Pub Date : 2023-05-01DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2201880
I. Prezelj, Kristopher W. Ramsay
{"title":"The risk of domino secessions: interdependent secessions and lessons from the Western Balkans","authors":"I. Prezelj, Kristopher W. Ramsay","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2023.2201880","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2201880","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47970403","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-16DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2196018
M. Dobrescu
ABSTRACT This article explores the factors underpinning third-country participation in EU military and civilian missions, by focusing on one particular category of CSDP participating non-EU states, namely the Association Trio - Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. While these three states share several characteristics, including their form of association with the EU, their engagement in the Eastern Partnership, a similar geostrategic environment and common security threats, the extent of their CSDP involvement varies widely. The article explains this variation through a combination of third country-specific and EU-level variables, against the background of the broader post-Cold War security environment and the three countries' deepening integration with the EU. The role conceptions of the three countries stand out as a variable providing an accurate expectation of their foreign policy behaviour, anticipating Ukraine's prominent role in peacekeeping, Moldova's low-key involvement as a neutral state and Georgia's prioritisation of NATO. At a more practical level, the variation among the three countries' contributions to CSDP missions is to be understood in light of their human and financial resources, institutional capacities and adequacy of legal frameworks, as well as the EU's selective opening up of missions to third countries and the highly competitive selection process for civilian personnel.
{"title":"Explaining third-country participation in CSDP missions: the case of the association trio – Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova","authors":"M. Dobrescu","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2023.2196018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2196018","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores the factors underpinning third-country participation in EU military and civilian missions, by focusing on one particular category of CSDP participating non-EU states, namely the Association Trio - Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. While these three states share several characteristics, including their form of association with the EU, their engagement in the Eastern Partnership, a similar geostrategic environment and common security threats, the extent of their CSDP involvement varies widely. The article explains this variation through a combination of third country-specific and EU-level variables, against the background of the broader post-Cold War security environment and the three countries' deepening integration with the EU. The role conceptions of the three countries stand out as a variable providing an accurate expectation of their foreign policy behaviour, anticipating Ukraine's prominent role in peacekeeping, Moldova's low-key involvement as a neutral state and Georgia's prioritisation of NATO. At a more practical level, the variation among the three countries' contributions to CSDP missions is to be understood in light of their human and financial resources, institutional capacities and adequacy of legal frameworks, as well as the EU's selective opening up of missions to third countries and the highly competitive selection process for civilian personnel.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-04-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47123620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-23DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2178845
Bojan B. Zoric, Věra Stojarová
ABSTRACT Hybrid warfare is playing an increasingly important role in global geopolitical competition. This article examines the elements of hybrid activities conducted by Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States in North Macedonia and sheds light on ways their geostrategic goals transpose into domestic political and socio-economic debates. Drawing on dozen interviews with Macedonian practitioners in the field and on the analyses of official documents and policy papers, the article provides evidence that there is no certain type of influence operations that can be attributed to only one external actor, but all countries use a combination of influence operations to achieve their desired objectives. The article asserts a rising tendency of China and confirms a solidified position of Turkey along various axes at the expense of Russia whose influence continues to fade, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine.
{"title":"Non-western influence operations in North Macedonia: a reason for concern or push towards the west?","authors":"Bojan B. Zoric, Věra Stojarová","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2023.2178845","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2178845","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Hybrid warfare is playing an increasingly important role in global geopolitical competition. This article examines the elements of hybrid activities conducted by Russia, China, Turkey and the Gulf States in North Macedonia and sheds light on ways their geostrategic goals transpose into domestic political and socio-economic debates. Drawing on dozen interviews with Macedonian practitioners in the field and on the analyses of official documents and policy papers, the article provides evidence that there is no certain type of influence operations that can be attributed to only one external actor, but all countries use a combination of influence operations to achieve their desired objectives. The article asserts a rising tendency of China and confirms a solidified position of Turkey along various axes at the expense of Russia whose influence continues to fade, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47074611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-29DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2166404
Bidzina Lebanidze, Kornely K. Kakachia
ABSTRACT Bandwagoning by stealth refers to a situation when a government of a small state tries to accommodate a great power turned to aggressor amid a strong public opposition. We explain it with the example of Georgia’s foreign policy towards Russia in the period of 2012–2022. It is argued that Georgia’s attempt for rapprochement to Russia since 2012 can be explained by two unit-level variables: (1) a belief of the country’s leadership in the need to accommodate Russia and (2) a societal and public opposition to the Russia-accommodating policy. A conflictual dynamic between the Russia-accommodating government and Russia-sceptic public resulted in bandwagoning by stealth – a defacto and partial bandwagoning with Russia without formally changing Georgia’s declared pro-Western foreign policy.
