B. White, Eliana Close, L. Willmott, Katrine Del Villar, J. Downie, J. Kevin Cameron, Jayne Hewitt, R. Meehan, Laura Ley Greaves
Eligibility criteria determine a crucial question for all voluntary assisted dying frameworks: who can access assistance to die? This article undertakes a critical and comparative analysis of these criteria across five legal frameworks: existing laws in Victoria, Western Australia, Oregon and Canada, along with a model Bill for reform. Key aspects of these criteria analysed are capacity requirements; the nature of the medical condition that will qualify; and any required suffering. There are many similarities between the five models but there are also important differences which can have a significant impact on who can access voluntary assisted dying and when. Further, seemingly straightforward criteria can become complex in practice. The article concludes with the implications of this analysis for designing voluntary assisted dying regulation. Those implications include challenges of designing certain yet fair legislation and the need to evaluate voluntary assisted dying frameworks holistically to properly understand their operation.
{"title":"Comparative and Critical Analysis of Key Eligibility Criteria for Voluntary Assisted Dying under Five Legal Frameworks","authors":"B. White, Eliana Close, L. Willmott, Katrine Del Villar, J. Downie, J. Kevin Cameron, Jayne Hewitt, R. Meehan, Laura Ley Greaves","doi":"10.53637/juwl9208","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/juwl9208","url":null,"abstract":"Eligibility criteria determine a crucial question for all voluntary assisted dying frameworks: who can access assistance to die? This article undertakes a critical and comparative analysis of these criteria across five legal frameworks: existing laws in Victoria, Western Australia, Oregon and Canada, along with a model Bill for reform. Key aspects of these criteria analysed are capacity requirements; the nature of the medical condition that will qualify; and any required suffering. There are many similarities between the five models but there are also important differences which can have a significant impact on who can access voluntary assisted dying and when. Further, seemingly straightforward criteria can become complex in practice. The article concludes with the implications of this analysis for designing voluntary assisted dying regulation. Those implications include challenges of designing certain yet fair legislation and the need to evaluate voluntary assisted dying frameworks holistically to properly understand their operation.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46572078","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Recently, the concept of entrepreneurship has attracted increased attention in the Australian case law on employment status. Some judges have adopted an ‘entrepreneurship approach’ in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, while others have rejected this approach. Although the concept of entrepreneurship has appeared increasingly frequently in the cases, it remains an under-theorised concept. This article critically evaluates the concept from a normative worker-protective perspective. It assesses the entrepreneurship approach by reference to theories of power and vulnerability in the employment relationship, and critically examines cases from the United States of America (‘US’) that illustrate the nature and practical operation of the entrepreneurship approach. The article argues that an entrepreneurship approach that operates in a manner similar to the ‘ABC’ test in the US warrants consideration by those seeking to revitalise the tests for employment status in Australia.
{"title":"The ‘Entrepreneurship Approach’ to Determining Employment Status: A Normative and Practical Critique","authors":"Pauline Bomball","doi":"10.53637/oglb7881","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/oglb7881","url":null,"abstract":"Recently, the concept of entrepreneurship has attracted increased attention in the Australian case law on employment status. Some judges have adopted an ‘entrepreneurship approach’ in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor, while others have rejected this approach. Although the concept of entrepreneurship has appeared increasingly frequently in the cases, it remains an under-theorised concept. This article critically evaluates the concept from a normative worker-protective perspective. It assesses the entrepreneurship approach by reference to theories of power and vulnerability in the employment relationship, and critically examines cases from the United States of America (‘US’) that illustrate the nature and practical operation of the entrepreneurship approach. The article argues that an entrepreneurship approach that operates in a manner similar to the ‘ABC’ test in the US warrants consideration by those seeking to revitalise the tests for employment status in Australia.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45847140","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Whistleblowing and a free press are vital to facilitating public accountability for powerful institutions and thereby improving integrity across the public and private sectors. But when is a whistleblower permitted to disclose information to the media? Once a whistleblower speaks to a journalist, what protections and assurances will they be entitled to? This article addresses these questions by examining existing protections for private and public sector whistleblowers and, relatedly, journalists’ confidential sources under federal law. In this way, it explores the intersection between whistleblowing and press freedom and reveals gaps and weaknesses in existing legal frameworks.
