International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence最新文献_第4页

Half-Century of Spying on Citizens 半个世纪对公民的监视

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International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-28 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2266310

Russell Campbell

Published in International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (Ahead of Print, 2023)

发表于《国际情报与反情报杂志》(2023年出版前)

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Reconsidering the Science and Semantics of Intelligence Analysis 重新考虑情报分析的科学性和语义学

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International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2270715

Joshua Yaphe

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Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Illegal Intelligence: A Case of a KGB Illegal in Post-WWII Japan 苏联非法情报机构中的少数民族：克格勃在二战后日本的非法案例

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International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2271659

Grigorij Serscikov

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Another Piece to Cuba’s Mole PuzzlePeter Lapp and Kelly Kennedy : Queen of Cuba: An FBI Agent’s Insider Account of the Spy Who Evaded Detection for 17 Years Post Hill Press, Brentwood, TN, 2023, 254 p., $28.99 (hardcover) 古巴鼹鼠之谜的另一块拼图彼得-拉普和凯利-肯尼迪：古巴女王：一位联邦调查局特工的内幕消息：躲避侦查 17 年之久的间谍 Post Hill Press，田纳西州布伦特伍德，2023 年，254 页，28.99 美元（精装本）

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International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-16 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2270893

Nigel West

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Not-So-Secret Secret Police: Yugoslavia’s Intelligence Apparatus 不那么秘密的秘密警察:南斯拉夫的情报机构

Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-14 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2270370

Florina Cristiana Matei

AbstractIntelligence agencies in former Yugoslavia served as the regime’s political police, which carried out domestic security roles in an internally divided country that was caught at the crossroads of a geopolitical cleavage between great powers. ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThe author thanks and gives credit to Ms. Natasha Hunsberger, Dr. Irena Chiru, and Mr. Claudiu Crivat for their support of the research associated with the writing of this article; and Dr. Jeff Rogg for reviewing an earlier draft. The author’s deepest gratitude goes to her colleague, Dr. Alexandar Matovski, for his guidance, assistance, and insights throughout the writing of this article.Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Herrick notes, “In efforts to avoid repeating the policies of the pre–Second World War government which exacerbated the ethnic differences, the communist regime established a federation which provided considerable autonomy to the ethnic groups while supporting a movement toward a strong central government and dissolution of ethnic, religious, and cultural differences.” R. C. Herrick, 1980, “The Yugoslav People’s Army: Its Military and Political Mission” (M.A. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/19109. In 1945, emboldened by their military victory during WWII, the Partisans established “the so-called second Yugoslavia.” The Soviet troops assisted Yugoslavia’s liberation endeavors but did not occupy Yugoslavia after the war. F. Ejdus, “Serbia’s Civil-Military Relations,” University of Belgrade, Department of Political Science, 30 July 2020, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.19012 Tito was the leader of the ruling communist party as well as the commander in chief of the overall Yugoslav armed forces. Florina Cristiana Matei, “Civilian Influence in Defense: Slovenia,” in Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, edited by T. C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2012).3 Ibid.4 J. Baev, “US Intelligence Community Estimates on Yugoslavia (1948–1991),” National Security and the Future, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2000), pp. 95–106; J. J. Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).5 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation.6 V. P. (Chip) Gagnon, Jr., “Yugoslavia in 1989 and After,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 38, No. 1 (2010), pp. 23–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/009059909033899617 Another term used for the “enemies of the state” was “the internal enemy.” According to Nielsen, “this term encompassed categories that were expansively and often arbitrarily defined and could include, inter alia, former members of noncommunist political parties, religious believers, Cominformists, spies, economic “saboteurs,” and anyone else deemed to be “reactionary” or engaged in “anti-state” activities.” C. A. Nielsen, “Imprisoning ‘Enemies of the State’ in a Communist Dic

