Pub Date : 2023-11-02DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2261824
Eleni Braat
Military dictatorships critically rely on the armed forces and intelligence agencies for the maintenance of their regime. They strengthen these through the allocation of substantial staff and personal resources. We know little about the behavior of intelligence and security services in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This article examines the Greek Intelligence Service (KYP) and, since 1986, the National Intelligence Service as its successor. A principal ingredient for the democratic embedment of the service was a break with this dictatorial past and, consequently, its demilitarization. This article shows that the de facto demilitarization of the service was a protracted process that was largely independent from the de jure formal demilitarization in 1986. It both preceded and lagged the legislative decision in 1986. This article particularly focusses on personnel policies aimed at distancing the service from its former ties to the junta regime (1967–1974), the “old KYP.” Its methodological contribution lies in its reliance on original, oral history interviews with former employees of the service and in its systematic analysis of newspaper publications for research on the KYP. I argue and show that internal organizational factors, most notably professionalization and shifting responsibilities, rather than external factors such as party politics or a prodemocratic ideological vision, are the key explanations for a change in the otherwise persistent military staffing of the intelligence service.
{"title":"Democratization of Intelligence: Demilitarizing the Greek Intelligence Service after the Junta","authors":"Eleni Braat","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2261824","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2261824","url":null,"abstract":"Military dictatorships critically rely on the armed forces and intelligence agencies for the maintenance of their regime. They strengthen these through the allocation of substantial staff and personal resources. We know little about the behavior of intelligence and security services in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. This article examines the Greek Intelligence Service (KYP) and, since 1986, the National Intelligence Service as its successor. A principal ingredient for the democratic embedment of the service was a break with this dictatorial past and, consequently, its demilitarization. This article shows that the de facto demilitarization of the service was a protracted process that was largely independent from the de jure formal demilitarization in 1986. It both preceded and lagged the legislative decision in 1986. This article particularly focusses on personnel policies aimed at distancing the service from its former ties to the junta regime (1967–1974), the “old KYP.” Its methodological contribution lies in its reliance on original, oral history interviews with former employees of the service and in its systematic analysis of newspaper publications for research on the KYP. I argue and show that internal organizational factors, most notably professionalization and shifting responsibilities, rather than external factors such as party politics or a prodemocratic ideological vision, are the key explanations for a change in the otherwise persistent military staffing of the intelligence service.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"185 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135933167","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-31DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2261823
Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández
{"title":"Spanish Intelligence in the Early Days of Late-Francoism: Fault Lines and Continuity","authors":"Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2261823","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2261823","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"29 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135871163","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-30DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2259743
Kevin Riehle
{"title":"Flood of Erroneous Details on Soviet IntelligenceBoris Volodarsky <b>:</b> <i>The Birth of the Soviet Secret Police: Lenin and History’s Greatest Heist 1917–1927</i> Frontline Books, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, 2023, 393 p., £25.00 (hardbound).","authors":"Kevin Riehle","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2259743","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2259743","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136104859","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2255507
Simon Oleszkiewicz, Dominick J. Atkinson, Steven Kleinman, Christian A. Meissner
Drawing on the scientific literature on trust and the experiences of distinguished interviewers, two primary trust-building tactics with potential application in investigative and intelligence interviewing were identified and assessed for their efficacy in this context. Trust-building tactics that demonstrate trustworthiness and demonstrate a willingness to trust portray the interviewer as reliable and dependable (i.e., perceptions of cognitive trust) as well as convey goodwill and warmth (i.e., perceptions of affective trust) were viewed as likely to increase a source’s willingness to disclose critical information. Across three experiments, both tactics were found to be influential in engaging the reciprocity principle in a manner that elicited the sources’ cooperation and enhanced information yield. However, perceptions of cognitive trust were found to function as a direct encouragement to reveal information. In contrast, perceptions of affective trust first facilitated a willingness to cooperate that had the potential for subsequently manifesting as an instrumental form of cooperation.
