Pub Date : 2021-10-02DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1976975
Kirsty Park, Jane Suiter
ABSTRACT Traditionally, political parties engage with journalists to promote their agendas and claim issue ownership through publishing manifestos, holding public events and issuing statements, but the coverage that this interaction produces is determined by the editorial focus and decision making of each outlet. In a hybrid media age, political parties can engage in disintermediation by directly shaping their own agenda and communicating with the public using social media, which also facilitate populist messaging. In this article, we use a combination of traditional media and social media data to explore how key issues and parties were mediated during the battle to own ‘change’ and claim issue ownership in the 2020 election campaign in Ireland. The analysis draws upon coded articles from three mainstream outlets and Facebook posts from the three main parties, along with user engagement data from those Facebook posts. We find that newspaper coverage reflected the framing of a change election. While Fine Gael received the most coverage, both Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin show clear attempts to own change through social media, with Sinn Féin in particular ‘owning’ the most salient election issue of housing while also deploying substantial populist messaging which resulted in the most engagement.
{"title":"Hybrid media consumption and production in #ge2020: the battle to own ‘change’","authors":"Kirsty Park, Jane Suiter","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1976975","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1976975","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Traditionally, political parties engage with journalists to promote their agendas and claim issue ownership through publishing manifestos, holding public events and issuing statements, but the coverage that this interaction produces is determined by the editorial focus and decision making of each outlet. In a hybrid media age, political parties can engage in disintermediation by directly shaping their own agenda and communicating with the public using social media, which also facilitate populist messaging. In this article, we use a combination of traditional media and social media data to explore how key issues and parties were mediated during the battle to own ‘change’ and claim issue ownership in the 2020 election campaign in Ireland. The analysis draws upon coded articles from three mainstream outlets and Facebook posts from the three main parties, along with user engagement data from those Facebook posts. We find that newspaper coverage reflected the framing of a change election. While Fine Gael received the most coverage, both Fianna Fáil and Sinn Féin show clear attempts to own change through social media, with Sinn Féin in particular ‘owning’ the most salient election issue of housing while also deploying substantial populist messaging which resulted in the most engagement.","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42484831","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-17DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1978219
Johan A. Elkink, D. Farrell
ABSTRACT This research note has two functions. It first sets the scene for this special issue using the 2020 Irish National Election Study (INES), which comprises several discrete data sets. The note also reports on findings from one part of the INES – an online poll of voters of polling day, which included a battery of questions related to attitudes and behaviours relevant to national politics. The note provides an empirical analysis of the vote choice in this election. Rather than taking a theory-testing approach, we use a more data-driven strategy and identify the key variables in the data set that are of relevance to an understanding of vote choice. Our findings support the views of other recent commentaries of Irish elections that Irish electoral politics is undergoing major transformation. The new electoral politics that is emerging is personified by a clear left vs. right divide in which strongly held ideological positions separate the voters of the main parties.
{"title":"Predicting vote choice in the 2020 Irish general election","authors":"Johan A. Elkink, D. Farrell","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1978219","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1978219","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This research note has two functions. It first sets the scene for this special issue using the 2020 Irish National Election Study (INES), which comprises several discrete data sets. The note also reports on findings from one part of the INES – an online poll of voters of polling day, which included a battery of questions related to attitudes and behaviours relevant to national politics. The note provides an empirical analysis of the vote choice in this election. Rather than taking a theory-testing approach, we use a more data-driven strategy and identify the key variables in the data set that are of relevance to an understanding of vote choice. Our findings support the views of other recent commentaries of Irish elections that Irish electoral politics is undergoing major transformation. The new electoral politics that is emerging is personified by a clear left vs. right divide in which strongly held ideological positions separate the voters of the main parties.","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41370149","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-08DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1973737
Stefan Müller, Aidan Regan
ABSTRACT The Irish party system has been an outlier in comparative politics. Ireland never had a left-right divide in parliament, and for decades, the dominant centrist political parties competed around a centre-right policy agenda. The absence of an explicit left-right divide in party competition suggested that Irish voters, on average, occupy centre-right policy preferences. Combining survey data since 1973 and all Irish election studies between 2002 and 2020, we show that the average Irish voter now leans to the centre-left. We also show that income has recently emerged as a predictor of left-right self-placement, and that left-right positions increasingly structure vote choice. These patterns hold when using policy preferences on taxes, spending, and government interventions to reduce inequality as alternative indicators. We outline potential explanations for this leftward shift, and conclude that these developments might be anchored in economic inequalities and the left populist strategies of Sinn Féin.
