{"title":"Localized Bargaining: The Political Economy of China's High-Speed Railway Program By Ma Xiao. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. 248pp. £19.99 (paper)","authors":"S. Wilson","doi":"10.1017/jea.2023.11","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2023.11","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"360 - 361"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-06-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43669722","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The Liberal Democratic Party maintains a dominant position in Japanese politics while the opposition side is fragmented into many parties. Small opposition parties, namely the Communists, are still surviving even though it has been almost three decades since the 1994 electoral law reform, which made it difficult for such parties to exist. Fragmentation of the opposition is giving an electoral advantage to the ruling party. How can small opposition parties survive? An empirical analysis of voter survey data supports the argument that the controversy over a constitutional revision is playing a role in preventing anti-government voters from unifying under a single party.
{"title":"Wedge Issue Politics in Japan: Why Not Revising the Constitution is Helping the Pro-Revision Ruling Party","authors":"Ko Maeda","doi":"10.1017/jea.2023.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2023.10","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The Liberal Democratic Party maintains a dominant position in Japanese politics while the opposition side is fragmented into many parties. Small opposition parties, namely the Communists, are still surviving even though it has been almost three decades since the 1994 electoral law reform, which made it difficult for such parties to exist. Fragmentation of the opposition is giving an electoral advantage to the ruling party. How can small opposition parties survive? An empirical analysis of voter survey data supports the argument that the controversy over a constitutional revision is playing a role in preventing anti-government voters from unifying under a single party.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"317 - 331"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41321840","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract What explains the lack of electoral consequences for corrupt politicians? Building on studies of motivated reasoning and asymmetric partisan bias, this article highlights the importance of partisan differences in how voters interpret corruption convictions and make voting decisions. I contend that in post-authoritarian democracies, supporters of authoritarian legacy parties (ALPs) are less likely to punish corrupt copartisan incumbents compared to supporters of other parties faced with equally corrupt copartisan incumbents. While voters of all kinds appear likely to ignore corruption among copartisan incumbents, supporters of authoritarian legacy parties are particularly likely to do so. Using original datasets from South Korea, this study shows empirical evidence of the lack of corruption voting for ALP partisans across three legislative elections. This article further finds partisan discrepancies and a striking lack of corruption voting among authoritarian legacy partisans.
{"title":"Authoritarian Legacies and Partisan Bias in Corruption Voting","authors":"Sanghoon Kim-Leffingwell","doi":"10.1017/jea.2023.5","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2023.5","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What explains the lack of electoral consequences for corrupt politicians? Building on studies of motivated reasoning and asymmetric partisan bias, this article highlights the importance of partisan differences in how voters interpret corruption convictions and make voting decisions. I contend that in post-authoritarian democracies, supporters of authoritarian legacy parties (ALPs) are less likely to punish corrupt copartisan incumbents compared to supporters of other parties faced with equally corrupt copartisan incumbents. While voters of all kinds appear likely to ignore corruption among copartisan incumbents, supporters of authoritarian legacy parties are particularly likely to do so. Using original datasets from South Korea, this study shows empirical evidence of the lack of corruption voting for ALP partisans across three legislative elections. This article further finds partisan discrepancies and a striking lack of corruption voting among authoritarian legacy partisans.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"241 - 262"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41749286","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In 2019, Taiwan became the first in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage (SSM). This article considers the social movement strategies and relational dynamics of three activist groups in the year leading to the landmark SSM legislation, respectively representing the “yes,” “no,” and “alternative” agendas in the public debates and social mobilization around the issue of equal marriage rights. Through a critical study of the three cases, this article examines how various campaigners shaped local SSM discourses and mobilized people to support, oppose, and question marriage equality, focusing on their social mobilization strategies and inter-group relational dynamics under Taiwan's political and legal structures. In so doing, it proposes a hybrid theoretical model to understand complex social movement and countermovement relations and dynamics.
{"title":"Taiwan's Same-Sex Marriage Legislation: Social Movement Strategies and Relational Dynamics","authors":"John Wei","doi":"10.1017/jea.2023.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2023.8","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In 2019, Taiwan became the first in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage (SSM). This article considers the social movement strategies and relational dynamics of three activist groups in the year leading to the landmark SSM legislation, respectively representing the “yes,” “no,” and “alternative” agendas in the public debates and social mobilization around the issue of equal marriage rights. Through a critical study of the three cases, this article examines how various campaigners shaped local SSM discourses and mobilized people to support, oppose, and question marriage equality, focusing on their social mobilization strategies and inter-group relational dynamics under Taiwan's political and legal structures. In so doing, it proposes a hybrid theoretical model to understand complex social movement and countermovement relations and dynamics.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"263 - 282"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45942648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract What motivates states’ choice of social classification? Existing explanations highlight scientific beliefs of modern states or social engineering by ideological regimes. Focusing on the initial state-building period of two Communist regimes, China and North Korea, this article complements the existing literature and suggests that social classification reflects three missions of political leaders: regime distinction, governance, and power consolidation. Population categories are created to distinguish the new government from the old, to selectively provide welfare, and to attack political opponents. The varying weight of the missions and their manifestation in social classification depend on new ruling elites’ cohesion and past experiences. This comparative historical analysis sheds light on the rise of political chaos in China and the personalistic dictatorship in North Korea in the 1970s.
