Abstract Those seeking to influence campaign finance policy often invoke public opinion to support their legal and policy arguments. Thus, an understanding of the factors that explain citizens' views about the topic can help illuminate the political landscape surrounding it. This study examines the foundations of public opinion about campaign finance issues that emerged in the wake of the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Citizens United. An analysis of original data from a national survey found that political predispositions—including party identification, political ideology, external political efficacy, trust in corporations, and political interest/attention—predicted individuals' opinions, as did use of the Fox News cable channel and satirical television news programs. The results speak to how a range of actors may shape and capitalize on the nature of public opinion here.
{"title":"The Foundations of U.S. Public Opinion About Campaign Finance in the Post-Citizens United Era","authors":"R. BrewerPaul, L. LambeJennifer, J. Edward","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2015.0361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0361","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Those seeking to influence campaign finance policy often invoke public opinion to support their legal and policy arguments. Thus, an understanding of the factors that explain citizens' views about the topic can help illuminate the political landscape surrounding it. This study examines the foundations of public opinion about campaign finance issues that emerged in the wake of the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Citizens United. An analysis of original data from a national survey found that political predispositions—including party identification, political ideology, external political efficacy, trust in corporations, and political interest/attention—predicted individuals' opinions, as did use of the Fox News cable channel and satirical television news programs. The results speak to how a range of actors may shape and capitalize on the nature of public opinion here.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2015.0361","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43959975","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Partisan unfairness is easily detected when the statewide vote is equally divided between two parties. But when the vote is not evenly divided, even the determination of which party is disfavored becomes controversial. This article examines the ideal fair outcome in a two party single member district system when the statewide vote is not equally divided. It is shown that equal voter empowerment, implied by readings of the First Amendment (Shapiro v. McManus and Whitford v. Nichol), requires that the fraction of seats be proportional to the fraction of the statewide vote. However, strict proportionality conflicts with the single member district system, so alternative approaches are explored. Generalized party inefficiency and voter effectiveness are defined and shown to encompass many possibilities for an ideal fair seats-votes function. The best choice is fundamentally determined by the degree of geographical heterogeneity of voters of like mind. Based upon historical election results, it appears...
{"title":"How Competitive Should a Fair Single Member Districting Plan Be","authors":"F. NagleJohn","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0386","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0386","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Partisan unfairness is easily detected when the statewide vote is equally divided between two parties. But when the vote is not evenly divided, even the determination of which party is disfavored becomes controversial. This article examines the ideal fair outcome in a two party single member district system when the statewide vote is not equally divided. It is shown that equal voter empowerment, implied by readings of the First Amendment (Shapiro v. McManus and Whitford v. Nichol), requires that the fraction of seats be proportional to the fraction of the statewide vote. However, strict proportionality conflicts with the single member district system, so alternative approaches are explored. Generalized party inefficiency and voter effectiveness are defined and shown to encompass many possibilities for an ideal fair seats-votes function. The best choice is fundamentally determined by the degree of geographical heterogeneity of voters of like mind. Based upon historical election results, it appears...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0386","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49189276","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract For a democracy to truly function, most—if not all—eligible citizens must participate. That means voters need fair access to the booth; but they also need a reason to get there, a belief that their votes count for something. As of now, our country isn't living up to that standard. The last decade ushered in a remarkably tougher landscape for voters, much of it thanks to the Supreme Court's recent decisions. In less than a decade, five justices—with some overlap in the decisions' majorities—gave voter ID laws the green light, unleashed a flood of new money from corporations into the political realm, and eviscerated a longstanding federal law that once stopped states from implementing limiting voting measures. The result? Democracy got pummeled at both ends. Voters, particularly low-income and those of color, started facing hurdles in numbers not seen since the 1960s. When they do make it to the ballot box, many fear their votes will get drowned out by special interests, dumping unprecedented amoun...
