We discuss the commitment mechanisms that underpin social orderings. We categorize commitments in relationships along a hierarchy that runs from the most extra-legal to the most legally intensive devices. Commitment devices are chosen in light of their social, legal and technological contexts. Changes to these contexts therefore change the social order and, in extremis, can cause significant social dislocation. We use a new new dataset of underwriting syndicates between 1933 and 2008 to argue that financial market have experienced such a dislocation. We discuss the policy implications of this dislocation with specific reference to cases in securitization and M&A markets.
{"title":"Trust, Reputation, and Law: the Evolution of Commitment in Investment Banking","authors":"A. Morrison, W. Wilhelm","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAV007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAV007","url":null,"abstract":"We discuss the commitment mechanisms that underpin social orderings. We categorize commitments in relationships along a hierarchy that runs from the most extra-legal to the most legally intensive devices. Commitment devices are chosen in light of their social, legal and technological contexts. Changes to these contexts therefore change the social order and, in extremis, can cause significant social dislocation. We use a new new dataset of underwriting syndicates between 1933 and 2008 to argue that financial market have experienced such a dislocation. We discuss the policy implications of this dislocation with specific reference to cases in securitization and M&A markets.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"209 1","pages":"363-420"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77759905","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Verifiable proxies for social capital potentially provide an empirically tractable way to identify environments where social norms both constrain behavior and substitute for judicial enforcement. Using regression and factor analysis with Japanese prefecture-level data, I explore several aspects of this possibility. First, I find that people in prefectures with high levels of social capital more readily comply with a range of low-level legal mandates. Second, reflecting the fact that social norms need not point toward government-approved ends, taxpayers in high social-capital prefectures (particularly in the agricultural sector) are more -- not less -- likely to evade taxes. Third, conditional on levels of economic welfare, I find that: (a) firms in prefectures with low levels of social capital are more likely to default on their contracts; (b) residents in low social-capital prefectures are probably (the results are ambiguous) more likely to litigate; (c) creditors of distressed debtors in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to apply in court for enforcement orders, and (d) distressed debtors in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to file in court for bankruptcy protection.
{"title":"Social Capital and the Formal Legal System: Evidence from Prefecture-Level Data in Japan","authors":"John M. Olin, M. Ramseyer","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAV008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAV008","url":null,"abstract":"Verifiable proxies for social capital potentially provide an empirically tractable way to identify environments where social norms both constrain behavior and substitute for judicial enforcement. Using regression and factor analysis with Japanese prefecture-level data, I explore several aspects of this possibility. First, I find that people in prefectures with high levels of social capital more readily comply with a range of low-level legal mandates. Second, reflecting the fact that social norms need not point toward government-approved ends, taxpayers in high social-capital prefectures (particularly in the agricultural sector) are more -- not less -- likely to evade taxes. Third, conditional on levels of economic welfare, I find that: (a) firms in prefectures with low levels of social capital are more likely to default on their contracts; (b) residents in low social-capital prefectures are probably (the results are ambiguous) more likely to litigate; (c) creditors of distressed debtors in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to apply in court for enforcement orders, and (d) distressed debtors in low social-capital prefectures are more likely to file in court for bankruptcy protection.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"1991 1","pages":"421-466"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82336192","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The master agreements that nominally govern the transactions between mid-western Original Equipment Manufacturers and their suppliers are not, for the most part, designed to create legal obligations. Rather, they create a space in which private order can flourish, much like the role played by firm boundaries in the Coase-Williamson theory of the firm. This Article explores how sophisticated transactors in this market have combined governance techniques associated with arm’s-length contracting, intrafirm hierarchy, and trust-based relational contracting to create relationships that are long-term, highly cooperative, and characterized by significant relationship-specific investment. It suggests that these transactors have been able to accomplish these outcomes with only minimal reliance on the legal system, in large part because they operate in a market of highly interconnected firms — a network that itself functions as a contract governance mechanism. It then explores the implications of these contract structures and the availability of network governance for firms’ make-or-buy decisions and the likelihood of innovation.
