Pub Date : 2023-05-08DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2197558
J. Hardy
Abstract The rapid expansion of Special Operations Forces (SOF) since the beginning of the twenty-first century is largely seen as a response to the necessity to fight the post–11 September 2001 counterterrorism wars. Strike and intelligence, previously studied as distinct functions for military forces, have been increasingly intertwined in contemporary SOF operations. This study examines the evolution of the strike and intelligence functions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and allied SOF in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns from 2004 to 2017. The coevolution of strike and intelligence functions in SOF operations provides unique insight into the processes of battlefield and doctrinal adaptation in counterterrorism campaigns. Opportunities for further research include links between emerging doctrine and practice in targeting enemy networks.
{"title":"Hunters and Gatherers: The Evolution of Strike and Intelligence Functions in Special Operations Forces","authors":"J. Hardy","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2197558","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2197558","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The rapid expansion of Special Operations Forces (SOF) since the beginning of the twenty-first century is largely seen as a response to the necessity to fight the post–11 September 2001 counterterrorism wars. Strike and intelligence, previously studied as distinct functions for military forces, have been increasingly intertwined in contemporary SOF operations. This study examines the evolution of the strike and intelligence functions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and allied SOF in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns from 2004 to 2017. The coevolution of strike and intelligence functions in SOF operations provides unique insight into the processes of battlefield and doctrinal adaptation in counterterrorism campaigns. Opportunities for further research include links between emerging doctrine and practice in targeting enemy networks.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"2 1","pages":"1143 - 1163"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84130594","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-08DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2022.2155028
Darren E. Tromblay
{"title":"Muddled Attempt at Surveying a Profession","authors":"Darren E. Tromblay","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2022.2155028","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2155028","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90097894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-08DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2202344
Valentin Stoian
Abstract Romania represents one of the paradigmatic cases where security sector reform proceeded quickly after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. The former Securitate was one of the most repressive intelligence services in the communist bloc and drastic reform was necessary in order to establish an efficient and trusted domestic intelligence service. Previous research by Bruneau and Matei highlighted the important steps that Romania has undertaken over the past years and argued that an efficient and robust oversight system has been built. This article addresses contemporary debates on factors triggering reform in parliamentary intelligence and focuses on Romania’s 2017 reforms. These reforms can be analyzed through the application of the “fire alarm/police patrol” model developed by Loch K. Johnson for changes in congressional oversight. By increasing and clarifying the power of the Joint Standing Committee for the Oversight of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the 2017 changes brought more clarity and more accountability to the oversight system. After 2017, the committee reverted to a “police patrol model” focusing on visits to intelligence sites and meetings with high-level intelligence officials.
{"title":"Parliamentary Intelligence Oversight in Romania: Between Consolidation and Controversy","authors":"Valentin Stoian","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2202344","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2202344","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Romania represents one of the paradigmatic cases where security sector reform proceeded quickly after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. The former Securitate was one of the most repressive intelligence services in the communist bloc and drastic reform was necessary in order to establish an efficient and trusted domestic intelligence service. Previous research by Bruneau and Matei highlighted the important steps that Romania has undertaken over the past years and argued that an efficient and robust oversight system has been built. This article addresses contemporary debates on factors triggering reform in parliamentary intelligence and focuses on Romania’s 2017 reforms. These reforms can be analyzed through the application of the “fire alarm/police patrol” model developed by Loch K. Johnson for changes in congressional oversight. By increasing and clarifying the power of the Joint Standing Committee for the Oversight of the Romanian Intelligence Service, the 2017 changes brought more clarity and more accountability to the oversight system. After 2017, the committee reverted to a “police patrol model” focusing on visits to intelligence sites and meetings with high-level intelligence officials.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"91 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73600615","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-08DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2202345
Katharine Palmer
Abstract Utilizing a conceptual framework of branching in—the ability of the state to utilize internal assets and mechanisms—and branching out—the solicitation of external services—this article introduces several criteria that states must fulfill in order to branch in, namely infrastructure control, offensive cyber capability, and sufficient resources. Subsequently, failure to meet one or more of these criteria forces a branch out toward commodity spyware. Nuances in this argument and the inherent features of commodity spyware also highlight the use of such services even by “branch-in capable” states. The findings within this article offer a broad overview of the factors predilecting state use of commodity spyware, with general applications for both nondemocratic and democratic states.
