Pub Date : 2021-10-04DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000297
Bastian Steuwer
Abstract Limited aggregation holds that we are only sometimes, not always, permitted to aggregate. Aggregation is permissible only when the harms and benefits are relevant to one another. But how should limited aggregation be extended to cases in which we are uncertain about what will happen? In this article, I provide a challenge to ex post limited aggregation. I reconstruct a precise version of ex post limited aggregation that relies on the notion of ex post claims. However, building a theory of limited aggregation based on ex post claims leads to a dilemma. This shows that ex post limited aggregation is currently far away from being a well-defined alternative, strengthening the case for ex ante limited aggregation.
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Pub Date : 2021-09-28DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000285
C. Frugé
noteworthy contribution to the literature. Roy Sorensen’s ‘Lying to Mindless Machines’ offers a pioneering discussion of lying to mindless machines (AIs). Sorensen argues that we can lie to machines, but machines cannot lie to us. If he is right about the first claim, and we can lie to mindless machines, DECEPTION must be false: we need not intend to change someone’s mind (since machines have none) in order to lie. Most of the volume’s essays focus on how individual statements can be used to deliberately convey false propositions. Jennifer Saul’s article examines other ways in which falsehoods spread through communication. Sometimes falsehoods are produced by the aggregation of different discourses (Saul calls these aggregate falsehoods). For instance, a journal that disproportionately covers crimes by black people may create the false impression that black people aremore likely to commit crimes. Other times,media propagate falsehoods unintentionally, by mere negligence, because their journalists and editors did not check their sources as carefully as they should have (Saul calls these negligent falsehoods). Although aggregate and negligent falsehoods are not strictly speaking ‘lies’, they are common and can be immensely damaging to the communities that they target. To understand how nefarious stereotypes are created and spread, Saul concludes, researchers need to pay more attention to these neglected forms of disinformation. The volume is divided into four main sections, each dealing with one of the four topics mentioned in the title (lying, knowledge, ethics, politics). Due to space constraints, I have been unable to comment on the sections of knowledge and ethics, which indeed contain some excellent essays. If I have not discussed essays on politics, it is because (perhaps fittingly for a volume that deals with deception), none of the essays grouped under ‘politics’ discusses (or touches upon) the political implications of dishonest communication (with the exception of Saul’s essay). This may be the main weakness of the volume: despite being published in the ‘Engaged Philosophy’ series of Oxford University Press, it offers very little material that fits this label. That said, this is an important collection with several excellent contributions, some of which will contribute to redefining research in this field in the forthcoming years.
对文学的显著贡献。罗伊·索伦森（Roy Sorensen）的《对无意识机器撒谎》（Living to Mindless Machines）提供了一个关于对无脑机器撒谎的开创性讨论。索伦森认为，我们可以对机器撒谎，但机器不能对我们撒谎。如果他对第一种说法是正确的，我们可以向无意识的机器撒谎，那么欺骗一定是错误的：我们不需要为了撒谎而改变别人的想法（因为机器没有）。该卷的大部分文章都集中在如何利用个人陈述来故意传达虚假命题上。詹妮弗·索尔的文章探讨了谎言通过交流传播的其他方式。有时，谎言是由不同话语的聚合而产生的（索尔称之为聚合谎言）。例如，一本不成比例地报道黑人犯罪的杂志可能会给人一种错误的印象，认为黑人更有可能犯罪。其他时候，媒体只是疏忽大意，无意中传播虚假信息，因为他们的记者和编辑没有像他们应该的那样仔细检查他们的来源（索尔称这些疏忽大意的虚假信息）。尽管总体和疏忽的谎言严格来说并不是“谎言”，但它们很常见，可能会对其目标社区造成巨大损害。索尔总结道，为了了解邪恶的刻板印象是如何产生和传播的，研究人员需要更多地关注这些被忽视的虚假信息形式。该卷分为四个主要部分，每个部分都涉及标题中提到的四个主题之一（撒谎、知识、伦理、政治）。由于篇幅限制，我无法评论知识和伦理的部分，这些部分确实包含了一些优秀的文章。如果我没有讨论过关于政治的文章，那是因为（也许对于一本关于欺骗的书来说是合适的），“政治”下的文章都没有讨论（或触及）不诚实沟通的政治含义（索尔的文章除外）。这可能是这本书的主要弱点：尽管它发表在牛津大学出版社的“参与哲学”系列中，但它提供的材料很少符合这个标签。也就是说，这是一个重要的收藏，有一些优秀的贡献，其中一些将有助于在未来几年重新定义该领域的研究。
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Pub Date : 2021-09-28DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000273
A. Dietz
Abstract Could it be true that even though we as a group ought to do something, you as an individual ought not to do your part? And under what conditions, in particular, could this happen? In this article, I discuss how a certain kind of case, introduced by David Copp, illustrates the possibility that you ought not to do your part even when you would be playing a crucial causal role in the group action. This is because you may have special agent-relative reasons against participating that are not shared by the group as a whole. I defend the claim that these are indeed cases in which you ought not to do your part in what the group ought to do. I then argue that we can expect these cases to produce a troubling kind of rational conflict.