{"title":"Bandwagoning by stealth? Explaining Georgia’s Appeasement Policy on Russia","authors":"Bidzina Lebanidze, Kornely K. Kakachia","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2023.2166404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2166404","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Bandwagoning by stealth refers to a situation when a government of a small state tries to accommodate a great power turned to aggressor amid a strong public opposition. We explain it with the example of Georgia’s foreign policy towards Russia in the period of 2012–2022. It is argued that Georgia’s attempt for rapprochement to Russia since 2012 can be explained by two unit-level variables: (1) a belief of the country’s leadership in the need to accommodate Russia and (2) a societal and public opposition to the Russia-accommodating policy. A conflictual dynamic between the Russia-accommodating government and Russia-sceptic public resulted in bandwagoning by stealth – a defacto and partial bandwagoning with Russia without formally changing Georgia’s declared pro-Western foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49164061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-19DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2155947
Alfa Sefland Winge
ABSTRACT The proposed sale of the Norwegian company Bergen Engines (BE) in 2020–2021 from Rolls Royce, UK, to Russian-controlled Transmashholding, listed for US sanctions, would have increased Russian military capability in a way that was not consistent with Norwegian or NATO security interests. Yet, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially had no objections. In the New Cold War situation, lessons from this case are relevant beyond Norway as regulatory loopholes can be exploited by non-allied powers. This article integrates perspectives from intelligence and organisation theory, using public documents as data, to analyse the BE case processing, its compliance with the established regulatory framework, sanctions and public threat assessments to understand and explain why the sale to sanctioned Russian-controlled entity was not administratively stopped, under the Export Controls Act or as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) under the Security Act, before the decision-making process escalated into public scrutiny and parliamentary critique. This article suggests that regulatory frameworks for Norwegian Export Controls and FDI need to be strengthened and reorganised. It is also important to define and operationalise considerations to national security across ministries in Norway. Joint operationalisation is also relevant for NATO and the EU in the current security situation.
{"title":"Chain of negligence: analysis of the decision-making in the proposed sale of Bergen Engines to a Russian- controlled entity","authors":"Alfa Sefland Winge","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2155947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2155947","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The proposed sale of the Norwegian company Bergen Engines (BE) in 2020–2021 from Rolls Royce, UK, to Russian-controlled Transmashholding, listed for US sanctions, would have increased Russian military capability in a way that was not consistent with Norwegian or NATO security interests. Yet, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially had no objections. In the New Cold War situation, lessons from this case are relevant beyond Norway as regulatory loopholes can be exploited by non-allied powers. This article integrates perspectives from intelligence and organisation theory, using public documents as data, to analyse the BE case processing, its compliance with the established regulatory framework, sanctions and public threat assessments to understand and explain why the sale to sanctioned Russian-controlled entity was not administratively stopped, under the Export Controls Act or as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) under the Security Act, before the decision-making process escalated into public scrutiny and parliamentary critique. This article suggests that regulatory frameworks for Norwegian Export Controls and FDI need to be strengthened and reorganised. It is also important to define and operationalise considerations to national security across ministries in Norway. Joint operationalisation is also relevant for NATO and the EU in the current security situation.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43881239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-19DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2165878
I. Paterson, G. Mulvey
ABSTRACT The “near unanimous focus in the literature on successful cases of securitization” is demonstrated by Ruzicka [2019. Failed securitization: why it matters. Polity, 51 (2), 365–377] to be as problematic as it is untenable. The call to interrogate “failed securitisation” is one this article responds to, focussing on the securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees in the United Kingdom, and the puzzle of why this securitisation has, in many respects, failed in Scotland. With the normatively troubling securitisation of migration deepening throughout Europe and beyond, this divergence in Scotland requires much greater attention. Exploring both discursive and non-discursive security mechanisms, empirically, the article reveals that whilst some securitisation policies have been enacted in Scotland, the UK Government-driven securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees has not succeeded there entirely and many elements have failed. By attending to devolution, overlapping jurisdiction and multi-level governance, the article sharpens the theorisation of “failed” securitisation, with implications for broader understandings of “success” in securitisation studies, in two principal ways. First, by demonstrating that effective contestation of securitisation, resting on formal authority and policymaking power, can play a key role in securitisation failure, and second, by revealing that binary notions of “failed” and “successful” securitisations are insufficient: securitisations can both fail and succeed simultaneously.
