Pub Date : 2023-08-14DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000109
Michel Plant
{"title":"William MacAskill, What We Owe The Future: A Million-Year View (One World Publications, London, 2022), pp. 246.","authors":"Michel Plant","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000109","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000109","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48694909","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-09DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000201
Josh Milburn
{"title":"Catia Faria, Animal Ethics in the Wild: Wild Animal Suffering and Intervention in Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), pp. ix + 222.","authors":"Josh Milburn","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000201","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000201","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48064423","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-09DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000183
Luca Hemmerich
In this article, I argue that desire-satisfaction theories of well-being face the problem of trivially satisfied desires. First, I motivate the claim that desire-satisfaction theories need an aggregation principle and reconstruct four possible principles desire-satisfactionists can adopt. Second, I contend that one of these principles seems implausible on numerous counts. Third, I argue that the other three principles, which hold that the creation and satisfaction of new desires is good for individuals and can be called proliferationist, are vulnerable to an objection from trivially satisfied desires. They implausibly imply that forming desires that are trivially satisfied is good for individuals. Finally, I argue that trivially satisfied desires may also worsen desire-satisfactionism's classical problem of pointless desires. Together, these claims constitute a challenge to desire-satisfactionism.
{"title":"Trivially Satisfied Desires: A Problem for Desire-Satisfaction Theories of Well-Being","authors":"Luca Hemmerich","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000183","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000183","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, I argue that desire-satisfaction theories of well-being face the problem of trivially satisfied desires. First, I motivate the claim that desire-satisfaction theories need an aggregation principle and reconstruct four possible principles desire-satisfactionists can adopt. Second, I contend that one of these principles seems implausible on numerous counts. Third, I argue that the other three principles, which hold that the creation and satisfaction of new desires is good for individuals and can be called proliferationist, are vulnerable to an objection from trivially satisfied desires. They implausibly imply that forming desires that are trivially satisfied is good for individuals. Finally, I argue that trivially satisfied desires may also worsen desire-satisfactionism's classical problem of pointless desires. Together, these claims constitute a challenge to desire-satisfactionism.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49037360","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000171
Atus Mariqueo-Russell
This paper considers a new problem for desire theories of well-being. The problem claims that these theories are implausible because they misvalue the effects of fleeting desires, long-standing desires, and fluctuations in desire strength on well-being. I begin by investigating a version of the desire theory of well-being, simple concurrentism, that fails to capture intuitions in these cases. I then argue that desire theories of well-being that are suitably stability-adjusted can avoid this problem. These theories claim that the average strength of a desire, and the length of time that it is held, both influence the extent to which its fulfilment or frustration affects well-being. I end by considering whether value-fulfilment theories of well-being have a more attractive response to this problem. I find that these theories have significant downsides that make them unappealing alternatives.
{"title":"Well-being and the Problem of Unstable Desires","authors":"Atus Mariqueo-Russell","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000171","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000171","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper considers a new problem for desire theories of well-being. The problem claims that these theories are implausible because they misvalue the effects of fleeting desires, long-standing desires, and fluctuations in desire strength on well-being. I begin by investigating a version of the desire theory of well-being, simple concurrentism, that fails to capture intuitions in these cases. I then argue that desire theories of well-being that are suitably stability-adjusted can avoid this problem. These theories claim that the average strength of a desire, and the length of time that it is held, both influence the extent to which its fulfilment or frustration affects well-being. I end by considering whether value-fulfilment theories of well-being have a more attractive response to this problem. I find that these theories have significant downsides that make them unappealing alternatives.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43658962","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-04DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000146
Kai Draper
David Benatar's asymmetry argument in defense of anti-natalism is unconvincing, but not, as most of his critics would have it, because the alleged asymmetry on which it is based does not exist. Rather, the problem is that the existence of that asymmetry does not warrant the conclusion that it is better never to have been. This paper explains Benatar's mistake and identifies the correct conclusions to draw from the axiological asymmetry he identifies. It also sheds light on certain puzzles in population ethics.