{"title":"Is the Supreme Court at Odds with Itself When It Comes to Democracy? A Look at the Disparities Between Crawford and Citizens United","authors":"ChapmanAllegra","doi":"10.1089/elj.2016.0409","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/elj.2016.0409","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract For a democracy to truly function, most—if not all—eligible citizens must participate. That means voters need fair access to the booth; but they also need a reason to get there, a belief that their votes count for something. As of now, our country isn't living up to that standard. The last decade ushered in a remarkably tougher landscape for voters, much of it thanks to the Supreme Court's recent decisions. In less than a decade, five justices—with some overlap in the decisions' majorities—gave voter ID laws the green light, unleashed a flood of new money from corporations into the political realm, and eviscerated a longstanding federal law that once stopped states from implementing limiting voting measures. The result? Democracy got pummeled at both ends. Voters, particularly low-income and those of color, started facing hurdles in numbers not seen since the 1960s. When they do make it to the ballot box, many fear their votes will get drowned out by special interests, dumping unprecedented amoun...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/elj.2016.0409","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44785797","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Although Buckley v. Valeo purported to subject both contribution and independent expenditure limits to “exacting” scrutiny, contribution limits have since been subjected to a lower level of scrutiny than independent expenditure limits. Contribution limits survive if closely drawn to match a “sufficiently important” government interest. Meanwhile, limits on independent expenditures must be narrowly tailored to a “compelling” government interest. The Court has insisted that the only government interest important enough to justify limits on big money is the prevention of corruption or its appearance, and that, while contribution limits are justified by this interest, independent expenditure limits are not. By holding there is no good reason to limit what individuals can spend on elections, the Court has subjected independent expenditure limits to something more like super-strict scrutiny, condemning them to a strong presumption of unconstitutionality regardless of how high the limit. This article ma...
{"title":"Scrutinizing Independent Expenditure Limits: A Case Against Super-Strict Scrutiny","authors":"Allie Boldt","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0399","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Although Buckley v. Valeo purported to subject both contribution and independent expenditure limits to “exacting” scrutiny, contribution limits have since been subjected to a lower level of scrutiny than independent expenditure limits. Contribution limits survive if closely drawn to match a “sufficiently important” government interest. Meanwhile, limits on independent expenditures must be narrowly tailored to a “compelling” government interest. The Court has insisted that the only government interest important enough to justify limits on big money is the prevention of corruption or its appearance, and that, while contribution limits are justified by this interest, independent expenditure limits are not. By holding there is no good reason to limit what individuals can spend on elections, the Court has subjected independent expenditure limits to something more like super-strict scrutiny, condemning them to a strong presumption of unconstitutionality regardless of how high the limit. This article ma...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0399","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47386016","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract While the opportunity to transform the Supreme Court's approach may not be as immediate as hoped just a short while ago, the current political context makes the project of constructing a pro-democracy jurisprudence more important than ever. The election exposed the urgent need to address a system that is alienating large segments of people, and to do so in a race-conscious way. The window of opportunity for substantial change may reopen soon enough, and the pieces that follow are helping to build the path forward.
{"title":"Foreword: New Approaches for Regulating Money in Politics","authors":"C. McGheeHeather","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2017.0430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2017.0430","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract While the opportunity to transform the Supreme Court's approach may not be as immediate as hoped just a short while ago, the current political context makes the project of constructing a pro-democracy jurisprudence more important than ever. The election exposed the urgent need to address a system that is alienating large segments of people, and to do so in a race-conscious way. The window of opportunity for substantial change may reopen soon enough, and the pieces that follow are helping to build the path forward.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2017.0430","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42811197","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Conventional research strategies to explore the relationship between money and politics have found little evidence of rampant political corruption. Newer perspectives on money and politics, however, suggest that deep political inequalities and biased pluralism may threaten democratic institutions. The presidential transition phase offers a case study in how an unregulated political process may result in unequal policy outcomes. This case suggests that new regulations might improve political equality and justify the development of a new legal theory focused on the relationship between money and politics.
{"title":"Measuring the Drapes in Secret: Why New Approaches to Money and Politics Can Address Biased Access and Influence During Presidential Transitions","authors":"BrownHeath","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0398","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0398","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Conventional research strategies to explore the relationship between money and politics have found little evidence of rampant political corruption. Newer perspectives on money and politics, however, suggest that deep political inequalities and biased pluralism may threaten democratic institutions. The presidential transition phase offers a case study in how an unregulated political process may result in unequal policy outcomes. This case suggests that new regulations might improve political equality and justify the development of a new legal theory focused on the relationship between money and politics.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0398","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48249707","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The academic literature has generally found the effect of money on election outcomes to be marginal. This is likely because they have looked in the wrong places. The literature has yet to ...