{"title":"In the Public Interest: Protections and Risks in Whistleblowing to the Media","authors":"Rebecca Ananian-Welsh, Rosemary Cronin, P. Greste","doi":"10.53637/wmzr2175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/wmzr2175","url":null,"abstract":"Whistleblowing and a free press are vital to facilitating public accountability for powerful institutions and thereby improving integrity across the public and private sectors. But when is a whistleblower permitted to disclose information to the media? Once a whistleblower speaks to a journalist, what protections and assurances will they be entitled to? This article addresses these questions by examining existing protections for private and public sector whistleblowers and, relatedly, journalists’ confidential sources under federal law. In this way, it explores the intersection between whistleblowing and press freedom and reveals gaps and weaknesses in existing legal frameworks.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42331397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Climate change is now widely recognised as a source of financial risk for institutional investors like superannuation funds, which may manifest as reduced asset values and investment returns. Investors are also facing increasing pressure to play a constructive role in society’s response to climate change by aligning portfolios to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. This article presents an empirical study of current and emerging climate-related investment practices in Australia, underpinned by an analysis of the legal, regulatory and theoretical frameworks in which investment decision-making takes place. While the study confirms that approaches to climate risk assessment and management are rapidly evolving, it also suggests that integrating climate considerations into investment decision-making and adopting responsible investment practices to manage climate-related risks is not encouraged by existing legal frameworks and dominant, mainstream approaches to investment. There remain considerable legal and practical barriers to aligning investment decision-making with the Paris Agreement.
气候变化现在被广泛认为是养老基金等机构投资者的一个金融风险来源，这可能表现为资产价值和投资回报的降低。投资者还面临越来越大的压力，要求他们在社会应对气候变化方面发挥建设性作用，使投资组合符合2015年《巴黎气候变化协定》(Paris Agreement on climate change)。本文通过分析投资决策发生的法律、监管和理论框架，对澳大利亚当前和新兴的气候相关投资实践进行了实证研究。虽然该研究证实，气候风险评估和管理的方法正在迅速发展，但它也表明，现有的法律框架和占主导地位的主流投资方法并不鼓励将气候因素纳入投资决策并采取负责任的投资实践来管理气候相关风险。在使投资决策与《巴黎协定》保持一致方面，仍存在相当大的法律和实际障碍。
{"title":"Investing for a Safe Climate?","authors":"A. Foerster, K. Sheehan, Daniel Parris","doi":"10.53637/rqqr9950","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/rqqr9950","url":null,"abstract":"Climate change is now widely recognised as a source of financial risk for institutional investors like superannuation funds, which may manifest as reduced asset values and investment returns. Investors are also facing increasing pressure to play a constructive role in society’s response to climate change by aligning portfolios to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. This article presents an empirical study of current and emerging climate-related investment practices in Australia, underpinned by an analysis of the legal, regulatory and theoretical frameworks in which investment decision-making takes place. While the study confirms that approaches to climate risk assessment and management are rapidly evolving, it also suggests that integrating climate considerations into investment decision-making and adopting responsible investment practices to manage climate-related risks is not encouraged by existing legal frameworks and dominant, mainstream approaches to investment. There remain considerable legal and practical barriers to aligning investment decision-making with the Paris Agreement.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45434599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article critiques Luke Beck’s ‘safeguard against religious intolerance’ theory of section 116 of the Constitution. We argue that a plausible theory of section 116 must be able to account for the fact that, at Federation, Australia was an overwhelmingly Christian nation, which was opposed to the establishment of any religion but was not ‘secular’, and also for the fact that Australian society has become less religious but with many surviving remnants of the enmeshing of religion and the government. We argue that, consistent with the traditional understanding, section 116 has a federal purpose, being designed to distribute power to legislate in relation to religion throughout the Australian federation. Section 116 can also be seen as promoting religious pluralism, enabling interactions between religion and government. Beck’s theory, and its separationist implications, fails to adequately take these factors into account.