David Benatar为反出生主义辩护的不对称论点没有说服力，但并不像他的大多数批评者所认为的那样，因为它所依据的所谓不对称并不存在。更确切地说，问题在于，这种不对称性的存在，并不能证明“不存在更好”的结论是正确的。本文解释了Benatar的错误，并从他所识别的价值论不对称中找出了正确的结论。它还揭示了人口伦理中的某些谜题。
{"title":"Benatar and Beyond: Rethinking the Consequences of Asymmetry","authors":"Kai Draper","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000146","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 David Benatar's asymmetry argument in defense of anti-natalism is unconvincing, but not, as most of his critics would have it, because the alleged asymmetry on which it is based does not exist. Rather, the problem is that the existence of that asymmetry does not warrant the conclusion that it is better never to have been. This paper explains Benatar's mistake and identifies the correct conclusions to draw from the axiological asymmetry he identifies. It also sheds light on certain puzzles in population ethics.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42427654","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-27DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000158
Dale E. Miller
In a well-known passage in chapter V of On Liberty, J. S. Mill notes that while economic competition is generally socially beneficial and should be permitted, this “Free Trade” doctrine does not follow from the liberty or harm principle because “trade is a social act.” In a largely overlooked passage in chapter IV of the same essay, however, Mill contends that for society to coercively prohibit the practice of piecework – paying workers by the unit rather than by the hour or day – does violate this principle. In this short note, I demonstrate that Mill's reasoning in these two passages is contradictory.
{"title":"Principle, Pragmatism, and Piecework in On Liberty","authors":"Dale E. Miller","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000158","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000158","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a well-known passage in chapter V of On Liberty, J. S. Mill notes that while economic competition is generally socially beneficial and should be permitted, this “Free Trade” doctrine does not follow from the liberty or harm principle because “trade is a social act.” In a largely overlooked passage in chapter IV of the same essay, however, Mill contends that for society to coercively prohibit the practice of piecework – paying workers by the unit rather than by the hour or day – does violate this principle. In this short note, I demonstrate that Mill's reasoning in these two passages is contradictory.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49670094","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-24DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000122
C. Riley
{"title":"James E. Crimmins, Utilitarianism in the Early American Republic (New York: Routledge, 2022), pp. 280.","authors":"C. Riley","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000122","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47029692","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-13DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000110
C. Tucker
{"title":"Douglas Portmore, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xvii + 324.","authors":"C. Tucker","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000110","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000110","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42776809","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-11DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000134
R. Chan
{"title":"David Boonin, Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xii + 209.","authors":"R. Chan","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000134","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000134","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45338071","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-22DOI: 10.1017/s0953820823000092
Ryan Kulesa
In this article, I present a novel argument against abortion. In short, what makes it wrong to kill someone is that they are a counterfactual person; counterfactual persons are individuals such that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. My view accommodates two intuitions which many views concerning the wrongness of killing fail to account for: embryo rescue cases and the impermissibility of infanticide. The view avoids embryo rescue cases because embryos in the rescue scenarios are not counterfactual people: they are not counterfactual people because it is false to say that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. As a result, it does not follow from my account that there is a prohibition against allowing embryos to die. On the other hand, infants are counterfactual people: an infant is an individual such that, were she not killed, she would have been a person.
{"title":"The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion","authors":"Ryan Kulesa","doi":"10.1017/s0953820823000092","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820823000092","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this article, I present a novel argument against abortion. In short, what makes it wrong to kill someone is that they are a counterfactual person; counterfactual persons are individuals such that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. My view accommodates two intuitions which many views concerning the wrongness of killing fail to account for: embryo rescue cases and the impermissibility of infanticide. The view avoids embryo rescue cases because embryos in the rescue scenarios are not counterfactual people: they are not counterfactual people because it is false to say that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. As a result, it does not follow from my account that there is a prohibition against allowing embryos to die. On the other hand, infants are counterfactual people: an infant is an individual such that, were she not killed, she would have been a person.","PeriodicalId":45896,"journal":{"name":"Utilitas","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47781390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：