Holger Spamann, Lars Klöhn, Christophe Jamin, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, J. Liu, Pavan Mamidi, Alexander Morell, I. Reidel
In our lab, 299 real judges from seven major jurisdictions (Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, and USA) spend up to fifty-five minutes to judge an international criminal appeals case and determine the appropriate prison sentence. The lab computer (i) logs their use of the documents (briefs, statement of facts, trial judgment, statute, precedent) and (ii) randomly assigns each judge (a) a horizontal precedent disfavoring, favoring, or strongly favoring defendant, (b) a sympathetic or an unsympathetic defendant, and (c) a short, medium, or long sentence anchor. Document use and written reasons differ between countries but not between common and civil law. Precedent effect is barely detectable and estimated to be less, and bounded to be not much greater than, that of legally irrelevant defendant attributes and sentence anchors.
{"title":"Judges in the Lab: No Precedent Effects, No Common/Civil Law Differences","authors":"Holger Spamann, Lars Klöhn, Christophe Jamin, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, J. Liu, Pavan Mamidi, Alexander Morell, I. Reidel","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3700289","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700289","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In our lab, 299 real judges from seven major jurisdictions (Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, and USA) spend up to fifty-five minutes to judge an international criminal appeals case and determine the appropriate prison sentence. The lab computer (i) logs their use of the documents (briefs, statement of facts, trial judgment, statute, precedent) and (ii) randomly assigns each judge (a) a horizontal precedent disfavoring, favoring, or strongly favoring defendant, (b) a sympathetic or an unsympathetic defendant, and (c) a short, medium, or long sentence anchor. Document use and written reasons differ between countries but not between common and civil law. Precedent effect is barely detectable and estimated to be less, and bounded to be not much greater than, that of legally irrelevant defendant attributes and sentence anchors.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"89207409","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Leasing may be the most important legal institution that has received virtually no systematic scholarly attention. Real property leasing is familiar in the context of residential tenancies. But it is also widely used in commercial contexts, including office buildings and shopping centers. Personal property leasing, which was rarely encountered before World War II, has more recently exploded on a world-wide basis, with everything from autos to farm equipment to airplanes being leased. This article seeks to develop a composite picture of the defining features of leases and why leasing is such a widespread and highly successful economic institution. The reasons fall under three general headings. (i) Leasing is an attractive method of financing the acquisition of assets, especially for persons who have limited capital or would like to conserve their capital and cash flows for other purposes. (ii) Leasing is a device for minimizing the risks that either lessees or lessors associate with owning assets; although leasing also creates risks, various lease modifications have been developed to manage these derivative risks. (iii) By dividing the rights to an asset between lessor and lessee, leasing permits the parties to specialize in different functions and to solve various impediments to contracting that would be difficult to overcome among separate owners. Understanding the economic advantages of leasing is an important first step in considering possible legal reforms of leasing.
{"title":"The Economics of Leasing","authors":"Merrill T.","doi":"10.1093/jla/laaa003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laaa003","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>Leasing may be the most important legal institution that has received virtually no systematic scholarly attention. Real property leasing is familiar in the context of residential tenancies. But it is also widely used in commercial contexts, including office buildings and shopping centers. Personal property leasing, which was rarely encountered before World War II, has more recently exploded on a world-wide basis, with everything from autos to farm equipment to airplanes being leased. This article seeks to develop a composite picture of the defining features of leases and why leasing is such a widespread and highly successful economic institution. The reasons fall under three general headings. (i) Leasing is an attractive method of financing the acquisition of assets, especially for persons who have limited capital or would like to conserve their capital and cash flows for other purposes. (ii) Leasing is a device for minimizing the risks that either lessees or lessors associate with owning assets; although leasing also creates risks, various lease modifications have been developed to manage these derivative risks. (iii) By dividing the rights to an asset between lessor and lessee, leasing permits the parties to specialize in different functions and to solve various impediments to contracting that would be difficult to overcome among separate owners. Understanding the economic advantages of leasing is an important first step in considering possible legal reforms of leasing.</span>","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-09-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Competition between firms to invent and patent an idea, or “patent racing,” has been much discussed in theory, but seldom analyzed empirically and never at scale. This article introduces an empirical way to identify patent races, and provides the first broad-based view of them in the real world. It reveals that patent races are common, particularly in information-technology fields. The article then analyzes the effect of winning a patent race, showing that patent race winners do significantly more follow-on innovation, and their follow-on research is more similar to what was covered by the patent.(JEL CODES: O34, O32, O31)
{"title":"Does Winning a Patent Race lead to more follow-on Innovation?","authors":"Thompson N, Kuhn J.","doi":"10.1093/jla/laaa001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laaa001","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>Competition between firms to invent and patent an idea, or “patent racing,” has been much discussed in theory, but seldom analyzed empirically and never at scale. This article introduces an empirical way to identify patent races, and provides the first broad-based view of them in the real world. It reveals that patent races are common, particularly in information-technology fields. The article then analyzes the effect of winning a patent race, showing that patent race winners do significantly more follow-on innovation, and their follow-on research is more similar to what was covered by the patent.(JEL CODES: O34, O32, O31)</span>","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Locke’s labor theory, the most familiar of property theories, has faced centuries of philosophical criticism. Nonetheless, recent legal scholars have applied it to intellectual property while overlooking these philosophical critiques. Philosophers, on the other hand, are largely absent in IP theorizing, thus not asking whether Locke’s resilient intuition is salvageable in copyright’s domain. This Article argues that Lockean copyright is actually far more plausible than Lockean property, for it avoids the most devastating objections the latter faces. It then defends a surprising doctrinal implication of this theoretical conclusion: a workable Lockean copyright favors rights far more limited than present law.