{"title":"Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in Procurement Contracts","authors":"Lisa E. Bernstein","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAW001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAW001","url":null,"abstract":"The master agreements that nominally govern the transactions between mid-western Original Equipment Manufacturers and their suppliers are not, for the most part, designed to create legal obligations. Rather, they create a space in which private order can flourish, much like the role played by firm boundaries in the Coase-Williamson theory of the firm. This Article explores how sophisticated transactors in this market have combined governance techniques associated with arm’s-length contracting, intrafirm hierarchy, and trust-based relational contracting to create relationships that are long-term, highly cooperative, and characterized by significant relationship-specific investment. It suggests that these transactors have been able to accomplish these outcomes with only minimal reliance on the legal system, in large part because they operate in a market of highly interconnected firms — a network that itself functions as a contract governance mechanism. It then explores the implications of these contract structures and the availability of network governance for firms’ make-or-buy decisions and the likelihood of innovation.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"25 1","pages":"561-621"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87020006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A trade association is a millennium-old organizational form that has existed on all continents. It is a private, formal, nonprofit organization designed to promote the common interests of its members, even if these members are competitors on product (or research) markets. While it is straightforward to assume that an association creates net benefits for its members – why would they join, otherwise? – it is unclear whether, or under which circumstances, the existence of an association has positive net effects for the rest of the economy. In “Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions,” Maria Larrain and Jens Prufer study this question by means of a game-theoretic model. The answer is, of course, “it depends.” But on what does it depend? And why?
{"title":"Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions","authors":"Maria Larrain, J. Prüfer","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAV009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAV009","url":null,"abstract":"A trade association is a millennium-old organizational form that has existed on all continents. It is a private, formal, nonprofit organization designed to promote the common interests of its members, even if these members are competitors on product (or research) markets. While it is straightforward to assume that an association creates net benefits for its members – why would they join, otherwise? – it is unclear whether, or under which circumstances, the existence of an association has positive net effects for the rest of the economy. In “Trade Associations, Lobbying, and Endogenous Institutions,” Maria Larrain and Jens Prufer study this question by means of a game-theoretic model. The answer is, of course, “it depends.” But on what does it depend? And why?","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"399 1","pages":"467-516"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2015-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76916306","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The story of a medieval law merchant has a strong hold on scholars interested in private ordering. Despite numerous historical works demonstrating the falsity of the myth, it continues to be discussed regularly in scholarship as if it were an accurate portrayal of the past. This article tests the law merchant story against evidence about the mechanisms of medieval trade. It suggests that medieval commerce had little space for a specialized law, and that merchants had little need for it because of both the well-developed trading infrastructure and the actions of local governments to ensure the protection of legal rights.
{"title":"The Medieval Law Merchant: The Tyranny of a Construct","authors":"Emily E. Kadens","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAV004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAV004","url":null,"abstract":"The story of a medieval law merchant has a strong hold on scholars interested in private ordering. Despite numerous historical works demonstrating the falsity of the myth, it continues to be discussed regularly in scholarship as if it were an accurate portrayal of the past. This article tests the law merchant story against evidence about the mechanisms of medieval trade. It suggests that medieval commerce had little space for a specialized law, and that merchants had little need for it because of both the well-developed trading infrastructure and the actions of local governments to ensure the protection of legal rights.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"26 1","pages":"251-289"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2015-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87219332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The functionality doctrine in trademark law bars protection for some, but not all, source-identifying product features — so-called trade dress — that contribute to a product’s functional performance. Despite the doctrine’s lengthy history, its critical role in promoting intellectual property policies, and the considerable attention devoted to it in recent decades, courts and commentators still disagree about what functionality means, the reasons why functional marks should not be protected, and how far the functionality bar should extend. This confusion is due largely to a lack of clarity and rigor at the normative level. This article seeks to remedy the deficiency. It traces the history of the functionality doctrine, critically analyzes its policy foundations, and outlines an analytical approach for designing optimal functionality rules.
