Pub Date : 2023-01-19DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2155947
Alfa Sefland Winge
ABSTRACT The proposed sale of the Norwegian company Bergen Engines (BE) in 2020–2021 from Rolls Royce, UK, to Russian-controlled Transmashholding, listed for US sanctions, would have increased Russian military capability in a way that was not consistent with Norwegian or NATO security interests. Yet, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially had no objections. In the New Cold War situation, lessons from this case are relevant beyond Norway as regulatory loopholes can be exploited by non-allied powers. This article integrates perspectives from intelligence and organisation theory, using public documents as data, to analyse the BE case processing, its compliance with the established regulatory framework, sanctions and public threat assessments to understand and explain why the sale to sanctioned Russian-controlled entity was not administratively stopped, under the Export Controls Act or as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) under the Security Act, before the decision-making process escalated into public scrutiny and parliamentary critique. This article suggests that regulatory frameworks for Norwegian Export Controls and FDI need to be strengthened and reorganised. It is also important to define and operationalise considerations to national security across ministries in Norway. Joint operationalisation is also relevant for NATO and the EU in the current security situation.
{"title":"Chain of negligence: analysis of the decision-making in the proposed sale of Bergen Engines to a Russian- controlled entity","authors":"Alfa Sefland Winge","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2155947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2155947","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The proposed sale of the Norwegian company Bergen Engines (BE) in 2020–2021 from Rolls Royce, UK, to Russian-controlled Transmashholding, listed for US sanctions, would have increased Russian military capability in a way that was not consistent with Norwegian or NATO security interests. Yet, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially had no objections. In the New Cold War situation, lessons from this case are relevant beyond Norway as regulatory loopholes can be exploited by non-allied powers. This article integrates perspectives from intelligence and organisation theory, using public documents as data, to analyse the BE case processing, its compliance with the established regulatory framework, sanctions and public threat assessments to understand and explain why the sale to sanctioned Russian-controlled entity was not administratively stopped, under the Export Controls Act or as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) under the Security Act, before the decision-making process escalated into public scrutiny and parliamentary critique. This article suggests that regulatory frameworks for Norwegian Export Controls and FDI need to be strengthened and reorganised. It is also important to define and operationalise considerations to national security across ministries in Norway. Joint operationalisation is also relevant for NATO and the EU in the current security situation.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43881239","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-19DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2165878
I. Paterson, G. Mulvey
ABSTRACT The “near unanimous focus in the literature on successful cases of securitization” is demonstrated by Ruzicka [2019. Failed securitization: why it matters. Polity, 51 (2), 365–377] to be as problematic as it is untenable. The call to interrogate “failed securitisation” is one this article responds to, focussing on the securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees in the United Kingdom, and the puzzle of why this securitisation has, in many respects, failed in Scotland. With the normatively troubling securitisation of migration deepening throughout Europe and beyond, this divergence in Scotland requires much greater attention. Exploring both discursive and non-discursive security mechanisms, empirically, the article reveals that whilst some securitisation policies have been enacted in Scotland, the UK Government-driven securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees has not succeeded there entirely and many elements have failed. By attending to devolution, overlapping jurisdiction and multi-level governance, the article sharpens the theorisation of “failed” securitisation, with implications for broader understandings of “success” in securitisation studies, in two principal ways. First, by demonstrating that effective contestation of securitisation, resting on formal authority and policymaking power, can play a key role in securitisation failure, and second, by revealing that binary notions of “failed” and “successful” securitisations are insufficient: securitisations can both fail and succeed simultaneously.
