This paper addresses the following three claims that Frankfurt makes about the concept of bullshit: 1. Bullshit requires the intention to deceive others. 2. Bullshit does not constitute lying (bullshit is “short of lying”). 3. The essence of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says. I offer counterexamples to all three claims. By way of defending my counterexamples, I examine Cohen’s distinction between bullshiting and bullshit and argue that my examples are indeed cases of bullshiting that Frankfurt’s analysis is intended to cover. My examples of bullshitters who are very concerned to say only things that are true show that Frankfurt is mistaken in claiming that the “essence” of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says.
{"title":"Frankfurt and Cohen on bullshit, bullshiting, deception, lying, and concern with the truth of what one says","authors":"T. Carson","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.1.03CAR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.1.03CAR","url":null,"abstract":"This paper addresses the following three claims that Frankfurt makes about the concept of bullshit: 1. Bullshit requires the intention to deceive others. 2. Bullshit does not constitute lying (bullshit is “short of lying”). 3. The essence of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says. I offer counterexamples to all three claims. By way of defending my counterexamples, I examine Cohen’s distinction between bullshiting and bullshit and argue that my examples are indeed cases of bullshiting that Frankfurt’s analysis is intended to cover. My examples of bullshitters who are very concerned to say only things that are true show that Frankfurt is mistaken in claiming that the “essence” of bullshit is lack of concern with the truth of what one says.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"53-67"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.1.03CAR","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060796","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The article looks at idioms as categorization means. On the basis of linguistic analysis of semantic organization of idioms two patterns of idiomatic categorization are argued — general categorization and relevant property based categorization. Cognitive functions of idioms differ with regard to their role as categorization means, idioms can serve different categorization purposes according to two general cognitive processes — static and dynamic — including in a category or considering the given qualities as the reasons for categorization. Moreover, the purpose of categorization was investigated with defining the specificity of the phenomena and its types. The categorization purpose was conceived as different types of information e.g. behavioral expectations or interaction models with the object. The cause-effect relationship between the category and the categorization purpose was claimed.
{"title":"Two categorization patterns in idiom semantics","authors":"Chermen G. Gogichev","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.2.08GOR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.2.08GOR","url":null,"abstract":"The article looks at idioms as categorization means. On the basis of linguistic analysis of semantic organization of idioms two patterns of idiomatic categorization are argued — general categorization and relevant property based categorization. Cognitive functions of idioms differ with regard to their role as categorization means, idioms can serve different categorization purposes according to two general cognitive processes — static and dynamic — including in a category or considering the given qualities as the reasons for categorization. Moreover, the purpose of categorization was investigated with defining the specificity of the phenomena and its types. The categorization purpose was conceived as different types of information e.g. behavioral expectations or interaction models with the object. The cause-effect relationship between the category and the categorization purpose was claimed.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"343-358"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.2.08GOR","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59061056","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Without any polemic intention, our present contribution will be concerned with the idea of corporeality as an ontological index, in positive and negative perspective. In the positive perspective, corporeality represents the definitional index of the human person. More specifically, we shall approach the (human) corporeality within the formative process of the person`s consciousness (persona). In order to make relevant our philosophical target, the idea of corporeality will be treated within the semiotic extension of the concept of place / locus (Romanian: loc, Latin: locus, French: lieu/place, Hebrew: makom ‘place/ locus’ — Hamakom ‘the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus’), in conformity with the following three oppositions: (a) place as a physical index vs. human symbol; (b) place with reference to physical persona vs. spiritual persona; (c) place in profane sense vs. sacred sense. In the negative perspective, the absence of corporeality makes relevant a new meaning of the Judaic concept hamakom: Hamakom with the sense of ‘the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus’. We intend to establish two targets for our research: 1. to follow the process during which the definitional index represents a formative agent of (self) consciousness; and 2. to establish the switching point where hamakom (“the place”) becomes Hamakom ‘the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus’.
