{"title":"Money, Equality, and Political Polarization in American Politics: Hasen's Plutocrats United and La Raja and Schaffner's Campaign Finance and Political Polarization","authors":"SchultzDavid","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0382","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0382","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0382","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61001405","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Election Law at the Local Level","authors":"A. DouglasJoshua","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0388","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0388","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0388","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61001571","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
C. SeljanEllen, LochnerTodd, GoldMaya, DavisWalker
Abstract This article investigates what state campaign finance regulatory agencies can do to increase perceptions among regulatees, specifically state legislators, that violations will be successfully detected. We test hypotheses that random audits and transparency-enhancing policies will promote perceptions that campaign finance violations are identified. With the use of an original survey of state legislators, we found that both strategies are effective. Agencies increase perceptions that they detect violations when their regulatees are subject to random audit. Additionally, agencies can bolster perceptions of third-party monitoring by increasing the information available to third-party monitors through transparent disclosure practices.
{"title":"I Know What You Did Last Cycle: Improving the Detection of State Campaign Finance Violations","authors":"C. SeljanEllen, LochnerTodd, GoldMaya, DavisWalker","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0348","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0348","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article investigates what state campaign finance regulatory agencies can do to increase perceptions among regulatees, specifically state legislators, that violations will be successfully detected. We test hypotheses that random audits and transparency-enhancing policies will promote perceptions that campaign finance violations are identified. With the use of an original survey of state legislators, we found that both strategies are effective. Agencies increase perceptions that they detect violations when their regulatees are subject to random audit. Additionally, agencies can bolster perceptions of third-party monitoring by increasing the information available to third-party monitors through transparent disclosure practices.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0348","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The fight over voter identification (voter ID) remains white hot. States continue to pass voter ID laws; litigation regarding the constitutionality and legality of those laws rages. However, the focus on the legality of voter ID laws can lead to insufficient attention being paid to the role state and local officials and poll workers play in enforcing those laws. Whether a voter can cast a ballot and have her vote counted may depend on a state or local official's interpretation of a voter ID law. Voter ID laws tend to address one question—is the putative voter the person listed in the pollbook?—by asking a different question—has the putative voter produced acceptable identification? Structuring the inquiry that way is problematic because it may lead to disfranchising people who should be allowed to vote but do not have proper identification. As importantly, the answer to the second question depends on how forms of identification are defined and how a poll worker decides whether the putative voter'...
{"title":"State and Local Officials and Voter ID","authors":"ChambersHenry L.Jr.","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0380","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0380","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The fight over voter identification (voter ID) remains white hot. States continue to pass voter ID laws; litigation regarding the constitutionality and legality of those laws rages. However, the focus on the legality of voter ID laws can lead to insufficient attention being paid to the role state and local officials and poll workers play in enforcing those laws. Whether a voter can cast a ballot and have her vote counted may depend on a state or local official's interpretation of a voter ID law. Voter ID laws tend to address one question—is the putative voter the person listed in the pollbook?—by asking a different question—has the putative voter produced acceptable identification? Structuring the inquiry that way is problematic because it may lead to disfranchising people who should be allowed to vote but do not have proper identification. As importantly, the answer to the second question depends on how forms of identification are defined and how a poll worker decides whether the putative voter'...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0380","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61001156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The nature of turnout has changed in the United States: a shift in state policies has transformed a singular Election Day into a multi-week voting period. During the 2012 election, we assembled daily snapshots of early voting records across the U.S. We observe where and when individuals with key demographic characteristics voted. By measuring the timing of voting by demographic subgroups within small geographic areas, we assess how the early voting period may differentially affect various politically relevant subsets of the electorate. We find that partisans and older voters disproportionately take advantage of early voting, and that political independents and younger individuals who vote early do so much later in the early-voting window. We discuss policy implications, and we also conduct an exploratory analysis of the relationship between early vote timing and campaign events.
{"title":"The Dynamic Election: Patterns of Early Voting Across Time, State, Party, and Age","authors":"AshokVivekinan, FederDaniel, McGrathMary, HershEitan","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0310","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0310","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The nature of turnout has changed in the United States: a shift in state policies has transformed a singular Election Day into a multi-week voting period. During the 2012 election, we assembled daily snapshots of early voting records across the U.S. We observe where and when individuals with key demographic characteristics voted. By measuring the timing of voting by demographic subgroups within small geographic areas, we assess how the early voting period may differentially affect various politically relevant subsets of the electorate. We find that partisans and older voters disproportionately take advantage of early voting, and that political independents and younger individuals who vote early do so much later in the early-voting window. We discuss policy implications, and we also conduct an exploratory analysis of the relationship between early vote timing and campaign events.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0310","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60997606","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"From Selma to Shelby County: A Review of Ari Berman's, Give Us the Ballot: The Modern Struggle for Voting Rights in America","authors":"KousserMorgan","doi":"10.1089/elj.2016.0375","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2016.0375","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/elj.2016.0375","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999820","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Review of Fragile Democracies by Samuel Issacharoff","authors":"RushMark","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0374","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0374","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60999739","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Since its 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court has voiced concern with corruption and the appearance of corruption stemming from political quid pro quo arrangements—particularly the deleterious consequences either could have on citizens' democratic behavior. Given the vagueness in the Court's definition of the “appearance of corruption,” campaign finance cases since Buckley have relied on survey data to measure perceptions of corruption. These data indicate high levels of perceived governmental corruption among the public but are silent on the question of whether these perceptions influence behavior. This study investigates the actual impact that perceptions of corruption have on individuals' levels of political participation. Adapting the socioeconomic status model developed most fully by Verba and Nie (1972), I estimate extended beta-binomial regressions using maximum likelihood techniques on data from the 2009 University of Texas Money in Politics survey and the 2012 America...
