Nigeria’s return to democracy has been a tumultuous era; the Fourth Republic has been characterized by insurgencies and violence throughout the country. Though seemingly disparate movements, the violence of the Fourth Republic has its roots in the country’s constitution. Three aspects of the 1999 Nigerian constitution stand out as particularly problematic: the centralization of the police at the federal level with limited sub-national oversight, the ambiguous concept of indigeneity, and the overlapping, often contradictory land tenure systems endorsed. All of these allude to the precariousness of Nigerian federalism under the current constitution; ultimately, the police centralization primes the country for violence, while the indigeneity rules and land tenure system make it more difficult to negotiate stable post-conflict settlements. The country’s recent experience with Boko Haram will be used to illustrate how these constitutional tenets facilitate instability.
{"title":"Institutionalizing Instability: The Constitutional Roots of Insecurity in Nigeria's Fourth Republic","authors":"Hilary Matfess","doi":"10.5334/STA.458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.458","url":null,"abstract":"Nigeria’s return to democracy has been a tumultuous era; the Fourth Republic has been characterized by insurgencies and violence throughout the country. Though seemingly disparate movements, the violence of the Fourth Republic has its roots in the country’s constitution. Three aspects of the 1999 Nigerian constitution stand out as particularly problematic: the centralization of the police at the federal level with limited sub-national oversight, the ambiguous concept of indigeneity, and the overlapping, often contradictory land tenure systems endorsed. All of these allude to the precariousness of Nigerian federalism under the current constitution; ultimately, the police centralization primes the country for violence, while the indigeneity rules and land tenure system make it more difficult to negotiate stable post-conflict settlements. The country’s recent experience with Boko Haram will be used to illustrate how these constitutional tenets facilitate instability.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"36 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77546373","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although it is common for armed groups to splinter (or “fragment”) during contexts of multi-party civil war, current guidance on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) does not address the challenges that arise when recalcitrant fighters, unwilling to report to DDR, break ranks and form new armed groups. This Practice Note addresses this issue, drawing lessons from the multi-party context of the DRC and from the experiences of former members of three armed groups: the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), and the DRC national army (FARDC). While the findings indicate that the fragmentation of armed groups may encourage desertion and subsequent participation in DDR, they also show that active armed groups may monitor DDR programs and track those who demobilize. Remobilization may follow, either as active armed groups target ex-combatants for forced re-recruitment or as ex-combatants remobilize in armed groups of their own choice. Given these dynamics, practitioners in settings of partial peace may find it useful to consider non-traditional methods of DDR such as the use of mobile patrols and mobile disarmament units. The temporary relocation of ex-combatants to safe areas free from armed groups, or to protected transitional assistance camps, may also help to minimize remobilization during the reintegration phase.
{"title":"Implementing DDR in Settings of Ongoing Conflict: The Organization and Fragmentation of Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)","authors":"J. Richards","doi":"10.5334/STA.467","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.467","url":null,"abstract":"Although it is common for armed groups to splinter (or “fragment”) during contexts of multi-party civil war, current guidance on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) does not address the challenges that arise when recalcitrant fighters, unwilling to report to DDR, break ranks and form new armed groups. This Practice Note addresses this issue, drawing lessons from the multi-party context of the DRC and from the experiences of former members of three armed groups: the Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma (RCD-Goma), the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), and the DRC national army (FARDC). While the findings indicate that the fragmentation of armed groups may encourage desertion and subsequent participation in DDR, they also show that active armed groups may monitor DDR programs and track those who demobilize. Remobilization may follow, either as active armed groups target ex-combatants for forced re-recruitment or as ex-combatants remobilize in armed groups of their own choice. Given these dynamics, practitioners in settings of partial peace may find it useful to consider non-traditional methods of DDR such as the use of mobile patrols and mobile disarmament units. The temporary relocation of ex-combatants to safe areas free from armed groups, or to protected transitional assistance camps, may also help to minimize remobilization during the reintegration phase.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"51 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83122752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that military integration served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan and ensuring a level of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011. Nonetheless, integration was poorly-conceived and implemented, and received limited support from third party actors that were more focused on rightsizing the SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional military. The de facto open-door nature of South Sudan’s integration process created incentives for armed rebellion, while failed rightsizing initiatives increased pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups posed to stability. Integration thus became an end in and of itself rather than a transitional measure to contain former combatants while the government worked out a more long-term solution for South Sudan’s security sector. Consequently, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to fragment along factional lines during periods of heightened political competition.
