Pub Date : 2022-12-23DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-2028
Alexandra Matejková, Jaroslav Mihálik
Abstract Gender ideology has quickly developed as a response to fostering human rights, especially in the case of gender equality. Gender policy thus became a political and ideological instrument that subjects human rights to another contest – a new form of crusade pursued by anti-gender movements which advocate traditional and conservative ideologies against gender equality and gender theories. In this paper, we seek to track and map the recent development of anti-gender movements and their mobilisation. We apply critical discourse analysis to several doctrines of antigenderism in order to understand the global popularity and mass appeal of these movements.
{"title":"Against Gender: The Anti-Gender Movements and the Socio-Cultural and Moral Deconstructions in Europe","authors":"Alexandra Matejková, Jaroslav Mihálik","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-2028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-2028","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Gender ideology has quickly developed as a response to fostering human rights, especially in the case of gender equality. Gender policy thus became a political and ideological instrument that subjects human rights to another contest – a new form of crusade pursued by anti-gender movements which advocate traditional and conservative ideologies against gender equality and gender theories. In this paper, we seek to track and map the recent development of anti-gender movements and their mobilisation. We apply critical discourse analysis to several doctrines of antigenderism in order to understand the global popularity and mass appeal of these movements.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"33 1","pages":"1 - 12"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45530813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-23DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-2031
Dóra Kanyicska Belán, M. Popper
Abstract Populistic political discourse often portrays ethnic minorities as threats to the majority society. However, the deeper characteristics of perceived threats have not been sufficiently empirically investigated. The goal of this study is to identify the similarities and differences in intergroup threats perceived by Slovak majority from Roma, Muslims, and ethnic Hungarian minorities. The participants included 1244 adults who were instructed to write the first five associations that came to mind when thinking about one of the minorities. Our findings indicate that power threat was dominant from the Hungarian minority and safety threat from the Roma and Muslim minorities. Moreover, the safety threat from the Roma minority related mainly to theft and violence, while from Muslims it was terrorism. Mapping and addressing specific threats associated with different minorities can help explain misperceptions and reduce prejudice against them.
{"title":"Different Minority Groups Elicit Different Safety, Economic, Power, and Symbolic Threats","authors":"Dóra Kanyicska Belán, M. Popper","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-2031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-2031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Populistic political discourse often portrays ethnic minorities as threats to the majority society. However, the deeper characteristics of perceived threats have not been sufficiently empirically investigated. The goal of this study is to identify the similarities and differences in intergroup threats perceived by Slovak majority from Roma, Muslims, and ethnic Hungarian minorities. The participants included 1244 adults who were instructed to write the first five associations that came to mind when thinking about one of the minorities. Our findings indicate that power threat was dominant from the Hungarian minority and safety threat from the Roma and Muslim minorities. Moreover, the safety threat from the Roma minority related mainly to theft and violence, while from Muslims it was terrorism. Mapping and addressing specific threats associated with different minorities can help explain misperceptions and reduce prejudice against them.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"33 1","pages":"51 - 66"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45535014","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-23DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-2035
Dmytro Mykhailov
Abstract Intelligent algorithms together with various machine learning techniques hold a dominant position among major challenges for contemporary value sensitive design. Self-learning capabilities of current AI applications blur the causal link between programmer and computer behavior. This creates a vital challenge for the design, development and implementation of digital technologies nowadays. This paper seeks to provide an account of this challenge. The main question that shapes the current analysis is the following: What conceptual tools can be developed within the value sensitive design school of thought for evaluating machine learning algorithms where the causal relation between designers and the behavior of their computer systems has been eroded? The answer to this question will be provided through two levels of investigation within the value sensitive design methodology. The first level is conceptual. Within the conceptual level, we will introduce the notion of computer intentionality and will show how this term may be used for solving an issue of non-causal relation between designer and computer system. The second level of investigation is technical. At this level the emphasis will be given to machine learning algorithms.