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Pub Date : 2021-09-23DOI: 10.1017/S0953820821000261
Jacob Barrett
Abstract In previous work, I have argued that subjectivists about well-being must turn from a preference-satisfaction to a desire-satisfaction theory of well-being in order to avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons of well-being. In a recent paper, Van der Deijl and Brouwer agree, but object that no version of the desire-satisfaction theory can provide a plausible account of how an individual's degree of well-being depends on the satisfaction or frustration of their various desires, at least in cases involving the gain or loss of desires. So subjectivists can avoid the conceptual problem of interpersonal comparisons only by adopting a substantively implausible view. In this reply, I defend subjectivism by arguing that the totalist desire-satisfaction theory avoids Van der Deijl and Brouwer's objections, and briefly suggest that it may also be able to handle the problem of adaptive desires. I conclude that subjectivists should endorse the totalist desire-satisfaction theory.
摘要在以前的工作中，我认为关于幸福感的主观主义者必须从偏好满足转向幸福感的欲望满足理论，以避免幸福感的人际比较的概念问题。在最近的一篇论文中，Van der Deijl和Brouwer表示同意，但反对任何版本的欲望满足理论都无法提供一个合理的解释，说明个人的幸福程度如何取决于他们各种欲望的满足或挫败，至少在涉及欲望的获得或损失的情况下是这样。因此，主观主义者只有采取实质上不可信的观点，才能避免人际比较的概念问题。在这个答复中，我为主观主义辩护，认为整体主义的欲望满足理论避免了范德德尔和布劳沃的反对意见，并简要指出它可能也能够处理适应性欲望的问题。我的结论是，主观主义者应该赞同整体主义的欲望满足理论。
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Pub Date : 2021-08-19DOI: 10.1017/S095382082100025X
J. Wieland
Abstract What's wrong with joining corona parties? In this article, I defend the idea that reasons to avoid such parties (or collective harms, more generally) come in degrees. I approach this issue from a participation-based perspective. Specifically, I argue that the more people are already joining the party, and the more likely it is that the virus will spread among everyone, the stronger the participation-based reason not to join. In defense of these degrees, I argue that they covary with the expression of certain attitudes.
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Pub Date : 2021-07-26DOI: 10.1017/S0953820819000566
G. Arrhenius, J. Mosquera
Abstract According to positive egalitarianism, not only do relations of inequality have negative value, as negative egalitarians claim, but relations of equality also have positive value. The egalitarian value of a population is a function of both pairwise relations of inequality (negative) and pairwise relations of equality (positive). Positive and negative egalitarianism diverge, especially in different-number cases. Hence, an investigation of positive egalitarianism might shed new light on the vexed topic of population ethics and our duties to future generations. We shall here, in light of some recent criticism, further develop the idea of giving positive value to equal relations.
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