Despite the rhetoric of the Responsibility to Protect principle (R2P), vulnerable groups continue to experience genocide. Some, such as the Yazidis in Iraq, have tried to mitigate genocide through communal self-protection. The dominance of R2P in contemporary normative discussions about responding to genocide, however, means that there has been a lack of research into the lived realities of such experiences. This article explores the phenomenon of communal self-protection during genocide, through a multiple case study analysis. It examines the pre-eminent examples of communal self-protection during three cases of modern genocide — the experiences of the Armenians at Musa Dagh during the 1915 Armenian genocide, the Tutsi at Bisesero during the 1994 Rwanda genocide, and the Yazidis in Sinjar during the 2014 Yazidi genocide. It presents a typology of communal self-protection strategies during genocide, developed from the case study analysis. The article finds that communal self-protection is only feasible as a strategy in exceptional circumstances. Even in a best-case scenario, communal self-protection offers a temporary reprieve, rather than sustainable living conditions. Vulnerable groups attempting communal self-protection are ultimately reliant on external rescue for their survival, which may not be forthcoming. Communal self-protection should therefore not be regarded as a viable strategy to mitigate genocide in any circumstance.
{"title":"‘Is Help Coming?’ Communal Self-Protection during Genocide","authors":"Deborah Mayersen","doi":"10.5334/sta.740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.740","url":null,"abstract":"Despite the rhetoric of the Responsibility to Protect principle (R2P), vulnerable groups continue to experience genocide. Some, such as the Yazidis in Iraq, have tried to mitigate genocide through communal self-protection. The dominance of R2P in contemporary normative discussions about responding to genocide, however, means that there has been a lack of research into the lived realities of such experiences. This article explores the phenomenon of communal self-protection during genocide, through a multiple case study analysis. It examines the pre-eminent examples of communal self-protection during three cases of modern genocide — the experiences of the Armenians at Musa Dagh during the 1915 Armenian genocide, the Tutsi at Bisesero during the 1994 Rwanda genocide, and the Yazidis in Sinjar during the 2014 Yazidi genocide. It presents a typology of communal self-protection strategies during genocide, developed from the case study analysis. The article finds that communal self-protection is only feasible as a strategy in exceptional circumstances. Even in a best-case scenario, communal self-protection offers a temporary reprieve, rather than sustainable living conditions. Vulnerable groups attempting communal self-protection are ultimately reliant on external rescue for their survival, which may not be forthcoming. Communal self-protection should therefore not be regarded as a viable strategy to mitigate genocide in any circumstance.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81995416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When violent conflict flares up, forced migration often follows. Ethnographic data shows that forced migrants remain attached to their places of origin and often express a desire to return once conflict has abated, be it after weeks, months, or years. Conversely, peacebuilders in the homeland have not effectively integrated displaced persons within their strategic programming. This is cause for concern considering the literature connecting the collapse of fragile peace to ‘refugee spoilers.’ There is a critical gap in peacebuilders’ commitment to understanding refugees’ needs and claims, and the implications these pose on peace stability following repatriation. This article argues that ethnography of refugees still living in exile can generate rich datasets useful to the development of peacebuilding programming. More than this, it proposes a methodology — ethnographic mapping — that can collect both spatial (maps) and narrative (descriptions) information in tandem and across cultural groups living in refugee camps.
