Abstract In this volume, Best and coauthors evaluate a series of measures of gerrymandering and conclude that some should be preferred over others. In this rejoinder, I suggest that their conclusions are premature because they do not offer a clear idea of what unfairness in redistricting means nor a sophisticated discussion of the mechanics of each measure. As such, their evaluations are inconsistent and sometimes factually inaccurate. Their analysis probably obscures more than it clarifies.
{"title":"Rejoinder to “Considering the Prospects for Establishing a Packing Gerrymandering Standard”","authors":"McGheeEric","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2017.0461","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2017.0461","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this volume, Best and coauthors evaluate a series of measures of gerrymandering and conclude that some should be preferred over others. In this rejoinder, I suggest that their conclusions are premature because they do not offer a clear idea of what unfairness in redistricting means nor a sophisticated discussion of the mechanics of each measure. As such, their evaluations are inconsistent and sometimes factually inaccurate. Their analysis probably obscures more than it clarifies.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2017.0461","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49329604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
E. BestRobin, J. DonahueShawn, KrasnoJonathan, B. MaglebyDaniel, D. McDonaldMichael
Abstract Courts have found it difficult to evaluate whether redistricting authorities have engaged in constitutionally impermissible partisan gerrymandering. The knotty problem is that no proposed standard has found acceptance as a convincing means for identifying whether a districting plan is a partisan gerrymander with knowable unconstitutional effects. We review five proposed standards for curbing gerrymandering. We take as our perspective how easily manageable and effective each would be to apply at the time a redistricting authority decides where to draw the lines or, post hoc, when a court is asked to decide whether an unconstitutional gerrymander has been enacted. We conclude that, among the five proposals, an equal vote weight standard offers the best prospects for identifying the form of unconstitutional gerrymanders that all but ensure one party is relegated to perpetual minority status.
{"title":"Considering the Prospects for Establishing a Packing Gerrymandering Standard","authors":"E. BestRobin, J. DonahueShawn, KrasnoJonathan, B. MaglebyDaniel, D. McDonaldMichael","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0392","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Courts have found it difficult to evaluate whether redistricting authorities have engaged in constitutionally impermissible partisan gerrymandering. The knotty problem is that no proposed standard has found acceptance as a convincing means for identifying whether a districting plan is a partisan gerrymander with knowable unconstitutional effects. We review five proposed standards for curbing gerrymandering. We take as our perspective how easily manageable and effective each would be to apply at the time a redistricting authority decides where to draw the lines or, post hoc, when a court is asked to decide whether an unconstitutional gerrymander has been enacted. We conclude that, among the five proposals, an equal vote weight standard offers the best prospects for identifying the form of unconstitutional gerrymanders that all but ensure one party is relegated to perpetual minority status.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0392","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41581891","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract While electoral management bodies have received an increasing amount of scholarly consideration recently, less attention has been paid to the institutions in charge of imparting electoral justice. These institutions are an integral column of the system of electoral integrity and the final check for achieving credible elections. This article offers an updated and systematic description of the institutions of electoral justice in all the presidential democracies around the world (19 countries in the Americas, eight in Africa, and four in Asia), based on an analysis of the accumulated total of 966 years of electoral legislation. I have traced the evolution of the institutions adjudicating election disputes from the time of the constitutional change immediately prior to the first democratic election in each of these presidential democracies following the start of the third wave of democracy in 1974. Contrary to the idea that specialized electoral courts are better suited than supreme courts for resol...
{"title":"Judging Presidential Elections Around the World: An Overview","authors":"A. Hernández-HuertaVíctor","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0373","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0373","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While electoral management bodies have received an increasing amount of scholarly consideration recently, less attention has been paid to the institutions in charge of imparting electoral justice. These institutions are an integral column of the system of electoral integrity and the final check for achieving credible elections. This article offers an updated and systematic description of the institutions of electoral justice in all the presidential democracies around the world (19 countries in the Americas, eight in Africa, and four in Asia), based on an analysis of the accumulated total of 966 years of electoral legislation. I have traced the evolution of the institutions adjudicating election disputes from the time of the constitutional change immediately prior to the first democratic election in each of these presidential democracies following the start of the third wave of democracy in 1974. Contrary to the idea that specialized electoral courts are better suited than supreme courts for resol...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0373","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48868848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In 2013, the American Political Science Association (APSA) Task Force on Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance released a report in which the authors say that more than 50 U.S.-based political scientists have been involved in electoral reform processes in the U.S. and abroad since 2010 (Htun and Powell 2013). In this symposium, we give new insights to this topic by offering a view from the outside of the U.S. European and Canadian political scientists who had been invited to give their opinion about the electoral system of their country, and who engaged with politicians, public officials, and national media on the topic, talk about their experience as national experts. They answer two related questions: (1) What do political scientists know about electoral reform that practitioners do not? and (2) Does it make a difference? This symposium gathers their respective contributions to the roundtable. In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the literature on the role o...
