Over the past decade, the High Court of Australia has made significant changes to the administrative law ground of unreasonableness, yet has given few indications of what values and functional considerations precipitated this shift. This is not unusual. The High Court has a reputation for preferring rules-based reasoning to values-based reasoning in administrative law (and beyond). But this does not mean that values and functional considerations are not important in shaping, and in explaining, the new legal unreasonableness test. This article analyses the changes that have occurred in unreasonableness – both in rhetoric and in application – and seeks to illuminate what this says about, and means for, Australian administrative law values. It explores the return, in the rhetoric of some judges, to relying on abuse of power as a justification and threshold for unreasonableness, and argues that other administrative law values better explain the new legal unreasonableness test.
{"title":"Legal Unreasonableness: In Need of a New Justification?","authors":"J. Boughey","doi":"10.53637/wopx7767","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/wopx7767","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decade, the High Court of Australia has made significant changes to the administrative law ground of unreasonableness, yet has given few indications of what values and functional considerations precipitated this shift. This is not unusual. The High Court has a reputation for preferring rules-based reasoning to values-based reasoning in administrative law (and beyond). But this does not mean that values and functional considerations are not important in shaping, and in explaining, the new legal unreasonableness test. This article analyses the changes that have occurred in unreasonableness – both in rhetoric and in application – and seeks to illuminate what this says about, and means for, Australian administrative law values. It explores the return, in the rhetoric of some judges, to relying on abuse of power as a justification and threshold for unreasonableness, and argues that other administrative law values better explain the new legal unreasonableness test.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42742591","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Charities are an essential part of Australian civil society and make fundamental contributions to social cohesion and well-being, as well as to the Australian economy. Public trust and confidence in the sector has, however, been damaged by high profile governance failures, despite the advent of a new national regime overseen by the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission. This article draws attention to gaps in the regulatory frameworks applicable to Australian charities in relation to misuse of charitable assets and makes reform suggestions. Strengthening the charities sector by deterring and sanctioning such misuse more effectively is important in order for the law to hold those who govern and control charities to account and to ensure that such power is not misused.
{"title":"Misuse of Power in the Australian Charities Sector","authors":"Rosemary Teele Langford, M. Webster","doi":"10.53637/oole6882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/oole6882","url":null,"abstract":"Charities are an essential part of Australian civil society and make fundamental contributions to social cohesion and well-being, as well as to the Australian economy. Public trust and confidence in the sector has, however, been damaged by high profile governance failures, despite the advent of a new national regime overseen by the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission. This article draws attention to gaps in the regulatory frameworks applicable to Australian charities in relation to misuse of charitable assets and makes reform suggestions. Strengthening the charities sector by deterring and sanctioning such misuse more effectively is important in order for the law to hold those who govern and control charities to account and to ensure that such power is not misused.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49429908","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Protect Prisoners’ Rights Author Andrew Dyer In recent cases in which prisoners have used Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution to challenge draconian legislation, the High Court of Australia (‘HCA’) has deployed formalistic reasoning when rejecting their claims. The latest such case was Minister for Home Affairs v Benbrika (‘Benbrika’), where a majority upheld the continuing detention order scheme created by Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), essentially on the basis that imprisonment is not necessarily punishment. Judges should never use such reasoning to avoid striking down laws that breach Chapter III. When they do so, they fail properly to hold power to account. However, the result in Benbrika seems largely justified. Judges are rightly cautious about using Chapter III to strike down punitive laws; and, as Edelman J showed, the Court in Benbrika could exercise restraint without resorting to formalistic evasion. His Honour correctly acknowledged that the HCA has only a limited ability to protect unpopular minorities.
