Abstract An entanglement between economic and political thought stands as a causal factor behind Trump's 2016 victory. Enshrined as constitutional law, this way of thinking allows wealth, whether a candidate's personal wealth or the wealth of her supporters, to serve as a requirement for mounting a viable campaign (and for maintaining one beyond its natural life cycle). It also allows vulgar, misleading, and hateful speech to play as large a role as a campaign or its supporters desire. Plutocracy and illiberal populism are among the reasons to revisit the Supreme Court's longstanding use of a market metaphor to ascertain the First Amendment's demands. Now an unstable and politicized facet of constitutional interpretation, the “marketplace of ideas” demands attention. In the space of forty years (Buckley v. Valeo to McCutcheon v. FEC), the Court moved from (a) an open marketplace as a metaphor for a robust speech environment that would lead to democratic responsiveness and public welfare, to (b) an unregul...
{"title":"The Market Metaphor, Radicalized: How a Capitalist Theology Trumped Democracy","authors":"Timothy K. Kuhner","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0402","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract An entanglement between economic and political thought stands as a causal factor behind Trump's 2016 victory. Enshrined as constitutional law, this way of thinking allows wealth, whether a candidate's personal wealth or the wealth of her supporters, to serve as a requirement for mounting a viable campaign (and for maintaining one beyond its natural life cycle). It also allows vulgar, misleading, and hateful speech to play as large a role as a campaign or its supporters desire. Plutocracy and illiberal populism are among the reasons to revisit the Supreme Court's longstanding use of a market metaphor to ascertain the First Amendment's demands. Now an unstable and politicized facet of constitutional interpretation, the “marketplace of ideas” demands attention. In the space of forty years (Buckley v. Valeo to McCutcheon v. FEC), the Court moved from (a) an open marketplace as a metaphor for a robust speech environment that would lead to democratic responsiveness and public welfare, to (b) an unregul...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"16 1","pages":"96-131"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0402","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47022320","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Do easier voter registration requirements improve voter turnout? Researchers have devoted much attention to laws allowing persons to complete voter registration at early voting sites and on Election Day, usually finding, at best, modest turnout increases. Nevertheless, researchers have yet to consider possible longer-term effects for the many people who do use these streamlined procedures to register. Are they as likely to vote subsequently as people who had registered at least a month before an election? Or do they vote only in the election for which they initially register and stay home during future elections? I explore this question with an empirical test of my hypotheses using the case study of North Carolina. I find that same day registrants (persons who registered at early voting sites just before the 2008 primaries and general elections) were slightly less likely to vote in the 2010 and 2012 general elections than earlier registrants. However, this disparity is larger for citizens who fir...
{"title":"Does Same Day Registration Lead to Repeat Customers at the Ballot Box","authors":"Bryan ColeJ.","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0350","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Do easier voter registration requirements improve voter turnout? Researchers have devoted much attention to laws allowing persons to complete voter registration at early voting sites and on Election Day, usually finding, at best, modest turnout increases. Nevertheless, researchers have yet to consider possible longer-term effects for the many people who do use these streamlined procedures to register. Are they as likely to vote subsequently as people who had registered at least a month before an election? Or do they vote only in the election for which they initially register and stay home during future elections? I explore this question with an empirical test of my hypotheses using the case study of North Carolina. I find that same day registrants (persons who registered at early voting sites just before the 2008 primaries and general elections) were slightly less likely to vote in the 2010 and 2012 general elections than earlier registrants. However, this disparity is larger for citizens who fir...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"271-284"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0350","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999563","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In recent years, the courts have invalidated a variety of campaign finance laws while simultaneously upholding disclosure requirements. Courts view disclosure as a less-restrictive means to root out corruption while critics claim that disclosure chills speech and deters political participation. Using individual-level contribution data from state elections between 2000 and 2008, we find that the speech-chilling effects of disclosure are negligible. On average, less than one donor per candidate is likely to stop contributing when the public visibility of campaign contributions increases. Moreover, we do not observe heterogeneous effects for small donors or ideological outliers despite an assumption in First Amendment jurisprudence that these donors are disproportionately affected by campaign finance regulations. In short, the argument that disclosure chills speech is not strongly supported by the data.