摘要前南斯拉夫的情报机构充当了政权的政治警察，在一个处于大国地缘政治分裂的十字路口、内部分裂的国家执行国内安全任务。作者感谢并感谢Natasha Hunsberger女士、Irena Chiru博士和Claudiu Crivat先生对撰写本文相关研究的支持;和杰夫·罗格博士审阅之前的草稿作者对她的同事Alexandar Matovski博士表示最深切的感谢，感谢他在本文写作过程中的指导、帮助和见解。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1赫里克指出:“为了避免重蹈第二次世界大战前政府加剧民族差异的政策覆辙，共产党政权建立了一个联邦，为各民族提供了相当大的自治权，同时支持建立一个强大的中央政府，消除民族、宗教和文化差异。”R. C. Herrick, 1980，“南斯拉夫人民军:其军事和政治使命”(硕士论文，海军研究生院，1980)，http://hdl.handle.net/10945/19109。1945年，在二战中取得军事胜利的鼓舞下，南斯拉夫游击队建立了“所谓的第二南斯拉夫”。苏联军队协助南斯拉夫的解放事业，但战后并没有占领南斯拉夫。F. Ejdus，“塞尔维亚的军民关系”，贝尔格莱德大学政治学系，2020年7月30日，https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.19012铁托是执政的共产党领导人，也是南斯拉夫武装部队的总指挥官。2 . Florina Cristiana Matei，“平民对国防的影响:斯洛文尼亚”，见t.c. Bruneau和Florina Cristiana Matei编辑的《劳特利奇军民关系手册》(纽约:劳特利奇出版社，2012)同上4 J. Baev，“美国情报界对南斯拉夫的估计(1948-1991)”，《国家安全和未来》，第1卷，第1期(2000年)，第95-106页;J. J.林茨和A.斯捷潘，《民主转型和巩固的问题》(巴尔的摩:约翰霍普金斯大学出版社，1996)林茨和斯捷潘:《民主过渡和巩固问题》，第6卷。P. (Chip) Gagnon, Jr.，《1989年及之后的南斯拉夫》，《民族论文》，Vol. 38, No. 1 (2010)， pp. 23-39。https://doi.org/10.1080/009059909033899617另一个用来表示“国家敌人”的词是“内部敌人”。根据尼尔森的说法，“这一术语包含了广泛且经常是任意定义的类别，除其他外，可以包括非共产主义政党的前成员、宗教信徒、共产主义者、间谍、经济“破坏者”以及任何被认为是“反动”或从事“反国家”活动的人。”C. a . Nielsen，“在共产主义独裁统治下监禁‘国家的敌人’:铁托的南斯拉夫记录，1945-1953”，《冷战研究杂志》，第23卷，第4期(2021)，第124-152页。https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_010418同上。9同上。10军队包括一个联邦组成部分，即南斯拉夫国民军(也称为南斯拉夫人民军)和在南斯拉夫六个共和国内运作的各种民兵部队，称为领土国防军。军队在党和铁托的直接控制下，但在1980年铁托去世后，军事自治增加了。马泰:《国防中的平民影响》;Ejdus， <塞尔维亚军民关系>。因此，在塞尔看来，“贫穷、饥饿和疾病在这片土地上肆虐。”《斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇与南斯拉夫的毁灭》(达勒姆，北卡罗来纳州:杜克大学出版社，2002)。在这方面，加格农强调:“南斯拉夫从一个绝大多数是农民、文盲和不发达的国家，到20世纪60年代初已经成为一个工业化和现代化的社会。”他进一步指出，“南斯拉夫共产党人允许农民继续耕种自己的土地，而不是集体化，这当然意味着南斯拉夫保持了大量的农村人口。但到了20世纪60年代，革命的英雄们和二战结束后掌管党和国家的人——他们大多来自农村，通常没有受过什么正规教育——面对的是一个正在崛起的新中产阶级，一个受过更多教育的技术官僚和城市人口，他们对生活水平的期望越来越高，对工作条件的控制也越来越高。”加格农，《1989年及其后的南斯拉夫》。南斯拉夫在1950年代经历了一些世界上最高的增长率。这些努力提高了铁托政权在全国的声望。《斯洛博丹·米洛舍维奇与南斯拉夫的毁灭》这些事态发展重新引发了关于SFRY未来的辩论。加格农:《1989年及其后的南斯拉夫》;加农:《民族战争的神话》;在这种背景下，加格农解释说:“面对20世纪80年代中期日益增长的改革派的成功，四面楚歌的保守派诉诸于冲突战略，首先以重新集中南斯拉夫党和国家为目标，然后，从1990年开始，摧毁这个国家，以保持他们对资源的控制和获取，这受到提议的改革的威胁。”1989年及之后的南斯拉夫。保守派担心改革者的进步/成功，开始使用暴力作为阻止这些变革的一种方式，这最终导致了20世纪90年代的冲突。他们将这些冲突描述为“民族仇恨”，但根本原因是精英派系之间围绕经济和政治自由化的长期政治斗争。1989年及之后的南斯拉夫。“53重新集中的大多数是安全部门加格农进一步强调，“1990年下半年发生的日益增长的暴力冲突，并在1991年爆发为公开战争，是保守派精英有目的的战略政策，目的是遣散更广泛的人口，并确保他们自己继续控制正在变化的权力结构。”加格农，《1989年及其后的南斯拉夫》。参见加格农的《种族战争的神话》。民族主义在1980年代初开始加剧，当时南斯拉夫人民共和国的合法性减弱，各共和国的共产党开始把自己描述为国家利益的保管人，并指责其他共和国造成南斯拉夫的问题。55应当指出，南斯拉夫情报机构的前身是秘密警察工作部，它是根据1899年10月国家中央行政当局修正案设立的。博达解释说，该机构隶属于塞尔维亚内务部，其职责是确保“维护国家内部秩序和世界安全”。“南斯拉夫社会主义联邦共和国的秘密警察”，《国家安全评论》2017年第5期，第56页德瓦尔是游击队主力部队的指挥中心。迪米特里耶维奇，《铁托南斯拉夫的情报和安全部门，1944-1966》。”57博达，“南斯拉夫社会主义联邦共和国的秘密警察”;罗比奥内克，《国家安全失控?》迪米特里耶维奇，“铁托南斯拉夫的情报和安全部门1944-1966”;B. B.迪米特里耶维奇，“ALEKSANDAR RANKOVIĆ: OSNIVAČ OZNE-SLUŽBE BEZBEDNOSTI PARTIZANSKOG POKRETA，”HERETICUS -Časopis za preispitivanje prošlosti, Vol. 1-2 (2020)， pp. 53-75, https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=97852858迪米特里耶维奇，“铁托南斯拉夫的情报和安全服务1944-1966。”(59同上。60同上。61同上。62同上。63 S. cvetkoviki，“Aleksandar rankoviki的垮台与对' Rankovićism '的谴责”，《20世纪南斯拉夫国家的塞尔维亚社会:在民主与独裁之间》，第177016期(2017)，第111-144页;迪米特里耶维奇，ALEKSANDAR RANKOVIĆ。

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引用次数: 0

Reassessment of Counterintelligence in National Security: The Case of Kosovo 反情报在国家安全中的重新评估:科索沃的案例

Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-10 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2267751

