The proposal for a European Health Data Space aims at creating a common space where individuals may control their health data in a trusted and secure way. The objective is not only improving healthcare delivery, but also enhancing the opportunities to use health data for research and innovation. To achieve these results, the proposal implements a mandatory self-certification scheme for European health records systems as well as for wellness devices and applications, setting up essential requirements related to interoperability and security. Although this is the first intervention that sets a horizontal framework that is mandatory for all Member States, the security requirements that are included in the legislative proposal are not sufficiently detailed and comprehensive. Given that cyberthreats are increasing and security incidents affecting health data may potentially have an impact on the lives of patients, it is important that cybersecurity measures are adopted and implemented in the most effective way. The paper will analyse the European Health Data Space proposal pointing to the open issues and doubts that may be emerging and it will compare them with the proposed Cyber Resilience Act, identifying the issues that may be solved thanks to this horizontal regulation and the ones that instead remain open.
{"title":"European Health Data Space – Is the Proposed Certification System Effective against Cyber Threats?","authors":"Federica Casarosa","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.25","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.25","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The proposal for a European Health Data Space aims at creating a common space where individuals may control their health data in a trusted and secure way. The objective is not only improving healthcare delivery, but also enhancing the opportunities to use health data for research and innovation. To achieve these results, the proposal implements a mandatory self-certification scheme for European health records systems as well as for wellness devices and applications, setting up essential requirements related to interoperability and security. Although this is the first intervention that sets a horizontal framework that is mandatory for all Member States, the security requirements that are included in the legislative proposal are not sufficiently detailed and comprehensive. Given that cyberthreats are increasing and security incidents affecting health data may potentially have an impact on the lives of patients, it is important that cybersecurity measures are adopted and implemented in the most effective way. The paper will analyse the European Health Data Space proposal pointing to the open issues and doubts that may be emerging and it will compare them with the proposed Cyber Resilience Act, identifying the issues that may be solved thanks to this horizontal regulation and the ones that instead remain open.</p>","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"127 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140613297","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The development of the precautionary principle by the EU Courts has often been interpreted by scholars as inconsistent with another trend in EU risk regulation: one that is evidence-based and relies on impact assessment. This article argues that the two trends – precaution and regulatory impact assessment – are not mutually exclusive. Together they may, in fact, act as a procedural safeguard against discretionary decisions that have an impact on fundamental rights, especially under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. The article illustrates this claim by looking at the decisions to close schools in Ireland during the pandemic.
{"title":"Precautionary Principle and Impact Assessment: The Case of School Closures during the Pandemic in Ireland","authors":"Sarah Arduin","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.26","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.26","url":null,"abstract":"<p>The development of the precautionary principle by the EU Courts has often been interpreted by scholars as inconsistent with another trend in EU risk regulation: one that is evidence-based and relies on impact assessment. This article argues that the two trends – precaution and regulatory impact assessment – are not mutually exclusive. Together they may, in fact, act as a procedural safeguard against discretionary decisions that have an impact on fundamental rights, especially under conditions of epistemic uncertainty. The article illustrates this claim by looking at the decisions to close schools in Ireland during the pandemic.</p>","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"96 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140613148","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Cybersecurity of medical devices has become a concrete concern for regulators and policymakers in the European Union and United States. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an increase in cyber-attacks on critical healthcare infrastructures and their IT systems, which have suffered service disruptions and put patients’ health and safety at risk. The increase in cyberattacks on healthcare infrastructure, including medical devices, exacerbated by the growing digitalisation of healthcare services in the EU and the US, has led legislators and regulatory bodies to pay more attention to cybersecurity. Cybersecurity of AI-based medical devices requires the assessment of three areas subject to evolving regulatory approaches: medical devices, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity. Although they may appear distinguished in regulatory matters, the existence of AI-based medical devices and their possible cyber vulnerabilities makes clear that the three are intertwined and deserve closer attention from a regulatory point of view. Few scholars have devoted attention to AI and cybersecurity together. Even less, in our understanding, few comprehensive and EU/US comparative pieces of literature reflect on this specific issue. This paper aims to fill this gap and address the main implications of different regulatory approaches toward AI medical device cybersecurity in the EU and the US. The research stems from the assumption that regulation of medical devices in the EU has been historically inspired by regulatory trends in the US, although with the different cultural, societal, and legal traditions that made them adapt to the specificities of the territory. The paper observes that the US is a rule-based system reflecting a “command-and-control” approach, while the EU system is a principle-based one. While they share the main characteristic of being risk-regulation-based systems, their differences impact how AI-enhanced cybersecurity is regulated.