{"title":"Simultaneous success and failure: the curious case of the (failed) securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees in the United Kingdom and Scotland","authors":"I. Paterson, G. Mulvey","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2023.2165878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2165878","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The “near unanimous focus in the literature on successful cases of securitization” is demonstrated by Ruzicka [2019. Failed securitization: why it matters. Polity, 51 (2), 365–377] to be as problematic as it is untenable. The call to interrogate “failed securitisation” is one this article responds to, focussing on the securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees in the United Kingdom, and the puzzle of why this securitisation has, in many respects, failed in Scotland. With the normatively troubling securitisation of migration deepening throughout Europe and beyond, this divergence in Scotland requires much greater attention. Exploring both discursive and non-discursive security mechanisms, empirically, the article reveals that whilst some securitisation policies have been enacted in Scotland, the UK Government-driven securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees has not succeeded there entirely and many elements have failed. By attending to devolution, overlapping jurisdiction and multi-level governance, the article sharpens the theorisation of “failed” securitisation, with implications for broader understandings of “success” in securitisation studies, in two principal ways. First, by demonstrating that effective contestation of securitisation, resting on formal authority and policymaking power, can play a key role in securitisation failure, and second, by revealing that binary notions of “failed” and “successful” securitisations are insufficient: securitisations can both fail and succeed simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46927805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-05DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2162821
Elie Perot
ABSTRACT In September 2021, Greece and France announced the conclusion of a landmark defence agreement, which included not only the sale of modern French frigates to the Hellenic Navy but also the signing of a new “strategic partnership for defence and security cooperation”. The cornerstone of this strategic partnership – which formalises Paris’ and Athens’ geopolitical rapprochement, accelerated after the tensions with Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean in 2020 – lies in a mutual defence clause that commits France and Greece to defend each other in case of an armed attack against their respective territory. The new bilateral alliance thus forged between Athens and Paris, coming on top of similar NATO and EU security guarantees, is of political as well as scholarly interest. Politically, the question is how such an arrangement, which ostensibly aims to protect Greece from fellow NATO member Turkey, squares with the broader European security architecture. From a scholarly perspective, the Franco-Greek defence agreement is remarkable in that, unlike almost all bilateral or minilateral defence cooperation arrangements that have been concluded in recent years between NATO and EU countries, this one touches on the key question of collective defence, thus constituting an intriguing case of “embedded alliance formation”.
{"title":"A new alliance in Europe: the September 2021 defence agreement between Greece and France as a case of embedded alliance formation","authors":"Elie Perot","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2162821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2162821","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In September 2021, Greece and France announced the conclusion of a landmark defence agreement, which included not only the sale of modern French frigates to the Hellenic Navy but also the signing of a new “strategic partnership for defence and security cooperation”. The cornerstone of this strategic partnership – which formalises Paris’ and Athens’ geopolitical rapprochement, accelerated after the tensions with Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean in 2020 – lies in a mutual defence clause that commits France and Greece to defend each other in case of an armed attack against their respective territory. The new bilateral alliance thus forged between Athens and Paris, coming on top of similar NATO and EU security guarantees, is of political as well as scholarly interest. Politically, the question is how such an arrangement, which ostensibly aims to protect Greece from fellow NATO member Turkey, squares with the broader European security architecture. From a scholarly perspective, the Franco-Greek defence agreement is remarkable in that, unlike almost all bilateral or minilateral defence cooperation arrangements that have been concluded in recent years between NATO and EU countries, this one touches on the key question of collective defence, thus constituting an intriguing case of “embedded alliance formation”.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44982387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-31DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2159384
Xue Mi
ABSTRACT Given the push to strengthen European defence cooperation, the topic of whether a European strategic culture is emerging has become widely contested. Since convergence between member states is the key that would unlock the way to a European strategic culture, this paper examines how they perceive crucial aspects of strategic culture and in what aspects they have converged and diverged. This study selected Germany, Poland, and Ireland as cases of the EU-27 member states. It compared the three national strategic cultures in three aspects: strategic environment, cooperation patterns, and strategic goals and means, by conducting a computer-based content analysis of strategic documents and official speeches of high-level national policymakers between 2000 and 2020. This study found that despite the persistent divergence in strategic goals and means, the three countries have shown greater convergence in their perceptions of the strategic environment and that while their preferences on cooperation patterns are largely unchanged, they seem to be accepting the EU as a legitimate and favourable platform for security and defence cooperation. These findings suggest that the prospects for the emergence of a European strategic culture and further developments of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy are both challenging and promising.