Bahri Gashi, Ngadhnjim Brovina

AbstractKosovo has faced significant challenges in terms of national security since the postwar period. In this context, counterintelligence services play a crucial role in preventing internal and external threats. However, Kosovo still does not have an effective and strong counterintelligence service, relying entirely on information and services provided by international allies. The mechanism of counterintelligence is mentioned in the preamble of the law of the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, but without any specific role. The purpose of this article is to analyze the case of Kosovo in strengthening the need for counterintelligence services, as well as analyzing which counterintelligence model would be suitable for Kosovo. Specific recommendations are made for creating a strong and effective counterintelligence service in Kosovo, including the measures that local authorities and international allies need to take to achieve this goal. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Prime Minister’s Office, Kosovo Security Strategy 2022–2027 (2022), https://kryeministri.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/2-Strategjia-e-Sigurise-e-Kosoves-ENG.pdf, p. 10.2 Ibid., p. 6.3 Ibid., p. 7.4 David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors: Intrigue, Deception and the Secrets That Destroyed Two of the Cold War’s Most Important Agents (Globe Pequot Press, 2003).5 U.S. Naval War College, “Intelligence Studies: Counterintelligence,” 23 January 2023,https://usnwc.libguides.com/c.php?g=494120&p=33815656 Blake W. Mobley and Carl Anthony Wege, “Counterintelligence Vetting Techniques Compared across Multiple Domains,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2021), pp. 78–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.18366037 Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002), p. 99.8 Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz, Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles of Democratic Control and Effectiveness (University of Texas Press, 2007), p. 242. https://doi.org/10.7560/7166059 John Ehrman, “Toward a Theory of Counterintelligence: What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Counterintelligence?” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 53, No. 2 (2009), pp. 1–12.10 Henry Prunckun, “Extending the Theoretical Structure of Intelligence to Counterintelligence,” Salus Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2014), pp. 31–49.11 Institute for Democracy and Mediation, “Security Issues K14,” Quarterly Journal, Vol 1, No. 1 (2009), pp. 143–154.12 Paul J. Redmond, “The Challenges of Counterintelligence,” in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by Loch K. Johnson (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 537–554.13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “Allied Joint Doctrine for Intelligence, Counterintelligence and Security [AJP-2],” (2016), http://standards.globalspec.com/std/9994887/nato-ajp-214 Petrus Duvenage, “Counterintelligence,” in

摘要战后以来，科索沃在国家安全方面面临着重大挑战。在这种情况下，反情报机构在防止内部和外部威胁方面发挥着至关重要的作用。然而，科索沃仍然没有一个有效和强大的反情报机构，完全依靠国际盟友提供的信息和服务。反间谍的机制在科索沃情报局法的序言中提到，但没有任何具体的作用。本文的目的是分析科索沃加强反情报服务需求的案例，以及分析哪种反情报模式适合科索沃。为在科索沃建立一个强大而有效的反情报机构提出了具体建议，包括地方当局和国际盟友为实现这一目标需要采取的措施。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1总理办公室，《科索沃安全战略2022 - 2027》(2022)，https://kryeministri.rks-gov.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/2-Strategjia-e-Sigurise-e-Kosoves-ENG.pdf，第10.2页同上，第6.3页同上，第7.4页大卫·c·马丁:《镜子的荒野:阴谋、欺骗和摧毁冷战中两个最重要特工的秘密》(环球Pequot出版社，2003)美国海军战争学院，“情报研究:反情报”，2023年1月23日，https://usnwc.libguides.com/c.php?g=494120&p=33815656布莱克W.莫布里和卡尔安东尼韦格，“跨多个领域的反情报审查技术比较，”国际情报和反情报杂志，卷34，第1(2021)，第78-96页。https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2020.18366037 Abram N. Shulsky和Gary J. Schmitt，《无声的战争:理解情报世界》(华盛顿特区:Potomac Books, 2002)，第99.8页。Thomas C. Bruneau和Steven C. Boraz，《改革情报:民主控制和有效性的障碍》(德克萨斯大学出版社，2007)，第242页。https://doi.org/10.7560/7166059约翰·埃尔曼，“走向反情报理论:当我们谈论反情报时，我们在谈论什么?”《情报研究》，第53卷，第2期(2009)，第1 - 12.10页。Henry Prunckun，“将情报的理论结构扩展到反情报”，Salus Journal，第2卷，第2期(2014)，第31-49.11页。民主与调解研究所，“安全问题K14”，季刊，第1卷，第1期(2009)，第143-154.12页。Paul J. Redmond，“反情报的挑战”，《牛津国家安全情报手册》，Loch K. Johnson编辑(牛津大学出版社，2010)，第537-554.13页。北大西洋公约组织(NATO)，“盟军情报、反情报和安全联合原则[AJP-2]”(2016)，http://standards.globalspec.com/std/9994887/nato-ajp-214 Petrus Duvenage，“反情报”，《情报与私人调查》:《发展复杂的调查方法》，由Henry Prunckun编辑(伊利诺伊州斯普林菲尔德:Charles C Thomas出版社，2013)，第93-109.15页。Prunckun，“将情报的理论结构扩展到反情报”，第31-49.16页。同上。17 Ministere des Armees, Direction du ressement and de la security de la defense，“DRSD的介绍:DRSD的任务”(2023)，https://www.drsd.defense.gouv.fr/presentation-de-la-drsd-en18艾伦·坎宁安，“21世纪的反情报:整合的需要”，作战室:美国陆军战争学院，2021年3月17日，https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/ci-integration/19国家反情报和安全中心，“美国国家反情报战略2020-2022”(华盛顿特区:白宫，2020)，https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/features/20200205-National_CI_Strategy_2020_2022.pdf20反情报，“CI的三种活动”(未注明日期)，https://www.scribd.com/document/148504731/CounterIntelligence-221美国海军战争学院，“情报研究”。22 Shanika Wickramasinghe，“网络反情报(CCI):网络安全的进攻与防御策略”，《Splunk》，2023年3月6日，https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/learn/cci-cyber-counterintelligence.html23国家反情报执行办公室，“保护关键资产:企业反情报指南”(未注明日期)，https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/ci/CI_Guide_2011_Web-508.pdf，第3.25页，同上。26美国海军战争学院，“情报研究”。27凯蒂·凯勒，“人工智能与反情报——深入学科”，ClearanceJobs, 2020年9月24日，https://news.clearancejobs.com/2020/09/24/humint-vs-counterintelligence-diving-into-the-disciplines/28北约，“情报、反情报和安全联合原则[AJP-2]。