{"title":"Branching Out: Factors Motivating Nondemocratic Use of Commodity Spyware","authors":"Katharine Palmer","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2202345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2202345","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Utilizing a conceptual framework of branching in—the ability of the state to utilize internal assets and mechanisms—and branching out—the solicitation of external services—this article introduces several criteria that states must fulfill in order to branch in, namely infrastructure control, offensive cyber capability, and sufficient resources. Subsequently, failure to meet one or more of these criteria forces a branch out toward commodity spyware. Nuances in this argument and the inherent features of commodity spyware also highlight the use of such services even by “branch-in capable” states. The findings within this article offer a broad overview of the factors predilecting state use of commodity spyware, with general applications for both nondemocratic and democratic states.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"2013 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"74326390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-24DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2195790
Scott A. Moseman
{"title":"Policy Success or Intelligence Failure?","authors":"Scott A. Moseman","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2195790","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2195790","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76292492","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-17DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2193133
T. Shakoor
Abstract The intelligence cycle has been the standard model for intelligence processes and national intelligence doctrines in the United States and Europe. However, at the same time, it is seen as theoretical flotsam from the Cold War. This study explores the cycle’s application in the Danish Defence Intelligence Services Middle East analytical department. It is a single-site explorative case study of the Middle Eastern analytic department using multiple sources in the form of formal descriptions, organograms, and qualitative interviews with intelligence and government officials to explore and compare the manifest and assumed organization. The study concludes that the cycle is merely a metaphor for a New Public Management framework in use in the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and across the Danish central administration. This framework is used for setting the annual intelligence requirements. This study is an argument for a closer look at the impact of New Public Management on European intelligence organizations.
{"title":"Unwinding the Intelligence Cycle in Denmark","authors":"T. Shakoor","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2193133","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2193133","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The intelligence cycle has been the standard model for intelligence processes and national intelligence doctrines in the United States and Europe. However, at the same time, it is seen as theoretical flotsam from the Cold War. This study explores the cycle’s application in the Danish Defence Intelligence Services Middle East analytical department. It is a single-site explorative case study of the Middle Eastern analytic department using multiple sources in the form of formal descriptions, organograms, and qualitative interviews with intelligence and government officials to explore and compare the manifest and assumed organization. The study concludes that the cycle is merely a metaphor for a New Public Management framework in use in the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and across the Danish central administration. This framework is used for setting the annual intelligence requirements. This study is an argument for a closer look at the impact of New Public Management on European intelligence organizations.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"1 1","pages":"1085 - 1103"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"77309788","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-12DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2189847
Artur Gruszczak
Abstract The broad range of European Union (EU) missions and operations sets out the requirement of strategic awareness and situational assessments for effective fulfillment of operational tasks in the areas of EU-led activities. Building on the concept of coercive isomorphism, this article argues that intelligence support for common security and defense policy activities has been limited and contentious because of the vulnerability gap caused by patterns enforced by member states. Priority for national interests and assets hinders the logic of reciprocity. It lowers the value of synergetic links between the intelligence services of member states and relevant EU agencies and bodies. Regardless of numerous obstacles and limitations, the strategic vulnerability gap has been slowly bridged thanks to the development and implementation of more reliable mechanisms of intelligence cooperation within the EU.