{"title":"Building Trust to Enhance Elicitation","authors":"Simon Oleszkiewicz, Dominick J. Atkinson, Steven Kleinman, Christian A. Meissner","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2255507","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2255507","url":null,"abstract":"Drawing on the scientific literature on trust and the experiences of distinguished interviewers, two primary trust-building tactics with potential application in investigative and intelligence interviewing were identified and assessed for their efficacy in this context. Trust-building tactics that demonstrate trustworthiness and demonstrate a willingness to trust portray the interviewer as reliable and dependable (i.e., perceptions of cognitive trust) as well as convey goodwill and warmth (i.e., perceptions of affective trust) were viewed as likely to increase a source’s willingness to disclose critical information. Across three experiments, both tactics were found to be influential in engaging the reciprocity principle in a manner that elicited the sources’ cooperation and enhanced information yield. However, perceptions of cognitive trust were found to function as a direct encouragement to reveal information. In contrast, perceptions of affective trust first facilitated a willingness to cooperate that had the potential for subsequently manifesting as an instrumental form of cooperation.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-10DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2257544
Simon Oleszkiewicz, Pär Anders Granhag, Timothy J. Luke
In the United States, it is permissible to place an undercover police officer in the jail cell with a suspect. This tactical move is rare and launched only for serious crimes, and it takes place before any charges have been filed. This tactic goes under the name of Perkins operations, from the case ruling that if an individual speaks freely to someone whom they believe is a fellow inmate it is allowed to take advantage of their misplaced trust (Illinois v. Perkins, 1990). In this study, we examine 22 Perkins operations, 60 hours of secretly taped interactions in the cells, and we describe and categorize the different approaches and tactics that the undercover officers used. Based on the descriptive analysis, we conceptualize two pathways to information elicitation (direct and relational) and explore the undercover officers’ use of risky interview tactics. The findings suggest that undercover officers use four broader approaches to establish relationships and gather information, and we were able to identify only a few instances of risky tactics in this sample. The relevance of the findings for human intelligence gathering and counterintelligence are discussed.
{"title":"Perkins Operations: Tactics Used in Undercover Interactions","authors":"Simon Oleszkiewicz, Pär Anders Granhag, Timothy J. Luke","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2257544","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2257544","url":null,"abstract":"In the United States, it is permissible to place an undercover police officer in the jail cell with a suspect. This tactical move is rare and launched only for serious crimes, and it takes place before any charges have been filed. This tactic goes under the name of Perkins operations, from the case ruling that if an individual speaks freely to someone whom they believe is a fellow inmate it is allowed to take advantage of their misplaced trust (Illinois v. Perkins, 1990). In this study, we examine 22 Perkins operations, 60 hours of secretly taped interactions in the cells, and we describe and categorize the different approaches and tactics that the undercover officers used. Based on the descriptive analysis, we conceptualize two pathways to information elicitation (direct and relational) and explore the undercover officers’ use of risky interview tactics. The findings suggest that undercover officers use four broader approaches to establish relationships and gather information, and we were able to identify only a few instances of risky tactics in this sample. The relevance of the findings for human intelligence gathering and counterintelligence are discussed.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"28 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136353378","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-10DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2254490
John A. Gentry
Intelligence studies (IS) is a new and rapidly evolving academic discipline. Scholars periodically assess its status, noting considerable progress, but they have barely begun to assess the origins and implications of a significant recent development in IS: infiltration of the discipline by people determined to alter intelligence studies for ideological reasons. This commentary focuses on the destructive impact of neo-Marxian “critical intelligence studies” on IS generally. It addresses the origins and implications of this infection and suggests ways to inoculate IS against further damage.