{"title":"Minister for Home Affairs v Benbrika and the Capacity of Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution to Protect Prisoners' Rights","authors":"Andrew Dyer","doi":"10.53637/wwjh7374","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/wwjh7374","url":null,"abstract":"Protect Prisoners’ Rights Author Andrew Dyer In recent cases in which prisoners have used Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution to challenge draconian legislation, the High Court of Australia (‘HCA’) has deployed formalistic reasoning when rejecting their claims. The latest such case was Minister for Home Affairs v Benbrika (‘Benbrika’), where a majority upheld the continuing detention order scheme created by Division 105A of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), essentially on the basis that imprisonment is not necessarily punishment. Judges should never use such reasoning to avoid striking down laws that breach Chapter III. When they do so, they fail properly to hold power to account. However, the result in Benbrika seems largely justified. Judges are rightly cautious about using Chapter III to strike down punitive laws; and, as Edelman J showed, the Court in Benbrika could exercise restraint without resorting to formalistic evasion. His Honour correctly acknowledged that the HCA has only a limited ability to protect unpopular minorities.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44962033","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the interaction between the National Electricity Law and potential algorithmic collusion in the National Electricity Market (‘NEM’). Reviewing the current state of Australian competition law, this article concludes that the law does not prohibit algorithmic collusion in the NEM, even though such collusion has serious ramifications for Australian consumers. Despite recent hesitancy to addressing algorithmic collusion, this article argues we cannot afford to ‘wait and see’ and proposes nuanced solutions that appropriately address algorithmic collusion in the NEM. These solutions include a notification regime, a reduction in bidding transparency, and a novel definition to ‘concerted practice’ that would ensure competition law captures tacit and autonomous algorithmic collusion. More generally, the approach in this article highlights the need for market-specific analysis of algorithmic collusion, particularly as the competitive impact of using algorithmic technology depends on the circumstances in which the algorithm is deployed.
{"title":"Algorithmic Collusion and Australian Competition Law: Trouble Ahead for the National Electricity Market?","authors":"Jeremy D Chan","doi":"10.53637/stoa4193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/stoa4193","url":null,"abstract":"This article explores the interaction between the National Electricity Law and potential algorithmic collusion in the National Electricity Market (‘NEM’). Reviewing the current state of Australian competition law, this article concludes that the law does not prohibit algorithmic collusion in the NEM, even though such collusion has serious ramifications for Australian consumers. Despite recent hesitancy to addressing algorithmic collusion, this article argues we cannot afford to ‘wait and see’ and proposes nuanced solutions that appropriately address algorithmic collusion in the NEM. These solutions include a notification regime, a reduction in bidding transparency, and a novel definition to ‘concerted practice’ that would ensure competition law captures tacit and autonomous algorithmic collusion. More generally, the approach in this article highlights the need for market-specific analysis of algorithmic collusion, particularly as the competitive impact of using algorithmic technology depends on the circumstances in which the algorithm is deployed.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42635568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recent crises affecting Australia, including the Black Summer bushfires and Coronavirus pandemic, have devastated social morale and crippled our economy. Countless lives and properties have been damaged or lost. These conditions have inflated demand for basic consumer goods and services, such as hygiene products, staple foods, and utility services. Sadly, some sellers have exploited public desperation, with widespread reports of price gouging. This notorious practice involves pricing high-demand essentials at levels significantly higher than what is commonly considered acceptable, reasonable or fair. This article critically analyses moral and economic arguments surrounding statutory controls before proposing a model law regulating price gouging during times of crisis. It argues that such a law is both essential and easily adaptable to Australia’s consumer law framework. The model law provides a basis for the federal government to consider desperately required change to ensure consumers do not suffer during current crises or those to come.
{"title":"Perilous Fires, Pandemics and Price Gouging: The Need to Protect Consumers from Unfair Pricing Practices during Times of Crisis","authors":"M. Giancaspro","doi":"10.53637/dkyf4495","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/dkyf4495","url":null,"abstract":"Recent crises affecting Australia, including the Black Summer bushfires and Coronavirus pandemic, have devastated social morale and crippled our economy. Countless lives and properties have been damaged or lost. These conditions have inflated demand for basic consumer goods and services, such as hygiene products, staple foods, and utility services. Sadly, some sellers have exploited public desperation, with widespread reports of price gouging. This notorious practice involves pricing high-demand essentials at levels significantly higher than what is commonly considered acceptable, reasonable or fair. This article critically analyses moral and economic arguments surrounding statutory controls before proposing a model law regulating price gouging during times of crisis. It argues that such a law is both essential and easily adaptable to Australia’s consumer law framework. The model law provides a basis for the federal government to consider desperately required change to ensure consumers do not suffer during current crises or those to come.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45971937","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (‘CISG’) is an international sales law treaty concluded in 1980 and drafted with traditional (physical) goods trade in mind. While a significant body of scholarship has addressed its capacity to govern electronic software transactions, only limited commentary has explored the CISG’s digital application beyond software per se. ‘To Boldly Go, Part I’, this article’s counterpart, developed a specific legal framework for assessing the CISG’s capacity to regulate international trade in non-software data. This article now applies that framework, confirming the CISG is capable of governing non-software data trade, and uses that framework to resolve the currently unsettled question of whether cryptocurrency trade falls within the CISG’s scope. Since non-software data trade is becoming increasingly economically important, this article’s conclusions stand to benefit data traders as well as the practitioners advising them.