{"title":"From Exile to Homeland Return: Ethnographic Mapping to Inform Peacebuilding from Afar","authors":"Nicolas Parent","doi":"10.5334/sta.772","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.772","url":null,"abstract":"When violent conflict flares up, forced migration often follows. Ethnographic data shows that forced migrants remain attached to their places of origin and often express a desire to return once conflict has abated, be it after weeks, months, or years. Conversely, peacebuilders in the homeland have not effectively integrated displaced persons within their strategic programming. This is cause for concern considering the literature connecting the collapse of fragile peace to ‘refugee spoilers.’ There is a critical gap in peacebuilders’ commitment to understanding refugees’ needs and claims, and the implications these pose on peace stability following repatriation. This article argues that ethnography of refugees still living in exile can generate rich datasets useful to the development of peacebuilding programming. More than this, it proposes a methodology — ethnographic mapping — that can collect both spatial (maps) and narrative (descriptions) information in tandem and across cultural groups living in refugee camps.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74579641","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes are an essential part of most contemporary post-conflict peacebuilding processes, but they are seldom the subject of academic analysis. In this study, we seek to reduce this gap by examining the Post-Amnesty Programme (PAP) introduced in Nigeria in 2009. Our analysis shows that the programme contributed to the reduction of small arms and light weapons (SALW), fewer attacks on oil infrastructure and kidnapping of expatriates, and improved human capacity development. However, the programme has been ineffective in reintegrating ex-militants into civilian life because of serious shortcomings in its design as well as the extremely difficult implementation environment. In addition, the programme has proved to be hugely expensive. Despite these serious shortcomings, the Federal Government of Nigeria cannot simply terminate the programme because this will increase the risk that ex-militants enrolled in the programme will reignite the violent insurgency against the Nigerian state and international oil companies. The study concludes by reflecting on how this challenging situation can be resolved.
{"title":"Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration: Analysing the Outcomes of Nigeria’s Post-Amnesty Programme","authors":"T. M. Ebiede, A. Langer, J. Tosun","doi":"10.5334/sta.752","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.752","url":null,"abstract":"Disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes are an essential part of most contemporary post-conflict peacebuilding processes, but they are seldom the subject of academic analysis. In this study, we seek to reduce this gap by examining the Post-Amnesty Programme (PAP) introduced in Nigeria in 2009. Our analysis shows that the programme contributed to the reduction of small arms and light weapons (SALW), fewer attacks on oil infrastructure and kidnapping of expatriates, and improved human capacity development. However, the programme has been ineffective in reintegrating ex-militants into civilian life because of serious shortcomings in its design as well as the extremely difficult implementation environment. In addition, the programme has proved to be hugely expensive. Despite these serious shortcomings, the Federal Government of Nigeria cannot simply terminate the programme because this will increase the risk that ex-militants enrolled in the programme will reignite the violent insurgency against the Nigerian state and international oil companies. The study concludes by reflecting on how this challenging situation can be resolved.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87735357","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Countries emerging from armed conflict often experience heightened violence and youth gang activity. Following the signing of peace accords with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (FARC-EP), what are Colombia’s risks in terms of youth gangs? To assess these risks, this article draws from gang research and literature on post-war violence to identify six factors that recur in post-war environments and are likely to fuel a rise in gangs: illicit economies and criminal networks, exposure to violence, marginalization, social disorganization, security gaps and state responses, and former combatants. After analyzing Colombia’s risks with reference to each of these, the article concludes that the strengthening ties between youth gangs and Colombia’s illicit economies, mediated by adult-run criminal networks, increase gang numbers and violence. Moreover, some disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods are vulnerable to gang escalation due to the effects on local youths of protracted violent exposure, marginalization, and social disorganization. Finally, while ex-combatant recidivism and security gaps are prominent concerns in Colombia, they are not expected to contribute significantly to youth gang dynamics in urban areas.
{"title":"Assessing Gang Risks in Post-War Environments: The Case of Colombia","authors":"K. Kerr","doi":"10.5334/sta.720","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.720","url":null,"abstract":"Countries emerging from armed conflict often experience heightened violence and youth gang activity. Following the signing of peace accords with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia — People’s Army (FARC-EP), what are Colombia’s risks in terms of youth gangs? To assess these risks, this article draws from gang research and literature on post-war violence to identify six factors that recur in post-war environments and are likely to fuel a rise in gangs: illicit economies and criminal networks, exposure to violence, marginalization, social disorganization, security gaps and state responses, and former combatants. After analyzing Colombia’s risks with reference to each of these, the article concludes that the strengthening ties between youth gangs and Colombia’s illicit economies, mediated by adult-run criminal networks, increase gang numbers and violence. Moreover, some disadvantaged, urban neighborhoods are vulnerable to gang escalation due to the effects on local youths of protracted violent exposure, marginalization, and social disorganization. Finally, while ex-combatant recidivism and security gaps are prominent concerns in Colombia, they are not expected to contribute significantly to youth gang dynamics in urban areas.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90397906","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In late 2014 and after more than two decades of a ‘semi-authoritarian’ regime, a popular insurrection in Burkina Faso led to the fall of Blaise Compaore, president and leader of the ruling party. Due to — or parallel to — the political transition, factors of insecurity developed or were amplified, leading to a reconfiguration of the provision of security at two levels. At the central state level began a reflection around the governance model of security and the improvement of the practices of state security forces. At the local level, non-state security initiatives have multiplied. Drawing on insights from the study of local security provision and providers in the town of Tenkodogo, located in the Boulgou province (Centre-East region), and on its wider integration into the national framework and response to insecurity in Burkina Faso, this article raises and investigates three major questions. First, how is the governance of security (co)produced by (state and non-state) actors in a specific local configuration in Burkina Faso? Second, in what ways does this local experience compare with the state’s response to insecurity and with the nationwide expansion of the Koglweogo movement? Finally, what new perspectives can such reflection at the local and national levels offer to overcome the limits of current approaches regarding local security?