{"title":"Place and Person(a)","authors":"Rodica Amel","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.3.05AME","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.3.05AME","url":null,"abstract":"Without any polemic intention, our present contribution will be concerned with the idea of corporeality as an ontological index, in positive and negative perspective. In the positive perspective, corporeality represents the definitional index of the human person. More specifically, we shall approach the (human) corporeality within the formative process of the person`s consciousness (persona). In order to make relevant our philosophical target, the idea of corporeality will be treated within the semiotic extension of the concept of place / locus (Romanian: loc, Latin: locus, French: lieu/place, Hebrew: makom ‘place/ locus’ — Hamakom ‘the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus’), in conformity with the following three oppositions: (a) place as a physical index vs. human symbol; (b) place with reference to physical persona vs. spiritual persona; (c) place in profane sense vs. sacred sense. In the negative perspective, the absence of corporeality makes relevant a new meaning of the Judaic concept hamakom: Hamakom with the sense of ‘the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus’. We intend to establish two targets for our research: 1. to follow the process during which the definitional index represents a formative agent of (self) consciousness; and 2. to establish the switching point where hamakom (“the place”) becomes Hamakom ‘the Omnipresent God, the Omnipresent locus’.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"404-415"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.3.05AME","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59061659","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, we propose to see the Necker cube phenomenon as a basis for the development of a mathematical language in accordance with Leibniz’s vision of soft logic. By the development of a new coordinate system, we make a distinction between −0 and +0. This distinction enables us to present a new model for nonstandard analysis, and to develop a calculus theory without the need of the concept of limit. We also established a connection between “Recursive Distinctioning” and soft logic, and use it as a basis for a new computational model. This model has a potential to change the current computational paradigm.
{"title":"Soft logic and numbers","authors":"Moshe Klein, O. Maimon","doi":"10.1075/PC.23.3.09KLE","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.23.3.09KLE","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we propose to see the Necker cube phenomenon as a basis for the development of a mathematical language in accordance with Leibniz’s vision of soft logic. By the development of a new coordinate system, we make a distinction between −0 and +0. This distinction enables us to present a new model for nonstandard analysis, and to develop a calculus theory without the need of the concept of limit. We also established a connection between “Recursive Distinctioning” and soft logic, and use it as a basis for a new computational model. This model has a potential to change the current computational paradigm.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"23 1","pages":"473-484"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2016-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.23.3.09KLE","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59061682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
When thought overwhelms the mind, the mind uses the body and the world. Several studies reveal ways that people alone or together use gesture and marks on paper to structure and augment their thought for comprehension, inference, and discovery. The studies show that the mapping of thought to gesture or the page is more direct than the arbitrary mapping to language and suggest that these forms of visual/spatial/action representation are used to “translate” language into mental representations. It is argued that actions in space create patterns in the world that reflect abstractions, that the actions are incorporated into gestures and the patterns into diagrams, a network that integrates gesture, action, the designed world, and abstraction dubbed spraction.
{"title":"Thinking in action","authors":"B. Tversky, Angela M. Kessell","doi":"10.1075/PC.22.2.03TVE","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.22.2.03TVE","url":null,"abstract":"When thought overwhelms the mind, the mind uses the body and the world. Several studies reveal ways that people alone or together use gesture and marks on paper to structure and augment their thought for comprehension, inference, and discovery. The studies show that the mapping of thought to gesture or the page is more direct than the arbitrary mapping to language and suggest that these forms of visual/spatial/action representation are used to “translate” language into mental representations. It is argued that actions in space create patterns in the world that reflect abstractions, that the actions are incorporated into gestures and the patterns into diagrams, a network that integrates gesture, action, the designed world, and abstraction dubbed spraction.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"22 1","pages":"206-223"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.22.2.03TVE","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060178","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Searle’s (1963/1991) account of the communicative intentions in speech acts purports to be an advance over that of Grice (1957), in acknowledging the ineliminable role of the linguistic (usage) rules in enabling the hearer to recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions. In this paper we argue that, given some plausible assumptions about ordinary speech exchanges, Searle’s insight on this score is incompatible with his (1983) commitment to internalism in the philosophy of mind. As a result, Searle cannot have it both ways: either he must give up his core insight regarding the ineliminable role of linguistic (usage) rules in the hearer’s recognition of a speaker’s communicative intentions, or he must give up his commitment to internalism the philosophy of mind. We conclude by arguing that this lesson is generic: the forced choice is one that all theorists must face, insofar as we theorize about the role of language in the communication of thought through speech.