自1976年巴克利诉法雷奥案(Buckley v. Valeo)作出裁决以来，美国最高法院一直对腐败和源于政治交换条件安排的腐败现象表示关注，尤其是对公民民主行为可能产生的有害后果。鉴于最高法院对“腐败表象”的定义含糊不清，自巴克利案以来，竞选资金案件一直依靠调查数据来衡量人们对腐败的看法。这些数据表明，公众对政府腐败的感知程度很高，但对这些感知是否影响行为的问题却保持沉默。本研究调查了腐败观念对个人政治参与水平的实际影响。采用Verba和Nie(1972)开发的最充分的社会经济地位模型，我使用最大似然技术对2009年德克萨斯大学金钱政治调查和2012年美国…
{"title":"Political Quid Pro Quo and the Impact of Perceptions of Corruption on Democratic Behavior","authors":"J. KellyKristin","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0298","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since its 1976 ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court has voiced concern with corruption and the appearance of corruption stemming from political quid pro quo arrangements—particularly the deleterious consequences either could have on citizens' democratic behavior. Given the vagueness in the Court's definition of the “appearance of corruption,” campaign finance cases since Buckley have relied on survey data to measure perceptions of corruption. These data indicate high levels of perceived governmental corruption among the public but are silent on the question of whether these perceptions influence behavior. This study investigates the actual impact that perceptions of corruption have on individuals' levels of political participation. Adapting the socioeconomic status model developed most fully by Verba and Nie (1972), I estimate extended beta-binomial regressions using maximum likelihood techniques on data from the 2009 University of Texas Money in Politics survey and the 2012 America...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0298","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60997300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Michael Schwam-Baird, Costas Panagopoulos, Jonathan S. Krasno, D. Green
Abstract We report the results of three field experiments that provided nonpartisan information about municipal- and state-level incentives for making political contributions to potential donors. Our experiments examine two types of contribution incentive programs, public matching funds and tax credits, in three different jurisdictions: New York City, Virginia, and Ohio. We find that providing information about matching funds and tax credits has negligible effects on both the probability that an individual will make a contribution and the amount that an individual donates. Our findings suggest that publicizing contribution incentive programs using nonpartisan messages does little to enhance the pool of new donors. Our research leaves open the possibility that contribution incentive programs, and donation matching programs in particular, may nonetheless affect campaign behavior and encourage campaigns to pursue more small donors.
{"title":"Do Public Matching Funds and Tax Credits Encourage Political Contributions? Evidence from Three Field Experiments Using Nonpartisan Messages","authors":"Michael Schwam-Baird, Costas Panagopoulos, Jonathan S. Krasno, D. Green","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0321","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0321","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We report the results of three field experiments that provided nonpartisan information about municipal- and state-level incentives for making political contributions to potential donors. Our experiments examine two types of contribution incentive programs, public matching funds and tax credits, in three different jurisdictions: New York City, Virginia, and Ohio. We find that providing information about matching funds and tax credits has negligible effects on both the probability that an individual will make a contribution and the amount that an individual donates. Our findings suggest that publicizing contribution incentive programs using nonpartisan messages does little to enhance the pool of new donors. Our research leaves open the possibility that contribution incentive programs, and donation matching programs in particular, may nonetheless affect campaign behavior and encourage campaigns to pursue more small donors.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0321","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60998505","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article investigates the impact of the Third Evaluation Round of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on party finance laws in 18 Northern, Western, and Southern European states. It particularly focuses on the transparency stipulations regarding political parties' annual accounts. Five indicators are analyzed: (1) the obligation of parties to submit their accounts, (2) the availability of a standardized form, (3) the obligation to make the accounts public, (4) the independence of the auditor, and (5) the independence of the monitoring body. On the basis of this analysis, a global transparency score is calculated, allowing us to assess the impact of GRECO. Our study shows that GRECO had a significant impact: the legal frameworks of a large number of countries have been amended, in the sense that the level of transparency regarding the parties' accounts has considerably improved.
{"title":"Political Parties' Annual Accounts and the Impact of the Group of States against Corruption in 18 European States: Towards Enhanced Transparency?","authors":"SmuldersJef, MaddensBart","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0369","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0369","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article investigates the impact of the Third Evaluation Round of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) on party finance laws in 18 Northern, Western, and Southern European states. It particularly focuses on the transparency stipulations regarding political parties' annual accounts. Five indicators are analyzed: (1) the obligation of parties to submit their accounts, (2) the availability of a standardized form, (3) the obligation to make the accounts public, (4) the independence of the auditor, and (5) the independence of the monitoring body. On the basis of this analysis, a global transparency score is calculated, allowing us to assess the impact of GRECO. Our study shows that GRECO had a significant impact: the legal frameworks of a large number of countries have been amended, in the sense that the level of transparency regarding the parties' accounts has considerably improved.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2016-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0369","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61000060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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