{"title":"Categorizing People in the New States: A Comparative Study of Communist China and North Korea","authors":"Juan Wang, J. E. Kim","doi":"10.1017/jea.2023.4","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2023.4","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract What motivates states’ choice of social classification? Existing explanations highlight scientific beliefs of modern states or social engineering by ideological regimes. Focusing on the initial state-building period of two Communist regimes, China and North Korea, this article complements the existing literature and suggests that social classification reflects three missions of political leaders: regime distinction, governance, and power consolidation. Population categories are created to distinguish the new government from the old, to selectively provide welfare, and to attack political opponents. The varying weight of the missions and their manifestation in social classification depend on new ruling elites’ cohesion and past experiences. This comparative historical analysis sheds light on the rise of political chaos in China and the personalistic dictatorship in North Korea in the 1970s.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"185 - 203"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46738604","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, we study how a combination of random ballot ordering and concurrent elections can increase invalid votes in the context of South Korea. In South Korea, elections for the nonpartisan superintendent of education are held concurrently with other partisan races. Whereas the ballot order for candidates in the nonpartisan superintendent of education elections is randomized and rotated, this order for other partisan races is determined according to the number of seats each party has in the national legislature. In this study, we found that a match between candidates’ partisan preferences and their ballot positions decreases invalid votes. Our findings suggest that combining two different ballot-order schemes for concurrently held elections can confuse voters and increase invalid votes.
{"title":"Misleading Ballot Positions and Invalid Votes","authors":"Ha Na Lee, B. Song","doi":"10.1017/jea.2022.38","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2022.38","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, we study how a combination of random ballot ordering and concurrent elections can increase invalid votes in the context of South Korea. In South Korea, elections for the nonpartisan superintendent of education are held concurrently with other partisan races. Whereas the ballot order for candidates in the nonpartisan superintendent of education elections is randomized and rotated, this order for other partisan races is determined according to the number of seats each party has in the national legislature. In this study, we found that a match between candidates’ partisan preferences and their ballot positions decreases invalid votes. Our findings suggest that combining two different ballot-order schemes for concurrently held elections can confuse voters and increase invalid votes.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"347 - 355"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45618635","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Roundtable on Rick Doner, Gregory Noble, and John Ravenhill, The Political Economy of Automotive Industrialization in East Asia","authors":"Eun Mee Kim","doi":"10.1017/jea.2022.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2022.25","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"164 - 165"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45381233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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{"title":"Roundtable on Rick Doner, Gregory Noble, and John Ravenhill, The Political Economy of Automotive Industrialization in East Asia","authors":"Natasha Hamilton-Hart","doi":"10.1017/jea.2022.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2022.23","url":null,"abstract":"An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135288591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract How does the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) affect labor protests in China? Building on the framework of fragmented authoritarianism, I argue that the regional competition to attract foreign investment causes labor protests in China due to its deregulatory effects on labor regulation. Each actor, including the central and local governments, foreign investors, and workers, has different cost–benefit considerations, which provide an explanation for the link between foreign investment and labor protests. By theorizing each actor's preferences, this article explains how FDI induces labor deregulation and workers’ protests in China. Analyzing China's prefecture-level city data from 2012 to 2018, I find that the influx of FDI is positively associated with labor protests. The result remains robust to alternative model specifications and instrumental variable estimation. I also provide empirical evidence for the deregulatory effect of FDI on labor standards with an analysis at the firm level using the World Bank Enterprise Survey. These findings deepen our understanding of how FDI shapes labor regulation and induces workers’ protests in the context of China.
{"title":"Fragmented Labor Regime: FDI, Labor Regulation, and Workers’ Protests in China","authors":"Tae-hoon Lim","doi":"10.1017/jea.2022.31","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2022.31","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract How does the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) affect labor protests in China? Building on the framework of fragmented authoritarianism, I argue that the regional competition to attract foreign investment causes labor protests in China due to its deregulatory effects on labor regulation. Each actor, including the central and local governments, foreign investors, and workers, has different cost–benefit considerations, which provide an explanation for the link between foreign investment and labor protests. By theorizing each actor's preferences, this article explains how FDI induces labor deregulation and workers’ protests in China. Analyzing China's prefecture-level city data from 2012 to 2018, I find that the influx of FDI is positively associated with labor protests. The result remains robust to alternative model specifications and instrumental variable estimation. I also provide empirical evidence for the deregulatory effect of FDI on labor standards with an analysis at the firm level using the World Bank Enterprise Survey. These findings deepen our understanding of how FDI shapes labor regulation and induces workers’ protests in the context of China.","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"125 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46516875","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Roundtable on Rick Doner, Gregory Noble, and John Ravenhill, The Political Economy of Automotive Industrialization in East Asia","authors":"R. Wade","doi":"10.1017/jea.2022.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2022.26","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45829,"journal":{"name":"Journal of East Asian Studies","volume":"23 1","pages":"165 - 174"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41769424","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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