医疗设备的网络安全已成为欧盟和美国监管机构和政策制定者关注的具体问题。COVID-19 大流行之后,针对关键医疗基础设施及其 IT 系统的网络攻击不断增加,导致服务中断,危及患者的健康和安全。欧盟和美国医疗服务的数字化程度不断提高,加剧了对包括医疗设备在内的医疗基础设施的网络攻击,这促使立法者和监管机构更加关注网络安全问题。基于人工智能的医疗设备的网络安全需要对三个领域进行评估,这三个领域的监管方法也在不断变化:医疗设备、人工智能(AI)和网络安全。虽然它们在监管问题上似乎有所区别,但基于人工智能的医疗设备的存在及其可能存在的网络漏洞清楚地表明,三者是相互交织的,值得从监管角度给予更密切的关注。很少有学者将人工智能和网络安全放在一起研究。据我们了解,很少有综合性的欧盟/美国比较文献对这一具体问题进行反思。本文旨在填补这一空白,探讨欧盟和美国对人工智能医疗设备网络安全的不同监管方法的主要影响。这项研究源于这样一个假设,即欧盟的医疗设备监管历来受到美国监管趋势的启发,尽管不同的文化、社会和法律传统使其适应了当地的特殊性。本文认为,美国的制度以规则为基础,反映了一种 "命令与控制 "的方法,而欧盟的制度则以原则为基础。虽然它们的主要特点都是基于风险监管的体系,但它们之间的差异影响了如何监管人工智能增强型网络安全。
{"title":"Regulatory Approaches Towards AI-Based Medical Device Cybersecurity: A Transatlantic Perspective","authors":"Elisabetta Biasin, Erik Kamenjašević","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.23","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.23","url":null,"abstract":"Cybersecurity of medical devices has become a concrete concern for regulators and policymakers in the European Union and United States. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been an increase in cyber-attacks on critical healthcare infrastructures and their IT systems, which have suffered service disruptions and put patients’ health and safety at risk. The increase in cyberattacks on healthcare infrastructure, including medical devices, exacerbated by the growing digitalisation of healthcare services in the EU and the US, has led legislators and regulatory bodies to pay more attention to cybersecurity. Cybersecurity of AI-based medical devices requires the assessment of three areas subject to evolving regulatory approaches: medical devices, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity. Although they may appear distinguished in regulatory matters, the existence of AI-based medical devices and their possible cyber vulnerabilities makes clear that the three are intertwined and deserve closer attention from a regulatory point of view. Few scholars have devoted attention to AI and cybersecurity together. Even less, in our understanding, few comprehensive and EU/US comparative pieces of literature reflect on this specific issue. This paper aims to fill this gap and address the main implications of different regulatory approaches toward AI medical device cybersecurity in the EU and the US. The research stems from the assumption that regulation of medical devices in the EU has been historically inspired by regulatory trends in the US, although with the different cultural, societal, and legal traditions that made them adapt to the specificities of the territory. The paper observes that the US is a rule-based system reflecting a “command-and-control” approach, while the EU system is a principle-based one. While they share the main characteristic of being risk-regulation-based systems, their differences impact how AI-enhanced cybersecurity is regulated.","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140593582","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The delegation of powers to the European Commission, facilitating the adoption of non-legislative acts to implement centrally provisions of European legislation, has long been an essential part of administrative governance in the European Union. However, the established practice of delegating legslative and implementing powers to the European Commission has increased over the last decade, at the same time in the context of the various crises that the EU has had to confront during this period. The crisis context has generally demonstrated that executive institutions often emergency politics, and the amplified use of delegated powers in such circumstances raises questions about the capacity of legislative institutions to carry out their usual control and scrutiny functions. The concern here is whether – at times when the established mechanisms of control need to be carried out in times of crisis, under greater time pressure – there is the risk of legislative institutions (that had originally delegated powers to the Commission) are being sidelined, with the detrimental effects that this may have on the democratic accountability of the whole process. Against this background of normative question-marks, this article examines empirically to what extent the scrutiny of the Commission’s adoption of delegated powers has fundamentally changed during times of emergency. In particular, it provides an analysis of the use of delegated powers by the European Commission in the context of the EU’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic in order to establish whether the Council and the European Parliament managed to enable the usual control mechanisms effectively. By way of conclusion, the article discusses the implications of the findings for the wider discussion and the future use of emergency governance in the European Union.
