Australian Journal of Politics and History最新文献

Over the past century, crises have enabled the construction of Australian foreign policy orders, or sets of ideas that reduce uncertainty and stabilise interests. However, such ideas have also engendered misplaced certainty and renewed crisis. Developing a constructivist framework, I stress the ways in which ideas can over time impede the use of information and fuel instability and crises. In a staged model, I trace the construction of ties with “great and powerful friends”, their conversion in ways that fuel misplaced certainty, and the construction of crises which advance change. Empirically, I then trace the construction of an early Imperial order, misplaced certainty in UK-backed austerity and appeasement, and crises in the Great Depression and fall of Singapore.

The Kerguelen archipelago in the Southern Indian Ocean was never militarised and never posed a realistic naval threat to Australia or the British Empire during the twentieth century. However, there were two episodes, once in the Federation Era and during the Second World War, when there was debate within Australia as to whether this outlying French possession posed a threat to Australian security. By examining these periods of Australian anxiety surrounding the Kerguelen archipelago, it becomes possible to see that these concerns were more reflective of Australian strategic angst than any tangible threat posed by a remote, unpopulated, nominal French possession. This episode is an example of a broader Australian angst in the early and mid-twentieth century that remote colonial possessions could be weaponised to isolate Australia and threaten it. The Kerguelens represent one of the most peculiar examples of the manifestations of Australian strategic insecurity.

In August 1974, the Australian Labor Party Government under Prime Minister Gough Whitlam announced it had recognised the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union de jure. Historical writing around this diplomatic recognition is scarce and sheds little light on why the policy was enacted. Using previously unavailable archival evidence, as well as other sources including testimony from Government and public service workers, this article demonstrates that the recognition was induced primarily by Whitlam, the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Sir James Plimsoll, Australia's ambassador to the Soviet Union. These actors were motivated by varying considerations. These included an adherence to realist foreign policy principles, concerns regarding Australian–Soviet bi-lateral relations, convictions around the legitimacy of Baltic self-determination, and ethnic prejudice against Australians of Baltic descent.

During the Cold War, defectors from the Russian Intelligence Services to the West were of critical importance. They exposed and neutralised hundreds of Soviet agents who had penetrated government departments and democratic institutions. Stretching from Anatoli Granovsky in 1946 to Oleg Gordievsky in 1985, these Soviet defectors were highly prized for the intelligence they provided to security services. Ranked amongst the most valuable at the time was Vladimir Mikhailovich Petrov, who defected in Sydney in 1954. Yet he, almost alone, has overwhelmingly been cast by commentators and historians as lazy, inefficient, and incompetent. This article will offer an alternative interpretation of Petrov. My argument has three prongs. First, Petrov's contact with Russian individuals and pro-Soviet political organisations in Australia was far more extensive than generally assumed. Second, contrary to the historiographical consensus, he withheld intelligence about his contacts and informants from his security service debriefers. Third, rather than Petrov seeing espionage as too dangerous, as suggested, he was a committed and active Soviet intelligence cadre. By reappraising Petrov, the article seeks to provide a fresh understanding of this key episode, the Petrov Affair, in Australia's Cold War history.

In the context of Hobsbawm's thesis about the nineteenth-century law of progress, the author studies Kollár's and Štúr's conception of Slavic reciprocity, which he compares with the Greek Great Idea (Megali Idea) and the Greek-Cypriot idea of enosis. He came to the conclusion that there is greater similarity, especially between Štúr's conception and enosis, since they both required state-political as well as territorial unification of Slavs or Greeks, unlike Kollár's conception, which was, rather, a cultural and literary reciprocity project. As a historical paradox, the author considers the fact that the practical and feasible conception of enosis was never carried out, while Kollár's theoretical conception and Štúr's highly unlikely model became, in a modified form, a reality after the First and Second World Wars.

Australian rule in the Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG) was conducted in large part by a system of patrol officers, the “kiaps”. This article examines rule-by-kiap in the two remote, westernmost districts of the late-Territory (Western and West Sepik) between 1960 and 1973, drawing upon archival sources and interviews with former officers. Australian colonial rule in these districts should be understood as “government by inspection”. The extension of infrastructures of access and the conduct of the census were dominant preoccupations of the Administration, and demonstrations of force were routine. Rule-by-kiap was characteristic of much of TPNG across the years of Australian rule but persisted later in these remote districts, due to their late consolidation under the control of the colonial state. Accordingly, longstanding preoccupations such as the census became linked to new imperatives, such as the conduct of elections.

In 2003, Iraq was invaded, ostensibly to remove a nuclear threat, by a coalition led by George W. Bush. At the same time select allies were invitited to participate in Bush's Global Nuclear Energy Partnership which aimed to limit the spread of nuclear enrichment and reprocessing. This came as climate change gave emphasis to the development of nuclear energy, especially in Asia. With an abundant supply of uranium and strict nuclear safeguards, Australia was well placed to provide a site for the full suite of nuclear services. The recent AUKUS nuclear submarine agreement has underscored its failure to do so. This article makes the case for the adoption of nuclear power as a necessary step in the development of advanced manufacturing; the provision of a domestic capability to fuel nuclear attack submarines and other naval craft; and as a contribution to global nuclear non-proliferation.