Comparative Economic Studies最新文献

This paper studies the relationship between microfinance, education and poverty at the macrolevel using a cross-country panel dataset of 116 countries over the period of 1999–2018. Disaggregating the effects by income levels and taking account of the potential problem of endogeneity related to microfinance institutions’ loans, this analysis reveals that any increase in the size of the gross loan portfolio of MFIs leads to a reduction in poverty in high- and middle-income economies. Moreover, I show that there is no significant relationship between microfinance and poverty in countries with lower levels of income. I also examine the channels through which microfinance affects poverty and find that any increase in the size of the microfinance sector fosters education which, in turn, reduces poverty.

The huge fiscal expansions triggered by the corona crisis raised debt/GDP ratios to very high levels. This led some economists to reconsider the taboo on seignorage. Following a brief documentation of the crisis impact and aggregate demand policies responses the paper discusses views of academics and policymakers on seignorage. Optimal taxation considerations imply that the decision on allocating deficit financing between debt and seignorage falls within the realm of fiscal authorities-a fact that infringes on central bank (CB) autonomy. The paper explores ideas aimed at improving the tradeoff between those two principles. Implication of cross-country variations in the need to use seignorage is discussed. Comparison of the indirect contribution of quantitative easing (QE) to deficit financing with the direct contribution of seignorage implies that QE is a substitute to seignorage that preserves central bank dominance without much change in existing monetary institutions. Comparison of empirical evidence from the USA during the global financial crisis with the post-WWI German inflation supports the view that for countries experiencing deflationary pressure seignorage is more potent in moving inflation toward its target than QE. Given the current outlook temporary use of seignorage does not appear to involve a substantial risk of inflation.

The expenditure benchmark is an indicator for the evolution of public expenditure introduced in 2011 in the already complex European fiscal rules framework, being a very specific application of an expenditure rule. However, it is a quite complex indicator and not suitable for the use at national level by the Independent Fiscal Institutions-that monitor compliance with national fiscal rules-as it relies on the European Commission's data inputs and judgement not available in real time. This paper argues for more transparency and for a simplification of this indicator to reduce the reliance on non-observable variables. Such improvements are essential as most existing proposals to reform the European Union's fiscal rules aim to use an expenditure rule as the operational fiscal rule, a role the expenditure benchmark as is cannot fulfil.

This paper analyzes the political economy causes of fiscal promise gaps, defined as the distance between planned fiscal objectives and actual realizations during planned fiscal expansions periods. Using a sample of 27 European Union countries between 1992 and 2015, we identify, by means of an "hybrid" narrative approach, 68 episodes of promised fiscal expansions. We show that expansionary promise gaps were sizeable (about 1.5-2.5% of GDP during an average fiscal expansion episode) and that initial and economic conditions matter in explaining their size. We also find that the more leftist a government is, the larger the expansionary promise gap. Governments facing weak opposition in the parliament and those more effective are characterized by smaller expansionary promise gaps. Regarding the importance of decentralization and the role played by subnational governments, the larger their capacity to influence national legislation and policy, the larger the promise gaps.

Using firm-level data from the Refinitiv Datastream Worldscope database for more than 17,253 non-financial firms in 45 advanced and emerging economies, this paper examines how fiscal stimulus interacted with sectoral business cycle sensitivity has affected firms' sales and capital expenditures during the global financial crisis. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that reductions in structural fiscal balances are associated with higher firms' sales and capital expenditures (as percentage of their total assets) in 2009. This result is obtained notably for the manufacturing and construction industries and for different regions depending on the firm performance variable. Our findings have key implications for the design of fiscal response to shocks at industry and firm levels, including during the current COVID-19 pandemic.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41294-021-00160-5.

In 2021, it is thirty years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This paper examines the evolution of Central Asia's five national economies since 1991 and their economic prospects. The 1990s were dominated by nation-building and the transition from central planning. By 2000, the transition from central planning was essentially complete and the varieties of market-based economies have changed little in the 21st century. Political systems, established in the 1990s around a general pattern of strong presidencies, also changed little, apart from in Kyrgyzstan. Between 1999 and 2014, national economic fortunes were largely shaped by the resource boom. Since the end of the boom, to re-orient Central Asia from dependence on primary product exports and remittances to more diversified outward-oriented economies, domestic change will be necessary. This paper assesses the pressures for economic reform and the forces resistant to change. The economic context includes an improved infrastructure for overland trade across Eurasia as well as an uncertain global trading system and the consequences of the COVID-19 epidemic. The political context includes autocratic non-democracies with an elite that may be content with the unreformed economy, and generational change in leadership. Whereas the initial presidents had spent their entire lives in the planned economy, the current presidents have spent most of their adult lives in market-based economies, mirroring similar changes in the wider population, and may be less resistant to market-based reform and integration into the global economy.

Adult mortality increased enormously in Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union when the Soviet system collapsed 30 years ago. What has happened to mortality in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union? What explains the wide swings of mortality over time? This paper documents changes in mortality in Russia since 1989, and reviews the research in the economics and public health literature on the causes of the changes. The focus is on the post-2000 period, and the possible role played in recent declining mortality rates by Russia's alcohol and tobacco control policies. The two themes that emerge are (1) that government policies are critical for understanding both rising and falling male mortality over this period, and (2) that the underlying causes of the mortality crisis and its reversal are difficult to clearly identify empirically and remain, at best, partially understood, leaving much scope for future research on this issue.

Supplementary information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1057/s41294-021-00169-w.

In this contribution, I use the fiscal theory of the price level as a backdrop for a discussion on the risks that expansionary fiscal policies may pose on debt sustainability. I recall that a regime of fiscal dominance does not lead to macroeconomic instability. I also review a few empirical papers on fiscal sustainability and I conclude, also based upon own estimates, that it is not a major concern, at least in the short to mid-run. Finally, I argue that Europeans should continue on the fiscal impetus they contributed to in 2020 by fostering coordination and transparency on EU fiscal policies. To achieve this objective, I revisit the idea of an enhanced dialogue on fiscal matters at the European Parliament and propose to establish a Fiscal Dialogue with the EU Member States.