{"title":"The Disintegration of the Military Integration Process in South Sudan (2006–2013)","authors":"L. Warner","doi":"10.5334/STA.460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.460","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues that military integration served a critical purpose in 2006, arguably preventing large-scale conflict within South Sudan and ensuring a level of stability prior to the CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination in 2011. Nonetheless, integration was poorly-conceived and implemented, and received limited support from third party actors that were more focused on rightsizing the SPLA and transforming it into a conventional, professional military. The de facto open-door nature of South Sudan’s integration process created incentives for armed rebellion, while failed rightsizing initiatives increased pressure on the military integration process as the most expedient way of mitigating the threat these groups posed to stability. Integration thus became an end in and of itself rather than a transitional measure to contain former combatants while the government worked out a more long-term solution for South Sudan’s security sector. Consequently, the SPLA was in a state of arrested development, preventing efforts to transform the military from gaining traction, and making the force more likely to fragment along factional lines during periods of heightened political competition.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"8 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82224169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vagisha I. Gunasekara, Mira Philips, K. Romeshun, Mohammed Munas
The Owner Driven Housing Assistance (ODHA) scheme is a donor and government supported initiative to help construct housing for internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to their original areas of residence after the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009. While ODHA is a commendable initiative for rebuilding the lives of those displaced by war, available evidence indicates an increase in household debt among the beneficiaries of such housing schemes and their vulnerability to livelihood insecurities after resettlement. Based on an analysis of the socio-economic status of ODHA beneficiaries in the northern Sri Lankan districts of Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Jaffna, this paper concludes that the financing modality of the housing programme has had a catalytic effect on indebtedness among beneficiaries. An inadequate understanding of the social, economic and cultural contexts that define the lives of beneficiaries on the part of donors and implementers appears to be contributing to unintended and negative repercussions of housing assistance. This paper illustrates how post-war participatory development projects such as the ODHA scheme can further exacerbate the vulnerability of war-affected populations, unless donors and policy makers have a holistic understanding of the varying contexts that define the experiences of those receiving development assistance.
{"title":"“Life and Debt”: Assessing the Impacts of Participatory Housing Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka","authors":"Vagisha I. Gunasekara, Mira Philips, K. Romeshun, Mohammed Munas","doi":"10.5334/STA.434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.434","url":null,"abstract":"The Owner Driven Housing Assistance (ODHA) scheme is a donor and government supported initiative to help construct housing for internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning to their original areas of residence after the end of the Sri Lankan Civil War in 2009. While ODHA is a commendable initiative for rebuilding the lives of those displaced by war, available evidence indicates an increase in household debt among the beneficiaries of such housing schemes and their vulnerability to livelihood insecurities after resettlement. Based on an analysis of the socio-economic status of ODHA beneficiaries in the northern Sri Lankan districts of Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Jaffna, this paper concludes that the financing modality of the housing programme has had a catalytic effect on indebtedness among beneficiaries. An inadequate understanding of the social, economic and cultural contexts that define the lives of beneficiaries on the part of donors and implementers appears to be contributing to unintended and negative repercussions of housing assistance. This paper illustrates how post-war participatory development projects such as the ODHA scheme can further exacerbate the vulnerability of war-affected populations, unless donors and policy makers have a holistic understanding of the varying contexts that define the experiences of those receiving development assistance.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"86 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-08-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83689231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An examination of the dialogue concerning Stabilisation illuminates a paradigm based on the ideas of the so-called ‘liberal peace’ – defined minimally as democracy and free markets. This model proposes that if the liberal peace is delivered at the sub-national level via Stabilisation interventions, then the desired outcome would be ‘stability’. However, commentators of Stabilisation generally agree that the liberal peace is an unachievable objective that inhibits the desired outcome of ‘stability’. This Practice Note contests this analysis and instead argues that ‘stability’ is an unachievable objective that inhibits the desired outcome of a liberal democratic functioning state. Therefore, Stabilisation’s desired outcome becomes the protection and enjoyment of human rights, rather than ‘stability’. This practice note continues its examination of Stabilisation and comes to the conclusion that Stabilisaton can be understood as political actions in support of an ideological outcome. This understanding of Stabilisation is compatible with existing international engagements in support of national transition processes and can be applied across the spectrum from consent to coercion.
