Criminal Law and Philosophy最新文献

The policy adopted by housing authorities of denying prospective tenants with a criminal record access to housing is an important barrier to ex-offenders seeking somewhere to live. The policy is legal, but are there any good reasons in favor of it when we know that having no, or limited, access to secure and affordable housing increases the probability of recidivism? The primary aim of this article is to critically discuss two central reasons that have been given for denying people with criminal records access to housing: that doing so will prevent crime, and that the policy reduces fear of crime. We also try to evaluate an argument for the conclusion that current law, and the policies that follows wrongfully discriminate against people with criminal records. The general thrust of the article is that arguments for this practice turning on its crime preventive effect, and its role in reducing or preventing fear of crime, are unpersuasive. We then explained why, in our view, excluding ex-offenders from housing amounts to wrongful discrimination against them. Our analysis suggests that ex-offenders, apart from a few excemptions, ought to be allowed access to housing to the same extent as other people.

This paper reviews The Ethics of Undercover Policing by Christopher Nathan.

The possible future use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and the challenges associated with assigning moral responsibility leads to several debates. Some authors argue that the highly autonomous capability of such systems may lead to a so-called responsibility gap in situations where LAWS cause serious violations of international humanitarian law. One proposed solution is the doctrine of command responsibility. Despite the doctrine’s original development to govern human interactions on the battlefield, it is worth considering whether the doctrine of command responsibility could provide a solution by applying the notion analogously to LAWS. A fundamental condition underpinning the doctrine’s application is the control requirement, stipulating that a superior must exert some degree of control over subordinates. The aim of this article is to provide an in-depth analysis of this control condition and assess whether it leads to the impossibility of applying the doctrine of command responsibility to LAWS. To this end, the first section briefly introduces the topic of LAWS and responsibility gaps. The subsequent section provides a concise overview of the doctrine itself and the conditions typically necessitated for its application. In the third section, a comprehensive scrutiny of the control requirement is undertaken through examination of key case law, examining how the concept has been interpreted. Finally, the fourth section delves into the evaluation of commanders’ potential to exert effective control over their (non-human) subordinates. Based on this, the feasibility of considering command responsibility as a viable solution is assessed, aiming to determine whether its application should be prima facie excluded or warrants further exploration.

Courts and commentators do not differentiate between defendants who perpetrate crimes by means of inanimate weapons or trained animals and those who perpetrate crimes by means of other human beings used as innocent agents. I argue that this widely accepted comparability is grossly insensitive to the violation of the human dignity of the person whom the perpetrator has turned into an instrument to an offence. Identifying the innocent agent as a possible second victim of the offence alongside the intended victim raises several issues of both morality and law. First, the question of moral pertinence: do the scenarios that the law recognises as cases of innocent agency involve a violation of the dignity of the innocent agent? Second, the question of criminalisation: is it appropriate to invoke criminal law to protect the dignity of the innocent agent? Third, the question of the protected interest: assuming that both the dignity of the innocent agent and their autonomy are compromised, which of these violations is graver? I argue that there is a strong connection between the doctrine of innocent agency and the violation of the dignity of the innocent agent; that the violation of the innocent agent’s dignity is severe enough to warrant criminalisation and that this is simple enough to enforce; and that the injury to the innocent agent’s dignity is more significant than the injury to their autonomy. The operative proposal of this article is that the law should recognise perpetration by means of innocent agents as an aggravated mode of commission or an aggravating factor in punishment.