{"title":"Military Intelligence in Support of EU Missions and Operations: Bridging the Strategic Vulnerability Gap","authors":"Artur Gruszczak","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2189847","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2189847","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The broad range of European Union (EU) missions and operations sets out the requirement of strategic awareness and situational assessments for effective fulfillment of operational tasks in the areas of EU-led activities. Building on the concept of coercive isomorphism, this article argues that intelligence support for common security and defense policy activities has been limited and contentious because of the vulnerability gap caused by patterns enforced by member states. Priority for national interests and assets hinders the logic of reciprocity. It lowers the value of synergetic links between the intelligence services of member states and relevant EU agencies and bodies. Regardless of numerous obstacles and limitations, the strategic vulnerability gap has been slowly bridged thanks to the development and implementation of more reliable mechanisms of intelligence cooperation within the EU.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"12 1","pages":"1104 - 1121"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"85129436","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-12DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2192374
A. Magee
Abstract In January 1990, a U.S counterintelligence surveillance team supporting a priority counterespionage investigation in Munich, West Germany, became engaged in a hostile encounter that was unlike anything ever experienced. The event was recorded as an “aggressive, hostile countersurveillance effort,” but with the U.S. victory in the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the dismantlement of the State Committee for Security, the investigative record was inconclusively filed away before the applicable lessons could be captured. After 30+ years, the declassified details of the investigation and the sequence of events leading to this fateful Munich night is examined under an inductive causal analysis to deconstruct the events using a case study methodology. After a comprehensive analysis, it becomes evident that the engagement was mischaracterized, and the hostile operation had much broader implications. While the hostile engagement was a black swan event, the sequence of events in the investigation leading to this final act was a microcosm of the larger Soviet strategic disinformation, misdirection, and manipulation apparatus. Three decades after fading into obscurity under a veil of classification restrictions, counterintelligence professionals, intelligence analysts, and intelligence historians can now benefit from the still-relevant lessons and other insights from this case study.
{"title":"Counterintelligence Black Swan: KGB Deception, Countersurveillance, and Active Measures Operation","authors":"A. Magee","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2192374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2192374","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In January 1990, a U.S counterintelligence surveillance team supporting a priority counterespionage investigation in Munich, West Germany, became engaged in a hostile encounter that was unlike anything ever experienced. The event was recorded as an “aggressive, hostile countersurveillance effort,” but with the U.S. victory in the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the dismantlement of the State Committee for Security, the investigative record was inconclusively filed away before the applicable lessons could be captured. After 30+ years, the declassified details of the investigation and the sequence of events leading to this fateful Munich night is examined under an inductive causal analysis to deconstruct the events using a case study methodology. After a comprehensive analysis, it becomes evident that the engagement was mischaracterized, and the hostile operation had much broader implications. While the hostile engagement was a black swan event, the sequence of events in the investigation leading to this final act was a microcosm of the larger Soviet strategic disinformation, misdirection, and manipulation apparatus. Three decades after fading into obscurity under a veil of classification restrictions, counterintelligence professionals, intelligence analysts, and intelligence historians can now benefit from the still-relevant lessons and other insights from this case study.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73792888","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-12DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2023.2189037
P. Petrović
Abstract Two decades after the overthrow of the autocratic regime of Slobodan Milosevic, security intelligence agencies in Serbia are not only far from being reformed, but they play a central role in democracy decline and what many academics and policy officials describe as state capture. Intelligence agencies are among the first victims of state capture and among the major instruments in further capturing state institutions. This process has been a product of the agreed transition from autocracy to democracy that prevented bloodshed but maintained a clientelist relationship between (new) democratic leadership and the (old) security apparatus. Consequently, thorough intelligence reform never happened, resulting in the survival of agencies’ strongholds of power, which facilitated the return to old secret police practice. It is not uncommon today that among important tasks of security intelligence are regime protection through suppression of political opposition and critical voices, as well as making sure that suspicious deals of those close to the ruling party run smoothly. This article aims to map and analyze events and processes that have led to these outcomes and describe how security intelligence is being instrumentalized by the ruling political party and its leader, Aleksandar Vucic.