{"title":"In the Shadows of Sunlight: The Effects of Transparency on State Political Campaigns","authors":"K. WoodAbby, M. SpencerDouglas","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0365","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In recent years, the courts have invalidated a variety of campaign finance laws while simultaneously upholding disclosure requirements. Courts view disclosure as a less-restrictive means to root out corruption while critics claim that disclosure chills speech and deters political participation. Using individual-level contribution data from state elections between 2000 and 2008, we find that the speech-chilling effects of disclosure are negligible. On average, less than one donor per candidate is likely to stop contributing when the public visibility of campaign contributions increases. Moreover, we do not observe heterogeneous effects for small donors or ideological outliers despite an assumption in First Amendment jurisprudence that these donors are disproportionately affected by campaign finance regulations. In short, the argument that disclosure chills speech is not strongly supported by the data.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"122 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0365","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61000015","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Partisan gerrymandering arises when many single-district gerrymanders are combined to obtain an overall advantage. The Supreme Court has held that partisan gerrymandering is recognizable by its asymmetry: for a given distribution of popular votes, if the parties switch places in popular vote, the numbers of seats would change in an unequal fashion. However, the asymmetry standard is only a broad statement of principle, and no analytical method for assessing asymmetry has yet been held to be manageable. Recently I proposed (68 Stanford Law Review 1263) three statistical tests to reliably assess asymmetry in state-level districting schemes: (a) a discrepancy in winning vote margins between the two parties' seats; (b) undue reliable wins for the party in charge of redistricting, as measured by the mean-median difference in vote share, or by an unusually even distribution of votes across districts; and (c) unrepresentative distortion in the number of seats won based on expectations from nationwide di...
当许多单一选区的不公正划分者联合起来以获得整体优势时，就会出现党派不公正划分。最高法院认为，党派不公正的划分可以通过其不对称性来识别:对于给定的普选选票分配，如果政党在普选中互换位置，席位数量就会以不平等的方式变化。然而，不对称标准只是一个宽泛的原则陈述，目前还没有评估不对称的分析方法被认为是可管理的。最近，我提出了三个统计测试(68 Stanford Law Review 1263)，以可靠地评估州一级选区方案的不对称性:(a)两党席位之间获胜票数的差异;(b)负责重新划分选区的政党获得了不合理的可靠的胜利，以选票份额的中位数差异或不同地区的选票分配异常均匀来衡量;(c)根据全国选民的期望赢得的席位数量不具代表性。
{"title":"Three Practical Tests for Gerrymandering: Application to Maryland and Wisconsin","authors":"W. S.H.","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0387","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Partisan gerrymandering arises when many single-district gerrymanders are combined to obtain an overall advantage. The Supreme Court has held that partisan gerrymandering is recognizable by its asymmetry: for a given distribution of popular votes, if the parties switch places in popular vote, the numbers of seats would change in an unequal fashion. However, the asymmetry standard is only a broad statement of principle, and no analytical method for assessing asymmetry has yet been held to be manageable. Recently I proposed (68 Stanford Law Review 1263) three statistical tests to reliably assess asymmetry in state-level districting schemes: (a) a discrepancy in winning vote margins between the two parties' seats; (b) undue reliable wins for the party in charge of redistricting, as measured by the mean-median difference in vote share, or by an unusually even distribution of votes across districts; and (c) unrepresentative distortion in the number of seats won based on expectations from nationwide di...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"367-384"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0387","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61001553","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article assesses how election administrators fulfill their responsibilities when state sovereignty is threatened, focusing on the case of Ukraine. Using data from a unique survey of administrators during the 2014 snap parliamentary elections, we explore how institutional, temporal, spatial, partisan, and experiential factors are associated with variation in responses to survey items designed to reveal administrative capabilities. We find evidence that some factors, notably spatial and experiential variables, are associated with assessments of readiness, security, and integrity. The findings speak to the scholarly literature on election administration and to the efforts of practitioners providing technical assistance in the conduct of democratic elections.
