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How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving? 风险和歧义应该如何影响我们的慈善捐赠?
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-05-16 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000055
Lara Buchak
Suppose we want to do the most good we can with a particular sum of money, but we cannot be certain of the consequences of different ways of making use of it. This article explores how our attitudes towards risk and ambiguity bear on what we should do. It shows that risk-avoidance and ambiguity-aversion can each provide good reason to divide our money between various charitable organizations rather than to give it all to the most promising one. It also shows how different attitudes towards risk and ambiguity affect whether we should give to an organization which does a small amount of good for certain or to one which does a large amount of good with some small or unknown probability.
假设我们想用一笔特定的钱做我们能做的最好的事情,但我们不能确定使用它的不同方式的后果。本文探讨了我们对风险和模糊性的态度如何影响我们应该做什么。这表明,规避风险和规避歧义都可以为我们在各种慈善组织之间分配资金提供充分的理由,而不是将资金全部捐给最有前途的慈善组织。它还表明,对风险和模糊性的不同态度如何影响我们是应该给予一个为某些事情做了少量好事的组织,还是给予一个以某种小概率或未知概率做了大量好事的组织。
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引用次数: 6
Indeterminacy in Global Warming: A Supervaluationist Response 全球变暖的不确定性:一个超估值主义者的回应
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-04-13 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000067
Patrick Dieveney
Global warming is a very complex collective harm. While various models have been proposed to assign moral responsibility in such cases, global warming presents an additional problem. The complexity of the climate system gives rise to ineliminable indeterminacy, which makes it impossible to determine the extent to which any particular emissions contribute to this collective harm. This indeterminacy poses an obstacle to assigning moral responsibility to individuals. To overcome this obstacle, I propose adopting a supervaluationist approach. This approach has several benefits. Among other things, it supplies a framework for assigning moral responsibility that handles indeterminacy that commonly arises when dealing with complex, global collective-harm scenarios.
全球变暖是一个非常复杂的集体危害。虽然已经提出了各种各样的模型来分配这种情况下的道德责任,但全球变暖提出了一个额外的问题。气候系统的复杂性带来了无法消除的不确定性,这使得人们无法确定任何特定排放在多大程度上造成了这种集体危害。这种不确定性给个人分配道德责任造成了障碍。为了克服这一障碍,我建议采用超估值主义方法。这种方法有几个好处。除此之外,它还提供了一个分配道德责任的框架,以处理在处理复杂的全球集体伤害情景时通常出现的不确定性。
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引用次数: 0
Helen McCabe, John Stuart Mill, Socialist (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2021), pp. 368. Helen McCabe,John Stuart Mill,《社会主义者》(蒙特利尔和金斯敦:麦吉尔女王大学出版社,2021),第368页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-08 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000031
Piers Norris Turner
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引用次数: 0
Thomas E. Hill Jr., Beyond Duty: Kantian Ideals of Respect, Beneficence, and Appreciation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), pp. xii + 319. Thomas E. Hill Jr.,超越责任:康德的尊重、仁慈和欣赏的理想(牛津:牛津大学出版社,2021),pp. xii + 319。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-03-06 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000043
Bas Tönissen
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引用次数: 0
Pattern-Based Reasons and Disaster 基于模式的原因与灾害
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-01-23 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000474
A. Dietz
Pattern-based reasons are reasons for action deriving not from the features of our own actions, but from the features of the larger patterns of action in which we might be participating. These reasons might relate to the patterns of action that will actually be carried out, or they might relate to merely hypothetical patterns. In past work, I have argued that accepting merely hypothetical pattern-based reasons, together with a plausible account of how to weigh these reasons, can lead to disastrous consequences. However, in this article, I argue that this problem is not limited to hypothetical pattern-based reasons: it turns out that there are analogous issues for reasons deriving from actual patterns. I then suggest that we can avoid this problem by adopting a different account of the weight of pattern-based reasons.
基于模式的原因是行为的原因不是来源于我们自己行为的特征,而是来源于我们可能参与的更大的行为模式的特征。这些原因可能与实际执行的行为模式有关,也可能与仅仅假设的模式有关。在过去的工作中,我认为仅仅接受假设的基于模式的原因,以及如何权衡这些原因的合理解释,可能会导致灾难性的后果。然而,在本文中,我认为这个问题并不局限于假设的基于模式的原因:事实证明,从实际模式派生的原因也存在类似的问题。然后我建议我们可以通过对基于模式的原因的权重采用不同的解释来避免这个问题。
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引用次数: 0
The Sum of Averages: An Egyptology-Proof Average View 平均数之和:埃及学证明的平均观
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-01-16 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000450
K. Grill
Contemporary population ethics is dominated by views that aggregate by summing, whether of well-being or of some construct based on well-being. In contrast, average well-being is generally considered axiologically irrelevant. To many of us, however, the number of future people does not seem important, as long as it is sufficient to enable rich and varied life experiences, and as long as the population continues throughout time. It therefore seems relatively plausible to aggregate future well-being by averaging. In particular, it seems plausible to value high average well-being at any particular time, and to do so for all future times. I present a time-sensitive version of the Average View that underpins such axiological intuitions. I also address a series of issues and objections that confront such a view.