{"title":"Failed Intelligence Reform, State Capture, and Authoritarian Turn in Serbia","authors":"P. Petrović","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2023.2189037","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2023.2189037","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Two decades after the overthrow of the autocratic regime of Slobodan Milosevic, security intelligence agencies in Serbia are not only far from being reformed, but they play a central role in democracy decline and what many academics and policy officials describe as state capture. Intelligence agencies are among the first victims of state capture and among the major instruments in further capturing state institutions. This process has been a product of the agreed transition from autocracy to democracy that prevented bloodshed but maintained a clientelist relationship between (new) democratic leadership and the (old) security apparatus. Consequently, thorough intelligence reform never happened, resulting in the survival of agencies’ strongholds of power, which facilitated the return to old secret police practice. It is not uncommon today that among important tasks of security intelligence are regime protection through suppression of political opposition and critical voices, as well as making sure that suspicious deals of those close to the ruling party run smoothly. This article aims to map and analyze events and processes that have led to these outcomes and describe how security intelligence is being instrumentalized by the ruling political party and its leader, Aleksandar Vucic.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"42 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"83263215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-03DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2022.2080982
Angela Gendron
Abstract A historical perspective aids our understanding of the present and capacity to anticipate the future. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but particularly its brutality and policy of “constructive destruction,” was shocking and unexpected, but faced with Russia’s relegation from superpower status, it was always a possibility that Putin would emulate Stalin’s determination to maintain Russian influence in the world and challenge the West’s dominance. The risk of recurrent totalitarianism borne of the fear, distrust, and mutual demonization which characterized the ideological rivalry of the early Cold War years has led to a search for historical analogies of relevance to the growing East/West tensions of today that threaten to bring about a second Cold War or limited nuclear conflict. The motivating ideology for Russian expansionism is no longer Communism, but a mythical narrative that promotes Russian nationalism, patriotism, and exceptionalism. Putin’s authoritarian state with its concentration of power and recourse to propaganda, disinformation, and lies is daily looking more Stalinesque and the Cold War question—how to contain Russian ambition—remains to be answered. While the focus has so far been on Stalin’s geopolitical strategy regarding Russia’s near neighbors, two books about the first post–World War II defection in 1945 merit re-visiting for the in-depth analysis and insights they provide into the period and the mindset of participants caught up in that affair. The defector, Igor Gouzenko, a Russian cyber clerk, insisted that Russia was preparing for a Third World War. His revelations precipitated the start of the Cold War.
{"title":"Looking Back at the Gouzenko Defection","authors":"Angela Gendron","doi":"10.1080/08850607.2022.2080982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2022.2080982","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract A historical perspective aids our understanding of the present and capacity to anticipate the future. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but particularly its brutality and policy of “constructive destruction,” was shocking and unexpected, but faced with Russia’s relegation from superpower status, it was always a possibility that Putin would emulate Stalin’s determination to maintain Russian influence in the world and challenge the West’s dominance. The risk of recurrent totalitarianism borne of the fear, distrust, and mutual demonization which characterized the ideological rivalry of the early Cold War years has led to a search for historical analogies of relevance to the growing East/West tensions of today that threaten to bring about a second Cold War or limited nuclear conflict. The motivating ideology for Russian expansionism is no longer Communism, but a mythical narrative that promotes Russian nationalism, patriotism, and exceptionalism. Putin’s authoritarian state with its concentration of power and recourse to propaganda, disinformation, and lies is daily looking more Stalinesque and the Cold War question—how to contain Russian ambition—remains to be answered. While the focus has so far been on Stalin’s geopolitical strategy regarding Russia’s near neighbors, two books about the first post–World War II defection in 1945 merit re-visiting for the in-depth analysis and insights they provide into the period and the mindset of participants caught up in that affair. The defector, Igor Gouzenko, a Russian cyber clerk, insisted that Russia was preparing for a Third World War. His revelations precipitated the start of the Cold War.","PeriodicalId":45249,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence","volume":"9 1","pages":"613 - 625"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82140633","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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