{"title":"Philosophical Inquiry into Computer Intentionality: Machine Learning and Value Sensitive Design","authors":"Dmytro Mykhailov","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-2035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-2035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Intelligent algorithms together with various machine learning techniques hold a dominant position among major challenges for contemporary value sensitive design. Self-learning capabilities of current AI applications blur the causal link between programmer and computer behavior. This creates a vital challenge for the design, development and implementation of digital technologies nowadays. This paper seeks to provide an account of this challenge. The main question that shapes the current analysis is the following: What conceptual tools can be developed within the value sensitive design school of thought for evaluating machine learning algorithms where the causal relation between designers and the behavior of their computer systems has been eroded? The answer to this question will be provided through two levels of investigation within the value sensitive design methodology. The first level is conceptual. Within the conceptual level, we will introduce the notion of computer intentionality and will show how this term may be used for solving an issue of non-causal relation between designer and computer system. The second level of investigation is technical. At this level the emphasis will be given to machine learning algorithms.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"33 1","pages":"115 - 127"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48595835","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-22DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-2030
Lucy Roberts, Karolina Bačová, Tigist Llaudet Sendín, Marek Urban
Abstract Children’s literature provides a critical method of socialization and familiarization with gender roles, providing examples, boundaries, and limitations for gender identity construction. While extensive research has been done on how children’s literature depicts both traditional and non-traditional gender roles, very little research has been published on the cultural differences between literary representations. The aim of the present paper is to describe the representations of social roles of men and women in American, Czech, and Spanish children’s books published between 2010 and 2020. Three best-selling children’s picture books from each year from each respective culture were selected and analyzed, culminating in a thematic analysis of ninety-nine books. Using inductive thematic analysis, the study found all three cultures to be conservative in their depictions of gender roles, with Czech books as the most likely to feature traditional gender roles. Spanish books are more, and American books are the most subversive in their depiction of gender roles, containing an increasing number of non-traditional elements over an examined time period.
{"title":"Cultural Differences in the Construction of Gender: A Thematic Analysis of Gender Representations in American, Spanish, and Czech Children’s Literature","authors":"Lucy Roberts, Karolina Bačová, Tigist Llaudet Sendín, Marek Urban","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-2030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-2030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Children’s literature provides a critical method of socialization and familiarization with gender roles, providing examples, boundaries, and limitations for gender identity construction. While extensive research has been done on how children’s literature depicts both traditional and non-traditional gender roles, very little research has been published on the cultural differences between literary representations. The aim of the present paper is to describe the representations of social roles of men and women in American, Czech, and Spanish children’s books published between 2010 and 2020. Three best-selling children’s picture books from each year from each respective culture were selected and analyzed, culminating in a thematic analysis of ninety-nine books. Using inductive thematic analysis, the study found all three cultures to be conservative in their depictions of gender roles, with Czech books as the most likely to feature traditional gender roles. Spanish books are more, and American books are the most subversive in their depiction of gender roles, containing an increasing number of non-traditional elements over an examined time period.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"33 1","pages":"34 - 50"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43889146","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-19DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-2029
M. Adamus, Eva Ballová Mikušková
Abstract The main goal of the paper was to obtain insights into how gender measures can be incorporated into quantitative research on risk-related behaviour. We explored relations between the measures (short versions of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI), Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ), and Traditional Masculinity-Femininity (TMF) scale) and their explanatory power in relation to risky behaviours (Decision Outcome Inventory, DOI). The sample consisted of 470 adults (238 men). The corresponding BSRI and PAQ subscales correlated significantly, while TMF correlated positively with the femininity subscales. All the instruments demonstrated good internal consistency and the measures explained a significant portion of risky behaviour. The results suggest that, although sex is a proxy of behaviour, using a measure of the gender-related aspects of identity could enhance understanding of risk-related behaviour. Finally, men and women viewed themselves as equally masculine, indicating that gender stereotypes about desirability of agentic characteristics change.
{"title":"Into the Black Box: Sex and Gender in the Study on Decision-Making – An Evidence from a Slovak Sample","authors":"M. Adamus, Eva Ballová Mikušková","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-2029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-2029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The main goal of the paper was to obtain insights into how gender measures can be incorporated into quantitative research on risk-related behaviour. We explored relations between the measures (short versions of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI), Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ), and Traditional Masculinity-Femininity (TMF) scale) and their explanatory power in relation to risky behaviours (Decision Outcome Inventory, DOI). The sample consisted of 470 adults (238 men). The corresponding BSRI and PAQ subscales correlated significantly, while TMF correlated positively with the femininity subscales. All the instruments demonstrated good internal consistency and the measures explained a significant portion of risky behaviour. The results suggest that, although sex is a proxy of behaviour, using a measure of the gender-related aspects of identity could enhance understanding of risk-related behaviour. Finally, men and women viewed themselves as equally masculine, indicating that gender stereotypes about desirability of agentic characteristics change.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"33 1","pages":"13 - 33"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-12-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47837941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0037
Adam Rostowski
Abstract In Freedom: An Impossible Reality (FAIR), Raymond Tallis finds room in a law-abiding universe for a uniquely human form of agency, capable of envisioning and pursuing genuinely open possibilities, thereby deflecting rather than merely inflecting the course of events, in accordance with self-owned intentions, reasons and goals. He argues that the genuinely free human pursuit of such propositional attitudes depends on our acting from a “virtual outside”, at an epistemic distance from the physical world that reveals not only what is the case, but that it is the case. The enactive approach in cognitive science and philosophy of mind aims to supersede the cognitivist traditional that has long dominated the field, by reframing cognition as an agentʼs immediate, embodied engagement with its environment. In an appendix of FAIR, Tallis argues that this approach risks both eliminating propositional attitudes, and collapsing the epistemic distance between agent and world. He concludes that if enactive theorists are to distinguish between genuinely pursuing an intention and merely responding to a stimulus, their corrective to cognitivism is in need of a correction of its own. This paper argues that such a correction is already to be found within the enactive literature, and furthermore, that it bears striking similarities to Tallis own account of what makes human agency unique. It is therefore concluded that the case for freedom set out in FAIR is compatible with the enactive approach.
