Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1949216
N. Sandal
ABSTRACT Religious populism features prominently in the global political landscape. This contribution focuses on this particular type of populism, and the political strategies employed by religious populist actors, with a focus on the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Although there is an established literature on religious populism, there are still dynamics that need to be studied further. How religious populists outflank their rivals, especially those with relatively conservative ideologies and understandings of nationalism, remains unanswered, for example. In this study, I investigate how the AKP, as a religious populist party, has competed with and distinguished itself from other mainstream and conservative Turkish political actors and movements, and their respective nationalist ideologies: (a) the secular political establishment, including the Kemalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party), (b) the tradition(s) the party was originally part of but is no longer viable, the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement, (c) other popular religious movements that have a claim to power (such as the Gülen, or Hizmet, movement), and finally (d) ultranationalist segments and parties such as the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party), each of which has their own interpretations of citizenship and nationalism.
宗教民粹主义在全球政治格局中占有显著地位。这篇文章的重点是这种特殊类型的民粹主义，以及宗教民粹主义行为者所采用的政治策略，重点是在塔伊普Erdoğan领导下的土耳其正义与发展党Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)。虽然已有关于宗教民粹主义的文献，但仍有需要进一步研究的动态。例如，宗教民粹主义者如何包抄对手，尤其是那些意识形态相对保守、对民族主义有理解的人，仍然没有答案。在这项研究中，我调查了正义与发展党，作为一个宗教民粹主义政党，如何与其他主流和保守的土耳其政治行动者和运动，以及他们各自的民族主义意识形态竞争并区分自己:(a)世俗政治建制，包括凯末尔主义共和人民党(Kemalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi); (b)该党原本属于但已不复存在的传统，即Milli Görüş(国民展望)运动;(c)其他主张掌权的大众宗教运动(如g len或Hizmet运动);最后(d)极端民族主义派别和政党，如milliyet i Hareket Partisi(民族行动党);它们对公民身份和民族主义都有自己的解释。
{"title":"Religious populist parties, nationalisms, and strategies of competition: the case of the AK Party in Turkey","authors":"N. Sandal","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1949216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1949216","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Religious populism features prominently in the global political landscape. This contribution focuses on this particular type of populism, and the political strategies employed by religious populist actors, with a focus on the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) under the leadership of Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. Although there is an established literature on religious populism, there are still dynamics that need to be studied further. How religious populists outflank their rivals, especially those with relatively conservative ideologies and understandings of nationalism, remains unanswered, for example. In this study, I investigate how the AKP, as a religious populist party, has competed with and distinguished itself from other mainstream and conservative Turkish political actors and movements, and their respective nationalist ideologies: (a) the secular political establishment, including the Kemalist Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party), (b) the tradition(s) the party was originally part of but is no longer viable, the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement, (c) other popular religious movements that have a claim to power (such as the Gülen, or Hizmet, movement), and finally (d) ultranationalist segments and parties such as the Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party), each of which has their own interpretations of citizenship and nationalism.","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"8 1","pages":"248 - 263"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87781431","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1935731
Axel R. Schäfer
{"title":"Finding faith in foreign policy: religion and American diplomacy in a postsecular world","authors":"Axel R. Schäfer","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1935731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1935731","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"24 1","pages":"281 - 283"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"80144514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1949935
M. Caiani, Tiago Carvalho
ABSTRACT The rise of populist parties in Europe and the increasing salience of religion in political discourse are two relevant, sometimes discussed as interrelated, phenomena of recent decades. While most analysis focuses on right-wing populism, this does not exhaust all possible relationships. This study addresses the role of religion in populist parties by focusing on the Italian case and adopting a comparative cross organisational perspective shedding light on how left-wing and right-wing populists use religion for different purposes. Drawing on interview data with party representatives and analysis of organisational documents and speeches, we explore the presence and the uses of religious appeals in the two populist Italian parties in recent years. We show that their use of religion varies on three dimensions: i) hierarchy of identifications, ii) salience, and iii) frame. The League represents ‘cultural populism’: religion is used as an ‘identity marker’ that is highly salient and an instrument for framing specific topics. Conversely, the Five Star Movement exemplifies ‘political/economic populism’, in which religion as an identifier is present but less salient and used to frame citizenship in juridical/legalist terms. These different usages of religion lead to different definitions of the ‘people’ and therefore in-group constituencies.