{"title":"Lockean Copyright versus Lockean Property","authors":"Chatterjee M.","doi":"10.1093/jla/laaa002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laaa002","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>Locke’s labor theory, the most familiar of property theories, has faced centuries of philosophical criticism. Nonetheless, recent legal scholars have applied it to intellectual property while overlooking these philosophical critiques. Philosophers, on the other hand, are largely absent in IP theorizing, thus not asking whether Locke’s resilient intuition is salvageable in copyright’s domain. This Article argues that Lockean copyright is actually far more plausible than Lockean property, for it avoids the most devastating objections the latter faces. It then defends a surprising doctrinal implication of this theoretical conclusion: a workable Lockean copyright favors rights far more limited than present law.</span>","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-05-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Traditional comparative private law scholars have a firm grasp of laws in several countries, but rarely of those in more than one hundred countries. Quantitative comparative private law scholars have placed dozens of countries into a legal family genealogy, but not based on a systematic understanding of legal substance around the world. Using a unique, hand-coded data set on 108 property doctrines (transformed into 170 binary variables) in 129 jurisdictions, we ran supervised and unsupervised machine-learning algorithms. Some of our findings confirm the conventional wisdom: French and German property laws are influential; mixed jurisdictions like South Africa and Scotland are one of a kind; common law jurisdictions form a group of their own; and a handful of formerly socialist countries, led by Russia, cluster together. Unlike the prior literature, however, we do not find that East Asian jurisdictions warrant a category of their own; but belong to distant groups. Spain and many Latin American countries form a separate group. Rather than finding a clear-cut common versus civil law division, we observe that the France-inspired group is one supercluster, separate from other jurisdictions.
{"title":"Drawing the Legal Family Tree: An Empirical Comparative Study of 170 Dimensions of Property Law in 129 Jurisdictions","authors":"Yun-chien Chang, Nuno Garoupa, M. Wells","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAAA004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAAA004","url":null,"abstract":"Traditional comparative private law scholars have a firm grasp of laws in several countries, but rarely of those in more than one hundred countries. Quantitative comparative private law scholars have placed dozens of countries into a legal family genealogy, but not based on a systematic understanding of legal substance around the world. Using a unique, hand-coded data set on 108 property doctrines (transformed into 170 binary variables) in 129 jurisdictions, we ran supervised and unsupervised machine-learning algorithms. Some of our findings confirm the conventional wisdom: French and German property laws are influential; mixed jurisdictions like South Africa and Scotland are one of a kind; common law jurisdictions form a group of their own; and a handful of formerly socialist countries, led by Russia, cluster together. Unlike the prior literature, however, we do not find that East Asian jurisdictions warrant a category of their own; but belong to distant groups. Spain and many Latin American countries form a separate group. Rather than finding a clear-cut common versus civil law division, we observe that the France-inspired group is one supercluster, separate from other jurisdictions.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77500732","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contemporary property theory highlights information costs as the central determinant of exclusion rights and numerus clausus-type standardization: rising information costs lead to stronger exclusion rights and more standardization, whereas falling information costs have the opposite effect. This paradigmatic model lacks, however, a theory of how information costs change in the first place. By developing such a theory, this article demonstrates that, in prominent cases, the legal impact of information costs tends to be counterbalanced by concurrent changes in individual preference, and that preexisting predictions about the relationship between information costs, standardization, and exclusion are therefore partially wrong, and otherwise incomplete.