{"title":"Strategic cultures between the EU member states: convergence or divergence?","authors":"Xue Mi","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2159384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2159384","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Given the push to strengthen European defence cooperation, the topic of whether a European strategic culture is emerging has become widely contested. Since convergence between member states is the key that would unlock the way to a European strategic culture, this paper examines how they perceive crucial aspects of strategic culture and in what aspects they have converged and diverged. This study selected Germany, Poland, and Ireland as cases of the EU-27 member states. It compared the three national strategic cultures in three aspects: strategic environment, cooperation patterns, and strategic goals and means, by conducting a computer-based content analysis of strategic documents and official speeches of high-level national policymakers between 2000 and 2020. This study found that despite the persistent divergence in strategic goals and means, the three countries have shown greater convergence in their perceptions of the strategic environment and that while their preferences on cooperation patterns are largely unchanged, they seem to be accepting the EU as a legitimate and favourable platform for security and defence cooperation. These findings suggest that the prospects for the emergence of a European strategic culture and further developments of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy are both challenging and promising.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43315784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-23DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2144728
Susanne Therese Hansen
ABSTRACT While ambiguity is a common feature of international obligations, there is a strong theoretical anticipation that ambiguities may be exploited, and obligations circumvented, under competing interests. This article largely backs this anticipation. The article scrutinises how ambiguous arms export control obligations are handled under strong incentives for arms export. The empirical case explored is the UK government’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen. Exports continued despite evidence that the Saudi-led coalition was violating international humanitarian law (IHL) in Yemen, and despite obligations not to export if there is a risk that the exported equipment can be used in IHL violations. A resulting legal challenge against the UK government provides valuable information about the role of ambiguity in the implementation of arms export controls. Drawing on primary sources from the legal process, this article argues that the UK government has taken advantage of linguistic ambiguity. The article also argues that the government has engaged in the continuous construction of ambiguity around events in Yemen and around the ideal parameters for arms trade risk assessment. Together, these strategies have facilitated continued arms exports to Saudi Arabia.
{"title":"Exploiting and constructing legal ambiguity. UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen","authors":"Susanne Therese Hansen","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2144728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2144728","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While ambiguity is a common feature of international obligations, there is a strong theoretical anticipation that ambiguities may be exploited, and obligations circumvented, under competing interests. This article largely backs this anticipation. The article scrutinises how ambiguous arms export control obligations are handled under strong incentives for arms export. The empirical case explored is the UK government’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen. Exports continued despite evidence that the Saudi-led coalition was violating international humanitarian law (IHL) in Yemen, and despite obligations not to export if there is a risk that the exported equipment can be used in IHL violations. A resulting legal challenge against the UK government provides valuable information about the role of ambiguity in the implementation of arms export controls. Drawing on primary sources from the legal process, this article argues that the UK government has taken advantage of linguistic ambiguity. The article also argues that the government has engaged in the continuous construction of ambiguity around events in Yemen and around the ideal parameters for arms trade risk assessment. Together, these strategies have facilitated continued arms exports to Saudi Arabia.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59488620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-11DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2142040
Yf Reykers, Johan Adriaensen
ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that staffing of international organisations (IOs) is politics. Understaffing of IOs, by contrast, has hardly received scholarly attention. By drawing upon the principal-agent model and refining the concept of “principal slack”, we explain why member states – as principals – might not provide the required resources to an IO and its substructures. We focus specifically on the case of the European Union’s (EU) Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which was established in June 2017. The MPCC has since then been hindered by systematic understaffing. Our analysis reveals that understaffing of the MPCC results from member states’ individual cost calculations, which are determined by national resource constraints and concerns over control. A limited pool of resources stretched thinly across rivalling institutions is a central problem to the MPCC’s development, exacerbated by rapidly growing expectations and the largely voluntary nature of staff provision. These are considerable obstacles to the EU’s ambition to become a credible and responsive security provider.
{"title":"The politics of understaffing international organisations: the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)","authors":"Yf Reykers, Johan Adriaensen","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2142040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2142040","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that staffing of international organisations (IOs) is politics. Understaffing of IOs, by contrast, has hardly received scholarly attention. By drawing upon the principal-agent model and refining the concept of “principal slack”, we explain why member states – as principals – might not provide the required resources to an IO and its substructures. We focus specifically on the case of the European Union’s (EU) Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which was established in June 2017. The MPCC has since then been hindered by systematic understaffing. Our analysis reveals that understaffing of the MPCC results from member states’ individual cost calculations, which are determined by national resource constraints and concerns over control. A limited pool of resources stretched thinly across rivalling institutions is a central problem to the MPCC’s development, exacerbated by rapidly growing expectations and the largely voluntary nature of staff provision. These are considerable obstacles to the EU’s ambition to become a credible and responsive security provider.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46229456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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