ISRAEL LAW REVIEW最新文献

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a legal institution embedded in international politics. Politics shaped the Rome Statute of the ICC, which is rooted in norms and rules of European lineage and security interests of party states. Politics constrains and influences the operation of the Court, which has adapted in response to oversight and governance of the Assembly of States Parties, and to political actions extrinsic to institutional rules. The ICC also has political effects in situation states. A brief history shows that application of Rome Statute triggers across state parties with different social conditions skewed geographic distribution of its investigations and prosecutions towards Africa, a structural bias that catalysed a legitimation crisis for the ICC. Subsequent exercises of expansive jurisdiction aimed at nationals of non-African, non-party states – including Israel and some of the world's great powers – have dampened African complaints and advanced the ICC agenda, but intensified non-legitimacy claims by powerful non-party states. To survive, Court organs must follow legal mandates, yet be responsive to pressing international political demands, continuously risking the legitimacy of the ICC as a legal institution and adverse political reactions by antagonised governments. Careful management of the tension between law and politics at the ICC may modestly reduce antagonism towards the Court, but that tension cannot be resolved, and confrontations over the ICC's legitimacy are certain to recur.

Since Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, there have been thousands of instances of civilian casualties, damage to the natural environment and cultural property, destruction of buildings and infrastructure, blockading of ports, siege, capturing installations containing dangerous forces, and other consequences that accompany hostilities. In addition to the fatalities related to humans (civilians and combatants alike) and their property or environment, the war in Ukraine has also accounted for non-human tolls – namely, the destruction of animals or damage to their habitats.

The primary objective of this article is to study three patterns of animal suffering documented during Russia's invasion of Ukraine: (i) targeting zoos and killing zoo animals; (ii) extermination of the Black Sea dolphin population; and (iii) eating pigeons or other pets in besieged localities, and to analyse these patterns in the light of applicable rules of international humanitarian law (IHL).

The idea of this research is to underline that war can have a significant effect on various categories of animals, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine is just another example of this. The article also discusses how, and the extent to which international law can provide protection for animals in armed conflict, and whether there are any gaps in the applicable IHL rules related to the protection of animals.

War crimes related to the decision to carry out attacks during the conduct of hostilities are almost always defined in terms of conduct and not result (Article 8(2)(b) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court). Yet it is common for critiques of such decisions to focus on attack results as proof of their alleged illegality. While such results are probative of compliance or non-compliance with international humanitarian law rules regulating the conduct of hostilities, they should rarely be indisputable. This article addresses the challenge of attaching probative value to attack results when assessing responsibility for alleged war crimes based on allegedly illicit attack decisions.

The Hungarian government has been utilising emergencies to expand its political power instead of upholding constitutionalism and the rule of law. This strategy has given the government almost unlimited power to enact emergency decrees, even when the state and the population are not in immediate danger. The ninth amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary has raised concerns about the government's use of emergency powers, granting the executive branch even more authority during exceptional times by allowing the government to prolong the ‘state of exception’ indefinitely and maintain pandemic-related emergency measures to respond to potential consequences of the war in Ukraine. As a result, the executive body has been able to exert significant political control without proper parliamentary oversight.

This article explores the legal situation relating to the Sea of Azov in the light of the Russian suspension of shipping on 24 February 2022. While this act received little scholarly or political attention, there is a debate concerning the legality of the suspension of shipping, mainly whether it is governed by the law of naval blockade under the laws of naval warfare. The article analyses the situation from the perspectives of both international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of the sea (LOS) and examines how the interaction between the two legal regimes affects the analysis. The article supports the conclusion that the Russian conduct does not constitute a naval blockade but may be an accepted practice within the legal regime of naval warfare. In addition, it holds that LOS affects both the laws of naval warfare and the status of the Sea of Azov. Furthermore, the article raises doubts as to the relevance and applicability of the legal concept of naval blockade in modern international law.

The article discusses the current legal-political crisis in Israel against the backdrop of the judicial and political powers that have led to the present situation. The disastrous Yom Kippur War of 1973 weakened the government and public confidence in the political institutions. The weaknesses of the government enabled the Supreme Court to carry out a judicial revolution, which completely changed the country's legal system. The legal revolution entered a new stage when the Supreme Court held that the Basic Laws form part of Israel's constitution. This judicially created constitution opened the way for judicial review of legislation. Its weakness stems from the fact that Basic Laws are legislated in much the same way as ordinary legislation. As a result, the Knesset can easily override any ruling of the Court that voids a statute, by amending the relevant Basic Law. The Court is now struggling to find a means of gaining some control over the legislation of Basic Laws. At the same time, the present government declared its intention to carry out legal reforms that are in effect a counter-revolution to the judicial revolution. The article examines how the fluctuation in the political support of the Court affects its decisions.