This article discusses why Russia replaced the South Stream project with the TurkStream by changing its route and name, and why Turkey is involved in a project on the North-South line although it plays a vital role in the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project in the southern gas corridor. The article first examines the Russia-Ukraine natural gas crisis. It then moves to analyze the reasons behind Russia’s changing of the name and the route of the South Stream project. After exploring Turkey’s involvement in the project, the article concludes by arguing that both countries adopted a win-win approach toward the project that Russia has gained a significant tariff advantage and freedom from the EU third-party-access rule. The article claims that although both Russia and Turkey have different perspectives on some issues in international politics, they can develop their cooperation with a win-win approach in the TurkStream project.
{"title":"TurkStream as Russia’s Last Step in Diversification: A Win-Win Approach","authors":"Ramazan Erdaǧ","doi":"10.25253/99.2021231.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.13","url":null,"abstract":"This article discusses why Russia replaced the South Stream project with the TurkStream by changing its route and name, and why Turkey is involved in a project on the North-South line although it plays a vital role in the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project in the southern gas corridor. The article first examines the Russia-Ukraine natural gas crisis. It then moves to analyze the reasons behind Russia’s changing of the name and the route of the South Stream project. After exploring Turkey’s involvement in the project, the article concludes by arguing that both countries adopted a win-win approach toward the project that Russia has gained a significant tariff advantage and freedom from the EU third-party-access rule. The article claims that although both Russia and Turkey have different perspectives on some issues in international politics, they can develop their cooperation with a win-win approach in the TurkStream project.","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42250052","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Three-and-a-half-years into the crisis that struck the heart of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 41st Gulf Summit, held on January 5, 2021, in the Saudi city of al-Ula, brought the blockade of Qatar to an end. The summits final communiqué stated that the GCC member states will “stand together as one to confront any threat to the security of the block” and prevent any “violation of sovereignty of any member state.”1 According to the Saudi Foreign Minister, Faisal bin Farhan, “points of disagreement with Qatar have been solved.”2 The Saudi minister declined to give more details on the compromises the two sides may have agreed on and the timeframe for their implementation. Lack of enthusiasm in the state-owned media on both sides of the fence suggests, however, that the agreement will merely return the relationship between the parties to the pre-June 5, 2017 position. So far, the two sides blame COVID-19 for ‘social distancing.’ Trade has not been fully resumed and cross-borders movement of goods and peoples remain low. It is assumed that cold peace is likely to prevail until the two sides re-establish mutual trust, which was badly damaged, especially at the level of the heads of states.
{"title":"The al-Ula GCC Summit: An End to Gulf Rivalry or Mere Truce?","authors":"Marwan Kabalan","doi":"10.25253/99.2021231.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.5","url":null,"abstract":"Three-and-a-half-years into the crisis that struck the heart of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the 41st Gulf Summit, held on January 5, 2021, in the Saudi city of al-Ula, brought the blockade of Qatar to an end. The summits final communiqué stated that the GCC member states will “stand together as one to confront any threat to the security of the block” and prevent any “violation of sovereignty of any member state.”1 According to the Saudi Foreign Minister, Faisal bin Farhan, “points of disagreement with Qatar have been solved.”2 The Saudi minister declined to give more details on the compromises the two sides may have agreed on and the timeframe for their implementation. Lack of enthusiasm in the state-owned media on both sides of the fence suggests, however, that the agreement will merely return the relationship between the parties to the pre-June 5, 2017 position. So far, the two sides blame COVID-19 for ‘social distancing.’ Trade has not been fully resumed and cross-borders movement of goods and peoples remain low. It is assumed that cold peace is likely to prevail until the two sides re-establish mutual trust, which was badly damaged, especially at the level of the heads of states.","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46475095","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The Eastern Mediterranean region is said to host five percent of the world’s known natural gas reserves. That stimulates tension when coupled with the aspirations of some states to claim these resources and control their transport to the markets. The claims of Greece and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC), which has always acted as if it were the sole representative of the island, seem to be extreme, given the relevant the rules of international law. In order to achieve its aspirations over Libya, France has recently intervened in regional developments on the side of Greece. Turkey has declared that its continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean extends up to 28° E longitude and that the western boundary of the Turkish continental shelf to the west of this longitude shall be drawn through equitable agreements with all concerned states. Turkey has also taken certain preventive measures to protect its rights and interests by making particular references to the relevant rules of international law. The present commentary examines the real motivations behind the acts of all sides and reviews their justifications with reference to international law, with particular reference to Turkey’s actions