{"title":"Are Irish voters moving to the left?","authors":"Stefan Müller, Aidan Regan","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1973737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1973737","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Irish party system has been an outlier in comparative politics. Ireland never had a left-right divide in parliament, and for decades, the dominant centrist political parties competed around a centre-right policy agenda. The absence of an explicit left-right divide in party competition suggested that Irish voters, on average, occupy centre-right policy preferences. Combining survey data since 1973 and all Irish election studies between 2002 and 2020, we show that the average Irish voter now leans to the centre-left. We also show that income has recently emerged as a predictor of left-right self-placement, and that left-right positions increasingly structure vote choice. These patterns hold when using policy preferences on taxes, spending, and government interventions to reduce inequality as alternative indicators. We outline potential explanations for this leftward shift, and conclude that these developments might be anchored in economic inequalities and the left populist strategies of Sinn Féin.","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42739312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-06DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1973318
R. Costello
ABSTRACT Political parties often employ the rhetoric of electoral mandates, claiming that the people who voted for them endorsed their policies. However, the level of voter-party issue congruence may vary across parties, issues, and elections; and the views of certain types of voters may be better represented by their party than others. This paper puts forward a series of hypotheses to explain variation in issue congruence, relating to how well-informed voters are about party policy, the role of non-policy determinants of vote choice, and the nature of policy competition between parties. The hypotheses are tested using data from surveys of voters and parties conducted during the 2020 general election and the 2019 European Parliament election in Ireland. Congruence is found to be higher when a party is particularly associated with an issue. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, for whom non-policy attributes play a significant part in voters’ assessments, are found to have lower policy congruence with their voters overall than other parties. While there is no evidence that certain socio-demographic groups are systematically more or less well represented by their parties across all policy areas, some gaps in representation are identified, particularly in relation to so-called ‘cultural’ issues.
{"title":"Issue congruence between voters and parties: examining the democratic party mandate in Ireland","authors":"R. Costello","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1973318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1973318","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Political parties often employ the rhetoric of electoral mandates, claiming that the people who voted for them endorsed their policies. However, the level of voter-party issue congruence may vary across parties, issues, and elections; and the views of certain types of voters may be better represented by their party than others. This paper puts forward a series of hypotheses to explain variation in issue congruence, relating to how well-informed voters are about party policy, the role of non-policy determinants of vote choice, and the nature of policy competition between parties. The hypotheses are tested using data from surveys of voters and parties conducted during the 2020 general election and the 2019 European Parliament election in Ireland. Congruence is found to be higher when a party is particularly associated with an issue. Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, for whom non-policy attributes play a significant part in voters’ assessments, are found to have lower policy congruence with their voters overall than other parties. While there is no evidence that certain socio-demographic groups are systematically more or less well represented by their parties across all policy areas, some gaps in representation are identified, particularly in relation to so-called ‘cultural’ issues.","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49058854","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-09-06DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1975966
Luke Field
ABSTRACT In May 2019, three Irish local authorities ran plebiscites alongside their local elections: Cork City Council, Limerick City and County Council, and Waterford City and County Council. The plebiscites were run to judge support for Government proposals to introduce a reformed, directly-elected mayoral office. The results were, in some ways, the worst possible from a Government perspective: a mix. While voters in Limerick backed the plan by a slight majority, it was marginally rejected in both Cork and Waterford. Faced with disappointing a large group of voters no matter the course of action taken, the Government shelved the plans for Cork and Waterford indefinitely, though the plan for Limerick may proceed. Despite the 2019 rejections, the 2020 UCD Online Election Poll (INES 1) found indications of high levels of support for these reforms: four-in-five respondents agreed that mayors should be directly elected, which is a significantly higher proportion than the Yes vote in any of the three plebiscite areas. This research uses further data from the online poll to establish correlates of support for these reforms, and tentatively suggests that partisan dynamics in turnout are why this support wasn’t reflected in the plebiscite results.