{"title":"Trademark Functionality Reexamined","authors":"R. Bone","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAV002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAV002","url":null,"abstract":"The functionality doctrine in trademark law bars protection for some, but not all, source-identifying product features — so-called trade dress — that contribute to a product’s functional performance. Despite the doctrine’s lengthy history, its critical role in promoting intellectual property policies, and the considerable attention devoted to it in recent decades, courts and commentators still disagree about what functionality means, the reasons why functional marks should not be protected, and how far the functionality bar should extend. This confusion is due largely to a lack of clarity and rigor at the normative level. This article seeks to remedy the deficiency. It traces the history of the functionality doctrine, critically analyzes its policy foundations, and outlines an analytical approach for designing optimal functionality rules.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"14 1","pages":"183-246"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2015-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73308233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
P. Robinson, M. Kussmaul, Camber M. Stoddard, I. Rudyak, A. Kuersten
There are fifty-two different bodies of criminal law at work in the United States, as diverse as they are many. Each one stakes out seemingly innumerable positions on a range of highly contested issues. So, how is one to know what the “American rule” is on any given matter of criminal law? This article takes the first step towards answering this question by presenting the first installment of the “American Criminal Code.”This article is the result of an exhaustive research project that examined every contested issue relating to the general defenses to criminal liability, including all justification, excuse, and non-exculpatory defenses. With this foundation, the article determines the majority American position among the fifty-two jurisdictions, and formulates statutory language for each defense that reflects the majority American rule in all respects. The article also compares and contrasts the majority position on each issue to all significant minority positions, the Model Penal Code, and the National Commission’s proposed code.Finally, using the results of these analyses, the article compares patterns among the states for issues within the most controversial justification defense, the Defense of Persons, to a wide range of other variables — such as state population, racial characteristics, violent crime rates, and gun ownership — and highlights many interesting correlations. While applying this kind of doctrinal correlation analysis to all of the project’s existing data would be a major undertaking many times larger than the present project, the article illustrates how such analysis can be done, and how interesting the revealed patterns can be.
{"title":"The American Criminal Code: General Defenses","authors":"P. Robinson, M. Kussmaul, Camber M. Stoddard, I. Rudyak, A. Kuersten","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAV001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAV001","url":null,"abstract":"There are fifty-two different bodies of criminal law at work in the United States, as diverse as they are many. Each one stakes out seemingly innumerable positions on a range of highly contested issues. So, how is one to know what the “American rule” is on any given matter of criminal law? This article takes the first step towards answering this question by presenting the first installment of the “American Criminal Code.”This article is the result of an exhaustive research project that examined every contested issue relating to the general defenses to criminal liability, including all justification, excuse, and non-exculpatory defenses. With this foundation, the article determines the majority American position among the fifty-two jurisdictions, and formulates statutory language for each defense that reflects the majority American rule in all respects. The article also compares and contrasts the majority position on each issue to all significant minority positions, the Model Penal Code, and the National Commission’s proposed code.Finally, using the results of these analyses, the article compares patterns among the states for issues within the most controversial justification defense, the Defense of Persons, to a wide range of other variables — such as state population, racial characteristics, violent crime rates, and gun ownership — and highlights many interesting correlations. While applying this kind of doctrinal correlation analysis to all of the project’s existing data would be a major undertaking many times larger than the present project, the article illustrates how such analysis can be done, and how interesting the revealed patterns can be.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"28 1","pages":"37-150"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2015-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75132977","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We formally demonstrate the general case for class action in a rent-seeking contest model, explaining why separate action adjudication is biased in the defendant’s favor and collective adjudication is bias-free. Separate action bias arises from the defendant’s investment advantage in capitalizing on centralized control over the aggregate (classwide) stake in the common question defense, while the plaintiff, with only an individual recovery at stake, spends much less. Class action eliminates bias by enabling both parties to make their best case through centralized optimal classwide investments. Our social benefit-cost analysis shows that class action surpasses alternative methods for achieving bias-free adjudication.
{"title":"Incentives to Invest in Litigation and the Superiority of the Class Action","authors":"D. Rosenberg, K. Spier","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAU006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAU006","url":null,"abstract":"We formally demonstrate the general case for class action in a rent-seeking contest model, explaining why separate action adjudication is biased in the defendant’s favor and collective adjudication is bias-free. Separate action bias arises from the defendant’s investment advantage in capitalizing on centralized control over the aggregate (classwide) stake in the common question defense, while the plaintiff, with only an individual recovery at stake, spends much less. Class action eliminates bias by enabling both parties to make their best case through centralized optimal classwide investments. Our social benefit-cost analysis shows that class action surpasses alternative methods for achieving bias-free adjudication.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"1 1","pages":"305-365"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2014-09-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87207875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There has been substantial debate in the legal academy centered on the questions of whether universal moral intuitions exist and, if so, whether these intuitions have a privileged normative status, a debate both reflecting and partly reinterpreting classical jurisprudential debates about the existence of “natural law” and “natural rights.” There is a strong but underappreciated homology between the debates about the nature and quality of intuitive moral reasoning, and debates, associated with the Heuristics and Biases (H&B) school on the one hand and the “Fast and Frugal” (F&F) school on the other, about the nature and quality of our capacity to make self-interested decisions (decisions requiring both factual and a-moral evaluative judgment and decision making ability. There are those in the legal academy, most prominently Cass Sunstein, who accept that people indeed often have strong moral intuitions but believe these predispositions deserve little or no normative deference because the intuitions frequently merely reflect the use of inapt rules of thumb. Others, most prominently John Mikhail, believe people readily make non-reflective moral judgments that we cannot readily explain or justify logically that are grounded in our capacity to process a quite small number of critical features of a decision situation in precisely the way that F&F theorists believe we make most judgments. I explore the degree to which some of the virtues, and, more importantly, most of the problems, in both Sunstein's and Mikhail’s work are the features and shortcomings that have bedeviled the work of each of the schools on heuristic reasoning.
