Pub Date : 2023-12-05DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000237
Joshua Segev
Constitutional courts are expected to operate under certain conditions (independence, transparency, democratic pedigree) and to resolve controversies in accordance with legal rules, principles and procedures. When these expectations are repeatedly frustrated, the legitimacy of the court is damaged and it is perceived as a partisan institution. This article discusses four structural problems in the operation of the Israeli High Court of Justice, which have contributed significantly to the Court's current legitimacy crisis: fact-finding, panel composition, standing, and judicial selection. The article examines the governmental reform plan with regard to these structural problems and proposes practical solutions for each of the problems.
{"title":"Reforming the Israeli High Court of Justice: Proposed versus Desirable","authors":"Joshua Segev","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000237","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000237","url":null,"abstract":"Constitutional courts are expected to operate under certain conditions (independence, transparency, democratic pedigree) and to resolve controversies in accordance with legal rules, principles and procedures. When these expectations are repeatedly frustrated, the legitimacy of the court is damaged and it is perceived as a partisan institution. This article discusses four structural problems in the operation of the Israeli High Court of Justice, which have contributed significantly to the Court's current legitimacy crisis: fact-finding, panel composition, standing, and judicial selection. The article examines the governmental reform plan with regard to these structural problems and proposes practical solutions for each of the problems.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138527572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-04DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000225
Barak Medina, Ofra Bloch
The judicial overhaul, designed to weaken the judiciary and unleash governmental power from its structural checks, should be understood, we argue, as part of a deeper transformation of Israel's constitutional identity. At its core, this transformation is not about ‘empowering the people’ but rather about questioning Israel's commitment to the fundamental principle of equal citizenship, mainly regarding the permissibility of preferring the interests of Jews over those of non-Jews. Understanding the judicial overhaul as part of this larger transformation of the state's identity, towards more Jewish and less democratic, carries normative implications regarding its legitimacy. The judicial overhaul is often presented by the Israeli government as an attempt to undo the 1992 so-called ‘constitutional revolution’, questioning its legitimacy and asserting that a counter-revolution would be permissible, aligning with the current will of the people. An examination of Israel's constitutional history refutes this argument. We show that while the 1992 revolution enjoyed both normative and, at least, partial social legitimacy, current attempts do not.
{"title":"The Two Revolutions of Israel's National Identity","authors":"Barak Medina, Ofra Bloch","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000225","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000225","url":null,"abstract":"The judicial overhaul, designed to weaken the judiciary and unleash governmental power from its structural checks, should be understood, we argue, as part of a deeper transformation of Israel's constitutional identity. At its core, this transformation is not about ‘empowering the people’ but rather about questioning Israel's commitment to the fundamental principle of equal citizenship, mainly regarding the permissibility of preferring the interests of Jews over those of non-Jews. Understanding the judicial overhaul as part of this larger transformation of the state's identity, towards more Jewish and less democratic, carries normative implications regarding its legitimacy. The judicial overhaul is often presented by the Israeli government as an attempt to undo the 1992 so-called ‘constitutional revolution’, questioning its legitimacy and asserting that a counter-revolution would be permissible, aligning with the current will of the people. An examination of Israel's constitutional history refutes this argument. We show that while the 1992 revolution enjoyed both normative and, at least, partial social legitimacy, current attempts do not.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138527576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-04DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000249
Yoav Dotan
As the result of the initiation of the ‘judicial reform’ in January 2023, and the huge wave of public protest, Israel is currently undergoing a political turmoil which may develop into a fully fledged constitutional crisis. In this article I provide an account of the roots and causes of the present crisis from a public law theory perspective. In particular, I discuss the relationship between constitutional and administrative law in Israeli law. I argue that the core of Israel's constitutional structure has always been the institutions of administrative law as created and developed during the ‘administrative revolution’ of the 1980s. In contrast, Israel's constitutional law has always been a peripheral in the core structure of judicial review over the political branches. Contrary to common wisdom, I argue that the ‘constitutional revolution’ of the mid-1990s has not changed this core structure, but rather provided an external belt of normative barricades for this core structure. Accordingly, and despite the pretentious constitutional discourse developed in the 1990s by the Court, Israel was and still is a monistic democracy with no true constitutional layer of norms that enjoys higher status vis-à-vis regular legislation.
