Pub Date : 2022-11-16DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000383
C. Barker
J. S. Mill is typically thought of as a liberal utilitarian disciple of Jeremy Bentham, and in other readings as a modern Socratic or even a modern Epicurean. Mill and the Epicureans are alike in several respects: they theorize personal freedom and active character versus determinism and passivity, they oppose excessive love and praise friendship, and they are critical of traditional religiosity. In spite of these similarities, Mill and the Epicureans have a different conception of active character and citizenship, stemming from a difference in first principles. Mill's philosopher does not share the Epicurean aim of untroubledness (ataraxia), and Mill accepts the demanding task of educating and regenerating a mass democratic society. Below, I assess Mill's troubled hedonism, that is, his acceptance of often intense and long-term mental perturbations, justified by a decidedly non-Epicurean social reform project.
{"title":"Troubled Hedonism and Social Justice: Mill and the Epicureans on the Ataraxic Life","authors":"C. Barker","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000383","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000383","url":null,"abstract":"J. S. Mill is typically thought of as a liberal utilitarian disciple of Jeremy Bentham, and in other readings as a modern Socratic or even a modern Epicurean. Mill and the Epicureans are alike in several respects: they theorize personal freedom and active character versus determinism and passivity, they oppose excessive love and praise friendship, and they are critical of traditional religiosity. In spite of these similarities, Mill and the Epicureans have a different conception of active character and citizenship, stemming from a difference in first principles. Mill's philosopher does not share the Epicurean aim of untroubledness (ataraxia), and Mill accepts the demanding task of educating and regenerating a mass democratic society. Below, I assess Mill's troubled hedonism, that is, his acceptance of often intense and long-term mental perturbations, justified by a decidedly non-Epicurean social reform project.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42939282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-31DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000401
S. F. Midtgaard
According to the influential disrespect account of what paternalism is, and why it is wrong, paternalism involves an anti-egalitarian, disrespectful attitude on the part of the paternalist: X (the paternalist) assumes an attitude of superiority when interfering in Y's matters for Y's good. Pace this account, the article argues that an important, although somewhat overlooked, form of paternalism is not, all things considered, insulting. This form of paternalism focusses on people's occasional lack of appropriate self-respect or their failure to see themselves as equals or to stand vis-à-vis others as such.
{"title":"Self-Respect Paternalism","authors":"S. F. Midtgaard","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000401","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 According to the influential disrespect account of what paternalism is, and why it is wrong, paternalism involves an anti-egalitarian, disrespectful attitude on the part of the paternalist: X (the paternalist) assumes an attitude of superiority when interfering in Y's matters for Y's good. Pace this account, the article argues that an important, although somewhat overlooked, form of paternalism is not, all things considered, insulting. This form of paternalism focusses on people's occasional lack of appropriate self-respect or their failure to see themselves as equals or to stand vis-à-vis others as such.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42708005","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-27DOI: 10.1017/s095382082200036x
Austen McDougal
Consequentialist theories that directly assess multiple focal points face an important objection: that one right option may conflict with another. Robert Adams raises an instance of this objection regarding the possibility that the right act conflicts with the right motives. Whereas only partial responses have previously been given, assuming particular views of the relation between motives and acts, an exhaustive treatment is in order. Either motives psychologically determine acts, or they do not – and I defend direct consequentialism on each assumption. Crucially, if motives determine acts, this may be compatible with the ability to act otherwise, but there remains a defense for consequentialism even on these assumptions. What clears consequentialism of conflict is not necessarily that the apparently right act is unavailable, but rather that its outcome is suboptimal once we account for necessary motives. Even if the agent remains free to perform the act, the act costs too much.