摘要学术文献普遍发现，金钱对选举结果的影响微乎其微。这可能是因为他们看错了地方。文学还没有。。。
{"title":"Professional Networks, Early Fundraising, and Electoral Success","authors":"Adam Bonica","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0413","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0413","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The academic literature has generally found the effect of money on election outcomes to be marginal. This is likely because they have looked in the wrong places. The literature has yet to ...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0413","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46495236","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Supreme Court doctrine assumes that limits on political spending threaten Free Speech but does not adequately address the precise relationship of money to speech or the precise harms the Court seeks to avoid. The result has been a money-in-politics jurisprudence steeped in fear and speculation rather than focused on the best ways to both facilitate robust political speech and protect the equal citizenship at the core of our democracy. This article takes potential threats to free expression seriously by defining dangers with particularity and suggesting the proper role of courts in safeguarding against them. To facilitate this inquiry, the article proposes a more nuanced conception of the relationship between money and speech than courts or commentators have typically employed, suggesting that money can act to facilitate the creation, provision, or amplification of speech in various social contexts.
{"title":"Limiting the Limits: Principles to Protect Free Expression While Fighting the Power of Big Money in Politics","authors":"LiozAdam","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0400","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0400","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Supreme Court doctrine assumes that limits on political spending threaten Free Speech but does not adequately address the precise relationship of money to speech or the precise harms the Court seeks to avoid. The result has been a money-in-politics jurisprudence steeped in fear and speculation rather than focused on the best ways to both facilitate robust political speech and protect the equal citizenship at the core of our democracy. This article takes potential threats to free expression seriously by defining dangers with particularity and suggesting the proper role of courts in safeguarding against them. To facilitate this inquiry, the article proposes a more nuanced conception of the relationship between money and speech than courts or commentators have typically employed, suggesting that money can act to facilitate the creation, provision, or amplification of speech in various social contexts.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0400","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41906771","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The current formula for judging campaign finance restrictions takes limits on money in politics to be burdens on freedom of speech that can only be justified if they are shown to be narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest. However, the Supreme Court effectively views preventing the reality or appearance of quid pro quo corruption as the only compelling state interest that could ever justify certain types of limits. In crafting this jurisprudence, the Court has discounted or ignored the importance of several other democratic values, beyond preventing a narrow type of corruption, such as political equality, increasing participation, preventing systemic corruption, and protecting electoral integrity, among others. With strong public discontent about money in politics and a vacancy on the Supreme Court, now is a particularly apt time to explore ways to inject some of those devalued competing interests back into the jurisprudence. But even the most well-developed legal theories do n...
{"title":"Laying the Foundation for a New Jurisprudence in State Courts","authors":"BowieBlair","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0408","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The current formula for judging campaign finance restrictions takes limits on money in politics to be burdens on freedom of speech that can only be justified if they are shown to be narrowly tailored to achieving a compelling state interest. However, the Supreme Court effectively views preventing the reality or appearance of quid pro quo corruption as the only compelling state interest that could ever justify certain types of limits. In crafting this jurisprudence, the Court has discounted or ignored the importance of several other democratic values, beyond preventing a narrow type of corruption, such as political equality, increasing participation, preventing systemic corruption, and protecting electoral integrity, among others. With strong public discontent about money in politics and a vacancy on the Supreme Court, now is a particularly apt time to explore ways to inject some of those devalued competing interests back into the jurisprudence. But even the most well-developed legal theories do n...","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0408","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44033984","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This piece excavates the history of the Millionaire's Amendment, a short-lived provision of campaign finance law that played a significant role in Barack Obama's successful 2004 Senate campaign. It argues that beyond the Amendment's role in that single, fateful race, it supplies a useful test case for examining competing paradigms for regulating money in politics.
{"title":"The Lost History of the Millionaire's Amendment","authors":"ShawKatherine","doi":"10.1089/ELJ.2016.0423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0423","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This piece excavates the history of the Millionaire's Amendment, a short-lived provision of campaign finance law that played a significant role in Barack Obama's successful 2004 Senate campaign. It argues that beyond the Amendment's role in that single, fateful race, it supplies a useful test case for examining competing paradigms for regulating money in politics.","PeriodicalId":45644,"journal":{"name":"Election Law Journal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2017-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1089/ELJ.2016.0423","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42904908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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