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引用次数: 0

Arming Uncle Joe: Secret Intelligence in the Service of a First Sea LordDavid Kenyon : Arctic Convoys, Bletchley Park, and the War for the Seas Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 320 p., $24.00 (hardback) 《武装乔叔叔:为第一海勋爵服务的秘密情报》大卫·凯尼恩:《北极车队、布莱切利公园和海洋战争》耶鲁大学出版社，康涅狄格州纽黑文，320页，24.00美元(精装本)

Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-08 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2267904

David King

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsDavid KingDavid King is a retired intelligence practitioner. He took an M.Phil. in International Relations at Cambridge, where he was privileged to be taught by Sir Harry Hinsley and supervised by Sir Hew Strachan. He is now the Non-Executive Chairman of the Oxford Intelligence Group. He can be contacted at david@king1.org.

点击放大图片大小点击缩小图片大小附加信息撰稿人说明大卫·金大卫·金是一位退休的情报从业者。他获得了哲学硕士学位。在剑桥大学国际关系专业，他有幸师从哈里·欣斯利爵士，并受到休·斯特拉罕爵士的指导。他现在是牛津情报集团的非执行主席。可以通过david@king1.org与他联系。

引用次数: 0

Portuguese Intelligence under Salazar’s Estado Novo 萨拉萨尔新国家体制下的葡萄牙情报机构

Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2264697

Andrés de Castro, Enrique Fernández-Carrera

AbstractThe Portuguese intelligence apparatus under António de Oliveira Salazar’s Estado Novo (New State) remains understudied. Even if there has been a relevant development of literature in general political terms after 25 April 1974, both in Portuguese and foreign languages, this interest seems to have decreased, even in the Portuguese sphere. This article aims at filling this gap in the literature. It provides an understanding of the historical context that enabled Salazar to develop Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado’s political police role in the historical context of both multipolarity before 1945 and bipolarity after the end of World War II. Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Lusitanian Integralism is a traditionalist, confessional Catholic, antiparliamentary, and corporatist movement. Born at the University of Coimbra in 1914, it has prominent intellectual figures (Antonio Sardinha, Rolao Preto, and Jose Pimenta) who later divided between those who were in favor of collaborating with Estado Novo and those who opposed the regime from a different point of view, National Syndicalist, close to the postulates of the Spanish Falange.2 It was a social–economic experiment that tried to overcome liberalism, Marxism, and to harmonize the private aspect with the community under an authoritarian state.3 Colonial wars in Portuguese Africa lasted between 1961 and 1974 and they were a political and economic burden for Portugal. The presence of other powers made those conflicts proxy wars and made it difficult for Portugal to stand a chance to win the war.4 A. H. de Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal Volume III Das Revoluções Liberais aos nossos Dias (Lisboa: editora Editorial Presença, 1998).5 J. Freire, “As Juventudes sindicalistas, um movimiento singular,” Penelope, revista de historia e ciencias sociais, No. 4 (1990), pp. 111–128.6 Documental RTP “A PIDE antes da PIDE,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqwHiqQR65Q7 G. Gouyomard, La dictature militaire au Portugal (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1927).8 Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal Volume III, pp. 424–471.9 Salazar recognized himself in the Social Catholicism of Pope Leo XII, mainly the Encyclical “Rerum Novarum,” as well as corporativists such as Giuseppe Toniolo (founder of economic sociology and collaborator for the encyclical “Rerum Novarum,” later beatified) and Karl Feriherr Von Vogelsang.10 Organicism is a philosophical perspective that sees the universe and its parts as a harmonious and interrelated whole. By extension, political organicism sees society as a living organism with its own existence, its own rules, and that differs from the sum of its members.11 E. Castro-Leal, “The Political and Ideological Origins of the Estado Novo in Portugal,” Portuguese Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2016), pp. 128–148; Juan J. Linz and Alfred C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Eu