{"title":"Delegated Rule-making in Times of Crisis: New Challenges for Democratic Scrutiny?","authors":"Giulia Gallinella, Thomas Christiansen","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.24","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.24","url":null,"abstract":"The delegation of powers to the European Commission, facilitating the adoption of non-legislative acts to implement centrally provisions of European legislation, has long been an essential part of administrative governance in the European Union. However, the established practice of delegating legslative and implementing powers to the European Commission has increased over the last decade, at the same time in the context of the various crises that the EU has had to confront during this period. The crisis context has generally demonstrated that executive institutions often emergency politics, and the amplified use of delegated powers in such circumstances raises questions about the capacity of legislative institutions to carry out their usual control and scrutiny functions. The concern here is whether – at times when the established mechanisms of control need to be carried out in times of crisis, under greater time pressure – there is the risk of legislative institutions (that had originally delegated powers to the Commission) are being sidelined, with the detrimental effects that this may have on the democratic accountability of the whole process. Against this background of normative question-marks, this article examines empirically to what extent the scrutiny of the Commission’s adoption of delegated powers has fundamentally changed during times of emergency. In particular, it provides an analysis of the use of delegated powers by the European Commission in the context of the EU’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic in order to establish whether the Council and the European Parliament managed to enable the usual control mechanisms effectively. By way of conclusion, the article discusses the implications of the findings for the wider discussion and the future use of emergency governance in the European Union.","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140593736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explains why hyper-engaging dark patterns should be considered unlawful in the European Union even though they are very common online, particularly on content-sharing platforms. A hyper-engaging dark pattern is a digital interface with an addictive design: it makes users spend more time interacting with the service by making use of big data analytics and one or more behavioural trait. Hyper-engaging dark patterns are a form of hypernudge. They exploit the dopamine cycle, reduce users’ autonomy and may have additional detrimental health effects. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive should be interpreted as prohibiting them either as a form of undue influence or under the general test pursuant to Article 5. Both the Digital Services Act and the Artificial Intelligence Act can play a beneficial but merely complementary role in combatting the diffusion of hyper-engaging dark patterns.
{"title":"Addictive Design as an Unfair Commercial Practice: The Case of Hyper-Engaging Dark Patterns","authors":"Fabrizio Esposito, Thaís Maciel Cathoud Ferreira","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.8","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.8","url":null,"abstract":"This article explains why hyper-engaging dark patterns should be considered unlawful in the European Union even though they are very common online, particularly on content-sharing platforms. A hyper-engaging dark pattern is a digital interface with an addictive design: it makes users spend more time interacting with the service by making use of big data analytics and one or more behavioural trait. Hyper-engaging dark patterns are a form of hypernudge. They exploit the dopamine cycle, reduce users’ autonomy and may have additional detrimental health effects. The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive should be interpreted as prohibiting them either as a form of undue influence or under the general test pursuant to Article 5. Both the Digital Services Act and the Artificial Intelligence Act can play a beneficial but merely complementary role in combatting the diffusion of hyper-engaging dark patterns.","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"66 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140301750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is an appraisal tool to bring evidence to bear on regulatory decisions. A key property of RIA is that is corrects errors in reasoning by pushing regulators towards deliberative thinking to override intuitive judgments. However, the steps for regulatory analysis suggested by international organisations and governmental handbooks do not handle two sources of bias and barriers that are well documented in the literature on behavioural insights. First, bias enters the process via knowledge production during the analytical process of assessment. Second, bias affects knowledge utilisation when regulators “read” or utilise the results of RIA. We explore these two pathways by focusing on drivers of behaviour rather than lists of biases. The conclusions reflect on the limitations of current practice and its possible improvement, making suggestions for an RIA architecture that is fully informed by behavioural analysis.