{"title":"‘With or Without You’: The Governance of (Local) Security and the Koglweogo Movement in Burkina Faso","authors":"S. Leclercq, G. Matagne","doi":"10.5334/sta.716","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.716","url":null,"abstract":"In late 2014 and after more than two decades of a ‘semi-authoritarian’ regime, a popular insurrection in Burkina Faso led to the fall of Blaise Compaore, president and leader of the ruling party. Due to — or parallel to — the political transition, factors of insecurity developed or were amplified, leading to a reconfiguration of the provision of security at two levels. At the central state level began a reflection around the governance model of security and the improvement of the practices of state security forces. At the local level, non-state security initiatives have multiplied. Drawing on insights from the study of local security provision and providers in the town of Tenkodogo, located in the Boulgou province (Centre-East region), and on its wider integration into the national framework and response to insecurity in Burkina Faso, this article raises and investigates three major questions. First, how is the governance of security (co)produced by (state and non-state) actors in a specific local configuration in Burkina Faso? Second, in what ways does this local experience compare with the state’s response to insecurity and with the nationwide expansion of the Koglweogo movement? Finally, what new perspectives can such reflection at the local and national levels offer to overcome the limits of current approaches regarding local security?","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84946664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a state-based international order, the state is understood as the best actor to protect its population. With this in mind, UN peace operations often have mandates to extend state authority. However, by their very nature, peace operations deploy to states whose authority and legitimacy are contested. Without a clear definition of what that authority entails, peace operations and host states must constantly negotiate the content and approaches taken in extending state authority, sometimes resulting in tensions between state and mission. This article examines the process of extending state authority in two cases: the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It finds that there are evolving and contesting understandings of state authority across and within peace operations, which can limit mission impact and stress key relationships between peace operations and their host state. The article concludes that there is a need for renewed conversations in the UN as to how state authority is understood and supported by UN peace operations.
{"title":"Defining State Authority: UN Peace Operations Efforts to Extend State Authority in Mali and the Central African Republic","authors":"Shannon Zimmerman","doi":"10.5334/sta.762","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.762","url":null,"abstract":"In a state-based international order, the state is understood as the best actor to protect its population. With this in mind, UN peace operations often have mandates to extend state authority. However, by their very nature, peace operations deploy to states whose authority and legitimacy are contested. Without a clear definition of what that authority entails, peace operations and host states must constantly negotiate the content and approaches taken in extending state authority, sometimes resulting in tensions between state and mission. This article examines the process of extending state authority in two cases: the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). It finds that there are evolving and contesting understandings of state authority across and within peace operations, which can limit mission impact and stress key relationships between peace operations and their host state. The article concludes that there is a need for renewed conversations in the UN as to how state authority is understood and supported by UN peace operations.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86268191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In recent years, the United Nations (UN) has increasingly turned towards stabilisation logics in its peace operations, focusing on the extension of state authority in fragile, conflict-prone areas. However, this concept of stabilisation relies upon a series of binaries — formal/informal actors, licit/illicit activities, governed/ungoverned space — which often distort the far more complex power relations in conflict settings. As a result, UN peace operations tend to direct resources towards state institutions and ignore a wide range of non-state entities, many of which are crucial sources of governance and exist at the local and national level. In response, this article places the UN’s stabilisation approach within a recent trend in peace research focused on the hybrid nature of socio-political order in conflict-affected regions, where non-state forms of governance often have significant and legitimate roles. Rather than replicate misleading state/non-state binaries, the article proposes a relational approach and develops a novel analytical framework for analysing a wide range of governance actors in terms of different forms of symbiotic relationships. It then applies this approach to specific examples in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), demonstrating the highly networked power arrangements present in conflict settings. The article posits that a relational approach would avoid many of the false assumptions at the heart of today’s stabilisation interventions and would instead allow the UN to design more effective, realistic strategies for pursuing sustainable peace in modern conflict settings. It concludes that relationality could be used more generally, including to explain the waning potency of the so-called ‘third wave’ of democratisation.