{"title":"The use of religion by populist parties: the case of Italy and its broader implications","authors":"M. Caiani, Tiago Carvalho","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1949935","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1949935","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The rise of populist parties in Europe and the increasing salience of religion in political discourse are two relevant, sometimes discussed as interrelated, phenomena of recent decades. While most analysis focuses on right-wing populism, this does not exhaust all possible relationships. This study addresses the role of religion in populist parties by focusing on the Italian case and adopting a comparative cross organisational perspective shedding light on how left-wing and right-wing populists use religion for different purposes. Drawing on interview data with party representatives and analysis of organisational documents and speeches, we explore the presence and the uses of religious appeals in the two populist Italian parties in recent years. We show that their use of religion varies on three dimensions: i) hierarchy of identifications, ii) salience, and iii) frame. The League represents ‘cultural populism’: religion is used as an ‘identity marker’ that is highly salient and an instrument for framing specific topics. Conversely, the Five Star Movement exemplifies ‘political/economic populism’, in which religion as an identifier is present but less salient and used to frame citizenship in juridical/legalist terms. These different usages of religion lead to different definitions of the ‘people’ and therefore in-group constituencies.","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"51 1","pages":"211 - 230"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88166206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1947111
J. Rees
ABSTRACT This contribution constructs a three-stage integrative framework to analyse relations between nationalism, populism, and religion. First, following the work of A.D. Smith, nationalism is interpreted as a complex phenomenon with the capacity to accommodate multiple religious forms. Second, productive comparisons are drawn between the ‘sacred properties of the nation’ as defined by Smith with elements of the ‘populist core’ proposed by the scholar of ideology M. Freeden. Third, situating these comparisons within arguments by S.W. Hibbard on the dynamics of religion and politics, connections between religion and populism are partly framed as ‘intra-communal’ contests over competing ideologies of the nation. The contribution concludes with preliminary analyses of religion and populism in Europe and the United States, highlighting the value of integrative methods to analyse the dynamics of religio-populism in western contexts of nationalism.
{"title":"Religion, populism, and the dynamics of nationalism","authors":"J. Rees","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1947111","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1947111","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This contribution constructs a three-stage integrative framework to analyse relations between nationalism, populism, and religion. First, following the work of A.D. Smith, nationalism is interpreted as a complex phenomenon with the capacity to accommodate multiple religious forms. Second, productive comparisons are drawn between the ‘sacred properties of the nation’ as defined by Smith with elements of the ‘populist core’ proposed by the scholar of ideology M. Freeden. Third, situating these comparisons within arguments by S.W. Hibbard on the dynamics of religion and politics, connections between religion and populism are partly framed as ‘intra-communal’ contests over competing ideologies of the nation. The contribution concludes with preliminary analyses of religion and populism in Europe and the United States, highlighting the value of integrative methods to analyse the dynamics of religio-populism in western contexts of nationalism.","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"20 1","pages":"195 - 210"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77838664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1946344
David T Smith
ABSTRACT This contribution explains the declining policy influence of the Christian Right in Australia, especially compared to its more powerful American counterpart. Despite seven years of conservative federal government in Australia featuring prominent Christian conservatives, including two prime ministers, the Christian Right has had continuous defeats on issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion. This contribution argues the Christian Right in Australia is weakened by the lack of a popular sense of Australia as a ‘Christian nation’, even if it still has a majority of Christian identifiers. Unlike the United States, where a Christian nation discourse is an important political resource for the Christian Right, in Australia the relative lack of such a discourse weakens the link between the Christian Right’s policy agenda and broader exclusionary nationalism. Even when repelling out-groups is politically popular, Christianity is no longer privileged as the national in-group. This contribution empirically examines the use of the term ‘Christian nation’ in recent public discourse in Australia to show why it lacks political power.
{"title":"No longer a ‘Christian nation’: why Australia’s Christian Right loses policy battles even when it wins elections","authors":"David T Smith","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1946344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1946344","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This contribution explains the declining policy influence of the Christian Right in Australia, especially compared to its more powerful American counterpart. Despite seven years of conservative federal government in Australia featuring prominent Christian conservatives, including two prime ministers, the Christian Right has had continuous defeats on issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion. This contribution argues the Christian Right in Australia is weakened by the lack of a popular sense of Australia as a ‘Christian nation’, even if it still has a majority of Christian identifiers. Unlike the United States, where a Christian nation discourse is an important political resource for the Christian Right, in Australia the relative lack of such a discourse weakens the link between the Christian Right’s policy agenda and broader exclusionary nationalism. Even when repelling out-groups is politically popular, Christianity is no longer privileged as the national in-group. This contribution empirically examines the use of the term ‘Christian nation’ in recent public discourse in Australia to show why it lacks political power.","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"20 1","pages":"231 - 247"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76956795","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1949217
J. Haynes
ABSTRACT This collection focuses on right-wing nationalism, populism, and religion, both theoretically and empirically, with an emphasis on the following countries: Australia, India, Italy, Turkey, and the USA. Although not the same thing, nationalism and populism are said to be closely linked. Nationalists, like populists, may claim that there is but one ‘true religion’ – that is, their own and their followers’ – which helps focus their nationalist vision. They bring religion and culture into their arguments to encourage political changes in their favour. Nationalists may identify and target those they see as ‘enemies of the people’, said to be a serious threat to fulfilment of a nationalist future free from culturally ‘alien’ influences. While linking nationalism with religion is not new, what is more novel is the connecting of religion, nationalism, and populism. The contributions to this collection explore these issues theoretically, conceptually, and empirically.