{"title":"Determinants of support for directly-elected mayors in Ireland","authors":"Luke Field","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1975966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1975966","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In May 2019, three Irish local authorities ran plebiscites alongside their local elections: Cork City Council, Limerick City and County Council, and Waterford City and County Council. The plebiscites were run to judge support for Government proposals to introduce a reformed, directly-elected mayoral office. The results were, in some ways, the worst possible from a Government perspective: a mix. While voters in Limerick backed the plan by a slight majority, it was marginally rejected in both Cork and Waterford. Faced with disappointing a large group of voters no matter the course of action taken, the Government shelved the plans for Cork and Waterford indefinitely, though the plan for Limerick may proceed. Despite the 2019 rejections, the 2020 UCD Online Election Poll (INES 1) found indications of high levels of support for these reforms: four-in-five respondents agreed that mayors should be directly elected, which is a significantly higher proportion than the Yes vote in any of the three plebiscite areas. This research uses further data from the online poll to establish correlates of support for these reforms, and tentatively suggests that partisan dynamics in turnout are why this support wasn’t reflected in the plebiscite results.","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45381730","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-09DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1969549
Cillian Mcbride
ABSTRACT The idea of recognition is often taken to support the notion of ‘pluralist accommodation’ between nationalists and unionists. This relies on a distinctive ‘cultural’ model of recognition as requiring identity affirmation as essential to conflict resolution. It is argued that the cultural model relies on a weak analysis of social recognition and is, consequently, a poor guide to understanding the politics of recognition in Northern Ireland. Firstly, it does not give sufficient weight to struggles for equal recognition. Secondly, the vague notion of ‘affirming’ identities does not capture the way recognition struggles arise over social positioning in wider status hierarchies. An alternative, ‘recognition struggle’ account is developed which focuses on conflicts over authority and which explains why recognition politics in Northern Ireland often centers on defying the other. Finally, the cultural model fails to see that cultural groups are themselves the product of internal struggles for recognition and wrongly assumes the politics of recognition must resist attempts to transform group identities. Taking recognition seriously requires us to move beyond ‘cultural recognition’ and ‘pluralist accommodation’ in Northern Ireland.
{"title":"Recognition politics in Northern Ireland: from cultural recognition to recognition struggle","authors":"Cillian Mcbride","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1969549","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1969549","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The idea of recognition is often taken to support the notion of ‘pluralist accommodation’ between nationalists and unionists. This relies on a distinctive ‘cultural’ model of recognition as requiring identity affirmation as essential to conflict resolution. It is argued that the cultural model relies on a weak analysis of social recognition and is, consequently, a poor guide to understanding the politics of recognition in Northern Ireland. Firstly, it does not give sufficient weight to struggles for equal recognition. Secondly, the vague notion of ‘affirming’ identities does not capture the way recognition struggles arise over social positioning in wider status hierarchies. An alternative, ‘recognition struggle’ account is developed which focuses on conflicts over authority and which explains why recognition politics in Northern Ireland often centers on defying the other. Finally, the cultural model fails to see that cultural groups are themselves the product of internal struggles for recognition and wrongly assumes the politics of recognition must resist attempts to transform group identities. Taking recognition seriously requires us to move beyond ‘cultural recognition’ and ‘pluralist accommodation’ in Northern Ireland.","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44884092","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-05DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1962162
T. Wilson
{"title":"Failed Führers: a history of Britain’s extreme right","authors":"T. Wilson","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1962162","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1962162","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-08-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07907184.2021.1962162","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45845392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-08-03DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1962163
Hugh Hanley
bler, the double-crosser, the non co-operator’. By the end of this hefty but deft survey, it becomes apparent that there was precious little elbow-room for anyone else at the very apex of British fascism. Liberal democracy in the United Kingdom has thus been repeatedly lucky in its opponents on this flank. Yet Macklin never makes the mistake of under-estimating this grisly cadre: and always pays due tribute to their (often considerable) talents for eye-catching invective and propaganda. Above all, he never loses sight of the big picture. He is always careful to recognise the core achievements of the British fascist tradition: its sheer resilience, its capacity for intellectual regeneration, its cultural authenticity. Unlike its subjects, Failed Führers succeeds triumphantly.