{"title":"Israel's Constitutional Moment","authors":"Yoav Dotan","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000249","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000249","url":null,"abstract":"As the result of the initiation of the ‘judicial reform’ in January 2023, and the huge wave of public protest, Israel is currently undergoing a political turmoil which may develop into a fully fledged constitutional crisis. In this article I provide an account of the roots and causes of the present crisis from a public law theory perspective. In particular, I discuss the relationship between constitutional and administrative law in Israeli law. I argue that the core of Israel's constitutional structure has always been the institutions of administrative law as created and developed during the ‘administrative revolution’ of the 1980s. In contrast, Israel's constitutional law has always been a peripheral in the core structure of judicial review over the political branches. Contrary to common wisdom, I argue that the ‘constitutional revolution’ of the mid-1990s has not changed this core structure, but rather provided an external belt of normative barricades for this core structure. Accordingly, and despite the pretentious constitutional discourse developed in the 1990s by the Court, Israel was and still is a monistic democracy with no true constitutional layer of norms that enjoys higher status vis-à-vis regular legislation.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138527573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-24DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000213
Iddo Porat
The article aims to further the understanding of the current constitutional crisis in Israel through the lens of political polarisation. Israel, like other countries around the world, is experiencing a substantial increase in political polarisation. Recent data shows that since 2009 affective polarisation (the extent to which individuals have negative feelings towards members of the opposing party or group and positive feelings towards their own party or group) has risen by 180 per cent. The article discusses the various phenomena associated with an increase in polarisation and the problems it raises, traces the reasons for the increase in polarisation in Israel, and argues that polarisation has played an important role in creating the conflict between the current government and the Supreme Court, and in making it so intense and intractable.
{"title":"Political Polarisation and the Constitutional Crisis in Israel","authors":"Iddo Porat","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000213","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000213","url":null,"abstract":"The article aims to further the understanding of the current constitutional crisis in Israel through the lens of political polarisation. Israel, like other countries around the world, is experiencing a substantial increase in political polarisation. Recent data shows that since 2009 affective polarisation (the extent to which individuals have negative feelings towards members of the opposing party or group and positive feelings towards their own party or group) has risen by 180 per cent. The article discusses the various phenomena associated with an increase in polarisation and the problems it raises, traces the reasons for the increase in polarisation in Israel, and argues that polarisation has played an important role in creating the conflict between the current government and the Supreme Court, and in making it so intense and intractable.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138527575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-17DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000201
Yaniv Roznai, Amichai Cohen
In the last year Israel has been going through its most severe constitutional crisis in its history. The newly elected right-wing government has initiated a judicial overhaul that would limit the authority of the judiciary and grant the executive almost absolute powers. In response, the country has witnessed unprecedented civil protestations and opposition from nearly all segments of civil society, academia and economic sectors. In this article we argue that the judicial overhaul must be analysed as a populist constitutional project. We also explain that compared with other systems, Israeli democracy is especially vulnerable to populism, because of its unique institutional design factors coupled with social factors. Only with understanding these factors can one grasp the risks that the judicial overhaul poses to Israeli democracy.
{"title":"Populist Constitutionalism and the Judicial Overhaul in Israel","authors":"Yaniv Roznai, Amichai Cohen","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000201","url":null,"abstract":"In the last year Israel has been going through its most severe constitutional crisis in its history. The newly elected right-wing government has initiated a judicial overhaul that would limit the authority of the judiciary and grant the executive almost absolute powers. In response, the country has witnessed unprecedented civil protestations and opposition from nearly all segments of civil society, academia and economic sectors. In this article we argue that the judicial overhaul must be analysed as a populist constitutional project. We also explain that compared with other systems, Israeli democracy is especially vulnerable to populism, because of its unique institutional design factors coupled with social factors. Only with understanding these factors can one grasp the risks that the judicial overhaul poses to Israeli democracy.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138527581","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-15DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000195
Tamar Hostovsky Brandes
The protests against the Israeli government's proposed constitutional changes, which started in January 2023, have escalated into overall social upheaval. Protestors, politicians and academics have claimed that the existing ‘social contract’ has been violated, that Israel needs a ‘new contract’, and that such ‘new contract’ should be enacted through a constitution. This article argues that while the calls for the enactment of a constitution are understandable, Israel's current form of control of the West Bank and its commitment to the settlement project hinders the political feasibility of the enactment of a constitution. Those calling for a constitution for Israel perceive it as a solution to the indeterminacy and ambiguity that plague the Israeli constitutional framework. However, Israel's current form of control of the West Bank depends on ambiguity, on the existence of legal grey areas, and on fragmentation of the normative framework. The resolution of these is thus inconsistent with the maintenance of this form of control.