{"title":"Beyond Information Costs: Preference Formation and the Architecture of Property Law","authors":"Zhang T.","doi":"10.1093/jla/laz007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laz007","url":null,"abstract":"<span><div>Abstract</div>Contemporary property theory highlights information costs as the central determinant of exclusion rights and numerus clausus-type standardization: rising information costs lead to stronger exclusion rights and more standardization, whereas falling information costs have the opposite effect. This paradigmatic model lacks, however, a theory of how information costs change in the first place. By developing such a theory, this article demonstrates that, in prominent cases, the legal impact of information costs tends to be counterbalanced by concurrent changes in individual preference, and that preexisting predictions about the relationship between information costs, standardization, and exclusion are therefore partially wrong, and otherwise incomplete.</span>","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Locke’s labor theory, the most familiar of property theories, has faced centuries of philosophical criticism. Nonetheless, recent legal scholars have applied it to intellectual property while overlooking these philosophical critiques. Philosophers, on the other hand, are largely absent in IP theorizing, thus not asking whether Locke’s resilient intuition is salvageable in copyright’s domain. This Article argues that Lockean copyright is actually far more plausible than Lockean property, for it avoids the most devastating objections the latter faces. It then defends a surprising doctrinal implication of this theoretical conclusion: a workable Lockean copyright favors rights far more limited than present law.
{"title":"Lockean Copyright versus Lockean Property","authors":"Mala Chatterjee","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.3423423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.3423423","url":null,"abstract":"Locke’s labor theory, the most familiar of property theories, has faced centuries of philosophical criticism. Nonetheless, recent legal scholars have applied it to intellectual property while overlooking these philosophical critiques. Philosophers, on the other hand, are largely absent in IP theorizing, thus not asking whether Locke’s resilient intuition is salvageable in copyright’s domain. This Article argues that Lockean copyright is actually far more plausible than Lockean property, for it avoids the most devastating objections the latter faces. It then defends a surprising doctrinal implication of this theoretical conclusion: a workable Lockean copyright favors rights far more limited than present law.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"88079292","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract We present a new framework for analyzing defamation liability that serves both to clarify and complicate understandings of the law’s consequences for speakers, victims, and the marketplace of ideas. In addition to the familiar deterrence and chilling effects, we show how defamation liability can generate a “warming effect,” making statements more credible and potentially raising both the quality and quantity of speech. We also explain how a more plaintiff-friendly liability regime may exacerbate harms to defamation victims. We end by considering the possibility of “self-tailored” defamation law, with victims or speakers selecting the defamation liability regime that applies to them.
{"title":"Free Speech and Cheap Talk","authors":"Daniel Hemel,Ariel Porat","doi":"10.1093/jla/laz004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jla/laz004","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We present a new framework for analyzing defamation liability that serves both to clarify and complicate understandings of the law’s consequences for speakers, victims, and the marketplace of ideas. In addition to the familiar deterrence and chilling effects, we show how defamation liability can generate a “warming effect,” making statements more credible and potentially raising both the quality and quantity of speech. We also explain how a more plaintiff-friendly liability regime may exacerbate harms to defamation victims. We end by considering the possibility of “self-tailored” defamation law, with victims or speakers selecting the defamation liability regime that applies to them.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138520852","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Digital information is the fuel of the new economy. But like the old economy’s carbon fuel, it also pollutes. Harmful “data emissions” are leaked into the digital ecosystem, disrupting social institutions and public interests. This article develops a novel framework—data pollution—to rethink the harms the data economy creates and the way they have to be regulated. It argues that social intervention should focus on the external harms from collection and misuse of personal data. The article challenges the hegemony of the prevailing view—that the injuries from digital data enterprise are exclusively private. That view has led lawmakers to focus solely on privacy protection as the regulatory objective. The article claims, instead, that a central problem in the digital economy has been largely ignored: how the information given by people affects others, and how it undermines and degrades public goods and interests. The data pollution concept offers a novel perspective why existing regulatory tools—torts, contracts, and disclosure law—are ineffective, mirroring their historical futility in curbing the harms from industrial pollution. The data pollution framework also opens up a rich roadmap for new regulatory devices—“an environmental law for data protection”—which focuses on controlling these external effects. The article examines how the tools used to control industrial pollution—production restrictions, carbon tax, and emissions liability—could be adapted to govern data pollution.
{"title":"Data Pollution","authors":"O. Ben‐Shahar","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3191231","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3191231","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Digital information is the fuel of the new economy. But like the old economy’s carbon fuel, it also pollutes. Harmful “data emissions” are leaked into the digital ecosystem, disrupting social institutions and public interests. This article develops a novel framework—data pollution—to rethink the harms the data economy creates and the way they have to be regulated. It argues that social intervention should focus on the external harms from collection and misuse of personal data. The article challenges the hegemony of the prevailing view—that the injuries from digital data enterprise are exclusively private. That view has led lawmakers to focus solely on privacy protection as the regulatory objective. The article claims, instead, that a central problem in the digital economy has been largely ignored: how the information given by people affects others, and how it undermines and degrades public goods and interests. The data pollution concept offers a novel perspective why existing regulatory tools—torts, contracts, and disclosure law—are ineffective, mirroring their historical futility in curbing the harms from industrial pollution. The data pollution framework also opens up a rich roadmap for new regulatory devices—“an environmental law for data protection”—which focuses on controlling these external effects. The article examines how the tools used to control industrial pollution—production restrictions, carbon tax, and emissions liability—could be adapted to govern data pollution.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2019-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"81793203","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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