摘要António de Oliveira Salazar的Estado Novo(新国家)下的葡萄牙情报机构仍未得到充分研究。即使在1974年4月25日之后，葡萄牙语和外语的一般政治文学有了相关的发展，这种兴趣似乎已经减少，甚至在葡萄牙语领域也是如此。本文旨在填补这一文献空白。它提供了对历史背景的理解，使萨拉查能够在1945年之前的多极化和第二次世界大战结束后的双极化的历史背景下发展Polícia国际保卫国家组织的政治警察作用。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1:卢西塔尼亚整合主义是一个传统主义、告解天主教、反议会和社团主义运动。它于1914年诞生于科英布拉大学，拥有杰出的知识分子人物(安东尼奥·萨丁哈，罗劳·普雷托和何塞·皮门塔)，他们后来分裂为支持与新国家党合作的人，以及从另一个不同的角度反对该政权的人，即国家工团主义者，接近西班牙的假设。二是在专制国家下实现个人与社会的和谐葡萄牙在非洲的殖民战争从1961年持续到1974年，这对葡萄牙来说是一个政治和经济负担。其他势力的存在使得这些冲突成为代理战争，使得葡萄牙很难有机会赢得战争一个。4 . H. de Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal，第三卷，《关于Revoluções自由和自由》(里斯本:编辑委员会，1998年)7 . J.弗莱雷，“作为青年，我们的运动是单一的”，佩内洛普，《社会科学史回顾》，第4期(1990年)，第111-128.6页。文献RTP“A PIDE antes da PIDE”，YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqwHiqQR65Q7 G. Gouyomard，葡萄牙军事独裁(巴黎:法国大学出版社，1927年)Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal卷III，第424-471.9 . Salazar在教皇利奥十二世的社会天主教中得到了认可，主要是通谕“新事物”，以及像Giuseppe Toniolo(经济社会学的创始人和通谕“新事物”的合作者，后来被册封)和Karl Feriherr Von vogelsang10这样的社团主义者。有机论是一种哲学观点，认为宇宙及其各部分是一个和谐和相互关联的整体。推而广之，政治有机体论认为社会是一个有生命的有机体，它有自己的存在，有自己的规则，不同于其成员的总和E. Castro-Leal，“葡萄牙新国家的政治和意识形态起源”，《葡萄牙研究》，第32卷，第2期(2016)，第128-148页;《民主转型和巩固的问题:南欧、南美和后共产主义欧洲》(巴尔的摩:约翰·霍普金斯大学出版社，1996)，第12页负责新州安全保卫的政治警察。它有不同的名称(pde / pde /DGS)，但共同点是它作为萨拉查政权的政治警察的职能，通常被称为pde。13林茨和斯威士兰，民主过渡和巩固的问题;胡安·林茨，《西班牙和葡萄牙:关键的选择》，载于《西欧:伙伴关系的试验》，大卫·s·兰德斯编辑(列克星敦出版社，1977年);尼尔·罗奇瑞，《里斯本:光之城阴影下的战争，1939 - 1945》(scriscribe Publications, 2011);Manuel Lucena, Os Lugar-Tenentes De Salazar(萨拉查的副手)(Alêtheia编辑，2015);Guillermo O 'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter和Laurence Whitehead，从专制统治的过渡:关于不确定民主的初步结论(约翰霍普金斯大学出版社，1986)“História Das Informações”(信息史)史学| SIRP, www.sirp.pt/quem-somos/historia;Vizela Cardoso，“As Informações em Portugal Resenha Histórica”，载于Estudos de Direito e segurana, Jorge Bacelar Gouveia和Rui Pereira编辑(Coords, 2015);Ronald H. Chilcote，《从独裁到民主的过渡:西班牙、葡萄牙和希腊的比较研究》(Routledge出版社，2016);罗纳德·H。摘要António de Oliveira Salazar的Estado Novo(新国家)下的葡萄牙情报机构仍未得到充分研究。即使在1974年4月25日之后，葡萄牙语和外语的一般政治文学有了相关的发展，这种兴趣似乎已经减少，甚至在葡萄牙语领域也是如此。本文旨在填补这一文献空白。它提供了对历史背景的理解，使萨拉查能够在1945年之前的多极化和第二次世界大战结束后的双极化的历史背景下发展Polícia国际保卫国家组织的政治警察作用。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1:卢西塔尼亚整合主义是一个传统主义、告解天主教、反议会和社团主义运动。它于1914年诞生于科英布拉大学，拥有杰出的知识分子人物(安东尼奥·萨丁哈，罗劳·普雷托和何塞·皮门塔)，他们后来分裂为支持与新国家党合作的人，以及从另一个不同的角度反对该政权的人，即国家工团主义者，接近西班牙的假设。二是在专制国家下实现个人与社会的和谐葡萄牙在非洲的殖民战争从1961年持续到1974年，这对葡萄牙来说是一个政治和经济负担。其他势力的存在使得这些冲突成为代理战争，使得葡萄牙很难有机会赢得战争一个。4 . H. de Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal，第三卷，《关于Revoluções自由和自由》(里斯本:编辑委员会，1998年)7 . J.弗莱雷，“作为青年，我们的运动是单一的”，佩内洛普，《社会科学史回顾》，第4期(1990年)，第111-128.6页。文献RTP“A PIDE antes da PIDE”，YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VqwHiqQR65Q7 G. Gouyomard，葡萄牙军事独裁(巴黎:法国大学出版社，1927年)Oliveira Marques, História de Portugal卷III，第424-471.9 . Salazar在教皇利奥十二世的社会天主教中得到了认可，主要是通谕“新事物”，以及像Giuseppe Toniolo(经济社会学的创始人和通谕“新事物”的合作者，后来被册封)和Karl Feriherr Von vogelsang10这样的社团主义者。有机论是一种哲学观点，认为宇宙及其各部分是一个和谐和相互关联的整体。推而广之，政治有机体论认为社会是一个有生命的有机体，它有自己的存在，有自己的规则，不同于其成员的总和E. Castro-Leal，“葡萄牙新国家的政治和意识形态起源”，《葡萄牙研究》，第32卷，第2期(2016)，第128-148页;《民主转型和巩固的问题:南欧、南美和后共产主义欧洲》(巴尔的摩:约翰·霍普金斯大学出版社，1996)，第12页负责新州安全保卫的政治警察。它有不同的名称(pde / pde /DGS)

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引用次数: 0

“Encore Merci de Votre Collaboration et Bravo!” Albert Van Buylaere, a Belgian Intelligence Agent during World War II “再次感谢你们的支持，合作与喝彩!”Albert Van Buylaere，二战期间的一名比利时情报人员

Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-07 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2264692