{"title":"Right-wing nationalism, populism, and religion: what are the connections and why?","authors":"J. Haynes","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1949217","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1949217","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This collection focuses on right-wing nationalism, populism, and religion, both theoretically and empirically, with an emphasis on the following countries: Australia, India, Italy, Turkey, and the USA. Although not the same thing, nationalism and populism are said to be closely linked. Nationalists, like populists, may claim that there is but one ‘true religion’ – that is, their own and their followers’ – which helps focus their nationalist vision. They bring religion and culture into their arguments to encourage political changes in their favour. Nationalists may identify and target those they see as ‘enemies of the people’, said to be a serious threat to fulfilment of a nationalist future free from culturally ‘alien’ influences. While linking nationalism with religion is not new, what is more novel is the connecting of religion, nationalism, and populism. The contributions to this collection explore these issues theoretically, conceptually, and empirically.","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"6 1","pages":"188 - 194"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75631347","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1947731
G. Shani
ABSTRACT This contribution, in answer to the question posed in this collection ‘right-wing nationalism, populism, and religion: what are the connections and why?’, attempts to account for the development of Hindu nationalism in India as articulated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Hindu nationalism represents a fusion of conservative right-wing nationalism and religion, which has proved highly successful at the ballot box. It aims at the establishment of a Hindu Rashtra or state. Central to Hindu nationalism is the idea of Hindutva, which interpellates all Indians as belonging to a Hindu civilisation based on a common pan-Indian Hindu national identity. Muslims occupy the position of a ‘constitutive outside’ enabling the construction of a Hindu Rashtra; they remain ‘enemies’ to be either excluded or assimilated to a Hindu national culture. Consequently, they remain targets of government legislation. This will be illustrated with reference to the recent abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir, the building of a temple to the Hindu God Ram in Ayodhya, the Citizen Amendment Act, and the government of India’s responses to COVID-19. India under Modi, it concludes, is on the way to becoming a Hindu Rashtra.
{"title":"Towards a Hindu Rashtra: Hindutva, religion, and nationalism in India","authors":"G. Shani","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1947731","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1947731","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This contribution, in answer to the question posed in this collection ‘right-wing nationalism, populism, and religion: what are the connections and why?’, attempts to account for the development of Hindu nationalism in India as articulated by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Hindu nationalism represents a fusion of conservative right-wing nationalism and religion, which has proved highly successful at the ballot box. It aims at the establishment of a Hindu Rashtra or state. Central to Hindu nationalism is the idea of Hindutva, which interpellates all Indians as belonging to a Hindu civilisation based on a common pan-Indian Hindu national identity. Muslims occupy the position of a ‘constitutive outside’ enabling the construction of a Hindu Rashtra; they remain ‘enemies’ to be either excluded or assimilated to a Hindu national culture. Consequently, they remain targets of government legislation. This will be illustrated with reference to the recent abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir, the building of a temple to the Hindu God Ram in Ayodhya, the Citizen Amendment Act, and the government of India’s responses to COVID-19. India under Modi, it concludes, is on the way to becoming a Hindu Rashtra.","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"4 1","pages":"264 - 280"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84420242","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-05-27DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1947660
Marat S. Shterin, Daniel Nilsson Dehanas
{"title":"Editors’ introduction","authors":"Marat S. Shterin, Daniel Nilsson Dehanas","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1947660","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1947660","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"100 1","pages":"187 - 187"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76643718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1925416
J. Madeley
{"title":"From Huntington to Trump: thirty years of the clash of civilizations","authors":"J. Madeley","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1925416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1925416","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"59 1","pages":"183 - 185"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"86017268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-03-15DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2021.1924014
Sunarwoto
ABSTRACT In explaining sectarian violence and conflict in Indonesia, some scholars have highlighted the crucial role played by key political actors. Taking online Salafi rivalries as its point of departure, this contribution aims to further advance the discussion on the sectarianisation thesis offered by Hashemi and Postel, which argues that one of the key factors in religious sectarianism is not theology but authoritarianism. Unlike the thesis, this contribution argues that Salafi sectarianism is facilitated by Indonesia’s democratic atmosphere rather than by authoritarianism. However, this contribution agrees with the thesis that theology is not a determining aspect in Salafi sectarianism. Although framed in theological terms, Salafi rivalries are driven by competing to demonstrate their religious identity, authority, and ‘good’ citizenship.
{"title":"Online Salafi rivalries in Indonesia: between sectarianism and ‘good’ citizenship","authors":"Sunarwoto","doi":"10.1080/09637494.2021.1924014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1924014","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In explaining sectarian violence and conflict in Indonesia, some scholars have highlighted the crucial role played by key political actors. Taking online Salafi rivalries as its point of departure, this contribution aims to further advance the discussion on the sectarianisation thesis offered by Hashemi and Postel, which argues that one of the key factors in religious sectarianism is not theology but authoritarianism. Unlike the thesis, this contribution argues that Salafi sectarianism is facilitated by Indonesia’s democratic atmosphere rather than by authoritarianism. However, this contribution agrees with the thesis that theology is not a determining aspect in Salafi sectarianism. Although framed in theological terms, Salafi rivalries are driven by competing to demonstrate their religious identity, authority, and ‘good’ citizenship.","PeriodicalId":45069,"journal":{"name":"Religion State & Society","volume":"59 1","pages":"157 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77212278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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