Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0034
T. W. Clark
Abstract In Freedom: An Impossible Reality, Ray Tallis argues that we escape imprisonment by causal determinism, and thus gain free will, by the virtual distance from natural laws afforded us by intentionality, a human capacity that he claims cannot be naturalized. I respond that we can’t know in advance that intentionality will never be subsumed by science, and that our capacities to entertain possibilities and decide among them are natural cognitive endowments that supervene on generally reliable neural processes. Moreover, any disconnection from the multi-level determinants that account for human behavior cannot augment, but would likely undermine, effective human agency. Our full inclusion in nature, understood in terms of a pragmatic, explanatory determinism, is therefore not a prison from which we need to escape.
{"title":"Jail break: Tallis and the prison of nature","authors":"T. W. Clark","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0034","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0034","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In Freedom: An Impossible Reality, Ray Tallis argues that we escape imprisonment by causal determinism, and thus gain free will, by the virtual distance from natural laws afforded us by intentionality, a human capacity that he claims cannot be naturalized. I respond that we can’t know in advance that intentionality will never be subsumed by science, and that our capacities to entertain possibilities and decide among them are natural cognitive endowments that supervene on generally reliable neural processes. Moreover, any disconnection from the multi-level determinants that account for human behavior cannot augment, but would likely undermine, effective human agency. Our full inclusion in nature, understood in terms of a pragmatic, explanatory determinism, is therefore not a prison from which we need to escape.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"403 - 412"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42711611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0033
J. Shand
Abstract In this attempt to deal with the problem of free will Tallis identifies intentionality as a feature of our lives that cannot be explained by deterministic, natural, physical, causal laws. Our ability to think about the world, and not merely be objects subject to it, gives us room for manoeuvre for free thought and action. Science, far from being antagonistic to the possibility of free will as it is usually presented through its deterministic explanations, is a manifestation of our freedom and could not exist without it. However, doubts arise for the argument owing to a lack of explanation as to how freedom is possible no matter how persuasively we are shown that it appears to be. That is, what kind of world would it have to be for freedom to exist and be explicable. I conclude with my own view, alluded to by Tallis, but not followed up, that the problem with the scientific worldview is that it is wedded to objectivity as the only stance deemed veridical as to the nature of reality, one which therefore cannot by necessity allow subjects or freedom. As freedom is a property of subjects, the scientific worldview cannot allow for freedom. Once the condition is dropped that only the objectively knowable can be real, freedom also may be real, defined as a knowable property of our subjectivity. There is no need to deny physicalism if the definition of it is released from the epistemic bonds of objectivity and we hold that some physical properties may be known subjectively, namely those that characterize our subjective life.
{"title":"Free will: Dr Johnson was right","authors":"J. Shand","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0033","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this attempt to deal with the problem of free will Tallis identifies intentionality as a feature of our lives that cannot be explained by deterministic, natural, physical, causal laws. Our ability to think about the world, and not merely be objects subject to it, gives us room for manoeuvre for free thought and action. Science, far from being antagonistic to the possibility of free will as it is usually presented through its deterministic explanations, is a manifestation of our freedom and could not exist without it. However, doubts arise for the argument owing to a lack of explanation as to how freedom is possible no matter how persuasively we are shown that it appears to be. That is, what kind of world would it have to be for freedom to exist and be explicable. I conclude with my own view, alluded to by Tallis, but not followed up, that the problem with the scientific worldview is that it is wedded to objectivity as the only stance deemed veridical as to the nature of reality, one which therefore cannot by necessity allow subjects or freedom. As freedom is a property of subjects, the scientific worldview cannot allow for freedom. Once the condition is dropped that only the objectively knowable can be real, freedom also may be real, defined as a knowable property of our subjectivity. There is no need to deny physicalism if the definition of it is released from the epistemic bonds of objectivity and we hold that some physical properties may be known subjectively, namely those that characterize our subjective life.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"394 - 402"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43941176","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0030
James Tartaglia
{"title":"Introduction a book symposium on Raymond Tallis’s Freedom: An impossible reality","authors":"James Tartaglia","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0030","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"371 - 372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46336321","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0032
Elena Popa
Abstract This paper takes a critical stance on Tallis’s separation of causation and agency. While his critique of the causal theory of action and the assumptions about causation underlying different versions of determinism, including the one based on neuroscience is right, his rejection of causation (of all sorts) has implausible consequences. Denying the link between action and causation amounts to overlooking the role action plays in causal inference and in the origin of causal concepts. I suggest that a weaker version of Tallis’ claim, compatible with causation understood as agency, would work better.
{"title":"Causation without the causal theory of action","authors":"Elena Popa","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0032","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0032","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper takes a critical stance on Tallis’s separation of causation and agency. While his critique of the causal theory of action and the assumptions about causation underlying different versions of determinism, including the one based on neuroscience is right, his rejection of causation (of all sorts) has implausible consequences. Denying the link between action and causation amounts to overlooking the role action plays in causal inference and in the origin of causal concepts. I suggest that a weaker version of Tallis’ claim, compatible with causation understood as agency, would work better.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"110 ","pages":"389 - 393"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41274858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0039
Joanna Kavenna
Abstract The author is in essential agreement with Tallis, that when we only deploy one mode of interpretation, ie the scientific mode, we lose the fundamental realities of human experience, including the experience of free will, on which, ironically, scientific practice depends. Tallis’s philosophical stance is compared to that of Owen Barfield and his work on free will is placed within the context of his other books. A sense of wonder is common to all of them.