{"title":"The Constitutional Overhaul and the West Bank: Is Israel's Constitutional Moment Occupied?","authors":"Tamar Hostovsky Brandes","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000195","url":null,"abstract":"The protests against the Israeli government's proposed constitutional changes, which started in January 2023, have escalated into overall social upheaval. Protestors, politicians and academics have claimed that the existing ‘social contract’ has been violated, that Israel needs a ‘new contract’, and that such ‘new contract’ should be enacted through a constitution. This article argues that while the calls for the enactment of a constitution are understandable, Israel's current form of control of the West Bank and its commitment to the settlement project hinders the political feasibility of the enactment of a constitution. Those calling for a constitution for Israel perceive it as a solution to the indeterminacy and ambiguity that plague the Israeli constitutional framework. However, Israel's current form of control of the West Bank depends on ambiguity, on the existence of legal grey areas, and on fragmentation of the normative framework. The resolution of these is thus inconsistent with the maintenance of this form of control.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-11-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138527582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-26DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000171
Yaniv Roznai, Rosalind Dixon, David E. Landau
Abstract How should the constitutional reform in Israel be assessed in comparative terms? Comparative constitutional understandings point to the centrality of three key sets of norms as part of the ‘democratic minimum core’: (i) commitments to free and fair, regular multi-party elections; (ii) political rights and freedoms; and (iii) a system of institutional checks and balances necessary to maintain (i) and (ii). Any change in judicial power and independence must be assessed against the benchmark of the democratic minimum core, and by reference to its cumulative practical effect on a system of institutional checks and balances. We claim that recent changes in Israel may already threaten these institutional checks, and have the potential to do more damage in the future, if given broad effect and if combined with further changes in the power and independence of the Supreme Court. On this basis, we suggest, the relevant changes should be viewed as either ‘abusive’ or ‘proto-abusive’ in nature. By threatening to undermine both the power and independence of the Supreme Court of Israel, they directly threaten the health of the constitutional checks and balances system and, hence, the ‘democratic minimum core’ in Israel.
{"title":"Judicial Reform or Abusive Constitutionalism in Israel","authors":"Yaniv Roznai, Rosalind Dixon, David E. Landau","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000171","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How should the constitutional reform in Israel be assessed in comparative terms? Comparative constitutional understandings point to the centrality of three key sets of norms as part of the ‘democratic minimum core’: (i) commitments to free and fair, regular multi-party elections; (ii) political rights and freedoms; and (iii) a system of institutional checks and balances necessary to maintain (i) and (ii). Any change in judicial power and independence must be assessed against the benchmark of the democratic minimum core, and by reference to its cumulative practical effect on a system of institutional checks and balances. We claim that recent changes in Israel may already threaten these institutional checks, and have the potential to do more damage in the future, if given broad effect and if combined with further changes in the power and independence of the Supreme Court. On this basis, we suggest, the relevant changes should be viewed as either ‘abusive’ or ‘proto-abusive’ in nature. By threatening to undermine both the power and independence of the Supreme Court of Israel, they directly threaten the health of the constitutional checks and balances system and, hence, the ‘democratic minimum core’ in Israel.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-12DOI: 10.1017/s002122372300016x
Guy Lurie
A central element in the Israeli government's agenda to overhaul the judiciary, unveiled in January 2023, is its proposal to give it and its parliamentary coalition control over the selection and promotion of judges. This article shows that this proposal is an attempt to capture the courts. To illustrate this, the article looks at the government's proposal through three different perspectives: first, the perspective of the rationale of the current system of judicial selection, against the background of court governance in Israel and its constitutional system; second, the perspective of changes in Israel's judicial selection system over the past two decades; third, the comparative perspective of trends in judicial selection in other democracies.