{"title":"Freedom: An enactive possibility","authors":"Adam Rostowski","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Freedom: An Impossible Reality (FAIR), Raymond Tallis finds room in a law-abiding universe for a uniquely human form of agency, capable of envisioning and pursuing genuinely open possibilities, thereby deflecting rather than merely inflecting the course of events, in accordance with self-owned intentions, reasons and goals. He argues that the genuinely free human pursuit of such propositional attitudes depends on our acting from a “virtual outside”, at an epistemic distance from the physical world that reveals not only what is the case, but that it is the case. The enactive approach in cognitive science and philosophy of mind aims to supersede the cognitivist traditional that has long dominated the field, by reframing cognition as an agentʼs immediate, embodied engagement with its environment. In an appendix of FAIR, Tallis argues that this approach risks both eliminating propositional attitudes, and collapsing the epistemic distance between agent and world. He concludes that if enactive theorists are to distinguish between genuinely pursuing an intention and merely responding to a stimulus, their corrective to cognitivism is in need of a correction of its own. This paper argues that such a correction is already to be found within the enactive literature, and furthermore, that it bears striking similarities to Tallis own account of what makes human agency unique. It is therefore concluded that the case for freedom set out in FAIR is compatible with the enactive approach.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"427 - 438"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41429286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0038
Jan Halák
Abstract This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis’ book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis argues that the laws described by science are dependent on human agency which extracts them from nature. Consequently, human agency cannot be explained as an effect of natural laws. I agree with Tallis’ main argument and I appreciate that he helps us understand the systematic importance of a human-scale breadth of view regarding any theoretical investigation. In the main part of the paper, I critically comment on Tallis’ interpretation of several more loosely associated topics from a phenomenological perspective. Firstly, I reconsider Tallis’ account of intentionality as a factor that opens a distance between the cognizer and the world. Whereas Tallis emphasizes that agency requisitions aspects of the world to achieve its goals, I point out that agency does not determine the meaning of things unidirectionally and independently of all context. A self-controlled agency is provisionally reached through a process of ‘deindexicalization’ of our passive intentional capacities, that is, by creating and maintaining new, different worldly contexts. Subsequently, I analyze Tallis’ description of our intentional relation to spatiotemporally distant possibilities. In my view, Tallis underestimates the extent to which our intentional relation to possibilities is pre-reflexive and pre-predicative and hence independent of propositional attitudes. Finally, I consider Tallis’ interpretation of nature and show that it is deeply influenced by the sciences of nature. In contrast, I argue that agency can be properly described only if we understand it as an intervention in a lifeworld already imbued with sense, not merely a physical or material nature.