{"title":"Behavioural Analysis and Regulatory Impact Assessment","authors":"James R. Drummond, Claudio M. Radaelli","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.1","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.1","url":null,"abstract":"Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) is an appraisal tool to bring evidence to bear on regulatory decisions. A key property of RIA is that is corrects errors in reasoning by pushing regulators towards deliberative thinking to override intuitive judgments. However, the steps for regulatory analysis suggested by international organisations and governmental handbooks do not handle two sources of bias and barriers that are well documented in the literature on behavioural insights. First, bias enters the process via knowledge production during the analytical process of assessment. Second, bias affects knowledge utilisation when regulators “read” or utilise the results of RIA. We explore these two pathways by focusing on drivers of behaviour rather than lists of biases. The conclusions reflect on the limitations of current practice and its possible improvement, making suggestions for an RIA architecture that is fully informed by behavioural analysis.","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"83 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140205153","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the mechanisms of prioritisation and hierarchisation of risk contained under influential soft law frameworks on value chain due diligence. It identifies the main stages of the due diligence process where prioritisation may be required and clarifies the criteria that may be used by corporations for prioritisation decisions. The article contributes to the development of the literature concerning prioritisation mechanisms under value chain due diligence norms, highlighting, from a compliance perspective, how corporations are expected to prioritise both their evaluations to identify and assess adverse impacts as well as their actions to address specific impacts identified and assessed. In doing so, it showcases the challenges present when comparing the significance of adverse impacts pertaining to different policy fields and their implications in a prioritisation context. It then compares the solutions found in these soft law frameworks concerning prioritisation to the ones contained in European laws and legislative proposals on the subject. The analysis reveals the different approaches used by legislators and reflects on their repercussions for prioritisation mechanisms, suggesting the reinforcement and clarification of prioritisation requirements in accordance with international frameworks of reference.
{"title":"Prioritisation under Value Chain Due Diligence","authors":"João Teixeira de Freitas","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.19","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.19","url":null,"abstract":"This article analyses the mechanisms of prioritisation and hierarchisation of risk contained under influential soft law frameworks on value chain due diligence. It identifies the main stages of the due diligence process where prioritisation may be required and clarifies the criteria that may be used by corporations for prioritisation decisions. The article contributes to the development of the literature concerning prioritisation mechanisms under value chain due diligence norms, highlighting, from a compliance perspective, how corporations are expected to prioritise both their evaluations to identify and assess adverse impacts as well as their actions to address specific impacts identified and assessed. In doing so, it showcases the challenges present when comparing the significance of adverse impacts pertaining to different policy fields and their implications in a prioritisation context. It then compares the solutions found in these soft law frameworks concerning prioritisation to the ones contained in European laws and legislative proposals on the subject. The analysis reveals the different approaches used by legislators and reflects on their repercussions for prioritisation mechanisms, suggesting the reinforcement and clarification of prioritisation requirements in accordance with international frameworks of reference.","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"100 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140171671","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Equivalence is an essential discipline for liberalising trade between States whose sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are based on divergent regulatory approaches. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, “equivalence” under the SPS Agreement was regarded by negotiators as being “of great importance”, and it was even considered to establish a right for exporting States. In practice, the discipline has remained ineffective, with only thirty-six equivalence recognition decisions made since 1995. This article argues that the underperformance of equivalence as an obligation is structural in nature: in effect, the SPS Agreement establishes a conditional right of importing Members to refuse equivalence requests. As such, exporting Members only gain equivalence protection where they either demonstrate that their measures (1) meet the importing Member’s appropriate level of protection or (2) achieve the same level of protection as parties to recognition agreements. Finally, the need for fostering regulatory trust between domestic SPS regulatory agencies is underscored as a prerequisite for achieving broader equivalence recognition.