Robin Liefferinckx

AbstractAlthough World War II intelligence and action services are an important research topic in current Belgian intelligence studies, researchers until recently never focused solely on the Benoît network in their studies. However, this organization was of vital importance for the successful transmission of the intelligence that had been gathered by the Belgian government and State Security in London. One of Benoît’s key members was Albert Van Buylaere who was considered “brilliant” by his superiors. This article gives an overview of his motives and actions and gives a first impression of why he was so sought after by various intelligence agencies during the Cold War. After a brief discussion on the organization and activities of this network and the main events around it, the focus will shift to his activities. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Kees Schuyt, Universitair verzet (1940–1945), maatschappelijk verzet en de waarde van wetenschap: Een drieluik (Den Haag: Boom Lemma Uitgevers, 2012), p. 18; Marc Cools, “Universitair verzet, inlichtingen en actie,” in Memorial Volume Intelligence and Action Agents, edited by Roger Coekelbers, Marc Cools, Robin Libert, Veerle Pashley, Jaak Raes, David Stans, and Renaat Vandecasteele (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2015), pp. 95–96.2 Fernand Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45: de inlichtings- en actiediensten in België (Tielt: Lannoo, 1992), p. 19.3 For an overview of the activities of each group, see, for example, Emmanuel Debruyne, La guerre secrète des espions belges 1940–1944 (Bruxelles: Racine, 2008); Marie-Pierre d’Udekem d’Acoz, Voor Koning & vaderland: De Belgische adel in het verzet (Tielt: Lannoo, 2013); Cools, “Universitair verzet, inlichtingen en actie.”4 A period known as the “repression” and “epuration: in Belgium (1944–1949).5 Michael Warner, “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, edited by Loch K. Johnson (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 21-22; Emmanuel Debruyne, “La maison de verre: Agents et réseaux de renseignements en Belgique. 1940-1944” (Ph.D. dissertation, Université Catholique de Louvain, 2006), p. 29.6 Peter Jackson, “Enquiries into the ‘Secret State,’” in Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State, edited by R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 3.7 Jean Fosty, “De Belgische netten in Frankrijk,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, Vol. 2 (1972), p. 220.8 Jackson, “Enquiries into the ‘Secret State,’” p. 3.9 Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45, p. 48; Etienne Verhoeyen, België Bezet 1940–1944: Een synthese (Brussel: BRTN-Educatieve Uitgaven, 1993), p. 261.10 Free translation: “A bewildering spectacle of people gathering intelligence, grouping together, and forming a network, but not knowing how to pass on that information.” Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ’40–’45, p. 21.11 Francis Balace, “Des milliers d’yeux dans la nuit:

虽然二战情报和行动服务是当前比利时情报研究的一个重要研究课题，但直到最近，研究人员才将研究重点放在beno<e:1>网络上。然而，这个组织对于比利时政府和伦敦国家安全局收集的情报的成功传递至关重要。beno<e:1>的主要成员之一是阿尔伯特·范·拜莱尔，他的上司认为他“才华横溢”。本文概述了他的动机和行为，并给出了他在冷战期间受到各种情报机构追捧的第一印象。在简要讨论了该网络的组织和活动以及围绕该网络的主要事件之后，重点将转移到他的活动上。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Kees Schuyt, Universitair verzet (1940-1945)， maatschappelijk verzet en de waarde van wetenschap: Een drieluik (Den Haag: Boom Lemma Uitgevers, 2012)， p. 18;马克·库尔斯，“Universitair verzet, inlichtingen en active”，收录于情报与行动代理纪念册，由罗杰·科克尔伯斯、马克·库尔斯、罗宾·利伯特、维尔勒·帕什利、Jaak Raes、大卫·斯坦斯和Renaat Vandecasteele编辑(安特威彭:马克卢，2015年)，第95-96.2页。Lannoo, 1992)，第19.3页，对每个小组的活动进行概述，例如，见Emmanuel Debruyne, 1940-1944年比利时间谍的秘密活动(布鲁塞尔:拉辛，2008年);Marie-Pierre d 'Udekem d 'Acoz, Voor Koning & vaderland: De Belgische adel in the verzet (Tielt: Lannoo, 2013);“很酷，”Universitair verzzet说，“很活跃。”被称为“镇压”和“清洗”的时期:比利时(1944-1949)Michael Warner，“智力研究的来源和方法”，见Loch K. Johnson编辑的《智力研究手册》(伦敦:Routledge出版社，2007)，第21-22页;Emmanuel Debruyne，“La maison de verre: Agents et r<s:1> seaux de renseignements en Belgique, 1940-1944”(博士论文，Louvain天主教大学，2006)，第29.6页，Peter Jackson，“对‘秘密国家’的调查”，收录于《情报档案探索:对秘密国家的调查》，由R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson和Len Scott编辑(伦敦:Jean Fosty，“De Belgische netten in Frankrijk”，Bijdragen tot De geschiedenis van De Tweede Wereldoorlog, Vol. 2 (1972)， p. 220.8 Jackson，“对‘秘密国家’的调查”，p. 3.9 Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ' 40 - ' 45, p. 48;Etienne Verhoeyen, België Bezet 1940-1944: even synthese(布鲁塞尔:brn - educatieve Uitgaven出版社，1993)，第261.10页意译:“一个令人困惑的景象，人们收集情报，聚集在一起，形成一个网络，但不知道如何传递这些信息。”斯特鲁布，Geheime oorlog ' 40- ' 45，第21.11页。弗朗西斯·巴勒斯，“军队的军事行动:1940-1944年的军事行动的起源和类型学”，收录于《情报和行动特工》纪念册，由罗杰·科克尔伯斯、马克·库尔斯、罗宾·利伯特、维尔勒·帕什利、雅克·拉斯、大卫·斯坦斯和雷纳特·范德卡斯蒂尔编辑(安特卫普:马克卢，2015年)，第77.12页。Robin Libert，“In vogelvlucht: De geschiedenis van 175 jaar Veiligheid van De Staat”，载于De Staatsveiligheid:超过175 jaar Veiligheid van De Staat的论文，由Marc Cools, Koen Dassen, Robin Libert和Paul Ponsaers编辑(布鲁塞尔:Politeia, 2005)，第37.14页。有关该协议的更多信息，请参见:Etienne Verhoeyen和Emmanuel Debruyne，“Les annacimes londoniennes”。《情报与行动特工》，收录于《情报与行动特工》纪念卷，由Roger Coekelbers、Marc Cools、Robin Libert、Veerle Pashley、Jaak Raes、David Stans和Renaat Vandecasteele(安特卫普:Maklu, 2015)编辑，第61-63.15页。Funkabwehr (Funkabwehr der Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)是一个无线电反情报机构，成立于1940年，由Oberstleutnant(相当于德国中校)Hans Kopp领导。在整个战争期间，Funkabwehr作为德国主要的信号情报组织，主要是监视和拦截来自被占领土的无线电传输。此外，Funkabwehr的传输本身向盟军提供的信息也很少。他们的x型设备是谜机的一部分，谜机是一种连布莱切利公园的天才们都觉得极难破译的编码系统Paul Louyet, België in de Tweede Wereldoorlog: Deel 4: heet verzet (Kapellen: de Nederlandsche Boekhandel, 1984)， 51.17页。Strubbe, Geheime oorlog ' 40 - ' 45, pp. 20-22。然而，这里应该做一个评论。由walth<s:1> dew<s:1>领导的克拉伦斯特遣队具有高度的专业精神。例如，它是唯一一个拥有真正“董事会”的组织。这可以从历史的角度来解释:克拉伦斯是第一次世界大战情报网络La Dame Blanche的继任者，该网络在内战期间被转变为SIS的“留守网络”，名为“观察军团”。凭借第一次世界大战的经验和与英国的关系，克拉伦斯能够展示出任何其他组织(包括外国组织)无法比拟的效率。克拉伦斯，被伊曼纽尔·德布鲁因恰如其分地描述为“克拉伦斯，一路前进”，因此成为被占领土上所有其他情报组织的榜样利伯特，“在道德上”，第23-48页;Verhoeyen and Debruyne， < Les annesemonines >，第47-68页。罗马人已经使用了这种策略，因为拥有帝国印章的信使可以自由进入城市。这些信使除了履行公务外，还经常递送私人信件和传递有价值的情报Robin Lieffe