{"title":"Religion and the Constitution: A Response to Luke Beck’s Safeguard against Religious Intolerance Theory of Section 116","authors":"Benjamin B. Saunders, Alex Deagon","doi":"10.53637/qduv1286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/qduv1286","url":null,"abstract":"This article critiques Luke Beck’s ‘safeguard against religious intolerance’ theory of section 116 of the Constitution. We argue that a plausible theory of section 116 must be able to account for the fact that, at Federation, Australia was an overwhelmingly Christian nation, which was opposed to the establishment of any religion but was not ‘secular’, and also for the fact that Australian society has become less religious but with many surviving remnants of the enmeshing of religion and the government. We argue that, consistent with the traditional understanding, section 116 has a federal purpose, being designed to distribute power to legislate in relation to religion throughout the Australian federation. Section 116 can also be seen as promoting religious pluralism, enabling interactions between religion and government. Beck’s theory, and its separationist implications, fails to adequately take these factors into account.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41262155","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since the criminalisation of forced marriage in Australia in 2013, the number of cases reported to Australian authorities has risen sharply. This article draws on a qualitative study with eight survivors of forced marriage in Australia to explore survivors understanding of the legal concepts of forced marriage and family violence; experiences of coercion and control in the lead up to, and within, a forced marriage; the obstacles survivors encountered when they sought help; their reflections on justice and the limitations of legal responses to forced marriage; and how survivors can shape law and policy reform. The findings of this study underline the need to reframe Australia’s response to forced marriage to address the complex processes of coercion and control which lead to forced marriage and to create meaningful opportunities for survivors to shape the design, implementation and evaluation of legal and policy responses to forced marriage.
{"title":"Learning from Lived Experience: Australia’s Legal Response to Forced Marriage","authors":"Frances Simmons, Grace Wong","doi":"10.53637/yjys9724","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/yjys9724","url":null,"abstract":"Since the criminalisation of forced marriage in Australia in 2013, the number of cases reported to Australian authorities has risen sharply. This article draws on a qualitative study with eight survivors of forced marriage in Australia to explore survivors understanding of the legal concepts of forced marriage and family violence; experiences of coercion and control in the lead up to, and within, a forced marriage; the obstacles survivors encountered when they sought help; their reflections on justice and the limitations of legal responses to forced marriage; and how survivors can shape law and policy reform. The findings of this study underline the need to reframe Australia’s response to forced marriage to address the complex processes of coercion and control which lead to forced marriage and to create meaningful opportunities for survivors to shape the design, implementation and evaluation of legal and policy responses to forced marriage.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48514682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The number of defendants raising an Autism Spectrum Disorder (‘ASD’) diagnosis in criminal proceedings is increasing. Australian courts treat this neurodevelopmental disorder as a mental impairment that they may take into account in sentencing. A few studies nonetheless exposed deficiencies in judicial officers’ understanding of ASD symptoms and their potential forensic relevance. Courts’ willingness to rely on expert evidence did not always lead to them sentencing offenders with ASD in a consistent or enlightened manner. Building on those investigations and drawing on research into ASD, this article examines sentencing decisions involving eight offenders with ASD in various Australian jurisdictions between 2014 and 2020. This analysis demonstrates that judicial officers’ knowledge about ASD and appreciation of its possible relevance to sentencing considerations are growing, but there remain gaps in both respects. The article speculates on possible reasons for this and proposes reforms to improve courts’ approaches to sentencing offenders with ASD.
{"title":"Growing Enlightenment: Sentencing Offenders with Autism Spectrum Disorder in Australia","authors":"Gabrielle C. Wolf","doi":"10.53637/rwwg5986","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/rwwg5986","url":null,"abstract":"The number of defendants raising an Autism Spectrum Disorder (‘ASD’) diagnosis in criminal proceedings is increasing. Australian courts treat this neurodevelopmental disorder as a mental impairment that they may take into account in sentencing. A few studies nonetheless exposed deficiencies in judicial officers’ understanding of ASD symptoms and their potential forensic relevance. Courts’ willingness to rely on expert evidence did not always lead to them sentencing offenders with ASD in a consistent or enlightened manner. Building on those investigations and drawing on research into ASD, this article examines sentencing decisions involving eight offenders with ASD in various Australian jurisdictions between 2014 and 2020. This analysis demonstrates that judicial officers’ knowledge about ASD and appreciation of its possible relevance to sentencing considerations are growing, but there remain gaps in both respects. The article speculates on possible reasons for this and proposes reforms to improve courts’ approaches to sentencing offenders with ASD.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44643855","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The legal regulation of politics has, at its core, the aim of preserving three fundamental democratic values: liberty, equality and deliberative political participation. Yet, the reference point for examining these values is rooted in 19th and 20th century practices: where political campaigning and mobilisation follow terrestrial principles of organisation and regulation is undertaken by the state. Using the most recent empirical evidence drawn from political science on the changing nature of political participation and organisation, this article analyses the challenges of regulating digital politics. It argues that while the major focus of current interventions centres on political disinformation, this obscures more fundamental regulatory concerns such as capturing the diversity of new modes of participation and reconceptualising equality. While a model of co-regulation holds promise by institutionalising communities and individuals within technology companies’ policy decision-making processes, firms’ ultimate authority to define and control their user base presents challenges for effective participation.