{"title":"Ideology in Costume: A Growing Threat to Intelligence Studies","authors":"John A. Gentry","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2254490","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2254490","url":null,"abstract":"Intelligence studies (IS) is a new and rapidly evolving academic discipline. Scholars periodically assess its status, noting considerable progress, but they have barely begun to assess the origins and implications of a significant recent development in IS: infiltration of the discipline by people determined to alter intelligence studies for ideological reasons. This commentary focuses on the destructive impact of neo-Marxian “critical intelligence studies” on IS generally. It addresses the origins and implications of this infection and suggests ways to inoculate IS against further damage.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"27 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136353221","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-05DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2257549
Adrian Wolfberg
AbtractDecisionmakers expect intelligence assessments to be insightful. Still, intelligence professionals do not understand the insight process well enough to achieve consistently such indispensable outcomes. Little, if any, research has studied how intelligence analysts achieve insights. A qualitative, interview-based unclassified study was conducted to understand how insight emerges in 36 intelligence analysts who solved novel problems. The results include an emergence process consisting of two interacting elements—internalized tensions and priming—across the emotion–cognition and individual–social dimensions, and that the relationship between the two elements is complex. The emergence of insight is not predictable or controllable, which has significant challenges for the management of intelligence analysts because intelligence agencies typically are hierarchical organizations that emphasize order and control, conditions antithetical for nurturing emergence. This conundrum requires a major individual and cultural shift by management. The study suggests that the findings are generalizable across intelligence analysts in any national security organization, domestic or international. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 339. https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/; Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 560. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-WMD2 Jacob W. Getzels and Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, “From Problem Solving to Problem Finding,” in Perspectives in Creativity, edited by Irving A. Taylor and Jacob W. Getzels (Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1975), pp. 90–115.3 Robert J. Sternberg, “A Three-Facet Model of Creativity,” in The Nature of Creativity, edited by Robert J. Sternberg (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 125–147.4 Stephen Marrin, “Understanding and Improving Intelligence Analysis by Learning from Others,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 32, No. 5 (2017), pp. 539–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310913; Joseph Soeters, Management and Military Studies: Classical and Current Foundations (New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 1–10.5 Peter A. Corning, “The Re-Emergence of ‘Emergence’: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory,” Complexity, Vol. 7, No. 6 (2002), pp. 18–30. https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.100436 Steve W. J. Kozlowski and Katherine J. Klein, “A Multilevel Approach to Theory and Research in Organizations: Contextual, Temporal, and Emergent Processes,” in Multilevel Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions, edited by Katherine J. Klein