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引用次数: 1

Auditory and Olfactory Copying in Intelligence: Brain and Thought Modifications Beyond the Word 智力中的听觉和嗅觉复制:超越文字的大脑和思想修正

Q4 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence

Pub Date : 2023-11-02 DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2257553

Davide Bellomo

AbstractFor those who command the machine, regulate the satellite, or handle operations in the field, everything depends on the brain, on the human being. According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the sixth domain where conflict will occur and peace will have to be managed is the cognitive one, made official in 2021. It becomes the most important of all. In the end, the match will be won by whoever will have practitioners, analysts, or those deployed in the field with the best brain. Experiments are being carried out in some countries where the human brain gets physically connected to the machine so that the machine can learn how the human brain works. However, a machine will learn from that person’s brain, with all their limitations, biases, and fears, therefore already having numerous flaws in its system, without considering the ethical disputableness of this kind of thing. There is a way to win in the sixth domain: enhancing the intelligence practitioners’ capabilities, which is doable thanks to the latest studies and techniques developed. It is, therefore, possible, without medicines, drugs, or electrical and electronic equipment, to augment the mental capability and plasticity of those who will have to win these challenges. Disclosure StatementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Bernard Claverie, Baptiste Prébot, Norbou Buchler, and François Du Cluzel, “Cognitive Warfare,” in First NATO Scientific Meeting on Cognitive Warfare (Bordeaux: NATO-STO Collaboration Support Office, with the support of NATO-ACT Innovation Hub, Bordeaux ENSC, the French Armed Forces Joint Staff and the Region Nouvelle Aquitaine, 2021).2 Ibid.3 Daniel J. Siegel, La mente relazionale: Neurobiologia dell’esperienza interpersonale [The Relational Mind: Neurobiology of the Interpersonal Experience] (Milan: Raffello Cortina Editore, 2013).4 Sabrina Magris, Perla Di Gioia, Ilaria Lamonato, Livia Stefania Mihalache, and Davide Bellomo, “To Have Alternatives, You Must Be Able to Think of Them,” The Journal of the Australian Institute of Professional Intelligence, Vol. 28, No. 2–3 (2020), pp. 68–82.5 The physiological bias is the elaboration of internal or external information aimed to cover up what is missed of the real information. The brain creates an ostensible version of what happens—based on the information it has already stored, without codifying new information—because it does not have the reality of what happens. At the neural level, it indicates the deficiency of substances that enable the connections between the parts of the brain involved, causing the noncodification of the information received. Davide Bellomo, What Is Biased Can Be Unbiased: The Neurological Process of Identification and Elimination of Biases Held by Professionals and Victims. Study Conducted Using Subject’s Brain Mapping to Evaluate Biases Caused by Trauma, Culture or Education. Poster presentation, End Violence Against Women International Conference