{"title":"The Right to Refuse Equivalence of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Trading on Regulatory Trust?","authors":"Christian Delev, Jochelle Greaves Siew","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.7","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.7","url":null,"abstract":"Equivalence is an essential discipline for liberalising trade between States whose sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are based on divergent regulatory approaches. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, “equivalence” under the SPS Agreement was regarded by negotiators as being “of great importance”, and it was even considered to establish a right for exporting States. In practice, the discipline has remained ineffective, with only thirty-six equivalence recognition decisions made since 1995. This article argues that the underperformance of equivalence as an obligation is structural in nature: in effect, the SPS Agreement establishes a conditional right of importing Members to refuse equivalence requests. As such, exporting Members only gain equivalence protection where they either demonstrate that their measures (1) meet the importing Member’s appropriate level of protection or (2) achieve the same level of protection as parties to recognition agreements. Finally, the need for fostering regulatory trust between domestic SPS regulatory agencies is underscored as a prerequisite for achieving broader equivalence recognition.","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"142 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140152333","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explores the proposed amendments to the AI Act, which introduce the concept of “groups of persons”. The inclusion of this notion has the potential to broaden the traditional individual-centric approach in data protection. The analysis explores the context and the challenges posed by the rapid evolution of technology, with an emphasis on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. It discusses both the potential benefits and challenges of recognising groups of people, including issues such as discrimination prevention, public trust and redress mechanisms. The analysis also identifies key challenges, including the lack of a clear definition for “group”, the difficulty in explaining AI architecture concerning groups and the need for well-defined redress mechanisms. The article also puts forward recommendations aimed at addressing these challenges in order to enhance the effectiveness and clarity of the proposed amendments.
{"title":"Groups of Persons in the Proposed AI Act Amendments","authors":"Liubomir Nikiforov","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.13","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.13","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This article explores the proposed amendments to the AI Act, which introduce the concept of “groups of persons”. The inclusion of this notion has the potential to broaden the traditional individual-centric approach in data protection. The analysis explores the context and the challenges posed by the rapid evolution of technology, with an emphasis on the role of artificial intelligence (AI) systems. It discusses both the potential benefits and challenges of recognising groups of people, including issues such as discrimination prevention, public trust and redress mechanisms. The analysis also identifies key challenges, including the lack of a clear definition for “group”, the difficulty in explaining AI architecture concerning groups and the need for well-defined redress mechanisms. The article also puts forward recommendations aimed at addressing these challenges in order to enhance the effectiveness and clarity of the proposed amendments.</p>","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"15 2 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140098064","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper describes how the development of texts on regulatory deference by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) addresses relevant recommendations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and supports Member countries of CAC in their negotiation and implementation of equivalence agreements. We consider the role and function of CAC within a rules-based multilateral framework, particularly in relation to the development and implementation of equivalence concepts. We then consider whether, through use of equivalence agreements, trade facilitation outcomes have been realised. Our hypothesis is that international standards on regulatory deference promote fair but aspirational standards and support fair practices in the trade of safe food – both vital outcomes for global food security and the achievement of many of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. We test this hypothesis against the framework provided by decisions of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee. We argue that the equivalence concepts and guidelines developed by CAC are appropriate but underutilised tools available for Member countries to strike a balance between their right to regulate to protect human, animal or plant life and health and to fulfil legitimate objectives whilst meeting their WTO obligations to avoid measures that constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.
{"title":"International Standards for Regulatory Deference Relating to National Food Control Systems: More to Do?","authors":"Steve Wearne, Nicola Hinder, Tom Heilandt","doi":"10.1017/err.2024.9","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.9","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper describes how the development of texts on regulatory deference by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) addresses relevant recommendations of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and supports Member countries of CAC in their negotiation and implementation of equivalence agreements. We consider the role and function of CAC within a rules-based multilateral framework, particularly in relation to the development and implementation of equivalence concepts. We then consider whether, through use of equivalence agreements, trade facilitation outcomes have been realised. Our hypothesis is that international standards on regulatory deference promote fair but aspirational standards and support fair practices in the trade of safe food – both vital outcomes for global food security and the achievement of many of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. We test this hypothesis against the framework provided by decisions of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Committee. We argue that the equivalence concepts and guidelines developed by CAC are appropriate but underutilised tools available for Member countries to strike a balance between their right to regulate to protect human, animal or plant life and health and to fulfil legitimate objectives whilst meeting their WTO obligations to avoid measures that constitute unnecessary barriers to trade.</p>","PeriodicalId":46207,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Risk Regulation","volume":"53 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.9,"publicationDate":"2024-03-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140056132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}