{"title":"Root Causes of the Eastern Mediterranean Dispute: Approaches of the Main Actors","authors":"S. H. Başeren","doi":"10.25253/99.2021231.2","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.2","url":null,"abstract":"The Eastern Mediterranean region is said to host five percent of the world’s known natural gas reserves. That stimulates tension when coupled with the aspirations of some states to claim these resources and control their transport to the markets. The claims of Greece and the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC), which has always acted as if it were the sole representative of the island, seem to be extreme, given the relevant the rules of international law. In order to achieve its aspirations over Libya, France has recently intervened in regional developments on the side of Greece. Turkey has declared that its continental shelf in the Eastern Mediterranean extends up to 28° E longitude and that the western boundary of the Turkish continental shelf to the west of this longitude shall be drawn through equitable agreements with all concerned states. Turkey has also taken certain preventive measures to protect its rights and interests by making particular references to the relevant rules of international law. The present commentary examines the real motivations behind the acts of all sides and reviews their justifications with reference to international law, with particular reference to Turkey’s actions","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43271352","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper aims to forecast the route that Joe Biden, will take in his foreign policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean, by trying to analyze the content of his speeches and rhetoric before and shortly after taking office. In this context, America’s relation to Turkey will be pivotal in order to gauge the impact of any change in U.S. course. After four years of Trump’s doctrine of ‘America First’ and his bilateral approach, there are many expectations that the newly elected president will follow a more multilateral approach and will put more importance on international organizations and alliances across the Atlantic. Those expectations are more like wishes, however, when it comes to the Eastern Mediterranean, which is on the verge of a critical standoff between Turkey and its neighbors. There are some speculations that Biden will take a more affirmative stance against Turkey. Indeed, Biden has stressed the value of cooperating with allies to achieve foreign policy objectives. But despite the harsh language, Biden used during his election campaign to describe Turkey’s leadership, it is still unclear whether Biden will place the U.S. on a collision course with Turkey.
{"title":"What Biden may bring to the Eastern Mediterranean Region","authors":"M. Al-Zawawy","doi":"10.25253/99.2021231.3","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.3","url":null,"abstract":"This paper aims to forecast the route that Joe Biden, will take in his foreign policy toward the Eastern Mediterranean, by trying to analyze the content of his speeches and rhetoric before and shortly after taking office. In this context, America’s relation to Turkey will be pivotal in order to gauge the impact of any change in U.S. course. After four years of Trump’s doctrine of ‘America First’ and his bilateral approach, there are many expectations that the newly elected president will follow a more multilateral approach and will put more importance on international organizations and alliances across the Atlantic. Those expectations are more like wishes, however, when it comes to the Eastern Mediterranean, which is on the verge of a critical standoff between Turkey and its neighbors. There are some speculations that Biden will take a more affirmative stance against Turkey. Indeed, Biden has stressed the value of cooperating with allies to achieve foreign policy objectives. But despite the harsh language, Biden used during his election campaign to describe Turkey’s leadership, it is still unclear whether Biden will place the U.S. on a collision course with Turkey.","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49628800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the last five years, Russian relations with the GCC have developed on a largely positive trajectory. Even Moscow’s decision to leave the OPEC+ agreement and launch a price war with Saudi Arabia in March 2020 did not threaten the gains made by Russian diplomacy in the region. Following a cooling-off period in 2012-2014 caused by the negative reaction of the GCC States to the Russian support of the Assad regime in Syria, the overall rapprochement continued. When explaining the complex mixture of factors that are driving Moscow’s dialogue with the GCC member states regardless of occasional political turbulence they usually refer to the growing intensity of Moscow’s presence in the region, changing dynamics of the U.S. relations with Russia and the GCC, existing tensions between Middle Eastern countries as well as the transformation of GCC foreign policy vision. Yet, the economic factors usually remain underestimated. Consequently, this article will try to prove the importance of the economic factors for the current development of Russia’s relations with the Gulf States. It will also assess the prospects for continued economic cooperation between GCC capitals and Moscow including an analysis of the ability of the sides to bring these relations to a new qualitative level.