决策者期望情报评估具有洞察力。尽管如此，情报专业人员对洞察过程的了解还不够充分，无法持续实现这些不可或缺的结果。很少有研究研究情报分析师是如何获得洞见的。我们进行了一项定性的、基于访谈的非分类研究，以了解36名解决新问题的情报分析师是如何产生洞察力的。结果表明，在情绪认知和个人社会维度上，出现了一个由两个相互作用的因素——内化紧张和启动——组成的出现过程，这两个因素之间的关系是复杂的。洞察力的出现是不可预测或可控的，这对情报分析人员的管理构成了重大挑战，因为情报机构通常是强调秩序和控制的等级组织，而这些条件与培养洞察力是对立的。这个难题需要管理层在个人和文化上做出重大转变。该研究表明，这些发现适用于任何国家安全组织的情报分析师，无论是国内还是国际。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Thomas H. Kean和Lee Hamilton，《9/11委员会报告:美国恐怖袭击国家委员会的最终报告》(华盛顿特区:美国政府印刷局，2004年)，第339页。https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/;Laurence H. Silberman和Charles S. Robb，《美国关于大规模杀伤性武器的情报能力委员会》(华盛顿特区:美国政府印刷局，2005年)，第560页。https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-WMD2 Jacob W. Getzels和Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi，“从解决问题到发现问题”，见Irving A. Taylor和Jacob W. Getzels编辑的《创造力的视角》(芝加哥，IL: Aldine, 1975)，第90-115.3页。Robert J. Sternberg，“创造力的三方面模型”，见《创造力的本质》，Robert J. Sternberg编辑的《创造力的本质》(剑桥，英国)。斯蒂芬·马林，《通过向他人学习来理解和改进情报分析》，《情报与国家安全》，第32卷，第5期(2017)，第539-547页。https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310913;约瑟夫·索特斯，《管理与军事研究:古典与现代基础》(纽约:劳特利奇，2020)，第1-10.5页。彼得·A·康宁，“‘涌现’的重新出现:一个寻求理论的可敬概念”，《复杂性》，第7卷，第6期(2002)，第18-30页。https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.100436 Steve W. J. Kozlowski和Katherine J. Klein，“组织中理论和研究的多层次方法:语境、时间和突发过程”，《组织中的多层次理论、研究和方法:基础、扩展和新方向》，由Katherine J. Klein和Steve W. J. Kozlowski编辑(旧金山，CA);Gary Klein和Andrea Jarosz，“洞察力的自然主义研究”，《认知工程与决策杂志》，第5卷，第4期(2011)，第335-351页。https://doi.org/10.1177/15553434114270138布鲁诺·拉图尔，科学在行动:如何跟随科学家和工程师通过社会(剑桥，马萨诸塞州:哈佛大学出版社，1987年)，第2-3.9米哈里·奇克森特米哈里和基思·索耶，“创造性的洞察力:孤独时刻的社会维度”，在洞察力的本质，由罗伯特J.斯滕伯格和珍妮特E.戴维森编辑(剑桥，马萨诸塞州:斯特兰·奥尔森，“洞察力和相关现象的信息处理解释”，载于马克·t·基恩和肯尼斯·j·吉尔胡利编辑的《思维心理学进展》(亨普斯特德，英国:收割机麦穗，1992)，第1-44页;斯特兰·奥尔森，“常规与创造性认知之间的辩证法”，载于洞察力:关于新思想的起源，由弗雷德里克·韦利-图朗高编辑(纽约:劳特利奇出版社，2018年)，第8-29.11页。伊万·阿什，本杰明·d·吉和詹妮弗·威利，“调查洞察力作为突然学习”，《问题解决杂志》，第4卷，第2期(2012年)，第1-27页。https://doi.org/10.7771/1932-6246.1123.12同上13 Ohlsson，“洞察力和相关现象的信息处理解释”，第1-44.14页同上15 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow(纽约:Farrar, Straus and Giroux出版社，2011)，第19-30页;William Taggart和Daniel Robey，“思想和管理者:关于人类信息处理和管理的双重性”，《管理评论学会》，第6卷，第2期(1981)，第187-195页。https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1981.4287774;Michael L. Tushman和David A. Nadler，“信息处理作为组织设计中的集成概念”，《管理评论》，1978年第3卷第3期，第613-624页。https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1981。 428777416 Leon Festinger，《认知失调理论》(斯坦福，加州:斯坦福大学出版社，1957年)，第9.17页。John A. Bargh和Tanya L. Chartrand，“在中间研究心灵:启动和自动性研究的实用指南”，《社会和人格心理学研究方法手册》，Harry T. Reis和Charles M. Judd编辑(纽约:剑桥大学出版社，2000年)，第253-285.18页。《边界与有机体》，《创造行为杂志》，第43卷，第1期(2009)，第1 - 28页。https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2162-6057.2009.tb01303.x19 Thomas Fingar，《减少不确定性:情报分析与国家安全》(斯坦福，CA)《斯坦福安全研究》，2011年)，第1-18.20页。国家情报总监办公室，情报共同体指令203，《分析标准》，2015年1月2日，https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD%20203%20Analytic%20Standards.pdfAdditional信息。关于投稿人的说明。sadrian Wolfberg开始他的情报生涯时是一名EA-3B喷气式航空母舰海军飞行军官，然后是一名民用情报分析师。Adrian的研究集中在大型复杂组织中的挑战，在这些组织中，知识生产者和高级决策者之间的知识交换接受、吸收和处理知识。他在凯斯西储大学韦瑟黑德管理学院获得博士学位，在国家战争学院获得国家安全战略理学硕士学位。可以通过awolfberg@gmail.com与作者联系
{"title":"Helping Intelligence Analysts Gain Insight","authors":"Adrian Wolfberg","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2257549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2257549","url":null,"abstract":"AbtractDecisionmakers expect intelligence assessments to be insightful. Still, intelligence professionals do not understand the insight process well enough to achieve consistently such indispensable outcomes. Little, if any, research has studied how intelligence analysts achieve insights. A qualitative, interview-based unclassified study was conducted to understand how insight emerges in 36 intelligence analysts who solved novel problems. The results include an emergence process consisting of two interacting elements—internalized tensions and priming—across the emotion–cognition and individual–social dimensions, and that the relationship between the two elements is complex. The emergence of insight is not predictable or controllable, which has significant challenges for the management of intelligence analysts because intelligence agencies typically are hierarchical organizations that emphasize order and control, conditions antithetical for nurturing emergence. This conundrum requires a major individual and cultural shift by management. The study suggests that the findings are generalizable across intelligence analysts in any national security organization, domestic or international. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Thomas H. Kean and Lee Hamilton, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), p. 339. https://www.9-11commission.gov/report/; Laurence H. Silberman and Charles S. Robb, The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 560. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-WMD2 Jacob W. Getzels and Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi, “From Problem Solving to Problem Finding,” in Perspectives in Creativity, edited by Irving A. Taylor and Jacob W. Getzels (Chicago, IL: Aldine, 1975), pp. 90–115.3 Robert J. Sternberg, “A Three-Facet Model of Creativity,” in The Nature of Creativity, edited by Robert J. Sternberg (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 125–147.4 Stephen Marrin, “Understanding and Improving Intelligence Analysis by Learning from Others,” Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 32, No. 5 (2017), pp. 539–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2017.1310913; Joseph Soeters, Management and Military Studies: Classical and Current Foundations (New York: Routledge, 2020), pp. 1–10.5 Peter A. Corning, “The Re-Emergence of ‘Emergence’: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory,” Complexity, Vol. 7, No. 6 (2002), pp. 18–30. https://doi.org/10.1002/cplx.100436 Steve W. J. Kozlowski and Katherine J. Klein, “A Multilevel Approach to Theory and Research in Organizations: Contextual, Temporal, and Emergent Processes,” in Multilevel Theory, Research, and Methods in Organizations: Foundations, Extensions, and New Directions, edited by Katherine J. Klein","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134947345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-19DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2252181
Ryan Shaffer
AbstractThis article explores intelligence in the English-speaking West Indies by examining institutions, capabilities, and objectives. It highlights how the British Overseas Territories and independent nations separately and collectively gather and utilize intelligence. The article argues the territories and countries’ sizes and resources as well as their geographic locations significantly shape intelligence networks that collect, share, and use vital security information. In doing so, this article provides the first academic analysis of the region’s intelligence as a whole in understanding how intelligence is viewed, utilized, and shared within territories and countries that are not usually examined in the intelligence studies literature. Disclosure statementThe author reports there are no competing interests to declare.Notes1 For example, see: Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 477–480; Biko Agozino, Ben Bowling, Elizabeth Ward, and Godfrey St Bernard, “Guns, Crime and Social Order in the West Indies,” Criminology & Criminal Justice, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009). doi:10.1177/1748895809336378; Don D. Marshall and Aretha M. Campbell, “The Consequences of Global Policy Initiatives Against Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Tax Evasion on Financial Centres in the Caribbean Region,” in Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Tax Evasion (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), pp. 267–324.2 Some examples include: Owen L. Sirrs, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations (New York: Routledge, 2017); Bob de Graaff, “Elements of an Asian Intelligence Culture,” in Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference, edited by Bob