{"title":"The seemingly ordinary complexity of daily life","authors":"Joanna Kavenna","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0039","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The author is in essential agreement with Tallis, that when we only deploy one mode of interpretation, ie the scientific mode, we lose the fundamental realities of human experience, including the experience of free will, on which, ironically, scientific practice depends. Tallis’s philosophical stance is compared to that of Owen Barfield and his work on free will is placed within the context of his other books. A sense of wonder is common to all of them.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"453 - 460"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44597795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0035
S. Leach
Abstract The problem that Tallis attempts to address in Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021) is that science appears to describe the entire world deterministically and that this seems to leave no room for free will. In the face of this threat, Tallis defends the existence of free will by arguing that science does not explain our intentional awareness of the world; and it is our intentional awareness that makes both science and free will possible. Against Tallis, it is here argued that his argument is vulnerable to two criticisms. Firstly, his characterisation of science as apparently deterministic is inaccurate. Secondly, he has not solved the problem he has set himself but rather recast it, so that his conclusion leaves us having to account for free will, not in a deterministic universe, but either as a product of chance or as a miracle. It is here suggested that when we set aside the illusory threat of scientific determinism, we also set aside the temptation of free will (as its spurious answer). That done, we may better focus upon agent’s freedom of action – as discussed by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume – the rational capability of an agent to act upon their wishes, given the constraints under which they find themselves.
{"title":"Free will: An impossible reality or an incoherent concept?","authors":"S. Leach","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0035","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0035","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The problem that Tallis attempts to address in Freedom: An Impossible Reality (2021) is that science appears to describe the entire world deterministically and that this seems to leave no room for free will. In the face of this threat, Tallis defends the existence of free will by arguing that science does not explain our intentional awareness of the world; and it is our intentional awareness that makes both science and free will possible. Against Tallis, it is here argued that his argument is vulnerable to two criticisms. Firstly, his characterisation of science as apparently deterministic is inaccurate. Secondly, he has not solved the problem he has set himself but rather recast it, so that his conclusion leaves us having to account for free will, not in a deterministic universe, but either as a product of chance or as a miracle. It is here suggested that when we set aside the illusory threat of scientific determinism, we also set aside the temptation of free will (as its spurious answer). That done, we may better focus upon agent’s freedom of action – as discussed by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke and Hume – the rational capability of an agent to act upon their wishes, given the constraints under which they find themselves.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"413 - 419"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47479025","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0024
P. Stenner
{"title":"‘Trust me, i´m an illusionist.’ a critical response to Keith Frankish’s illusionism and its place in contemporary philosophy of mind","authors":"P. Stenner","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0024","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"311 - 320"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41579895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0026
P. Stenner
{"title":"Four clarifications on the soft problem of ‘Qualia as illusions’","authors":"P. Stenner","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0026","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0026","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"328 - 333"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48837505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1515/humaff-2022-0027
Viktor Marsai
Abstract In the mid-1950s, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an effort to break free of the isolation brought about by the military defeat and communist takeover after WWII. One of the main priorities of Hungarian foreign policy was the developing world, including Africa. Although the revolution and subsequent reprisals of 1956 temporarily halted the opening up, at the end of the decade Hungary launched a new diplomatic offensive. Ethiopia, which symbolized African independence and power, was among the main targets. In spite of the setbacks and challenges, and thanks to the determination of Hungarian diplomats, Hungarian-Ethiopian relations were normalized in 1959–60. This paper examines this process by analyzing documents from the Hungarian National Archive and explains why establishing diplomatic connections proved valuable to both parties.
{"title":"Go south! – The establishment of Hungarian–Ethiopian diplomatic relations in 1959-1960","authors":"Viktor Marsai","doi":"10.1515/humaff-2022-0027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2022-0027","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the mid-1950s, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs made an effort to break free of the isolation brought about by the military defeat and communist takeover after WWII. One of the main priorities of Hungarian foreign policy was the developing world, including Africa. Although the revolution and subsequent reprisals of 1956 temporarily halted the opening up, at the end of the decade Hungary launched a new diplomatic offensive. Ethiopia, which symbolized African independence and power, was among the main targets. In spite of the setbacks and challenges, and thanks to the determination of Hungarian diplomats, Hungarian-Ethiopian relations were normalized in 1959–60. This paper examines this process by analyzing documents from the Hungarian National Archive and explains why establishing diplomatic connections proved valuable to both parties.","PeriodicalId":44829,"journal":{"name":"Human Affairs-Postdisciplinary Humanities & Social Sciences Quarterly","volume":"32 1","pages":"334 - 347"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46453343","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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