{"title":"Searle vs. Searle on language, speech, and thought","authors":"Sanford C. Goldberg, Guiming Yang","doi":"10.1075/PC.22.3.05GOL","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.22.3.05GOL","url":null,"abstract":"Searle’s (1963/1991) account of the communicative intentions in speech acts purports to be an advance over that of Grice (1957), in acknowledging the ineliminable role of the linguistic (usage) rules in enabling the hearer to recognize the speaker’s communicative intentions. In this paper we argue that, given some plausible assumptions about ordinary speech exchanges, Searle’s insight on this score is incompatible with his (1983) commitment to internalism in the philosophy of mind. As a result, Searle cannot have it both ways: either he must give up his core insight regarding the ineliminable role of linguistic (usage) rules in the hearer’s recognition of a speaker’s communicative intentions, or he must give up his commitment to internalism the philosophy of mind. We conclude by arguing that this lesson is generic: the forced choice is one that all theorists must face, insofar as we theorize about the role of language in the communication of thought through speech.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"22 1","pages":"352-372"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.22.3.05GOL","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060617","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper defends a theory of speech act that I call concurrentism. It receives support from a psychological study and goes well with evolutionary theory. It sheds light on what the hearer believes when he hears an indicative sentence, what the speaker believes when he says an indicative sentence, what the speaker does after he says an indicative sentence contrary to what he believes, why Moore’s paradox occurs, why it is puzzling to say some variants of Moorean sentences, and why it is not absurd to say other variants of Moorean sentences. It will become clear that other things being equal, we believe that other people speak as they believe, and we speak in accordance with what we believe. It will also become clear that after we speak contrary to what we believe, we keep to ourselves the discrepancy between what we speak and what we believe, ceteris paribus .
{"title":"On the relationship between speech acts and psychological states","authors":"Seungbae Park","doi":"10.1075/PC.22.3.04PAR","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.22.3.04PAR","url":null,"abstract":"This paper defends a theory of speech act that I call concurrentism. It receives support from a psychological study and goes well with evolutionary theory. It sheds light on what the hearer believes when he hears an indicative sentence, what the speaker believes when he says an indicative sentence, what the speaker does after he says an indicative sentence contrary to what he believes, why Moore’s paradox occurs, why it is puzzling to say some variants of Moorean sentences, and why it is not absurd to say other variants of Moorean sentences. It will become clear that other things being equal, we believe that other people speak as they believe, and we speak in accordance with what we believe. It will also become clear that after we speak contrary to what we believe, we keep to ourselves the discrepancy between what we speak and what we believe, ceteris paribus .","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"22 1","pages":"340-351"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.22.3.04PAR","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study examined the interrelationships among selected cognitive characteristics of Iranian EFL learners including English self-efficacy, metacognitive awareness, and their test performance. For this purpose, a model was proposed based on empirical studies and was tested using structural equation modeling (SEM). Following this, two questionnaires were administrated to 200 Iranian EFL learners of two language institutes in Mashhad, Iran. Results of this study indicated that Iranian EFL learners perceived themselves self-efficacious. They were also metacognitively aware of their learning process. Correlation analysis results showed that metacognitive awareness statistically correlated with English self-efficacy and foreign language test performance. It was found that English self-efficacy significantly correlated with foreign language test performance as well. The proposed SEM model adequately fitted the data. Results of the SEM indicated that self-efficacy was the strongest direct predictor of learners’ test performance. Metacognitive awareness directly affected learners’ English self-efficacy. It also indirectly affected test performance through affecting English self-efficacy.
{"title":"An Exploration Of The Interrelationships Among EFL learners’ English Self-efficacy, Metacognitive Awareness, And Their Test Performance","authors":"Elahe Goudarzi, B. Ghonsooly, R. Pishghadam","doi":"10.1075/PC.22.3.03GOU","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.22.3.03GOU","url":null,"abstract":"This study examined the interrelationships among selected cognitive characteristics of Iranian EFL learners including English self-efficacy, metacognitive awareness, and their test performance. For this purpose, a model was proposed based on empirical studies and was tested using structural equation modeling (SEM). Following this, two questionnaires were administrated to 200 Iranian EFL learners of two language institutes in Mashhad, Iran. Results of this study indicated that Iranian EFL learners perceived themselves self-efficacious. They were also metacognitively aware of their learning process. Correlation analysis results showed that metacognitive awareness statistically correlated with English self-efficacy and foreign language test performance. It was found that English self-efficacy significantly correlated with foreign language test performance as well. The proposed SEM model adequately fitted the data. Results of the SEM indicated that self-efficacy was the strongest direct predictor of learners’ test performance. Metacognitive awareness directly affected learners’ English self-efficacy. It also indirectly affected test performance through affecting English self-efficacy.","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"22 1","pages":"325-339"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.22.3.03GOU","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060443","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Creativity, cognition and material culture: An introduction","authors":"L. Malafouris, C. Gosden, Karenleigh A. Overmann","doi":"10.1075/PC.22.1.001IN","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1075/PC.22.1.001IN","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45741,"journal":{"name":"Pragmatics & Cognition","volume":"22 1","pages":"1-4"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4,"publicationDate":"2014-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1075/PC.22.1.001IN","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59060143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"文学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：