{"title":"Digital Democracy: Big Technology and the Regulation of Politics","authors":"Anika Gauja","doi":"10.53637/ouzz2397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/ouzz2397","url":null,"abstract":"The legal regulation of politics has, at its core, the aim of preserving three fundamental democratic values: liberty, equality and deliberative political participation. Yet, the reference point for examining these values is rooted in 19th and 20th century practices: where political campaigning and mobilisation follow terrestrial principles of organisation and regulation is undertaken by the state. Using the most recent empirical evidence drawn from political science on the changing nature of political participation and organisation, this article analyses the challenges of regulating digital politics. It argues that while the major focus of current interventions centres on political disinformation, this obscures more fundamental regulatory concerns such as capturing the diversity of new modes of participation and reconceptualising equality. While a model of co-regulation holds promise by institutionalising communities and individuals within technology companies’ policy decision-making processes, firms’ ultimate authority to define and control their user base presents challenges for effective participation.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49163890","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Automation is transforming how government agencies make decisions. This article analyses three distinctive features of automated decision-making that are difficult to reconcile with key doctrines of administrative law developed for a human-centric decision-making context. First, the complex, multi-faceted decision-making requirements arising from statutory interpretation and administrative law principles raise questions about the feasibility of designing automated systems to cohere with these expectations. Secondly, whilst the courts have emphasised a human mental process as a criterion of a valid decision, many automated decisions are made with limited or no human input. Thirdly, the new types of bias associated with opaque automated decision-making are not easily accommodated by the bias rule, or other relevant grounds of judicial review. This article, therefore, argues that doctrinal and regulatory evolution are both needed to address these disconnections and maintain the accountability and contestability of administrative decisions in the digital age.
{"title":"Addressing Disconnection: Automated Decision-Making, Administrative Law and Regulatory Reform","authors":"Anna Huggins","doi":"10.53637/wcgg2401","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/wcgg2401","url":null,"abstract":"Automation is transforming how government agencies make decisions. This article analyses three distinctive features of automated decision-making that are difficult to reconcile with key doctrines of administrative law developed for a human-centric decision-making context. First, the complex, multi-faceted decision-making requirements arising from statutory interpretation and administrative law principles raise questions about the feasibility of designing automated systems to cohere with these expectations. Secondly, whilst the courts have emphasised a human mental process as a criterion of a valid decision, many automated decisions are made with limited or no human input. Thirdly, the new types of bias associated with opaque automated decision-making are not easily accommodated by the bias rule, or other relevant grounds of judicial review. This article, therefore, argues that doctrinal and regulatory evolution are both needed to address these disconnections and maintain the accountability and contestability of administrative decisions in the digital age.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42712826","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
For over a year, the then Minister for Immigration successfully avoided granting permanent protection to refugees who came by boat. His newly elected government had promised to re-introduce a temporary protection regime, but came to power without the numbers to pass necessary legislation. In order to achieve his policy objective, the Minister chose to engage in a variety of legally dubious tactics to forestall and delay granting permanent protection, as required by the law. In doing so, the Minister navigated skilfully through the holes in Australia’s institutional frameworks designed to protect the rule of law and Australia’s constitutional arrangements. The saga of Scott Morrison and temporary protection visas is therefore a telling story about the fragility of the rule of law in Australia and demonstrates how a determined executive can upend the constitutional order.
{"title":"A Masterclass in Evading the Rule of Law: The Saga of Scott Morrison and Temporary Protection Visas","authors":"J. Chia, Savitri Taylor","doi":"10.53637/odrx7356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.53637/odrx7356","url":null,"abstract":"For over a year, the then Minister for Immigration successfully avoided granting permanent protection to refugees who came by boat. His newly elected government had promised to re-introduce a temporary protection regime, but came to power without the numbers to pass necessary legislation. In order to achieve his policy objective, the Minister chose to engage in a variety of legally dubious tactics to forestall and delay granting permanent protection, as required by the law. In doing so, the Minister navigated skilfully through the holes in Australia’s institutional frameworks designed to protect the rule of law and Australia’s constitutional arrangements. The saga of Scott Morrison and temporary protection visas is therefore a telling story about the fragility of the rule of law in Australia and demonstrates how a determined executive can upend the constitutional order.","PeriodicalId":45951,"journal":{"name":"UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES LAW JOURNAL","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2021-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48488372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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