摘要对于那些指挥机器、调节卫星或处理野外作业的人来说，一切都取决于大脑，取决于人。根据北大西洋公约组织(North Atlantic Treaty Organization)的说法，2021年正式确定的第六个将发生冲突并必须管理和平的领域是认知领域。它成为最重要的。最终，谁拥有从业者、分析师，谁在该领域拥有最聪明的头脑，谁就能赢得这场比赛。一些国家正在进行实验，将人脑与机器物理连接起来，这样机器就可以学习人脑的工作原理。然而，机器将从人的大脑中学习，尽管有局限性、偏见和恐惧，因此它的系统已经有了许多缺陷，而不考虑这种事情的伦理争议。在第六领域取胜的方法是:提高情报从业者的能力，这是可行的，这得益于最新的研究和技术的发展。因此，不需要药物、药物或电子电气设备，就有可能增强那些必须赢得这些挑战的人的心智能力和可塑性。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1 Bernard Claverie, Baptiste pracimbot, Norbou Buchler和franois Du Cluzel，“认知战”，在第一次北约认知战科学会议上(波尔多:北约- sto协作支持办公室，在北约- act创新中心，波尔多ENSC，法国武装部队联合参谋部和新阿基坦地区的支持下，2021)4 . Daniel J. Siegel, La mente relazionale: Neurobiologia dell 'esperienza interpersonale[关系思维:人际体验的神经生物学](米兰:Raffello Cortina Editore, 2013)Sabrina Magris, Perla Di Gioia, Ilaria Lamonato, Livia Stefania Mihalache和Davide Bellomo，“要有替代方案，你必须能够想到它们”，《澳大利亚专业情报研究所杂志》，第28卷，第2-3期(2020年)，第68-82.5页生理偏见是对内部或外部信息的阐述，旨在掩盖真实信息中遗漏的内容。大脑根据它已经储存的信息创造了一个表面上的版本，而没有编纂新的信息——因为它不知道发生了什么。在神经层面上，它表明缺乏能够连接大脑相关部分的物质，导致接收到的信息不编码。大卫·贝洛莫，有偏见的东西可以是无偏见的:识别和消除专业人员和受害者持有的偏见的神经学过程。利用受试者的大脑映射来评估创伤、文化或教育造成的偏见。5 . 2018年4月3日至5日，美国芝加哥，“制止对妇女的暴力行为国际会议”海报展示Ariel Rokem和Merav Ahissar，“先天失明个体的认知和听觉能力的相互作用”，《神经心理学》，Vol. 47, No. 3 (2009)， pp. 843-848。https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.12.0177同上8 Giacomo Rizzolatti, Luciano Fadiga, Vittorio Gallese和Leonardo Fogassi，“前运动皮层和运动动作的识别”，《大脑研究》。认知脑研究，第3卷，第2期(1996)，第131-141页。https://doi.org/10.1016/0926 - 6410 (95) 00038 - 0;Giacomo Rizzolatti和Laila Craighero，“镜像神经元系统”，《神经科学年鉴》，第27卷，第1期(2004)，第169-192页。https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.1442309 Wayne L. Silver和Thomas E. Finger，“外周鼻三叉神经化学感受的解剖和电生理基础”，《纽约科学院年鉴》，Vol. 1170 (2009)， pp. 202-205。https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.03894.x10 Christopher S. Von Bartheld，“末梢神经及其与球外“嗅觉”投射的关系:来自七鳃鳗和肺鱼的经验”，《显微镜研究与技术》，第65卷，第1-2期(2004)，第13-24页。https://doi.org/10.1002/jemt.20095。Wolfgang Klimesch，“大脑和脑体振荡的频率架构:分析”，欧洲神经科学杂志，Vol. 48 (2018)， pp. 2431-2453。https://doi.org/10.1111/ejn.14192;Joshua H. Balsters, Ian H. Robertson和Vince D. Calhoun，“BOLD频率功率指数工作记忆性能”，《人类神经科学前沿》，第7卷(2013)。https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00207;Charles J. Wysocki和George Preti，“人类信息素的事实、谬误、恐惧和挫折”，《解剖记录》A卷281(2004)，第1201-1211页。https://doi.org/10.1002/ar.a.2012512西格尔，《关系之门》记忆技术，双眼技术，以及与突触重新开放相关的技术。 [14]卢吉·阿诺里和保罗·勒格伦兹，《普通心理学》(博洛尼亚:大众心理学，2001).15“设计意味着一个地方，一个主体所在的地方，如何改变主体的行为。”此外，“设计被转化为谎言的设计，谎言的设计基于存在于地点、物体、文字和图像之间的推理，基于个人如何根据他进入和/或沉浸的地方修改他的行为。”萨布丽娜·马格里斯，La svolta apicale: Come cambiare La mentalitcome aumentare le capacitcomdi leadership[顶点转向:如何改变心态和增强领导技能](Castelfranco Veneto: Panda edition, 2022)几十年来，人们一直认为视力是一种器官，但事实证明视力并不是这种器官。眼见是骗人的。大脑看不见的地方，它就发明，而听觉和嗅觉器官的错误率较低19 .大卫·贝洛莫，“研究成果的介绍”，École国际大学课堂，意大利罗马，2022.18年3月。查尔斯·达尔文，自然选择的进化论(1859)20 .世界卫生组织，《世界卫生统计报告》(2021年)Gaetano Kanizsa，“Margini quasi- perceptivi in campi con stimulmolazione omogenea”[准知觉边缘在均匀刺激场]，Rivista di Psicologia[心理学杂志]，卷49，第1期(1955)，第7-30页;Gaetano Kanizsa和Walter Gerbino，《情态完成:看见还是思考?》Kenneth N. Stevens和Sheila Ellen Blumstein，“顿音发音位置的不变线索”，《美国声学学会杂志》，第64卷，第5期(1978)，第1358-1368页。https://doi.org/10.1121/1.382102;Kenneth

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