{"title":"UN Stabilisation Operations and the Problem of Non-Linear Change: A Relational Approach to Intervening in Governance Ecosystems","authors":"A. Day, Charles T. Hunt","doi":"10.5334/sta.727","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.727","url":null,"abstract":"In recent years, the United Nations (UN) has increasingly turned towards stabilisation logics in its peace operations, focusing on the extension of state authority in fragile, conflict-prone areas. However, this concept of stabilisation relies upon a series of binaries — formal/informal actors, licit/illicit activities, governed/ungoverned space — which often distort the far more complex power relations in conflict settings. As a result, UN peace operations tend to direct resources towards state institutions and ignore a wide range of non-state entities, many of which are crucial sources of governance and exist at the local and national level. In response, this article places the UN’s stabilisation approach within a recent trend in peace research focused on the hybrid nature of socio-political order in conflict-affected regions, where non-state forms of governance often have significant and legitimate roles. Rather than replicate misleading state/non-state binaries, the article proposes a relational approach and develops a novel analytical framework for analysing a wide range of governance actors in terms of different forms of symbiotic relationships. It then applies this approach to specific examples in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), demonstrating the highly networked power arrangements present in conflict settings. The article posits that a relational approach would avoid many of the false assumptions at the heart of today’s stabilisation interventions and would instead allow the UN to design more effective, realistic strategies for pursuing sustainable peace in modern conflict settings. It concludes that relationality could be used more generally, including to explain the waning potency of the so-called ‘third wave’ of democratisation.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83037365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Security in Africa continues to be problematic to both scholars and practitioners. Its study often takes an itemised approach where actors are studied in detail and security outcomes are linked to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of actors. Perceived and actual security threats are correlated to conflict or presented as causal factors of conflict. In other words, security provision is explained through an itemised and reductionist analysis of security actors. In the past few decades, it is increasingly evident that non-linearity is pervasive in all forms of social organisation. This article rejects the Newtonian paradigm. It is argued that security is often a product of a system, which can be a complex adaptive system (CAS). It contends that a resilient security system guarantees a minimum level of security. To support this argument, empirical evidence from Cameroon is used to prove that Cameroon’s security system is a CAS. The conceptualisation of Cameroon’s security system as a CAS enables the application of both complexity science and resilience perspectives to security analysis. These perspectives allow the argument that Cameroon’s security system is resilient. The characterisation of Cameroon as fragile, failing or failed is rejected.