{"title":"Partition: how and why Ireland was divided","authors":"Hugh Hanley","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1962163","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1962163","url":null,"abstract":"bler, the double-crosser, the non co-operator’. By the end of this hefty but deft survey, it becomes apparent that there was precious little elbow-room for anyone else at the very apex of British fascism. Liberal democracy in the United Kingdom has thus been repeatedly lucky in its opponents on this flank. Yet Macklin never makes the mistake of under-estimating this grisly cadre: and always pays due tribute to their (often considerable) talents for eye-catching invective and propaganda. Above all, he never loses sight of the big picture. He is always careful to recognise the core achievements of the British fascist tradition: its sheer resilience, its capacity for intellectual regeneration, its cultural authenticity. Unlike its subjects, Failed Führers succeeds triumphantly.","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49477511","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-14DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1953870
Kieran McConaghy
sections is on sabotage, extraordinarily neglected by most historians of violence. Given the ever-growing complexity of modern economies – pointed out acutely by the suffragette leader Emmeline Pankhurst before the Great War – systematic sabotage would appear to offer immense opportunities for those engaging in violent action against the state. Indeed the IRA embarked on such a campaign in the late 1930s (a campaign which generated Britain’s first anti-terrorist law). It proved too ambitious for the organisation’s meagre resources, but also fell victim to simple lack of competence. After that, sabotage went out of fashion amongst terrorists; Wilson notes that the Provisional IRA only began to come up with anything like a systematic sabotage strategy after two decades. This blind spot, shared by other terrorist groups, is hard to explain; Dr Wilson admits that the neglect of energy targets in particular remains puzzling. After all, it is surely a dramatic shift in targeting which marks terrorism as becoming ‘modern’. As we see here, what Wilson calls the ‘frictions of local intimacy’ which produced most premodern violence was superseded by what WB Yeats called ‘abstract hatred’. This shift towards depersonalised killing ‘remains’, as Wilson says, ‘one of the least explained features of the broader transformation of western societies into late modernity’. Alongside the anonymity marking these ‘societies of strangers’ came the capacity to label whole categories of people – from the ‘aristocrats’ of the French Revolution (few of them actual aristocrats) to the ‘bourgeoisie’ of the anarchists as legitimate targets. But modernity itself has turned out to be more complicated than early modernisation theorists assumed; sharp-eyed studies like this book will be needed to understand its nuances.
{"title":"Sounding dissent: rebel songs, resistance and Irish republicanism","authors":"Kieran McConaghy","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1953870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1953870","url":null,"abstract":"sections is on sabotage, extraordinarily neglected by most historians of violence. Given the ever-growing complexity of modern economies – pointed out acutely by the suffragette leader Emmeline Pankhurst before the Great War – systematic sabotage would appear to offer immense opportunities for those engaging in violent action against the state. Indeed the IRA embarked on such a campaign in the late 1930s (a campaign which generated Britain’s first anti-terrorist law). It proved too ambitious for the organisation’s meagre resources, but also fell victim to simple lack of competence. After that, sabotage went out of fashion amongst terrorists; Wilson notes that the Provisional IRA only began to come up with anything like a systematic sabotage strategy after two decades. This blind spot, shared by other terrorist groups, is hard to explain; Dr Wilson admits that the neglect of energy targets in particular remains puzzling. After all, it is surely a dramatic shift in targeting which marks terrorism as becoming ‘modern’. As we see here, what Wilson calls the ‘frictions of local intimacy’ which produced most premodern violence was superseded by what WB Yeats called ‘abstract hatred’. This shift towards depersonalised killing ‘remains’, as Wilson says, ‘one of the least explained features of the broader transformation of western societies into late modernity’. Alongside the anonymity marking these ‘societies of strangers’ came the capacity to label whole categories of people – from the ‘aristocrats’ of the French Revolution (few of them actual aristocrats) to the ‘bourgeoisie’ of the anarchists as legitimate targets. But modernity itself has turned out to be more complicated than early modernisation theorists assumed; sharp-eyed studies like this book will be needed to understand its nuances.","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07907184.2021.1953870","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49344020","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-07-03DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2021.1938361
L. Whitten
{"title":"Northern Ireland – Republic of Ireland comparative data 2020","authors":"L. Whitten","doi":"10.1080/07907184.2021.1938361","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2021.1938361","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45746,"journal":{"name":"Irish Political Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2021-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/07907184.2021.1938361","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43247625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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