{"title":"Reversing the Stabilisation Paradigm: Towards an Alternative Approach","authors":"M. Knight","doi":"10.5334/STA.455","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.455","url":null,"abstract":"An examination of the dialogue concerning Stabilisation illuminates a paradigm based on the ideas of the so-called ‘liberal peace’ – defined minimally as democracy and free markets. This model proposes that if the liberal peace is delivered at the sub-national level via Stabilisation interventions, then the desired outcome would be ‘stability’. However, commentators of Stabilisation generally agree that the liberal peace is an unachievable objective that inhibits the desired outcome of ‘stability’. This Practice Note contests this analysis and instead argues that ‘stability’ is an unachievable objective that inhibits the desired outcome of a liberal democratic functioning state. Therefore, Stabilisation’s desired outcome becomes the protection and enjoyment of human rights, rather than ‘stability’. This practice note continues its examination of Stabilisation and comes to the conclusion that Stabilisaton can be understood as political actions in support of an ideological outcome. This understanding of Stabilisation is compatible with existing international engagements in support of national transition processes and can be applied across the spectrum from consent to coercion.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"191 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73732025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Internet in Africa has become an increasingly contested space, where competing ideas of development and society battle for hegemony. By comparing the evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda, we question whether policies and projects emerging from two of Africa’s fastest growing, but also most tightly controlled countries, can be understood as part of a relatively cohesive model of the ‘developmental’ Internet, which challenges mainstream conceptions. Our answer is a qualified yes. Ethiopia and Rwanda have shared an overarching strategy which places the state as the prime mover in the development of Internet policy and large-scale ICT projects. Rwanda, however, appears to have developed a more open model which can accommodate a greater variety of actors and opinions, and incorporate them within a relatively coherent vision that emanates from the centre. Ethiopia, in contrast, has developed a more closed model, where all powers rest firmly in the hands of a government that has refused (so far) to entertain and engage with alternative ideas of the Internet. In the case of Rwanda, we argue, this approach reflects broader strategies adopted by the government in the economic domain but appears to counter the prevailing political approach of the government, allowing for a greater degree of freedom on the Internet as compared to traditional media. While in the case of Ethiopia, the opposite is true; Ethiopia’s Internet policies appear to run counter to prevailing economic policies but fit tightly with the government’s approach to politics and governance.
{"title":"The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda: Towards a “Developmental” Model?","authors":"I. Gagliardone, F. Golooba-Mutebi","doi":"10.5334/STA.344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.344","url":null,"abstract":"The Internet in Africa has become an increasingly contested space, where competing ideas of development and society battle for hegemony. By comparing the evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda, we question whether policies and projects emerging from two of Africa’s fastest growing, but also most tightly controlled countries, can be understood as part of a relatively cohesive model of the ‘developmental’ Internet, which challenges mainstream conceptions. Our answer is a qualified yes. Ethiopia and Rwanda have shared an overarching strategy which places the state as the prime mover in the development of Internet policy and large-scale ICT projects. Rwanda, however, appears to have developed a more open model which can accommodate a greater variety of actors and opinions, and incorporate them within a relatively coherent vision that emanates from the centre. Ethiopia, in contrast, has developed a more closed model, where all powers rest firmly in the hands of a government that has refused (so far) to entertain and engage with alternative ideas of the Internet. In the case of Rwanda, we argue, this approach reflects broader strategies adopted by the government in the economic domain but appears to counter the prevailing political approach of the government, allowing for a greater degree of freedom on the Internet as compared to traditional media. While in the case of Ethiopia, the opposite is true; Ethiopia’s Internet policies appear to run counter to prevailing economic policies but fit tightly with the government’s approach to politics and governance.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74342796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper explores the range of likely and potential progress on poverty eradication in fragile states to 2030. Using the International Futures model and recently released 2011 International Comparison Program data, this paper calculates current (2015) poverty for a US$1.90 poverty line, and subsequently runs three scenarios. The estimates suggest that there are 485 million poor in fragile states in 2015, a 33.5 per cent poverty rate. This paper’s Base Case scenario results in a forecasted 22.8 per cent poverty rate in fragile states by 2030. The most optimistic scenario yields a 13.1 per cent poverty rate for this group of countries (257 million). An optimistic scenario reflecting political constraints in fragile states yields a 19.1 per cent poverty rate (376 million). Even under the most optimistic circumstances, fragile states will almost certainly be home to hundreds of millions of poor in 2030, suggesting that the world must do things dramatically differently if we are to reach the high hanging fruit and truly ‘leave no one behind’ in the next fifteen years of development.
{"title":"Poverty Eradication in Fragile Places: Prospects for Harvesting the Highest Hanging Fruit by 2030","authors":"Gary J. Milante, B. Hughes, A. Burt","doi":"10.5334/STA.435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.435","url":null,"abstract":"This paper explores the range of likely and potential progress on poverty eradication in fragile states to 2030. Using the International Futures model and recently released 2011 International Comparison Program data, this paper calculates current (2015) poverty for a US$1.90 poverty line, and subsequently runs three scenarios. The estimates suggest that there are 485 million poor in fragile states in 2015, a 33.5 per cent poverty rate. This paper’s Base Case scenario results in a forecasted 22.8 per cent poverty rate in fragile states by 2030. The most optimistic scenario yields a 13.1 per cent poverty rate for this group of countries (257 million). An optimistic scenario reflecting political constraints in fragile states yields a 19.1 per cent poverty rate (376 million). Even under the most optimistic circumstances, fragile states will almost certainly be home to hundreds of millions of poor in 2030, suggesting that the world must do things dramatically differently if we are to reach the high hanging fruit and truly ‘leave no one behind’ in the next fifteen years of development.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"78144637","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Arab Spring uprisings have released a flood of land and property conflicts, brought about by decades of autocratic rule. Expropriations, corruption, poor performance of the rule of law, patronage and sectarian discrimination built up a wide variety of land and property transgressions over approximately 30 years. The result has been the creation of longstanding, acute grievances among large components of national populations who now seek to act on them. If new, transitional or reforming governments and their international partners fail to effectively attend to such grievances, the populations concerned may act on them in ways that detract from stability. This article critiques the case of Yemen, whose transitional government, with international support, initiated a land and property mass claims process in the South in order to address a primary grievance of the southern population as part of the National Dialogue transition. A series of techniques are described that would greatly improve the mass claims process once it inevitably recommences after the Houthi conflict comes to an end. These improvements would attach more importance to socio-political realities and how to quickly attend to them, as opposed to an over-reliance on specific legalities. Such an approach could have wider utility among Arab Spring states seeking to address similar land and property grievances.
