Pub Date : 2022-10-14DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2127317
D. Snetselaar
ABSTRACT Amid concerns over the rivalry between Washington and Beijing, the discourse and practice of knowledge security have become prevalent in Europe. This is especially true with regard to Sino-Western research collaborations on emerging technologies. Despite the scientific and economic benefits, these collaborations are increasingly perceived as a potential threat in the context of broader concerns with so-called hybrid threats. Knowledge security has emerged as a key term to identify and mitigate the risk of espionage, unwanted knowledge transfers, censorship, and the misuse of dual-use technology. To understand knowledge security and its implications, the article offers a qualitative, in-depth case study of Dreams Lab in the Netherlands: an AI research project run by the University of Amsterdam and the Free University of Amsterdam and funded by the Chinese company Huawei. Li’s practices of assemblage are used as an analytical framework to answer the question: how and why a diverse group of actors were brought together to respond to Dreams Lab and govern scientific knowledge on emerging technologies? By analysing the discourse and practice of knowledge security, the article offers crucial insights into how the great power rivalry is shaping scientific research and the international exchange of knowledge and technology.
{"title":"Dreams Lab: assembling knowledge security in Sino-Dutch research collaborations","authors":"D. Snetselaar","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2127317","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2127317","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Amid concerns over the rivalry between Washington and Beijing, the discourse and practice of knowledge security have become prevalent in Europe. This is especially true with regard to Sino-Western research collaborations on emerging technologies. Despite the scientific and economic benefits, these collaborations are increasingly perceived as a potential threat in the context of broader concerns with so-called hybrid threats. Knowledge security has emerged as a key term to identify and mitigate the risk of espionage, unwanted knowledge transfers, censorship, and the misuse of dual-use technology. To understand knowledge security and its implications, the article offers a qualitative, in-depth case study of Dreams Lab in the Netherlands: an AI research project run by the University of Amsterdam and the Free University of Amsterdam and funded by the Chinese company Huawei. Li’s practices of assemblage are used as an analytical framework to answer the question: how and why a diverse group of actors were brought together to respond to Dreams Lab and govern scientific knowledge on emerging technologies? By analysing the discourse and practice of knowledge security, the article offers crucial insights into how the great power rivalry is shaping scientific research and the international exchange of knowledge and technology.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"233 - 251"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42977986","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-06DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2129966
C. Kollias, Panayiotis G. Tzeremes
ABSTRACT Using President Joe Biden’s opinion article published in The Washington Post ahead of the June 14, 2021 NATO Summit as a point of departure, the present paper examines how NATO members fare in terms of the core constituent elements of liberal democracy such as civil liberties and freedom of expression. To this effect, the paper uses three indices constructed and published by the Varieties of Democracy project. The Liberal democracy, Civil liberties and Freedom of expression indices. The results from club convergence analysis that covers the post-Cold War period, indicate the presence of different convergence clubs among NATO’s member-states and Turkey as the single divergent country. Moreover, given that many NATO countries are also EU members, the paper examines the comparative effect the dual NATO and EU membership had on the democratisation process of East European countries and Turkey. The findings suggest a statistically stronger impact of EU membership vis-à-vis NATO membership.
{"title":"“My trip to Europe is about America rallying the world’s democracies” and the elephant in NATO’s room","authors":"C. Kollias, Panayiotis G. Tzeremes","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2129966","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2129966","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Using President Joe Biden’s opinion article published in The Washington Post ahead of the June 14, 2021 NATO Summit as a point of departure, the present paper examines how NATO members fare in terms of the core constituent elements of liberal democracy such as civil liberties and freedom of expression. To this effect, the paper uses three indices constructed and published by the Varieties of Democracy project. The Liberal democracy, Civil liberties and Freedom of expression indices. The results from club convergence analysis that covers the post-Cold War period, indicate the presence of different convergence clubs among NATO’s member-states and Turkey as the single divergent country. Moreover, given that many NATO countries are also EU members, the paper examines the comparative effect the dual NATO and EU membership had on the democratisation process of East European countries and Turkey. The findings suggest a statistically stronger impact of EU membership vis-à-vis NATO membership.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"190 - 209"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44474136","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-20DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2124370
M. Szalai
ABSTRACT The article describes the process of norm localisation in the security sector by analysing the context, format and functions of national security strategies published by the Visegrád countries between 1990 and 2020. After the end of the cold war, the “Europeanisation” of the security policy of Central European took place, which included the publication of Western-style national security strategies. Nevertheless, due to national and regional particularities, such documents serve specific political and communication functions, signifying that Visegrád states localised the practice of issuing national security strategies instead of merely copying them. This process led to the diminishing practical value of such documents at the expense of their communication role in terms of belonging and hedging. The article tracks these developments through the three waves of Central European national security strategies between 1990 and 2020 through the analysis of their political context, aims and specific attributes based on various criteria. Results of the research indicate that the functions of national security strategies varied in different stages of the norm localisation process, which questions the traditional method of comparing explicit strategies through content analysis.