{"title":"When a Free Act Costs a Motive: Clearing Consequentialism of Conflict","authors":"Austen McDougal","doi":"10.1017/s095382082200036x","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s095382082200036x","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Consequentialist theories that directly assess multiple focal points face an important objection: that one right option may conflict with another. Robert Adams raises an instance of this objection regarding the possibility that the right act conflicts with the right motives. Whereas only partial responses have previously been given, assuming particular views of the relation between motives and acts, an exhaustive treatment is in order. Either motives psychologically determine acts, or they do not – and I defend direct consequentialism on each assumption. Crucially, if motives determine acts, this may be compatible with the ability to act otherwise, but there remains a defense for consequentialism even on these assumptions. What clears consequentialism of conflict is not necessarily that the apparently right act is unavailable, but rather that its outcome is suboptimal once we account for necessary motives. Even if the agent remains free to perform the act, the act costs too much.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43587939","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000140
S. Nair
One family of maximizing act consequentialist theories is actualist direct theories. Indeed, historically there are at least three different forms of actualist direct consequentialism (due to Bentham, Moore, and contemporary consequentialists). This article is about the logical differences between these three actualist direct theories and the differences between actualist direct theories and their competitors. Three main points emerge. First, the sharpest separation between actualist direct theories and their competitors concerns the so-called ‘inheritance’ principle. Second, there are a myriad of other logical differences among actualist direct theories. Third, one theory (Moore's theory) stands out among actualist direct theories because it entails a variety of logical principles. This fact may count in favor of that theory.
{"title":"Three Forms of Actualist Direct Consequentialism","authors":"S. Nair","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000140","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000140","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 One family of maximizing act consequentialist theories is actualist direct theories. Indeed, historically there are at least three different forms of actualist direct consequentialism (due to Bentham, Moore, and contemporary consequentialists). This article is about the logical differences between these three actualist direct theories and the differences between actualist direct theories and their competitors. Three main points emerge. First, the sharpest separation between actualist direct theories and their competitors concerns the so-called ‘inheritance’ principle. Second, there are a myriad of other logical differences among actualist direct theories. Third, one theory (Moore's theory) stands out among actualist direct theories because it entails a variety of logical principles. This fact may count in favor of that theory.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43309469","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-11DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000371
Ben Eggleston
The last few decades have seen rapid changes in the online publishing of scholarly journals. Many readers of Utilitas may remember a time when there was no online version of the journal, and they would await the delivery of printed issues in the mail. Other readers may have never seen a printed issue, having always relied on online access provided by university libraries or, in rarer cases, individual online subscriptions. Because of the shift to online access, subscriptions to the printed issues ofUtilitas have fallen over the years. In fact, they currently stand at fewer than 30. As you might imagine, this number is not large enough to generate the economies of scale that are necessary for print publication to be financially sustainable. Accordingly, Cambridge University Press proposed to me that print publication of Utilitas end after the 2022 volume of the journal, and I agreed that was sensible. In true utilitarian fashion, consideration was given to the harms as well as the benefits of this decision. Given the price of a print subscription, it seems likely that each print subscriber highly values the printed issues and will be disappointed by their discontinuation. But it is hard to argue (and perhaps no print subscriber would argue) that print subscriptions should operate at a loss for CUP, or that some price level can be found that would make print subscriptions break even for CUP. As many of you know, on the CUP website for Utilitas, published articles are temporarily posted in an area called FirstView, and then grouped into issues corresponding to the printed issues. After 2022, although there will be no more printed issues for the online issues to correspond to, Utilitas articles will continue to be grouped into quarterly issues online as their final, permanent, venue of publication for being accessed and cited.