de Graaff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2020), pp. 461–470; Dheeraj Chaya, India’s Intelligence Culture and Strategic Surprises Spying for South Block (New York: Routledge, 2023); Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” African Intelligence Services: Early Postcolonial and Contemporary Challenges, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021), pp. 3–22; Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” The Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), pp. xvii–xxvi; Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” The Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), pp. xii–xxi; Ryan Shaffer, “Following in Footsteps: The History of Kenya’s Post-Colonial Intelligence Services,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2019), pp. 23–40.3 For example, see: Kevin Peters, “Bahamas-Trinidad Tobago-Jamaica,” in The Handbook of Latin American and Caribbean Intelligence Cultures, edited by Florina Cristiana Matei, Carolyn Halladay, and Eduardo E. Estévez (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022), pp. 227–244; Glenn E. McPhee, “Barriers to Collecting ‘Secret Intelligence’ in the Bahamas,”
摘要本文通过考察制度、能力和目标来探讨讲英语的西印度群岛的智力。它突出了英国海外领土和独立国家如何单独或集体地收集和利用情报。这篇文章认为，领土和国家的大小、资源以及地理位置显著地塑造了情报网络，这些网络收集、共享和使用重要的安全信息。在这样做的过程中，本文提供了第一个对该地区情报作为一个整体的学术分析，以了解情报是如何在情报研究文献中通常没有研究过的领土和国家内被看待、利用和共享的。披露声明作者报告无竞争利益需要申报。注1例如，参见:Christopher Andrew，《保卫王国:军情五处的授权历史》(伦敦:Allen Lane出版社，2009)，第477-480页;Biko Agozino, Ben Bowling, Elizabeth Ward和Godfrey St Bernard，“西印度群岛的枪支，犯罪和社会秩序”，犯罪学与刑事司法，第9卷，第3期(2009)。doi: 10.1177 / 1748895809336378;Don D. Marshall和Aretha M. Campbell，“全球反洗钱、恐怖主义融资和逃税政策举措对加勒比地区金融中心的影响”，载于《洗钱、恐怖主义融资和逃税》(Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021)，第267-324.2页。一些例子包括:Owen L. Sirrs，《巴基斯坦三军情报局:秘密行动和内部行动》(纽约:Routledge, 2017);鲍勃·德·格拉夫，“亚洲情报文化的要素”，《亚洲和中东的情报社区和文化:综合参考》，由鲍勃·德·格拉夫编辑(博尔德，CO: Lynne Rienner出版社，2020)，第461-470页;Dheeraj Chaya，印度的情报文化和战略惊喜间谍南区(纽约:劳特利奇，2023);Ryan Shaffer，“介绍，”非洲情报服务:早期后殖民和当代挑战，由Ryan Shaffer编辑(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021)，第3-22页;Ryan Shaffer，“引言”，《非洲情报文化手册》，由Ryan Shaffer编辑(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023)，第17 - 26页;Ryan Shaffer，“引言”，《亚洲智力文化手册》，由Ryan Shaffer编辑(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023)，第12 - 21页;Ryan Shaffer，“跟随脚步:肯尼亚后殖民情报服务的历史”，情报研究，第63卷，第1期(2019)，第23-40.3页例如，参见:Kevin Peters，“巴哈马-特立尼达多巴哥-牙买加”，在拉丁美洲和加勒比情报文化手册中，由Florina Cristiana Matei, Carolyn Halladay和Eduardo E. estvez (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022)，第227-244页;Glenn E. McPhee，“在巴哈马收集‘秘密情报’的障碍”，《国际情报、安全和公共事务杂志》，第18卷，第2期(2016)，第93-109页。doi: 10.1080 / 23800992.2016.1196937。另见:Derron Mc Clean，情报改革:特立尼达和多巴哥的考虑(未发表的硕士论文，海军研究生院，2018)。https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1069660.pdf4例如，参见:查尔斯·考利，《冲突中的殖民地:英国海外领土的历史》(泰恩河畔纽卡斯尔:剑桥学者出版社，2015)菲利普·洛夫特，《英国海外领土及其总督》，第9583号(伦敦:下议院图书馆，2022年6月30日)，第7页。https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9583/CBP-9583.pdf6海外领土和内政部(伦敦:内政部，2012)，第1页。https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98668/overseas-territories.pdf7 Loft，英国海外领土及其总督，第5.8页“军情五处的资源和联系”，安全服务，2022年，https://www.mi5.gov.uk/resources-and-links9“我们做什么”，安全服务，2022年，https://www.mi5.gov.uk/what-we-do10海外领土:国防部的贡献(伦敦:国防部，未注明日期)。https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27626/overseas_territories.pdf11同上12关于英国情报风格在后殖民时期肯尼亚的连续性的一个例子，请参见:Ryan Shaffer，“更多的事情变化:肯尼亚在独立十年中的特殊分支”，非洲情报部门:早期后殖民和当代挑战，由Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD)编辑。罗曼和利特菲尔德，2021)，第33-46.13 Loft，英国海外领土及其总督，第13.14页“特立尼达和多巴哥被FATF从灰名单中删除”特立尼达和多巴哥政府(2020)，http://www.news.gov.tt/content/trinidad-tobago-removed-grey-list-fatf#。 108朱莉塔·彼得，“台湾圣卢西亚联手打击跨国犯罪”，圣卢西亚民政、司法和国家安全部，2018年2月5日，https://homeaffairs.govt.lc/news/saint-lucia-taiwan-join-forces-on-transnational-crime109“圣卢西亚委员会会议”，圣卢西亚内政、司法和国家安全部，2019年11月15日，https://homeaffairs.govt.lc/news/the-franco-saint-lucian-committee-meets110“圣卢西亚警察情报不足”，《加勒比全球新闻》，2021年5月5日，https://www.caribbeannewsglobal.com/st-lucia-police-intelligence-found-wanting/111中央情报局，“圣文森特和格林纳丁斯”，《世界概况》(2022年)，https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines/112“部门联系人名单”，圣文森特和格林纳丁斯国家安全部(2022年)，http://www.security.gov.vc/security/index.php?option=com_conte
