Pub Date : 2023-05-03DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09672-w
R. Barney
{"title":"Gopal Sreenivasan, Emotion and Virtue: Five Questions About Courage","authors":"R. Barney","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09672-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09672-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47486789","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-26DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09675-7
Maxime Lepoutre, Sara Vilar-Lluch, E. Borg, Nat Hansen
{"title":"What is Hate Speech? The Case for a Corpus Approach","authors":"Maxime Lepoutre, Sara Vilar-Lluch, E. Borg, Nat Hansen","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09675-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09675-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46772886","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-20DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09666-8
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Rachel Harmon
{"title":"Flight and Force","authors":"Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Rachel Harmon","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09666-8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09666-8","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-04-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48279858","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-31DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09671-x
Christian List
Michael S. Moore defends the ideas of free will and responsibility, especially in relation to criminal law, against several challenges from neuroscience. I agree with Moore that morality and the law presuppose a commonsense understanding of humans as rational agents, who make choices and act for reasons, and that to defend moral and legal responsibility, we must show that this commonsense understanding remains viable. Unlike Moore, however, I do not think that classical compatibilism, which is based on a conditional understanding of the ability to do otherwise, provides a sufficiently robust account of free will, even when it is amended as Moore suggests. I argue that free will and responsibility can be defended more robustly by observing that, at the level of agency, there can be alternative possibilities and mental causation in a stronger sense than recognized by classical compatibilism, even if physical determinism is true. Moore's arguments could thus be strengthened by embracing this compatibilist libertarian position. At the same time, I note that, although the idea of responsibility is robustly defensible, there are independent reasons for rejecting a retributivist approach to punishment.
{"title":"Mechanical Choices: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.","authors":"Christian List","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09671-x","DOIUrl":"10.1007/s11572-023-09671-x","url":null,"abstract":"<p><p>Michael S. Moore defends the ideas of free will and responsibility, especially in relation to criminal law, against several challenges from neuroscience. I agree with Moore that morality and the law presuppose a commonsense understanding of humans as rational agents, who make choices and act for reasons, and that to defend moral and legal responsibility, we must show that this commonsense understanding remains viable. Unlike Moore, however, I do not think that classical compatibilism, which is based on a conditional understanding of the ability to do otherwise, provides a sufficiently robust account of free will, even when it is amended as Moore suggests. I argue that free will and responsibility can be defended more robustly by observing that, at the level of agency, there can be alternative possibilities and mental causation in a stronger sense than recognized by classical compatibilism, even if physical determinism is true. Moore's arguments could thus be strengthened by embracing this compatibilist libertarian position. At the same time, I note that, although the idea of responsibility is robustly defensible, there are independent reasons for rejecting a retributivist approach to punishment.</p>","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC10064598/pdf/","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"9715421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-21DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09665-9
Alexander Sarch
{"title":"Too Objective for Culpability?","authors":"Alexander Sarch","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09665-9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09665-9","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47800323","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-21DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09667-7
Ivó Coca-Vila
{"title":"On the Necessity Defense in a Democratic Welfare State: Leaving Pandora’s Box Ajar","authors":"Ivó Coca-Vila","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09667-7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09667-7","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48049687","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-21DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09668-6
K. Sifferd
{"title":"Deserving Blame, and Sometimes Punishment","authors":"K. Sifferd","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09668-6","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09668-6","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48585507","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-18DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09669-5
R. Healey
{"title":"Review of The Scope of Consent by Tom Dougherty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021)","authors":"R. Healey","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09669-5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09669-5","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46757003","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-11DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09670-y
David James
{"title":"Review of Guy Elgat, Being Guilty: Freedom, Responsibility, and Conscience in German Philosophy from Kant to Heidegger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022)","authors":"David James","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09670-y","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09670-y","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41266674","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-10DOI: 10.1007/s11572-023-09664-w
Stephen R. Galoob, Jake Monaghan
{"title":"Introduction to Symposium on Policing and Political Philosophy","authors":"Stephen R. Galoob, Jake Monaghan","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09664-w","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09664-w","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43810870","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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