International Journal of Law in Context最新文献

The fact that migration cases seldom raise any questions under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is neither inevitable nor justified. This article reaffirms the equality provision as a useful and indeed necessary mechanism for the European Court of Human Rights to deal with such applications. More concretely, we build on our previous work, which identified a legal tool suitable for achieving this reorientation in judicial practice: the principle that we call ‘migratory vulnerability’, once recalibrated away from a group-based approach to a notion of vulnerability as situational and socially induced. In this article, we explain how the principle of migratory vulnerability, even if it does not represent an inherently suspect ground of differentiation, enables us to identify instances of discrimination defined as a measurable disadvantage that is disproportionate or arbitrary and cannot, therefore, be reasonably justified on the basis of the Convention. This presupposes a move away from nationality as a privileged ground in migration-related cases and from the ‘comparator’ test to determine Article 14 ECHR violations, to also encompass situational experiences. We end with two examples that show that this reconceptualization is both workable in practice and of added value, enabling the Court to find violations that presently go undetected.

It is now over ten years since the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or Court) first established that asylum seekers are inherently and particularly vulnerable on account of their very situation as asylum seekers. This occurred in its Grand Chamber judgment in the case of M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece. This article critically examines the Court’s subsequent asylum jurisprudence through the lens of vulnerability. The analysis reveals that the Court has engaged in ‘vulnerability backsliding’. Specifically, it traces the ways in which the Court has surreptitiously reversed the very principle of asylum vulnerability it itself established in M.S.S. The consequence of this backsliding is not only that the judicially recognised concept of asylum vulnerability is undermined, but that some of the most vulnerable applicants that come before the Court suffer renewed marginalisation, and, in some circumstances, exclusion from the ‘special protection’ to which they were previously afforded courtesy of M.S.S.

The traditional drafting and subsequent implementation of international refugee law have been criticised for relying on a male-centric understanding of persecution. Whilst this framework has recently shifted to include a more gender-sensitive interpretation, I argue that this introduction of gender within refugee status determination has traditionally relied on narratives infused with gendered and racialised stereotypes. In particular, it relies on a ‘white saviour’ colonial narrative that perceives refugee women as vulnerable victims in need of saving. Drawing on a decolonial and critical epistemological analysis that includes both a race and gender dimension, I unpack the epistemic violence and hidden colonial legacies in the representation of refugee women in case-law. Ultimately, this article concludes with a call for reframing the legal narrative around refugee women by approaching them as political actors rather than oppressed and vulnerable subjects.

Debates about cultural participation of persons with disabilities within legal and socio-legal scholarship and within disability studies tend to remain disconnected. This article brings legal analysis and other academic disciplines into a critical dialogue. It sheds light on how the right to cultural participation is understood from the bottom up, building on a study carried out across Europe. Participants in this study perceived opportunities to participate in, and to contribute to, arts and culture in ways that are consistent with the human rights approach to disability as expressed in the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and as central to the concept of inclusive equality. Cultural participation was also understood as intrinsic to the humanity of all people, as vital to inclusion in mainstream life, as capable of communicating experiences or identities not otherwise represented, and as potentially transformative of art-forms and ultimately, of society.

The professionalisation, institutionalisation and standardisation of transitional justice has often been critiqued for pushing more informal, vernacular or experimental approaches off the radar. While this concern is legitimate and needs to be addressed, this article explores the continued relevance of standardised approaches, and of a shared language of transitional justice more specifically. I develop this argument against the background of recent events in the Philippines where, in May 2022, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son of the former dictator, won the presidential elections. In this article I show that there has been a multiplicity of context-sensitive, vernacular and experimental transitional justice initiatives to deal with intersecting and multilayered legacies of violence, but that what has been missing is an overarching framework as expressed through the discourse of transitional justice, and the potential to forge collaborations and coalitions on the basis thereof. The case of the Philippines hints at the potential of a more ecological understanding of transitional justice in which justice actors involved in standardised and vernacular, formal and informal, state and non-state, top-down and bottom-up approaches recognise each other and certain shared objectives through the shared language and normativity of transitional justice.

To date the mainstreaming of equality and human rights law into public sector organisations has been underwhelming with the implementation of these norms being ad hoc and inconsistent. Existing research on factors that influence implementation has been either too general or too disjointed. This article has two aims to advance research on the implementation of equality and human rights: (i) to outline factors that influence the implementation of these norms and (ii) provide a more settled foundations for future research on equality and human rights implementation. It does this through interviews, undertaken in 2018–2019, with individuals responsible for leading the implementation of equality and human rights law within public sector organisations (specifically regulators, inspectorates and ombudsmen) in England and Wales. On the basis of this, the article makes suggestions for how the implementation of equality and human rights can be advanced further through changes to the regulatory environment.

Reflecting the international experience, statistics show that most medical negligence cases in Ireland settle. Less is known, however, about the duration of these cases, though anecdotal evidence suggests that they are protracted in nature. Procedurally focused reforms, aimed at reducing costs and facilitating more expedient resolution of these disputes have been proposed in Ireland, yet await implementation. As such, the pace of litigation is largely determined by the parties to the dispute. Drawing on the findings of an empirical study (an analysis of closed case files and qualitative interviews), this article explores two questions: first, how long do medical negligence cases take to resolve; and secondly, what contributes to delay in this context. Whilst causes of delay may vary by case, it is important to attempt to identify and explore common factors which contribute to delay. If these factors can be problematised and understood, possible solutions may be reached. In doing so, the article contributes to the debate on medical negligence reform across common law jurisdictions, evidencing the broader considerations, in addition to procedurally focused reforms, which are required when considering the issue of delay.