{"title":"Norm localisation in the process of crafting national security strategies – the case of the Visegrád countries","authors":"M. Szalai","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2124370","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2124370","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The article describes the process of norm localisation in the security sector by analysing the context, format and functions of national security strategies published by the Visegrád countries between 1990 and 2020. After the end of the cold war, the “Europeanisation” of the security policy of Central European took place, which included the publication of Western-style national security strategies. Nevertheless, due to national and regional particularities, such documents serve specific political and communication functions, signifying that Visegrád states localised the practice of issuing national security strategies instead of merely copying them. This process led to the diminishing practical value of such documents at the expense of their communication role in terms of belonging and hedging. The article tracks these developments through the three waves of Central European national security strategies between 1990 and 2020 through the analysis of their political context, aims and specific attributes based on various criteria. Results of the research indicate that the functions of national security strategies varied in different stages of the norm localisation process, which questions the traditional method of comparing explicit strategies through content analysis.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"210 - 232"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45550626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2113062
D. Arter
ABSTRACT Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 triggered a process that saw Finland abandon its traditional policy of military non-alignment and, together with Sweden, submit an application for NATO membership. Finland’s history of Finlandisation came up routinely in the parliamentary debates on a NATO application and there was a broad consensus that NATO membership would mark the end of Finlandised Finland. Accordingly, this article has a dual aim. First, it seeks to chart the main lines of post-war Finnish foreign and security policy since the late 1960s using Finlandisation and post-Finlandisation as the organising concepts. Second, it explores why, ultimately, Finland applied for NATO membership in May 2022. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, it is suggested, engendered a psychosis of fear among the Finnish public, stirring collective memories of the loss of land, lives and livelihood at the hands of unprovoked Soviet aggression in the 1939–40 Winter War and the fear of history repeating itself at various tension points in Finno-Soviet relations thereafter. Strikingly, until 24 February a clear majority of politicians and the Finnish public opposed NATO membership.
{"title":"From Finlandisation and post-Finlandisation to the end of Finlandisation? Finland’s road to a NATO application","authors":"D. Arter","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2113062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2113062","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 triggered a process that saw Finland abandon its traditional policy of military non-alignment and, together with Sweden, submit an application for NATO membership. Finland’s history of Finlandisation came up routinely in the parliamentary debates on a NATO application and there was a broad consensus that NATO membership would mark the end of Finlandised Finland. Accordingly, this article has a dual aim. First, it seeks to chart the main lines of post-war Finnish foreign and security policy since the late 1960s using Finlandisation and post-Finlandisation as the organising concepts. Second, it explores why, ultimately, Finland applied for NATO membership in May 2022. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, it is suggested, engendered a psychosis of fear among the Finnish public, stirring collective memories of the loss of land, lives and livelihood at the hands of unprovoked Soviet aggression in the 1939–40 Winter War and the fear of history repeating itself at various tension points in Finno-Soviet relations thereafter. Strikingly, until 24 February a clear majority of politicians and the Finnish public opposed NATO membership.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"171 - 189"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48735098","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-18DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2109414
A. Bayramov
ABSTRACT This article evaluates the presence of framing mechanisms in Dutch media reporting on the Second Karabakh war. The paper is led by the following questions: To what extent, and why, does the reporting of the Dutch press favour/undermine certain actors in the conflict? What kind of framing patterns are involved in generating such partiality? And did the frames change over the course of the war? In order to evaluate the presence of framing mechanisms in Dutch media reporting on the second Karabakh war, this research conducted a qualitative data analysis of 188 articles on the topic in nine major national Dutch news media. The paper finds that Dutch newspapers created a rather stereotypical, simplified picture of the Second Karabakh war. There are instances where the reporting gave the impression of a possible bias or overemphasis on certain dimensions.