{"title":"Conducting Credible Elections Under Threat: Results from a Survey of Election Administrators","authors":"S. HerronErik, BoykoNazar","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0351","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0351","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article assesses how election administrators fulfill their responsibilities when state sovereignty is threatened, focusing on the case of Ukraine. Using data from a unique survey of administrators during the 2014 snap parliamentary elections, we explore how institutional, temporal, spatial, partisan, and experiential factors are associated with variation in responses to survey items designed to reveal administrative capabilities. We find evidence that some factors, notably spatial and experiential variables, are associated with assessments of readiness, security, and integrity. The findings speak to the scholarly literature on election administration and to the efforts of practitioners providing technical assistance in the conduct of democratic elections.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"285-301"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0351","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this article, we evaluate the rationale behind partisan disaffiliation laws, which prevent a candidate from running as an independent or from switching parties if they have not adequately severed their ties to an existing party. One prominent justification for these laws is that they help prevent voter confusion, which may result in the most preferred candidate losing. Utilizing a database of state legislative elections from 1968 to 2014, we categorize independent and third-party candidates into two groups: those who have run in the past as a Democrat or Republican, whom we refer to as former major-party candidates (FMPs), and those who have always run as a non-major party candidate (ANMs). The findings reveal that the latter appear less strategic about where to run, and they are unlikely to run again. In contrast, FMPs are much more likely to have held state legislative office and are more likely to have run multiple times; they are also more strategic, running under conditions that are advan...
{"title":"Spoilers? Evaluating the Logic Behind Partisan Disaffiliation Requirements for Independent and Third-Party Candidates","authors":"ChamberlainAdam, KlarnerCarl","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0370","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this article, we evaluate the rationale behind partisan disaffiliation laws, which prevent a candidate from running as an independent or from switching parties if they have not adequately severed their ties to an existing party. One prominent justification for these laws is that they help prevent voter confusion, which may result in the most preferred candidate losing. Utilizing a database of state legislative elections from 1968 to 2014, we categorize independent and third-party candidates into two groups: those who have run in the past as a Democrat or Republican, whom we refer to as former major-party candidates (FMPs), and those who have always run as a non-major party candidate (ANMs). The findings reveal that the latter appear less strategic about where to run, and they are unlikely to run again. In contrast, FMPs are much more likely to have held state legislative office and are more likely to have run multiple times; they are also more strategic, running under conditions that are advan...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"330-350"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0370","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61000172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The United States Supreme Court may be open to reconsidering the standards for judging the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders. This article presents a workable criteria for determining when districting arrangements so distort the process of translating votes into seats in a legislature that the process or the redistricting plan rises to a constitutional violation. The procedure uses an adjusted normal partisan vote (ANPV) measure to determine the number of seats that the preferred party would receive when the vote is equally divided between the parties and how that distribution of seats would change as the ANPV is adjusted up or down. This procedure would show that a gerrymander is long lasting, severe, and intentional.
{"title":"A Practical Procedure for Detecting a Partisan Gerrymander","authors":"S. ArringtonTheodore","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0383","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The United States Supreme Court may be open to reconsidering the standards for judging the constitutionality of partisan gerrymanders. This article presents a workable criteria for determining when districting arrangements so distort the process of translating votes into seats in a legislature that the process or the redistricting plan rises to a constitutional violation. The procedure uses an adjusted normal partisan vote (ANPV) measure to determine the number of seats that the preferred party would receive when the vote is equally divided between the parties and how that distribution of seats would change as the ANPV is adjusted up or down. This procedure would show that a gerrymander is long lasting, severe, and intentional.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"385-402"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0383","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61001504","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Partisan gerrymandering is widely frowned upon by the citizenry as well as the Supreme Court. Despite broad disdain for the practice, the Supreme Court has found it difficult to identify a workable standard by which we might regulate political gerrymandering. We have lacked sufficient tools to analyze and synthesize redistricting data, in part, because the requisite computation is massive. At the same time, the recent proliferation of significant computing power has led to the discovery of the extensive and often surprising reach of technology, information, and computation in many realms of life. Our capacities to compile, organize, analyze, and disseminate information have increased dramatically and facilitated the creation of many tools to connect citizens and automate human tasks. We present a computational model that brings these significantly advanced computing capacities to the redistricting process. Our model allows us to understand redistricting in fundamentally new ways and allows us to ...