{"title":"Stronger Together: Intelligence in the English-Speaking West Indies","authors":"Ryan Shaffer","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2252181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2252181","url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThis article explores intelligence in the English-speaking West Indies by examining institutions, capabilities, and objectives. It highlights how the British Overseas Territories and independent nations separately and collectively gather and utilize intelligence. The article argues the territories and countries’ sizes and resources as well as their geographic locations significantly shape intelligence networks that collect, share, and use vital security information. In doing so, this article provides the first academic analysis of the region’s intelligence as a whole in understanding how intelligence is viewed, utilized, and shared within territories and countries that are not usually examined in the intelligence studies literature. Disclosure statementThe author reports there are no competing interests to declare.Notes1 For example, see: Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), pp. 477–480; Biko Agozino, Ben Bowling, Elizabeth Ward, and Godfrey St Bernard, “Guns, Crime and Social Order in the West Indies,” Criminology & Criminal Justice, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2009). doi:10.1177/1748895809336378; Don D. Marshall and Aretha M. Campbell, “The Consequences of Global Policy Initiatives Against Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Tax Evasion on Financial Centres in the Caribbean Region,” in Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Tax Evasion (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), pp. 267–324.2 Some examples include: Owen L. Sirrs, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate: Covert Action and Internal Operations (New York: Routledge, 2017); Bob de Graaff, “Elements of an Asian Intelligence Culture,” in Intelligence Communities and Cultures in Asia and the Middle East: A Comprehensive Reference, edited by Bob de Graaff (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2020), pp. 461–470; Dheeraj Chaya, India’s Intelligence Culture and Strategic Surprises Spying for South Block (New York: Routledge, 2023); Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” African Intelligence Services: Early Postcolonial and Contemporary Challenges, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2021), pp. 3–22; Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” The Handbook of African Intelligence Cultures, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), pp. xvii–xxvi; Ryan Shaffer, “Introduction,” The Handbook of Asian Intelligence Cultures, edited by Ryan Shaffer (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2023), pp. xii–xxi; Ryan Shaffer, “Following in Footsteps: The History of Kenya’s Post-Colonial Intelligence Services,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2019), pp. 23–40.3 For example, see: Kevin Peters, “Bahamas-Trinidad Tobago-Jamaica,” in The Handbook of Latin American and Caribbean Intelligence Cultures, edited by Florina Cristiana Matei, Carolyn Halladay, and Eduardo E. Estévez (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2022), pp. 227–244; Glenn E. McPhee, “Barriers to Collecting ‘Secret Intelligence’ in the Bahamas,”","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135060610","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-15DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2253083
Published in International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (Vol. 36, No. 4, 2023)
发表于《国际情报与反情报杂志》(第36卷第4期，2023年)