{"title":"Ending Print Publication After December 2022 Issue","authors":"Ben Eggleston","doi":"10.1017/s0953820822000371","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820822000371","url":null,"abstract":"The last few decades have seen rapid changes in the online publishing of scholarly journals. Many readers of Utilitas may remember a time when there was no online version of the journal, and they would await the delivery of printed issues in the mail. Other readers may have never seen a printed issue, having always relied on online access provided by university libraries or, in rarer cases, individual online subscriptions. Because of the shift to online access, subscriptions to the printed issues ofUtilitas have fallen over the years. In fact, they currently stand at fewer than 30. As you might imagine, this number is not large enough to generate the economies of scale that are necessary for print publication to be financially sustainable. Accordingly, Cambridge University Press proposed to me that print publication of Utilitas end after the 2022 volume of the journal, and I agreed that was sensible. In true utilitarian fashion, consideration was given to the harms as well as the benefits of this decision. Given the price of a print subscription, it seems likely that each print subscriber highly values the printed issues and will be disappointed by their discontinuation. But it is hard to argue (and perhaps no print subscriber would argue) that print subscriptions should operate at a loss for CUP, or that some price level can be found that would make print subscriptions break even for CUP. As many of you know, on the CUP website for Utilitas, published articles are temporarily posted in an area called FirstView, and then grouped into issues corresponding to the printed issues. After 2022, although there will be no more printed issues for the online issues to correspond to, Utilitas articles will continue to be grouped into quarterly issues online as their final, permanent, venue of publication for being accessed and cited.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"367 - 367"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47920084","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-07DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000358
Brian Kogelmann
Abstract Why pursue economic growth? For poor countries this is an easy question to answer, but it is more difficult for rich ones. Some of the world's greatest philosophers and economists – such as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls – thought that, once a certain material standard of well-being has been achieved, economic growth should stop. I argue the opposite in this article. We always have reason to pursue economic growth. My argument is indirect. I shall not argue that economic growth itself is always better. Rather, I shall argue that stopping growth requires morally objectionable actions. Economic growth tends to occur naturally if certain underlying conditions are in place. We have moral reasons to insist on these conditions independent their effect on growth, however. Halting growth requires that we alter these conditions, but we ought not do this.
{"title":"We Must Always Pursue Economic Growth","authors":"Brian Kogelmann","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000358","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000358","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Why pursue economic growth? For poor countries this is an easy question to answer, but it is more difficult for rich ones. Some of the world's greatest philosophers and economists – such as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, and John Rawls – thought that, once a certain material standard of well-being has been achieved, economic growth should stop. I argue the opposite in this article. We always have reason to pursue economic growth. My argument is indirect. I shall not argue that economic growth itself is always better. Rather, I shall argue that stopping growth requires morally objectionable actions. Economic growth tends to occur naturally if certain underlying conditions are in place. We have moral reasons to insist on these conditions independent their effect on growth, however. Halting growth requires that we alter these conditions, but we ought not do this.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"478 - 492"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49644475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-16DOI: 10.1017/S0953820822000346
Matthew Shea, James S. Kintz
Abstract Perfectionism is the view that what is intrinsically good is the fulfillment of human nature or the development and exercise of the characteristic human capacities. An important objection to the theory is what Gwen Bradford calls the “Deep Problem”: explaining why nature-fulfillment is good. We argue that situating perfectionism within a Thomistic metaethical framework and adopting Aquinas's account of the metaphysical “convertibility” of being and goodness gives us a solution to the Deep Problem. In short, the fulfillment of human nature consists in the actualization of human potentialities or fullness of human being, and because being is ultimately the same thing as goodness, the fulfillment of human nature is good. We show that Thomistic perfectionism meets the requirements for an answer to the Deep Problem, provides the best explanation possible for the goodness of nature fulfillment, and is a natural foundation for perfectionist theories of value.
{"title":"A Thomistic Solution to the Deep Problem for Perfectionism","authors":"Matthew Shea, James S. Kintz","doi":"10.1017/S0953820822000346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820822000346","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Perfectionism is the view that what is intrinsically good is the fulfillment of human nature or the development and exercise of the characteristic human capacities. An important objection to the theory is what Gwen Bradford calls the “Deep Problem”: explaining why nature-fulfillment is good. We argue that situating perfectionism within a Thomistic metaethical framework and adopting Aquinas's account of the metaphysical “convertibility” of being and goodness gives us a solution to the Deep Problem. In short, the fulfillment of human nature consists in the actualization of human potentialities or fullness of human being, and because being is ultimately the same thing as goodness, the fulfillment of human nature is good. We show that Thomistic perfectionism meets the requirements for an answer to the Deep Problem, provides the best explanation possible for the goodness of nature fulfillment, and is a natural foundation for perfectionist theories of value.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":"34 1","pages":"461 - 477"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47573685","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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