{"title":"Producing knowledge about Eastern Europe in times of war: the case of Dutch media and the Second Karabakh war","authors":"A. Bayramov","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2109414","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2109414","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article evaluates the presence of framing mechanisms in Dutch media reporting on the Second Karabakh war. The paper is led by the following questions: To what extent, and why, does the reporting of the Dutch press favour/undermine certain actors in the conflict? What kind of framing patterns are involved in generating such partiality? And did the frames change over the course of the war? In order to evaluate the presence of framing mechanisms in Dutch media reporting on the second Karabakh war, this research conducted a qualitative data analysis of 188 articles on the topic in nine major national Dutch news media. The paper finds that Dutch newspapers created a rather stereotypical, simplified picture of the Second Karabakh war. There are instances where the reporting gave the impression of a possible bias or overemphasis on certain dimensions.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"125 - 146"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-08-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47757841","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2101883
L. Monsees, Daniel Lambach
ABSTRACT “Digital sovereignty” has emerged as a hot topic in European politics. But although true European digital sovereignty seems unattainable, analysing the digital sovereignty discourse is still useful since it tells us much about European politics. We examine three “projects” which are part of the broader digital sovereignty initiative: 5G, Gaia-X, and the semiconductor industry. This empirical perspective allows for a better understanding of how imaginaries about digital sovereignty play out in these specific tech projects and how these then help to affirm a particular European identity. Methodologically, we focus on how particular geopolitical imaginaries appear in these digital sovereignty projects. Our empirical analysis reveals that Europe’s comparatively weak digital industries are considered a security issue. China and, to a lesser degree, the United States are not only seen as economic rivals but also security threats when it comes to issues such as espionage and data protection. Based on this, we argue that digital sovereignty projects, despite being full of contradictions and tensions, contribute to a distinct EU identity of an agile, future-oriented global player in the digitised economy. This, while not entirely new, is a powerful imaginary even if the proposed idea of “sovereignty” might never be enacted.
{"title":"Digital sovereignty, geopolitical imaginaries, and the reproduction of European identity","authors":"L. Monsees, Daniel Lambach","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2101883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2101883","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT “Digital sovereignty” has emerged as a hot topic in European politics. But although true European digital sovereignty seems unattainable, analysing the digital sovereignty discourse is still useful since it tells us much about European politics. We examine three “projects” which are part of the broader digital sovereignty initiative: 5G, Gaia-X, and the semiconductor industry. This empirical perspective allows for a better understanding of how imaginaries about digital sovereignty play out in these specific tech projects and how these then help to affirm a particular European identity. Methodologically, we focus on how particular geopolitical imaginaries appear in these digital sovereignty projects. Our empirical analysis reveals that Europe’s comparatively weak digital industries are considered a security issue. China and, to a lesser degree, the United States are not only seen as economic rivals but also security threats when it comes to issues such as espionage and data protection. Based on this, we argue that digital sovereignty projects, despite being full of contradictions and tensions, contribute to a distinct EU identity of an agile, future-oriented global player in the digitised economy. This, while not entirely new, is a powerful imaginary even if the proposed idea of “sovereignty” might never be enacted.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"31 1","pages":"377 - 394"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45902872","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2101887
R. Bellanova, Helena Carrapico, D. Duez
ABSTRACT The notion of digital sovereignty, also often referred to as technological sovereignty, has been gaining momentum in the European Union’s (EU) political and policy discourses over recent years. Digital sovereignty has come to supplement an already substantial engagement of the EU with the digital across various security policy domains. The goal of this article and of the overall Special Issue is to explore how the discourse and practices of digital sovereignty redefine European security integration. Our core argument is that digital sovereignty has both direct and indirect implications for European security as the EU attempts to develop and control digital infrastructures (sovereignty over the digital), as well as the use of digital tools for European security governance (sovereignty through the digital). It is thus essential to further explore digital sovereignty both in terms of European policies and of a re-articulation of sovereign power and digital technologies – what we suggest calling digital/sovereignty.