{"title":"Russia-GCC Economic Relations: When Quality Matters more than Quantity","authors":"N. Kozhanov","doi":"10.25253/99.2021231.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.12","url":null,"abstract":"During the last five years, Russian relations with the GCC have developed on a largely positive trajectory. Even Moscow’s decision to leave the OPEC+ agreement and launch a price war with Saudi Arabia in March 2020 did not threaten the gains made by Russian diplomacy in the region. Following a cooling-off period in 2012-2014 caused by the negative reaction of the GCC States to the Russian support of the Assad regime in Syria, the overall rapprochement continued. When explaining the complex mixture of factors that are driving Moscow’s dialogue with the GCC member states regardless of occasional political turbulence they usually refer to the growing intensity of Moscow’s presence in the region, changing dynamics of the U.S. relations with Russia and the GCC, existing tensions between Middle Eastern countries as well as the transformation of GCC foreign policy vision. Yet, the economic factors usually remain underestimated. Consequently, this article will try to prove the importance of the economic factors for the current development of Russia’s relations with the Gulf States. It will also assess the prospects for continued economic cooperation between GCC capitals and Moscow including an analysis of the ability of the sides to bring these relations to a new qualitative level.","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44169346","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Civil Society, NGOs and Religion in the European Refugee Crisis: A Review","authors":"Osman Ülker","doi":"10.25253/99.2021231.14","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.14","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42143006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The energy resource potential and discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have attracted the attention of the global energy markets for a long time. Since the beginning of the 2000s, exploration, and drilling activities have continued to increase in the region. The discovered hydrocarbon resources are only a small part of the estimated potential, consequently, the actors in the Eastern Mediterranean have been focusing on increasing this quantity. On the other hand, the ongoing discussions related to Exclusive Economic Zones have delayed the seismic surveys, drilling operations, and production activities in some specific areas of the region. Moreover, transferring the discovered resources from the Eastern Mediterranean to the international markets is another issue that has not yet been resolved. Therefore, this study evaluates the general situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of the potential of energy resources, discoveries, and transfer projects. In this context, this paper examines the geo-economic competition over the energy resources in the region.
{"title":"The Energy Equation in the Eastern Mediterranean","authors":"İsmail Kavaz","doi":"10.25253/99.2021231.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.10","url":null,"abstract":"The energy resource potential and discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have attracted the attention of the global energy markets for a long time. Since the beginning of the 2000s, exploration, and drilling activities have continued to increase in the region. The discovered hydrocarbon resources are only a small part of the estimated potential, consequently, the actors in the Eastern Mediterranean have been focusing on increasing this quantity. On the other hand, the ongoing discussions related to Exclusive Economic Zones have delayed the seismic surveys, drilling operations, and production activities in some specific areas of the region. Moreover, transferring the discovered resources from the Eastern Mediterranean to the international markets is another issue that has not yet been resolved. Therefore, this study evaluates the general situation in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of the potential of energy resources, discoveries, and transfer projects. In this context, this paper examines the geo-economic competition over the energy resources in the region.","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48351889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
France’s Mediterranean policy can be analyzed from a historical perspective and through the actual conjuncture related to its geopolitical and geo-cultural elements, such as the West-East civilization dilemma and colonization background. Although these two elements are complementary to each other, they intersect with the political and economic interests of the Turkish state in the region. France’s policy has become intertwined with its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean dispute against Turkey as a result of the natural gas discovery in recent years in the region. France’s identification of Turkey as an ‘external enemy’ reflects the former’s political and economic concerns in regard to the Mediterranean gas reserves. Therefore, the envisaged French leadership in the region insists that the EU adopt an exclusionary political approach toward Turkey with the political and diplomatic support of France for Greece and Cyprus. The existing regional problems, however, need to be resolved on the basis of equity, not by ignoring the rights of the parties, but by integrating them. This is necessary for the peaceful resolution of these concerns