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Pub Date : 2023-09-13DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2253120
David R. Mandel, Daniel Irwin
For the last half-century, the U.S. and Allied Intelligence Community (IC) has sought to minimize the ostensibly detrimental effects of cognitive biases on intelligence practice. The dominant approach has been to develop structured analytic techniques (SATs), teach them to analysts in brief training sessions, provide the means to use SATs on the job, and hope they work. The SAT approach, however, suffers from severe conceptual problems and a paucity of support from scientific research. For example, a highly promoted SAT—the analysis of competing hypotheses—was shown in several recent studies to either not improve judgment quality or to make it worse. This article recaps the key problems with the SAT approach and sketches some alternative interventions. At the core of these proposals is the idea that intelligence agencies should be focused broadly on improving intelligence and not narrowly on minimizing bias. While the latter contributes to achieving the former, overemphasis on bias minimization could inadvertently bias agencies toward a singular form of intervention, blinding then from potentially more effective interventions. Two lines of alternative intervention are sketched. The first line focuses on postanalytic statistical optimization methods such as recalibration and performance-weighted aggregation of analysts’ judgments. The second line focuses on a broad human augmentation program to optimize human cognition through better sleep, exercise, nutrition (including nootropic compounds), and biometric tracking. Both lines of effort would require substantial scientific investment by the IC to examine risks and efficacy.
{"title":"Beyond Bias Minimization: Improving Intelligence with Optimization and Human Augmentation","authors":"David R. Mandel, Daniel Irwin","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2253120","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2253120","url":null,"abstract":"For the last half-century, the U.S. and Allied Intelligence Community (IC) has sought to minimize the ostensibly detrimental effects of cognitive biases on intelligence practice. The dominant approach has been to develop structured analytic techniques (SATs), teach them to analysts in brief training sessions, provide the means to use SATs on the job, and hope they work. The SAT approach, however, suffers from severe conceptual problems and a paucity of support from scientific research. For example, a highly promoted SAT—the analysis of competing hypotheses—was shown in several recent studies to either not improve judgment quality or to make it worse. This article recaps the key problems with the SAT approach and sketches some alternative interventions. At the core of these proposals is the idea that intelligence agencies should be focused broadly on improving intelligence and not narrowly on minimizing bias. While the latter contributes to achieving the former, overemphasis on bias minimization could inadvertently bias agencies toward a singular form of intervention, blinding then from potentially more effective interventions. Two lines of alternative intervention are sketched. The first line focuses on postanalytic statistical optimization methods such as recalibration and performance-weighted aggregation of analysts’ judgments. The second line focuses on a broad human augmentation program to optimize human cognition through better sleep, exercise, nutrition (including nootropic compounds), and biometric tracking. Both lines of effort would require substantial scientific investment by the IC to examine risks and efficacy.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"37 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135733964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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