2013年，美国政治科学协会(APSA)政治科学、选举规则和民主治理工作组发布了一份报告，作者在报告中说，自2010年以来，有50多名美国政治学家参与了美国和国外的选举改革进程(Htun and Powell 2013)。在本次研讨会上，我们通过提供来自美国、欧洲和加拿大以外的政治科学家的观点，为这一主题提供了新的见解。这些政治科学家被邀请发表他们对本国选举制度的看法，并与政治家、公职人员和国家媒体就这一主题进行了接触，谈论他们作为国家专家的经验。他们回答了两个相关的问题:(1)关于选举改革，政治学家知道而实践者不知道的是什么?(2)有什么区别吗?本次研讨会汇集了他们各自对圆桌会议的贡献。在这篇引言中，我们简要概述了关于……的作用的文献。
{"title":"Political Scientists and Electoral Reforms in Europe and Canada: What They Know, What They Do","authors":"Camille Bedock, Damien Bol, Thomas Ehrhard","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2017.0445","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2017.0445","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 2013, the American Political Science Association (APSA) Task Force on Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance released a report in which the authors say that more than 50 U.S.-based political scientists have been involved in electoral reform processes in the U.S. and abroad since 2010 (Htun and Powell 2013). In this symposium, we give new insights to this topic by offering a view from the outside of the U.S. European and Canadian political scientists who had been invited to give their opinion about the electoral system of their country, and who engaged with politicians, public officials, and national media on the topic, talk about their experience as national experts. They answer two related questions: (1) What do political scientists know about electoral reform that practitioners do not? and (2) Does it make a difference? This symposium gathers their respective contributions to the roundtable. In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the literature on the role o...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2017.0445","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61001619","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract After the federal elections of June 13, 2010, it took Belgian politicians 541 days to agree on a new state reform and to form a government. On December 6, 2011, the government of Prime Minister Di Rupo took the oath. As a result, Belgium became holder of the (unofficial) world record of longest government formation period. The Flemish right-wing nationalist party (N-VA) convincingly won the elections in Dutch-speaking Flanders, while the Socialist Party (PS) acquired most votes in French-speaking Wallonia. After negotiations of nearly 18 months, the negotiating parties reached the Butterfly Agreement on the Sixth State Reform of October 11, 2011. This State Reform, inter alia, includes a transfer of powers of approximately 20 billion euros from the federal level to the level of the federated states (i.e., the regions and communities); a substantial increase of fiscal autonomy for the regions; a reform of the Senate including an abolition of its direct election; a decision to principally hold coin...
{"title":"Electoral Reforms in Belgium's Sixth State Reform: Historic Split of Electoral Constituency BHV, Reform of the Senate, and Coincident Elections","authors":"GoossensJurgen","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0420","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0420","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract After the federal elections of June 13, 2010, it took Belgian politicians 541 days to agree on a new state reform and to form a government. On December 6, 2011, the government of Prime Minister Di Rupo took the oath. As a result, Belgium became holder of the (unofficial) world record of longest government formation period. The Flemish right-wing nationalist party (N-VA) convincingly won the elections in Dutch-speaking Flanders, while the Socialist Party (PS) acquired most votes in French-speaking Wallonia. After negotiations of nearly 18 months, the negotiating parties reached the Butterfly Agreement on the Sixth State Reform of October 11, 2011. This State Reform, inter alia, includes a transfer of powers of approximately 20 billion euros from the federal level to the level of the federated states (i.e., the regions and communities); a substantial increase of fiscal autonomy for the regions; a reform of the Senate including an abolition of its direct election; a decision to principally hold coin...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0420","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47451955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article argues that the current regime under President Abdel Fatah Sisi has established a military electoral authoritarian state with a non-dominant party electoral system. Coupled with Egypt's long tradition of nepotism, cronyism, and patronage networks, the new election laws perpetuate a fragmented, depoliticized parliament wherein no mobilized opposition can take shape to challenge the military state. The cause of Egypt's current depoliticization, however, is not a weak central party beholden to the presidency—as was the case under Sadat and Mubarak—but rather hundreds of rent-seeking parliamentarians with no party affiliation. Sisi intentionally structured the parliament to consist of over 400 individual, self-interested actors vulnerable to bribery or coercion to keep them depoliticized and compliant. This strategy facilitates purging any parliamentary figures who emerge to challenge executive power.