{"title":"Moral Realism and the Heuristics Debate","authors":"M. Kelman","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAT004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAT004","url":null,"abstract":"There has been substantial debate in the legal academy centered on the questions of whether universal moral intuitions exist and, if so, whether these intuitions have a privileged normative status, a debate both reflecting and partly reinterpreting classical jurisprudential debates about the existence of “natural law” and “natural rights.” There is a strong but underappreciated homology between the debates about the nature and quality of intuitive moral reasoning, and debates, associated with the Heuristics and Biases (H&B) school on the one hand and the “Fast and Frugal” (F&F) school on the other, about the nature and quality of our capacity to make self-interested decisions (decisions requiring both factual and a-moral evaluative judgment and decision making ability. There are those in the legal academy, most prominently Cass Sunstein, who accept that people indeed often have strong moral intuitions but believe these predispositions deserve little or no normative deference because the intuitions frequently merely reflect the use of inapt rules of thumb. Others, most prominently John Mikhail, believe people readily make non-reflective moral judgments that we cannot readily explain or justify logically that are grounded in our capacity to process a quite small number of critical features of a decision situation in precisely the way that F&F theorists believe we make most judgments. I explore the degree to which some of the virtues, and, more importantly, most of the problems, in both Sunstein's and Mikhail’s work are the features and shortcomings that have bedeviled the work of each of the schools on heuristic reasoning.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"68 1","pages":"339-397"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74522968","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article proposes a new approach to the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The idea works as follows. Defendant moves to dismiss exactly as under current practice. Plaintiff either responds to the motion, thus submitting the matter for decision, or files an affidavit proposing a plan of targeted discovery. After receiving defendant’s response, the court approves, rejects, or revises the proposed discovery plan. If the judge allows discovery, defendant either withdraws the motion or produces the information. If defendant withdraws the motion, the litigation proceeds in the usual way. If defendant continues the motion the parties engage in targeted discovery. The court then reviews the motion taking account of information which either party brings to the court’s attention, including information produced in discovery. If the court grants the motion, the case is dismissed and plaintiff pays defendant’s reasonable fees and costs associated with the motion and associated discovery. If the court denies the motion, the case continues and defendant pays plaintiff’s reasonable fees and costs. Our proposal would incentivize both parties to reveal information pertinent to the court’s decision. It promises to improve the operation of the motion to dismiss regardless of the substantive standard used to evaluate the sufficiency of the claims for relief.
{"title":"An Information-Forcing Approach to the Motion to Dismiss","authors":"S. Issacharoff, G. Miller","doi":"10.1093/JLA/LAT002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/JLA/LAT002","url":null,"abstract":"This article proposes a new approach to the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The idea works as follows. Defendant moves to dismiss exactly as under current practice. Plaintiff either responds to the motion, thus submitting the matter for decision, or files an affidavit proposing a plan of targeted discovery. After receiving defendant’s response, the court approves, rejects, or revises the proposed discovery plan. If the judge allows discovery, defendant either withdraws the motion or produces the information. If defendant withdraws the motion, the litigation proceeds in the usual way. If defendant continues the motion the parties engage in targeted discovery. The court then reviews the motion taking account of information which either party brings to the court’s attention, including information produced in discovery. If the court grants the motion, the case is dismissed and plaintiff pays defendant’s reasonable fees and costs associated with the motion and associated discovery. If the court denies the motion, the case continues and defendant pays plaintiff’s reasonable fees and costs. Our proposal would incentivize both parties to reveal information pertinent to the court’s decision. It promises to improve the operation of the motion to dismiss regardless of the substantive standard used to evaluate the sufficiency of the claims for relief.","PeriodicalId":45189,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Legal Analysis","volume":"67 1","pages":"437-465"},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2013-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84001005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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