":"1175-1198"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85365588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Evolutionary game theory has a lengthy history of modeling human interactions, and has been recently used to analyze the emergence and long-term viability of team reasoning. I review some basic elements of evolutionary analysis, and discuss a few issues attending evolutionary game theory?s importation from biology (where it was originally used to study genetic evolution of animal behavior) to the human sciences; in particular, I emphasize important differences between genetic and cultural evolution. After sketching a few fundamental results, I describe recent evolutionary analyses of team reasoning. Finally, I suggest some open lines of theoretical and empirical inquiry.
{"title":"On Evolutionary Game Theory and Team Reasoning","authors":"D. Lempert","doi":"10.3917/REDP.283.0423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.283.0423","url":null,"abstract":"Evolutionary game theory has a lengthy history of modeling human interactions, and has been recently used to analyze the emergence and long-term viability of team reasoning. I review some basic elements of evolutionary analysis, and discuss a few issues attending evolutionary game theory?s importation from biology (where it was originally used to study genetic evolution of animal behavior) to the human sciences; in particular, I emphasize important differences between genetic and cultural evolution. After sketching a few fundamental results, I describe recent evolutionary analyses of team reasoning. Finally, I suggest some open lines of theoretical and empirical inquiry.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"24 1","pages":"423-446"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84678989","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
From its beginning, economic thinking has been deeply intertwined with philosophical considerations. The most important early economic thinkers, from Aristotle to Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, were of course also and (for some of them) foremost philosophers. Though the Marginalist revolution and the rise of neoclassical economics at the end of the 19th century have contributed to the constitution...
{"title":"Philosophy and Economics: Recent Issues and Perspectives. Introduction to the Special Issue","authors":"Cyril Hédoin","doi":"10.3917/redp.282.0177","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.282.0177","url":null,"abstract":"From its beginning, economic thinking has been deeply intertwined with philosophical considerations. The most important early economic thinkers, from Aristotle to Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, were of course also and (for some of them) foremost philosophers. Though the Marginalist revolution and the rise of neoclassical economics at the end of the 19th century have contributed to the constitution...","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"34 1","pages":"177-189"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78070955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses the behaviour of an agent under strict liability and negligence when he can influence both the probability of the accident and the probability of being found liable in case of accident. We aim to compare the normative properties of strict liability versus fault-based liability under such circumstances. The model demonstrates that only a negligence rule is efficient and that the optimal damages under strict liability is less than what is usually admitted in the literature, i.e. the expected fine, given the probability to escape the liability, should be less than the level of harm. Finally, the paper highlights the role played by the technologies of precaution and evasion in the results.
{"title":"Economics of Liability Precaution versus Avoidance","authors":"B. Deffains, S. Rouillon","doi":"10.3917/redp.281.0041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/redp.281.0041","url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyses the behaviour of an agent under strict liability and negligence when he can influence both the probability of the accident and the probability of being found liable in case of accident. We aim to compare the normative properties of strict liability versus fault-based liability under such circumstances. The model demonstrates that only a negligence rule is efficient and that the optimal damages under strict liability is less than what is usually admitted in the literature, i.e. the expected fine, given the probability to escape the liability, should be less than the level of harm. Finally, the paper highlights the role played by the technologies of precaution and evasion in the results.","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"17 1","pages":"41-58"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77526631","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introduction to the Special Issue “66ème congrès de l’AFSE”","authors":"Flora Bellone, P. Aghion","doi":"10.3917/REDP.285.0691","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.3917/REDP.285.0691","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44798,"journal":{"name":"REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE","volume":"335 1","pages":"691-692"},"PeriodicalIF":0.3,"publicationDate":"2018-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80611390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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