{"title":"Security as an Emergent Property of a Complex Adaptive System","authors":"Manu Lekunze","doi":"10.5334/sta.700","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.700","url":null,"abstract":"Security in Africa continues to be problematic to both scholars and practitioners. Its study often takes an itemised approach where actors are studied in detail and security outcomes are linked to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of actors. Perceived and actual security threats are correlated to conflict or presented as causal factors of conflict. In other words, security provision is explained through an itemised and reductionist analysis of security actors. In the past few decades, it is increasingly evident that non-linearity is pervasive in all forms of social organisation. This article rejects the Newtonian paradigm. It is argued that security is often a product of a system, which can be a complex adaptive system (CAS). It contends that a resilient security system guarantees a minimum level of security. To support this argument, empirical evidence from Cameroon is used to prove that Cameroon’s security system is a CAS. The conceptualisation of Cameroon’s security system as a CAS enables the application of both complexity science and resilience perspectives to security analysis. These perspectives allow the argument that Cameroon’s security system is resilient. The characterisation of Cameroon as fragile, failing or failed is rejected.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"72663639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite twenty-first-century technological advances by Western militaries for demining and the removal of improvised explosive devices, humanitarian demining relies mostly on mid-twentieth-century technology. While international legal efforts to curb the global use of landmines have been quite successful, constraints on humanitarian demining technology mean that unfortunate and preventable deaths of both civilians and deminers continue to occur. Developing devices and technologies to help human deminers successfully and safely carry out their work is a major challenge. Each phase of the physical demining process (i.e., vegetation clearance, mine detection, and removal) can benefit from the development of demining technologies. However, even with the prospect of “smart” demining technology, the human aspect of supervision remains a crucial challenge. Although current research and development hold promise for the future of humanitarian demining, the barriers to progress in the field are more than technical. The prioritization of military operations, a lack of coordination between governments and humanitarian actors, a tendency towards secrecy, and an underlying lack of funding are just some of the roadblocks to eliminating the yearly death toll associated with humanitarian demining, in addition to other impacts on post-conflict societies. This paper calls for new ideas, renewed innovation, and new sources of governmental and non-governmental support for this often-neglected aspect of international security.
{"title":"Eliminating Hidden Killers: How Can Technology Help Humanitarian Demining?","authors":"A. Walter Dorn","doi":"10.5334/sta.743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/sta.743","url":null,"abstract":"Despite twenty-first-century technological advances by Western militaries for demining and the removal of improvised explosive devices, humanitarian demining relies mostly on mid-twentieth-century technology. While international legal efforts to curb the global use of landmines have been quite successful, constraints on humanitarian demining technology mean that unfortunate and preventable deaths of both civilians and deminers continue to occur. Developing devices and technologies to help human deminers successfully and safely carry out their work is a major challenge. Each phase of the physical demining process (i.e., vegetation clearance, mine detection, and removal) can benefit from the development of demining technologies. However, even with the prospect of “smart” demining technology, the human aspect of supervision remains a crucial challenge. Although current research and development hold promise for the future of humanitarian demining, the barriers to progress in the field are more than technical. The prioritization of military operations, a lack of coordination between governments and humanitarian actors, a tendency towards secrecy, and an underlying lack of funding are just some of the roadblocks to eliminating the yearly death toll associated with humanitarian demining, in addition to other impacts on post-conflict societies. This paper calls for new ideas, renewed innovation, and new sources of governmental and non-governmental support for this often-neglected aspect of international security.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84218181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Globally, the response to human trafficking has moved up the political agenda. The prime minister of the United Kingdom has referred to it as “the greatest human rights issue of our time”, which demands a response outside the constraints of politics. This is particularly the case in relation to conflict, where an additional urgency arises from people being forced into sexual slavery or combat. However, even in these contexts, political agendas are not abandoned and the response to trafficking comes second to other priorities, such as combatting violent extremism. The result is initiatives that don’t directly engage with the problem, and are thus not appropriately targeted. This article discusses the motives that have brought human trafficking in conflict to the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). By developing a typology of the different forms of trafficking present in conflict-affected contexts, it calls for a more nuanced response that engages with the dynamics of trafficking.
{"title":"Conflict and Migration: From Consensual Movement to Exploitation","authors":"S. Jesperson","doi":"10.5334/STA.631","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.5334/STA.631","url":null,"abstract":"Globally, the response to human trafficking has moved up the political agenda. The prime minister of the United Kingdom has referred to it as “the greatest human rights issue of our time”, which demands a response outside the constraints of politics. This is particularly the case in relation to conflict, where an additional urgency arises from people being forced into sexual slavery or combat. However, even in these contexts, political agendas are not abandoned and the response to trafficking comes second to other priorities, such as combatting violent extremism. The result is initiatives that don’t directly engage with the problem, and are thus not appropriately targeted. This article discusses the motives that have brought human trafficking in conflict to the attention of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). By developing a typology of the different forms of trafficking present in conflict-affected contexts, it calls for a more nuanced response that engages with the dynamics of trafficking.","PeriodicalId":44806,"journal":{"name":"Stability-International Journal of Security and Development","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2019-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75680159","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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