{"title":"On the importance of a human-scale breadth of view: Reading Tallis’ freedom","authors":"Jan Halák","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0038","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper is my commentary on Raymond Tallis’ book Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021). Tallis argues that the laws described by science are dependent on human agency which extracts them from nature. Consequently, human agency cannot be explained as an effect of natural laws. I agree with Tallis’ main argument and I appreciate that he helps us understand the systematic importance of a human-scale breadth of view regarding any theoretical investigation. In the main part of the paper, I critically comment on Tallis’ interpretation of several more loosely associated topics from a phenomenological perspective. Firstly, I reconsider Tallis’ account of intentionality as a factor that opens a distance between the cognizer and the world. Whereas Tallis emphasizes that agency requisitions aspects of the world to achieve its goals, I point out that agency does not determine the meaning of things unidirectionally and independently of all context. A self-controlled agency is provisionally reached through a process of ‘deindexicalization’ of our passive intentional capacities, that is, by creating and maintaining new, different worldly contexts. Subsequently, I analyze Tallis’ description of our intentional relation to spatiotemporally distant possibilities. In my view, Tallis underestimates the extent to which our intentional relation to possibilities is pre-reflexive and pre-predicative and hence independent of propositional attitudes. Finally, I consider Tallis’ interpretation of nature and show that it is deeply influenced by the sciences of nature. In contrast, I argue that agency can be properly described only if we understand it as an intervention in a lifeworld already imbued with sense, not merely a physical or material nature.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"439 - 452"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44904548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0036
H. Steward
Abstract This paper argues that the position on free will which is defended in ‘Freedom: An Impossible Reality’ is not, as Tallis claims, a compatibilist view, but actually a version of libertarianism. While endorsing many aspects of that libertarian view itself, the paper raises questions about how one of the central arguments for Tallis’s view is supposed to work, and queries whether it really follows from the fact that we need to stand apart from nature in a certain sense, in order to develop the kind of abstract knowledge that is constituted by the body of scientific law, that our own actions are not mere manifestations of what Tallis calls the ‘habits of nature’. It is also suggested that while a strong case can be made for many varieties of human exceptionalism, Tallis’s view of animal behaviour may be too simple and that there are examples of animal agency which cannot be explained merely by the associative learning which appears to be the highest grade of animal cognition that Tallis countenances.
{"title":"Libertarianism in disguise","authors":"H. Steward","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0036","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper argues that the position on free will which is defended in ‘Freedom: An Impossible Reality’ is not, as Tallis claims, a compatibilist view, but actually a version of libertarianism. While endorsing many aspects of that libertarian view itself, the paper raises questions about how one of the central arguments for Tallis’s view is supposed to work, and queries whether it really follows from the fact that we need to stand apart from nature in a certain sense, in order to develop the kind of abstract knowledge that is constituted by the body of scientific law, that our own actions are not mere manifestations of what Tallis calls the ‘habits of nature’. It is also suggested that while a strong case can be made for many varieties of human exceptionalism, Tallis’s view of animal behaviour may be too simple and that there are examples of animal agency which cannot be explained merely by the associative learning which appears to be the highest grade of animal cognition that Tallis countenances.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"420 - 426"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46321889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0040
James Tartaglia
Abstract I begin by clarifying Tallis’s revisionary terminology, showing how he redraws the lines of the traditional debate about free will by classifying himself as a compatibilist, when in standard terms he is an incompatibilist. I then examine what I take to be the two main lines of argument in Freedom, which I call the Mysterian Argument and the Intentionality Argument. I argue that neither can do the required work on its own, so I ask how they are supposed to combine. I then argue that a commitment to the ontological priority of everydayness, of the kind suggested in chapters 5 and 6 of Freedom, might combine the arguments in such a way as to secure Tallis’s conclusion. I conclude that the argument of Freedom requires positive metaphysical commitment of a kind Tallis has yet to provide.
{"title":"The ontology of freedom","authors":"James Tartaglia","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0040","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I begin by clarifying Tallis’s revisionary terminology, showing how he redraws the lines of the traditional debate about free will by classifying himself as a compatibilist, when in standard terms he is an incompatibilist. I then examine what I take to be the two main lines of argument in Freedom, which I call the Mysterian Argument and the Intentionality Argument. I argue that neither can do the required work on its own, so I ask how they are supposed to combine. I then argue that a commitment to the ontological priority of everydayness, of the kind suggested in chapters 5 and 6 of Freedom, might combine the arguments in such a way as to secure Tallis’s conclusion. I conclude that the argument of Freedom requires positive metaphysical commitment of a kind Tallis has yet to provide.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"461 - 473"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48367490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0031
David Steven Scott
Abstract I argue that, in his effort to overcome causation as an obstacle to agency or free will, Raymond Tallis’ self-described “Humean” re-working of David Hume’s analysis of causation falters on historicotextual and conceptual grounds.
{"title":"Disarming causation in the service of agency: Tallis on Hume","authors":"David Steven Scott","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract I argue that, in his effort to overcome causation as an obstacle to agency or free will, Raymond Tallis’ self-described “Humean” re-working of David Hume’s analysis of causation falters on historicotextual and conceptual grounds.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"373 - 388"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41784446","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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