{"title":"Deciphering the Mediterranean Policy of France through the lens of Islamophobia, Populism, and Turkey","authors":"Galip Emre Yildirim","doi":"10.25253/99.2021231.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2021231.11","url":null,"abstract":"France’s Mediterranean policy can be analyzed from a historical perspective and through the actual conjuncture related to its geopolitical and geo-cultural elements, such as the West-East civilization dilemma and colonization background. Although these two elements are complementary to each other, they intersect with the political and economic interests of the Turkish state in the region. France’s policy has become intertwined with its involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean dispute against Turkey as a result of the natural gas discovery in recent years in the region. France’s identification of Turkey as an ‘external enemy’ reflects the former’s political and economic concerns in regard to the Mediterranean gas reserves. Therefore, the envisaged French leadership in the region insists that the EU adopt an exclusionary political approach toward Turkey with the political and diplomatic support of France for Greece and Cyprus. The existing regional problems, however, need to be resolved on the basis of equity, not by ignoring the rights of the parties, but by integrating them. This is necessary for the peaceful resolution of these concerns","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47755276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The EU is now considered as an actor in international relations in many ways. Considering that it is dependent on energy imports, it is interesting to watch the actorness of the EU in energy relations as well. In this article, the external actorness of the EU in its energy relations is analysed and specified based on a set of predefined criteria of a modified concept: (i) the diplomatic apparatus and policy tools the actor uses in its energy relations; (ii) the consistency and specificity of the external energy policy and the goals and interests pursued by the EU in regard to it, and (iii) the actor’s perception of a third party which is accepted and recognised as an autonomous actor in the energy field by other actors. The criteria are then applied to a case study focused on Algeria in order to demonstrate whether the EU can be considered as an actor.
{"title":"The EU Actorness in the Energy Relations with Algeria","authors":"L. Tichý, J. Mazáč, Zbyněk Dubský","doi":"10.25253/99.2020224.12","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2020224.12","url":null,"abstract":"The EU is now considered as an actor in international relations in many ways. Considering that it is dependent on energy imports, it is interesting to watch the actorness of the EU in energy relations as well. In this article, the external actorness of the EU in its energy relations is analysed and specified based on a set of predefined criteria of a modified concept: (i) the diplomatic apparatus and policy tools the actor uses in its energy relations; (ii) the consistency and specificity of the external energy policy and the goals and interests pursued by the EU in regard to it, and (iii) the actor’s perception of a third party which is accepted and recognised as an autonomous actor in the energy field by other actors. The criteria are then applied to a case study focused on Algeria in order to demonstrate whether the EU can be considered as an actor.","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":"1 1","pages":"201-227"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42727784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
External interventions by both regional and global powers in Libya have not been a scarcity after the 2011 revolution. With the turn of 2014, however, the nature of external interventions became more of a military one especially with the imposition of Haftar’s rule in the east by several counter-revolutionary regional and global actors. At the point that the same counter-revolutionary alliance attempted to geopolitically strangulate Turkey both via propping up hostile and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, and also excluding it from the prospect of exploiting the riches of the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish intervention materialized in early 2020. This study attempts to explain the various motivations of the major intervening actors in Libya, namely France, Russia, Egypt, and the UAE with a special focus on Turkey. Structural realist perspective is used to elucidate the international interventions to the Libyan civil war. The nature of the uncertainty emanating from the regional transformation motivated the key actors to get militarily involved in the Libyan crisis. The actors with defensive motives are more likely to stick to the conflict despite the risks of escalation.
{"title":"A Sea of Change in the MENA Region: External Intervention in Libya","authors":"Talha Kose, Bilgehan Öztürk","doi":"10.25253/99.2020224.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2020224.08","url":null,"abstract":"External interventions by both regional and global powers in Libya have not been a scarcity after the 2011 revolution. With the turn of 2014, however, the nature of external interventions became more of a military one especially with the imposition of Haftar’s rule in the east by several counter-revolutionary regional and global actors. At the point that the same counter-revolutionary alliance attempted to geopolitically strangulate Turkey both via propping up hostile and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa, and also excluding it from the prospect of exploiting the riches of the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkish intervention materialized in early 2020. This study attempts to explain the various motivations of the major intervening actors in Libya, namely France, Russia, Egypt, and the UAE with a special focus on Turkey. Structural realist perspective is used to elucidate the international interventions to the Libyan civil war. The nature of the uncertainty emanating from the regional transformation motivated the key actors to get militarily involved in the Libyan crisis. The actors with defensive motives are more likely to stick to the conflict despite the risks of escalation.","PeriodicalId":44871,"journal":{"name":"Insight Turkey","volume":"1 1","pages":"113-138"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2020-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48127410","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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