当代人口伦理学的主流观点是,无论是关于幸福的,还是基于幸福的一些建构。相比之下,平均幸福感通常被认为与价值无关。然而,对我们许多人来说,未来人口的数量似乎并不重要,只要它足以使丰富多样的生活经历成为可能,只要人口持续不断就行。因此,通过平均来汇总未来的幸福似乎是相对合理的。尤其值得注意的是,在任何一个特定的时间都重视高平均幸福感,并在未来的所有时间都这样做似乎是合理的。我提出了一个具有时效性的“平均观点”版本,它支撑着这种价值论直觉。我还讨论了与这种观点相抵触的一系列问题和反对意见。
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引用次数: 1
Moral Significance and Overpermissiveness 道德意义和过度放纵
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2023-01-16 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000462
Fırat Akova
As opposed to overdemanding principles which ask individuals to sacrifice too much, there are overpermissive principles which ask individuals to sacrifice too little. Determining the extent to which one should sacrifice often comes with the need of understanding what is of moral significance. By analysing different readings of moral significance, and singling out one specific interpretation of moral significance which links moral significance to gaining or losing a considerable amount of welfare, I demonstrate that one of the well-known principles of Peter Singer, the Weaker Principle of Sacrifice, is overpermissive as it exempts deliberately cultivated morally significant lavish pursuits from the domain of sacrifice. Overpermissiveness not only renders moral principles unreasonably broad but also causes burdens to be distributed unjustifiably in a comparative sense, where some parties are assigned a moral obligation whereas others are not.
与要求过多的原则相反,要求个人牺牲太多的原则是过度宽容的原则,要求个人牺牲太少。在决定一个人应该牺牲的程度时,往往需要理解什么是具有道德意义的。通过分析对道德意义的不同解读,并挑选出一种将道德意义与获得或失去相当数量的福利联系起来的具体解释,我证明了彼得·辛格(Peter Singer)著名的原则之一——牺牲的弱原则(weak Principle of Sacrifice)——是过于宽容的,因为它将刻意培养的具有道德意义的奢侈追求从牺牲的领域中排除了出来。过度纵容不仅使道德原则不合理地宽泛,而且在比较意义上造成负担的不合理分配,即一些当事人被赋予道德义务,而另一些当事人则没有。
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引用次数: 0
The Morality of Creating Lives Not Worth Living: On Boonin's Solution to the Non-Identity Problem 创造不值得生活的生命的道德——论布宁对非身份问题的解决
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-12-12 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000449
Olle Risberg
David Boonin argues that in a choice between creating a person whose life would be well worth living and creating a different person whose life would be significantly worse, but still worth living, each option is morally permissible. I show that Boonin's argument for this view problematically implies that in a choice between creating a person whose life would be well worth living and creating another person whose life would not be worth living, each option is also morally permissible.
大卫·布宁(David Boonin)认为,在创造一个生活值得过的人和创造一个不同的生活更糟糕但仍然值得过的人生之间做出选择时,每一种选择在道德上都是允许的。我表明,布宁对这一观点的论点有问题地暗示,在创造一个生命值得活下去的人和创造另一个生命不值得活下来的人之间做出选择时,每一种选择在道德上也是允许的。
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引用次数: 0
Roger Crisp, Sacrifice Regained: Morality and Self-Interest in British Moral Philosophy from Hobbes to Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2019), pp. x + 233. 罗杰·克里斯普,《重新获得的牺牲:从霍布斯到边沁的英国道德哲学中的道德和自利》(牛津:克拉伦登出版社,2019),第x + 233页。
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-12-05 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000437
James E. Crimmins
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引用次数: 0
Of trolleys and self-driving cars: What machine ethicists can and cannot learn from trolleyology 电车和自动驾驶汽车:机器伦理学家能和不能从电车学中学到什么
IF 0.9 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI: 10.1017/s0953820822000395
Peter Königs
Crashes involving self-driving cars at least superficially resemble trolley dilemmas. This article discusses what lessons machine ethicists working on the ethics of self-driving cars can learn from trolleyology. The article proceeds by providing an account of the trolley problem as a paradox and by distinguishing two types of solutions to the trolley problem. According to an optimistic solution, our case intuitions about trolley dilemmas are responding to morally relevant differences. The pessimistic solution denies that this is the case. An optimistic solution would yield first-order moral insights for the ethics of self-driving cars, but such a solution is difficult to come by. More plausible is the pessimistic solution, and it teaches us a methodological lesson. The lesson is that machine ethicists should discount case intuitions and instead rely on intuitions and judgments at a higher level of generality.
涉及自动驾驶汽车的撞车事故至少从表面上看类似于电车困境。本文讨论了从事自动驾驶汽车伦理研究的机器伦理学家可以从电车学中学到什么。这篇文章首先提供了电车问题作为一个悖论的解释,并区分了电车问题的两种解决方案。根据乐观解,我们对电车困境的情况直觉是对道德相关差异的反应。悲观的解决方案否认了这一点。一种乐观的解决方案将为自动驾驶汽车的伦理问题提供一级道德见解,但这样的解决方案很难实现。悲观的解决方案更为合理,它给我们上了方法论的一课。从中得到的教训是,机器伦理学家应该摒弃案例直觉,转而依赖直觉和更高层次的一般性判断。
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引用次数: 2
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