{"title":"Toward a Talismanic Redistricting Tool: A Computational Method for Identifying Extreme Redistricting Plans","authors":"K. T. ChoWendy, Y. Liuyan","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0384","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Partisan gerrymandering is widely frowned upon by the citizenry as well as the Supreme Court. Despite broad disdain for the practice, the Supreme Court has found it difficult to identify a workable standard by which we might regulate political gerrymandering. We have lacked sufficient tools to analyze and synthesize redistricting data, in part, because the requisite computation is massive. At the same time, the recent proliferation of significant computing power has led to the discovery of the extensive and often surprising reach of technology, information, and computation in many realms of life. Our capacities to compile, organize, analyze, and disseminate information have increased dramatically and facilitated the creation of many tools to connect citizens and automate human tasks. We present a computational model that brings these significantly advanced computing capacities to the redistricting process. Our model allows us to understand redistricting in fundamentally new ways and allows us to ...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"351-366"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0384","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61001523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Voter identification laws have exploded onto the state legislative scene over the last decade. Observers of this powerful movement correctly note its strongly partisan character. Democrats and Republicans have staked out distinctive and opposed positions; Republican electoral gains consistently precede a state's adoption of new voter identification (ID) requirements, and legislative voting patterns are strictly partisan. There is little evidence thus far, however, regarding the role of judicial partisanship in voter identification litigation. This study seeks to fill that empirical gap. I examine voter identification cases from 2005 through 2015 and find a striking partisan divide, with Democratic judges far more skeptical of voter ID laws than Republican judges. Overall, nearly three-quarters of judicial votes in these cases conformed to the position of the party to which a judge belonged. The votes of judges on this contentious issue are not, however, as starkly partisan as those of elected off...
{"title":"Judicial Partisanship in Voter Identification Litigation","authors":"PerettiTerri","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0352","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Voter identification laws have exploded onto the state legislative scene over the last decade. Observers of this powerful movement correctly note its strongly partisan character. Democrats and Republicans have staked out distinctive and opposed positions; Republican electoral gains consistently precede a state's adoption of new voter identification (ID) requirements, and legislative voting patterns are strictly partisan. There is little evidence thus far, however, regarding the role of judicial partisanship in voter identification litigation. This study seeks to fill that empirical gap. I examine voter identification cases from 2005 through 2015 and find a striking partisan divide, with Democratic judges far more skeptical of voter ID laws than Republican judges. Overall, nearly three-quarters of judicial votes in these cases conformed to the position of the party to which a judge belonged. The votes of judges on this contentious issue are not, however, as starkly partisan as those of elected off...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"15 1","pages":"214-231"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0352","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999209","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This essay for the 2016 AALS Section on Election Law Program, “Election Law at the Local Level,” applies lessons from local government law to election law problems. Both local government and international law scholars discuss something sometimes called the “boundary problem.” A simple belief in democracy or self-determination—or the decision of some group of voters—cannot provide much guidance about what the boundaries of a city, state, or nation should be. Before a geographically bounded group of voters can decide its own boundaries, who comprises the relevant group must itself be determined. Any such choice will exclude some people who claim an interest in the decision. The group of deciders cannot be determined democratically, as a vote to decide who decides would face the same problem. Some value other than self-determination must be introduced to determine who decides before any boundaries can be set. The implication is that any city, state, or country's decision about its own boundaries is ...
{"title":"The Boundary Problem and the Changing Case Against Deference in Election Law Cases: Lessons from Local Government Law","authors":"SchleicherDavid","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0364","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0364","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This essay for the 2016 AALS Section on Election Law Program, “Election Law at the Local Level,” applies lessons from local government law to election law problems. Both local government and international law scholars discuss something sometimes called the “boundary problem.” A simple belief in democracy or self-determination—or the decision of some group of voters—cannot provide much guidance about what the boundaries of a city, state, or nation should be. Before a geographically bounded group of voters can decide its own boundaries, who comprises the relevant group must itself be determined. Any such choice will exclude some people who claim an interest in the decision. The group of deciders cannot be determined democratically, as a vote to decide who decides would face the same problem. Some value other than self-determination must be introduced to determine who decides before any boundaries can be set. The implication is that any city, state, or country's decision about its own boundaries is ...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0364","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999419","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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