{"title":"Mass Claims in Land and Property Following the Arab Spring: Lessons from Yemen","authors":"J. Unruh","doi":"10.5334/STA.444","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.444","url":null,"abstract":"The Arab Spring uprisings have released a flood of land and property conflicts, brought about by decades of autocratic rule. Expropriations, corruption, poor performance of the rule of law, patronage and sectarian discrimination built up a wide variety of land and property transgressions over approximately 30 years. The result has been the creation of longstanding, acute grievances among large components of national populations who now seek to act on them. If new, transitional or reforming governments and their international partners fail to effectively attend to such grievances, the populations concerned may act on them in ways that detract from stability. This article critiques the case of Yemen, whose transitional government, with international support, initiated a land and property mass claims process in the South in order to address a primary grievance of the southern population as part of the National Dialogue transition. A series of techniques are described that would greatly improve the mass claims process once it inevitably recommences after the Houthi conflict comes to an end. These improvements would attach more importance to socio-political realities and how to quickly attend to them, as opposed to an over-reliance on specific legalities. Such an approach could have wider utility among Arab Spring states seeking to address similar land and property grievances.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"os-42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-07-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87232111","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is stabilisation, and why do we need a conceptual discussion? Based on interviews and policy documents from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, this article distils two conceptual visions of stabilisation, outlines a range of institutional and budgetary designs and offers a number of lessons of what a realistic and responsible idea of stabilisation might look like. Given the ubiquity of fragility and the lack of generalised knowledge about social engineering, this article argues in favour of a narrow understanding of stabilisation that seeks only to mitigate acute situations of crisis marked by extreme political volatility and violence. Even this more limited goal is ambitious enough to require sober assessment and communication of risk, continuing improvements to the conceptual and institutional tools for stabilisation and stronger commitment to constant reflection and learning.
{"title":"Toward a Realistic and Responsible Idea of Stabilisation","authors":"P. Rotmann","doi":"10.5334/STA.414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.414","url":null,"abstract":"What is stabilisation, and why do we need a conceptual discussion? Based on interviews and policy documents from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, this article distils two conceptual visions of stabilisation, outlines a range of institutional and budgetary designs and offers a number of lessons of what a realistic and responsible idea of stabilisation might look like. Given the ubiquity of fragility and the lack of generalised knowledge about social engineering, this article argues in favour of a narrow understanding of stabilisation that seeks only to mitigate acute situations of crisis marked by extreme political volatility and violence. Even this more limited goal is ambitious enough to require sober assessment and communication of risk, continuing improvements to the conceptual and institutional tools for stabilisation and stronger commitment to constant reflection and learning.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"21 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"79361816","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The current migratory crisis in the Mediterranean questions the European Union’s (EU) capacity to manage migratory flows. So far, the EU has placed a particular emphasis on border management, given a lack of political will that continues to prevent more in depth institutional responses. The current situation in the Mediterranean, and the EU’s response is a cause of concern due to the risk it represents to the human security of migrants, and the questions it raises regarding the management of migratory flows within the EU. The major question to emerge during this crisis is: How does the EU manage irregular migration flows while safeguarding migrants’ human rights?
{"title":"Migratory Crisis in the Mediterranean: Managing Irregular Flows","authors":"Susana Ferreira","doi":"10.5334/STA.441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.441","url":null,"abstract":"The current migratory crisis in the Mediterranean questions the European Union’s (EU) capacity to manage migratory flows. So far, the EU has placed a particular emphasis on border management, given a lack of political will that continues to prevent more in depth institutional responses. The current situation in the Mediterranean, and the EU’s response is a cause of concern due to the risk it represents to the human security of migrants, and the questions it raises regarding the management of migratory flows within the EU. The major question to emerge during this crisis is: How does the EU manage irregular migration flows while safeguarding migrants’ human rights?","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":"27 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80234917","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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