{"title":"Military electoral authoritarianism in Egypt","authors":"Sahar F. Aziz","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0419","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article argues that the current regime under President Abdel Fatah Sisi has established a military electoral authoritarian state with a non-dominant party electoral system. Coupled with Egypt's long tradition of nepotism, cronyism, and patronage networks, the new election laws perpetuate a fragmented, depoliticized parliament wherein no mobilized opposition can take shape to challenge the military state. The cause of Egypt's current depoliticization, however, is not a weak central party beholden to the presidency—as was the case under Sadat and Mubarak—but rather hundreds of rent-seeking parliamentarians with no party affiliation. Sisi intentionally structured the parliament to consist of over 400 individual, self-interested actors vulnerable to bribery or coercion to keep them depoliticized and compliant. This strategy facilitates purging any parliamentary figures who emerge to challenge executive power.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0419","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44737238","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract American election law litigation is unique in many ways. In this short essay, I highlight some of its distinctive aspects and show how they have manifested themselves in a landmark partisan gerrymandering lawsuit in which I have been involved.
{"title":"Lessons from Litigating for Reform","authors":"StephanopoulosNicholas","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0417","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract American election law litigation is unique in many ways. In this short essay, I highlight some of its distinctive aspects and show how they have manifested themselves in a landmark partisan gerrymandering lawsuit in which I have been involved.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0417","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49421189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In the campaign finance system in the U.S., organizations representing business and upper income actors numerically dominate those representing the middle class and the poor, raising the concern that policy outcomes are skewed toward the wealthy. Some campaign finance regulations are specifically designed to alter the mobilization of organized interests, yet we have limited knowledge of whether these laws actually work as intended. In this article I take advantage of variation in state campaign finance laws to examine how laws banning and regulating corporate and labor campaign contributions and expenditures shape the mobilization of upper class actors (i.e., business groups and professional associations) and labor groups, and ultimately “bias” in the U.S. states. Descriptively, I demonstrate that bias in state campaign finance systems is substantial. The multivariate analysis covering data from the early 1990s to 2010 shows that bans on direct contributions from corporations and labor unions red...
{"title":"Regulation and Upper Class Bias in Campaign Finance Systems","authors":"WitkoChristopher","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0397","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In the campaign finance system in the U.S., organizations representing business and upper income actors numerically dominate those representing the middle class and the poor, raising the concern that policy outcomes are skewed toward the wealthy. Some campaign finance regulations are specifically designed to alter the mobilization of organized interests, yet we have limited knowledge of whether these laws actually work as intended. In this article I take advantage of variation in state campaign finance laws to examine how laws banning and regulating corporate and labor campaign contributions and expenditures shape the mobilization of upper class actors (i.e., business groups and professional associations) and labor groups, and ultimately “bias” in the U.S. states. Descriptively, I demonstrate that bias in state campaign finance systems is substantial. The multivariate analysis covering data from the early 1990s to 2010 shows that bans on direct contributions from corporations and labor unions red...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0397","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44050974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article makes the case for considering political equality as a compelling government interest in establishing campaign finance laws. The article considers the historic role of equality from the Declaration of Independence through the Fourteenth Amendment and then its more recent limitation as a valid basis for campaign finance regulation. The author argues that equality is closely related at the root to other interests such as fighting corruption or supporting discursive democracy, but that equality must also be considered on its own. The article proposes a concept of bounded equality, rather than perfect equality, to be applied in the campaign finance context. Even with a valid interest in equality, campaign finance laws must be respectful of the First Amendment and the important role of money in modern political communications. Equality can be a basis for upholding reasonable campaign finance laws, but not outright bans, very low limits, or felony penalties that are too restrictive of spee...
{"title":"Bring Back Equality","authors":"SoltaniAbdi","doi":"10.1089/elj.2016.0401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2016.0401","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article makes the case for considering political equality as a compelling government interest in establishing campaign finance laws. The article considers the historic role of equality from the Declaration of Independence through the Fourteenth Amendment and then its more recent limitation as a valid basis for campaign finance regulation. The author argues that equality is closely related at the root to other interests such as fighting corruption or supporting discursive democracy, but that equality must also be considered on its own. The article proposes a concept of bounded equality, rather than perfect equality, to be applied in the campaign finance context. Even with a valid interest in equality, campaign finance laws must be respectful of the First Amendment and the important role of money in modern political communications. Equality can be a basis for upholding reasonable campaign finance laws, but not outright bans, very low limits, or felony penalties that are too restrictive of spee...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/elj.2016.0401","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41928646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Beyond Corruption: New Approaches for Regulating Money in Politics","authors":"SchultzDavid","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2017.0429","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2017.0429","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2017.0429","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48616927","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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