{"title":"Digital/sovereignty and European security integration: an introduction","authors":"R. Bellanova, Helena Carrapico, D. Duez","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2101887","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2101887","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The notion of digital sovereignty, also often referred to as technological sovereignty, has been gaining momentum in the European Union’s (EU) political and policy discourses over recent years. Digital sovereignty has come to supplement an already substantial engagement of the EU with the digital across various security policy domains. The goal of this article and of the overall Special Issue is to explore how the discourse and practices of digital sovereignty redefine European security integration. Our core argument is that digital sovereignty has both direct and indirect implications for European security as the EU attempts to develop and control digital infrastructures (sovereignty over the digital), as well as the use of digital tools for European security governance (sovereignty through the digital). It is thus essential to further explore digital sovereignty both in terms of European policies and of a re-articulation of sovereign power and digital technologies – what we suggest calling digital/sovereignty.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"31 1","pages":"337 - 355"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48506669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2102896
B. Farrand, Helena Carrapico
ABSTRACT In recent years, we have been able to observe the emergence and mainstreaming of an EU discourse on digital sovereignty, which highlights the importance of gaining back control of EU digital infrastructure and technological production, based on the EU's perceived loss of economic competitiveness, limited capacity to innovate, high degree of dependence on foreign digital infrastructures and service providers and, related to all these factors, difficulty in providing EU citizens with a high level of cybersecurity. Bearing in mind that a considerable percentage of these infrastructures and service providers are under private sector control, the present article asks how this sovereignty discourse conceptualises the role of the private sector in EU cybersecurity. Drawing from a Regulatory Capitalism theoretical model, this article proposes that the EU has instead entered a Regulatory Mercantilist phase where it seeks to reassert its control over cyberspace, impose digital borders, accumulate data wealth and reduce its dependence on external private sector actors whose values may not reflect those of the EU order. A new approach to cybersecurity is emerging, in which the non-EU private sector can be perceived as much of a threat as foreign powers, and from whom digital sovereignty must be secured.
{"title":"Digital sovereignty and taking back control: from regulatory capitalism to regulatory mercantilism in EU cybersecurity","authors":"B. Farrand, Helena Carrapico","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2102896","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2102896","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In recent years, we have been able to observe the emergence and mainstreaming of an EU discourse on digital sovereignty, which highlights the importance of gaining back control of EU digital infrastructure and technological production, based on the EU's perceived loss of economic competitiveness, limited capacity to innovate, high degree of dependence on foreign digital infrastructures and service providers and, related to all these factors, difficulty in providing EU citizens with a high level of cybersecurity. Bearing in mind that a considerable percentage of these infrastructures and service providers are under private sector control, the present article asks how this sovereignty discourse conceptualises the role of the private sector in EU cybersecurity. Drawing from a Regulatory Capitalism theoretical model, this article proposes that the EU has instead entered a Regulatory Mercantilist phase where it seeks to reassert its control over cyberspace, impose digital borders, accumulate data wealth and reduce its dependence on external private sector actors whose values may not reflect those of the EU order. A new approach to cybersecurity is emerging, in which the non-EU private sector can be perceived as much of a threat as foreign powers, and from whom digital sovereignty must be secured.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"31 1","pages":"435 - 453"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49639000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2102895
A. Barrinha, G. Christou
ABSTRACT The EU’s revised Cybersecurity Strategy (2020) has been constructed in the context of increasing geopolitical tension and within a dynamically evolving technological environment. The onset of new technologies has brought with it new opportunities but also perceived risks and threats in cyberspace, to which the EU has sought to elicit a more comprehensive approach underpinned by a move to become more “technologically sovereign”. We seek in this article to critically unpack what such claims to technological sovereignty mean for the EU in the cyber domain and what the practical implications are of the EU taking ownership of and performing sovereignty. More specifically, in seeking to conceptually unpack technological sovereignty in its internal and external manifestations, we show how its articulation, legitimisation and operationalisation has implications and consequences for the EU’s identity and action in the cyber domain.
{"title":"Speaking sovereignty: the EU in the cyber domain","authors":"A. Barrinha, G. Christou","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2102895","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2102895","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The EU’s revised Cybersecurity Strategy (2020) has been constructed in the context of increasing geopolitical tension and within a dynamically evolving technological environment. The onset of new technologies has brought with it new opportunities but also perceived risks and threats in cyberspace, to which the EU has sought to elicit a more comprehensive approach underpinned by a move to become more “technologically sovereign”. We seek in this article to critically unpack what such claims to technological sovereignty mean for the EU in the cyber domain and what the practical implications are of the EU taking ownership of and performing sovereignty. More specifically, in seeking to conceptually unpack technological sovereignty in its internal and external manifestations, we show how its articulation, legitimisation and operationalisation has implications and consequences for the EU’s identity and action in the cyber domain.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"31 1","pages":"356 - 376"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45184091","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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