{"title":"To Boldly Go, Part II: Data as the CISG’s Next (but Probably Not Final) Frontier","authors":"B. Hayward","doi":"10.53637/ntic9846","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/ntic9846","url":null,"abstract":"The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (‘CISG’) is an international sales law treaty concluded in 1980 and drafted with traditional (physical) goods trade in mind. While a significant body of scholarship has addressed its capacity to govern electronic software transactions, only limited commentary has explored the CISG’s digital application beyond software per se. ‘To Boldly Go, Part I’, this article’s counterpart, developed a specific legal framework for assessing the CISG’s capacity to regulate international trade in non-software data. This article now applies that framework, confirming the CISG is capable of governing non-software data trade, and uses that framework to resolve the currently unsettled question of whether cryptocurrency trade falls within the CISG’s scope. Since non-software data trade is becoming increasingly economically important, this article’s conclusions stand to benefit data traders as well as the practitioners advising them.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43100976","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Complex laws regulate the development and management of Queensland community titles schemes. Different legislative regimes co-exist, including the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (‘BCCM Act’) and its predecessor, the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld) (‘BUGT Act’). This article considers by-laws under the BUGT Act regulating short-term holiday letting post the decisions in Fairway Island GTP v Redman [2019] QMC 13 and Redman v The Proprietors – Fairway Island GTP 107328 [2020] QDC 68. It compares the BCCM Act and BUGT Act requirements and argues that similarities in by-law making powers under the two may appear to blur the divisions between them. However, the positions under each Act are in stark contrast, rendering the cases distinguishable for BCCM Act schemes, a desirable outcome. The article also explores arguments in favour of self-regulation, and the governmental response in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia.
复杂的法律规范了昆士兰社区产权计划的制定和管理。不同的立法制度共存，包括《1997年法人团体和社区管理法》（“BCCM法”）及其前身《1980年建筑单位和集团产权法》（《BUGT法》）。本文考虑了《BUGT法案》下监管短期度假出租的章程，包括Fairway Island GTP v Redman【2019】QMC 13和Redman v the Owners–Fairway IslandGTP 107328【2020】QDC 68中的决定。它比较了《BCCM法案》和《BUGT法案》的要求，并认为两者在章程制定权方面的相似之处可能会模糊它们之间的分歧。然而，每一项法案下的立场都形成了鲜明的对比，这使得BCCM法案计划的案例可以区分，这是一个理想的结果。文章还探讨了支持自我监管的论点，以及新南威尔士州、维多利亚州和西澳大利亚州政府的回应。
{"title":"Blurred Lines or Stark Contrasts: Are By-laws to Restrict Short-Term Holiday Letting Permissible in Queensland Community Titles Schemes?","authors":"Melissa Pocock","doi":"10.53637/fuex9448","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/fuex9448","url":null,"abstract":"Complex laws regulate the development and management of Queensland community titles schemes. Different legislative regimes co-exist, including the Body Corporate and Community Management Act 1997 (Qld) (‘BCCM Act’) and its predecessor, the Building Units and Group Titles Act 1980 (Qld) (‘BUGT Act’). This article considers by-laws under the BUGT Act regulating short-term holiday letting post the decisions in Fairway Island GTP v Redman [2019] QMC 13 and Redman v The Proprietors – Fairway Island GTP 107328 [2020] QDC 68. It compares the BCCM Act and BUGT Act requirements and argues that similarities in by-law making powers under the two may appear to blur the divisions between them. However, the positions under each Act are in stark contrast, rendering the cases distinguishable for BCCM Act schemes, a desirable outcome. The article also explores arguments in favour of self-regulation, and the governmental response in New South Wales, Victoria and Western Australia.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43723575","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
International civil aviation is today a mature global industry, without which the modern world is unimaginable. That modern world increasingly recognises, in view of advancing medical science, that the dualist distinction between body and mind is artificial. Yet recent judicial interpretation of the term ‘bodily injury’ in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (‘Montreal’) of 1999 has revalidated this distinction by denying compensation for psychiatric injury in the field of international civil aviation. This article challenges that interpretation by explaining the physical nature of psychiatric injury with reference to medical literature and neuroimaging technologies. It argues that the ordinary meaning of ‘bodily injury’ across Montreal’s authentic texts encompasses psychiatric injury, supporting this construction by examining both Montreal’s travaux préparatoires and its parties’ municipal jurisprudence. After briefly addressing policy concerns, it concludes that national courts may permit recovery for pure psychiatric injury under Montreal.