{"title":"The Attempt to Capture the Courts in Israel","authors":"Guy Lurie","doi":"10.1017/s002122372300016x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s002122372300016x","url":null,"abstract":"A central element in the Israeli government's agenda to overhaul the judiciary, unveiled in January 2023, is its proposal to give it and its parliamentary coalition control over the selection and promotion of judges. This article shows that this proposal is an attempt to capture the courts. To illustrate this, the article looks at the government's proposal through three different perspectives: first, the perspective of the rationale of the current system of judicial selection, against the background of court governance in Israel and its constitutional system; second, the perspective of changes in Israel's judicial selection system over the past two decades; third, the comparative perspective of trends in judicial selection in other democracies.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135968936","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000146
Mordechai Kremnitzer
Abstract The Knesset has recently amended Basic Law: The Judiciary to eliminate the ability of the courts to issue an injunction against the government or any of its ministers based on the reasonableness of their decisions. This article examines this amendment from various angles. The first section posits the amendment as part of a larger plan of the coalition to eliminate judicial review and provide the government with unlimited power. The second section emphasises that the amendment was legislated by the Knesset for itself, raising concern over a conflict of interest. This is followed by a brief explanation of the reasonableness standard in Israeli law, and an assessment of the duty to act reasonably, which stems from the democratic principle of the rule of law. The next two sections assess the many risks that the amendment creates, such as the types of decision that could be made without adhering to a standard of reasonableness, and the trimming of the power of the Attorney General as a legal ‘gatekeeper’. Special emphasis is given to the dangers that the amendment holds for the quality and diversity of the civil service. Finally, the article discusses the multiple reasons why the government should not be immune from a reasonableness check and tackles the arguments against the use of the standard of reasonableness by the courts. This multifaceted analysis leads to the conclusion that the elimination of the reasonableness standard undermines basic features of democracy and fractures the social contract between the citizens and the government. Therefore, it should not be immune from judicial review.
{"title":"Releasing the Government from Acting Reasonably; or, the Government Says Goodbye to Reasonableness","authors":"Mordechai Kremnitzer","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000146","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Knesset has recently amended Basic Law: The Judiciary to eliminate the ability of the courts to issue an injunction against the government or any of its ministers based on the reasonableness of their decisions. This article examines this amendment from various angles. The first section posits the amendment as part of a larger plan of the coalition to eliminate judicial review and provide the government with unlimited power. The second section emphasises that the amendment was legislated by the Knesset for itself, raising concern over a conflict of interest. This is followed by a brief explanation of the reasonableness standard in Israeli law, and an assessment of the duty to act reasonably, which stems from the democratic principle of the rule of law. The next two sections assess the many risks that the amendment creates, such as the types of decision that could be made without adhering to a standard of reasonableness, and the trimming of the power of the Attorney General as a legal ‘gatekeeper’. Special emphasis is given to the dangers that the amendment holds for the quality and diversity of the civil service. Finally, the article discusses the multiple reasons why the government should not be immune from a reasonableness check and tackles the arguments against the use of the standard of reasonableness by the courts. This multifaceted analysis leads to the conclusion that the elimination of the reasonableness standard undermines basic features of democracy and fractures the social contract between the citizens and the government. Therefore, it should not be immune from judicial review.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135350668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1017/s0021223723000158
Tom Ginsburg
Abstract There are many ways in which to examine the current Israeli constitutional crisis. This article uses the lens of anti-corruption, a global movement which has changed politics in many countries. The long empowerment of the legal system in Israel arguably has its origins in policing corruption, which may be a particularly powerful motivator for the current governing coalition's efforts to assert more control over the Supreme Court. The dynamics of anti-corruption in Israel are somewhat distinct from those of other countries in ways that may bode well for the Court in its confrontation with the government.
{"title":"The Long Hand of Anti-Corruption: Israeli Judicial Reform in Comparative Perspective","authors":"Tom Ginsburg","doi":"10.1017/s0021223723000158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0021223723000158","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There are many ways in which to examine the current Israeli constitutional crisis. This article uses the lens of anti-corruption, a global movement which has changed politics in many countries. The long empowerment of the legal system in Israel arguably has its origins in policing corruption, which may be a particularly powerful motivator for the current governing coalition's efforts to assert more control over the Supreme Court. The dynamics of anti-corruption in Israel are somewhat distinct from those of other countries in ways that may bode well for the Court in its confrontation with the government.","PeriodicalId":44911,"journal":{"name":"ISRAEL LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135350735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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