{"title":"Still Lagging Behind: Diagnosing Judicial Approaches to ‘Bodily Injury’ Claims for Psychiatric Injury under the Montreal Convention of 1999","authors":"John-Patrick Asimakis","doi":"10.53637/idln9124","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/idln9124","url":null,"abstract":"International civil aviation is today a mature global industry, without which the modern world is unimaginable. That modern world increasingly recognises, in view of advancing medical science, that the dualist distinction between body and mind is artificial. Yet recent judicial interpretation of the term ‘bodily injury’ in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (‘Montreal’) of 1999 has revalidated this distinction by denying compensation for psychiatric injury in the field of international civil aviation. This article challenges that interpretation by explaining the physical nature of psychiatric injury with reference to medical literature and neuroimaging technologies. It argues that the ordinary meaning of ‘bodily injury’ across Montreal’s authentic texts encompasses psychiatric injury, supporting this construction by examining both Montreal’s travaux préparatoires and its parties’ municipal jurisprudence. After briefly addressing policy concerns, it concludes that national courts may permit recovery for pure psychiatric injury under Montreal.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41757664","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article considers how native title is a legal manifestation of settler colonialism that operates as a displaced mediator. Using native title cases from Australia and elsewhere, this article argues that native title displaces Indigenous laws, customs, and practices in constructing native title holders as ‘traditional’ to mediate their integration into the so-called ‘modern’ nation. Legal processes construct native title and then retroactively posit that these legal constructions pre-exist the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty. This provides legal support for the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples who assert native title claims become subjects who aver and reproduce the myth that the Crown acquired sovereignty over them. Native title displaces more unsettling, decolonising practices but produces the appearance of justice through the production of existential and material benefits for its subjects. Northern Territory v Griffiths (2019) 364 ALR 208 (‘Timber Creek’) demonstrates this.
{"title":"Native Title as Displaced Mediator","authors":"Stephenie Young","doi":"10.53637/wphs1787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/wphs1787","url":null,"abstract":"This article considers how native title is a legal manifestation of settler colonialism that operates as a displaced mediator. Using native title cases from Australia and elsewhere, this article argues that native title displaces Indigenous laws, customs, and practices in constructing native title holders as ‘traditional’ to mediate their integration into the so-called ‘modern’ nation. Legal processes construct native title and then retroactively posit that these legal constructions pre-exist the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty. This provides legal support for the Crown’s acquisition of sovereignty and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples who assert native title claims become subjects who aver and reproduce the myth that the Crown acquired sovereignty over them. Native title displaces more unsettling, decolonising practices but produces the appearance of justice through the production of existential and material benefits for its subjects. Northern Territory v Griffiths (2019) 364 ALR 208 (‘Timber Creek’) demonstrates this.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70624060","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Digital contact tracing apps, such as the COVIDSafe App in Australia, have been rapidly implemented by many governments as a public policy solution to increase the efficiency of health screening testing during the COVID-19 viral pandemic. This article analyses how the COVIDSafe App’s unresolved efficacy and equity issues and the cybersecurity and privacy externalities it imposes onto Australians have prevented the App from making a significant positive contribution towards reducing the impact of the pandemic in Australia. It attributes some of the failure of Bluetooth-based digital contract tracing apps to their mis-characterisation as a Lessigean ‘code as law’ policy response, arguing instead that such apps are more complex and fragile cyber-physical systems requiring more analysis prior to implementation.
{"title":"The Efficacy, Equity and Externalities of Australia’s COVIDSafe App as a Policy Intervention during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Was It Sunscreen or Tanning Lotion?","authors":"J. Selby","doi":"10.53637/jbeo1430","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/jbeo1430","url":null,"abstract":"Digital contact tracing apps, such as the COVIDSafe App in Australia, have been rapidly implemented by many governments as a public policy solution to increase the efficiency of health screening testing during the COVID-19 viral pandemic. This article analyses how the COVIDSafe App’s unresolved efficacy and equity issues and the cybersecurity and privacy externalities it imposes onto Australians have prevented the App from making a significant positive contribution towards reducing the impact of the pandemic in Australia. It attributes some of the failure of Bluetooth-based digital contract tracing apps to their mis-characterisation as a Lessigean ‘code as law’ policy response, arguing instead that such apps are more complex and fragile cyber-physical systems requiring more analysis prior to implementation.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47995967","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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