{"title":"Simultaneous success and failure: the curious case of the (failed) securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees in the United Kingdom and Scotland","authors":"I. Paterson, G. Mulvey","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2023.2165878","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2165878","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The “near unanimous focus in the literature on successful cases of securitization” is demonstrated by Ruzicka [2019. Failed securitization: why it matters. Polity, 51 (2), 365–377] to be as problematic as it is untenable. The call to interrogate “failed securitisation” is one this article responds to, focussing on the securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees in the United Kingdom, and the puzzle of why this securitisation has, in many respects, failed in Scotland. With the normatively troubling securitisation of migration deepening throughout Europe and beyond, this divergence in Scotland requires much greater attention. Exploring both discursive and non-discursive security mechanisms, empirically, the article reveals that whilst some securitisation policies have been enacted in Scotland, the UK Government-driven securitisation of asylum seekers and refugees has not succeeded there entirely and many elements have failed. By attending to devolution, overlapping jurisdiction and multi-level governance, the article sharpens the theorisation of “failed” securitisation, with implications for broader understandings of “success” in securitisation studies, in two principal ways. First, by demonstrating that effective contestation of securitisation, resting on formal authority and policymaking power, can play a key role in securitisation failure, and second, by revealing that binary notions of “failed” and “successful” securitisations are insufficient: securitisations can both fail and succeed simultaneously.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46927805","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-05DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2162821
Elie Perot
ABSTRACT In September 2021, Greece and France announced the conclusion of a landmark defence agreement, which included not only the sale of modern French frigates to the Hellenic Navy but also the signing of a new “strategic partnership for defence and security cooperation”. The cornerstone of this strategic partnership – which formalises Paris’ and Athens’ geopolitical rapprochement, accelerated after the tensions with Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean in 2020 – lies in a mutual defence clause that commits France and Greece to defend each other in case of an armed attack against their respective territory. The new bilateral alliance thus forged between Athens and Paris, coming on top of similar NATO and EU security guarantees, is of political as well as scholarly interest. Politically, the question is how such an arrangement, which ostensibly aims to protect Greece from fellow NATO member Turkey, squares with the broader European security architecture. From a scholarly perspective, the Franco-Greek defence agreement is remarkable in that, unlike almost all bilateral or minilateral defence cooperation arrangements that have been concluded in recent years between NATO and EU countries, this one touches on the key question of collective defence, thus constituting an intriguing case of “embedded alliance formation”.
{"title":"A new alliance in Europe: the September 2021 defence agreement between Greece and France as a case of embedded alliance formation","authors":"Elie Perot","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2162821","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2162821","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In September 2021, Greece and France announced the conclusion of a landmark defence agreement, which included not only the sale of modern French frigates to the Hellenic Navy but also the signing of a new “strategic partnership for defence and security cooperation”. The cornerstone of this strategic partnership – which formalises Paris’ and Athens’ geopolitical rapprochement, accelerated after the tensions with Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean in 2020 – lies in a mutual defence clause that commits France and Greece to defend each other in case of an armed attack against their respective territory. The new bilateral alliance thus forged between Athens and Paris, coming on top of similar NATO and EU security guarantees, is of political as well as scholarly interest. Politically, the question is how such an arrangement, which ostensibly aims to protect Greece from fellow NATO member Turkey, squares with the broader European security architecture. From a scholarly perspective, the Franco-Greek defence agreement is remarkable in that, unlike almost all bilateral or minilateral defence cooperation arrangements that have been concluded in recent years between NATO and EU countries, this one touches on the key question of collective defence, thus constituting an intriguing case of “embedded alliance formation”.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44982387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-31DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2159384
Xue Mi
ABSTRACT Given the push to strengthen European defence cooperation, the topic of whether a European strategic culture is emerging has become widely contested. Since convergence between member states is the key that would unlock the way to a European strategic culture, this paper examines how they perceive crucial aspects of strategic culture and in what aspects they have converged and diverged. This study selected Germany, Poland, and Ireland as cases of the EU-27 member states. It compared the three national strategic cultures in three aspects: strategic environment, cooperation patterns, and strategic goals and means, by conducting a computer-based content analysis of strategic documents and official speeches of high-level national policymakers between 2000 and 2020. This study found that despite the persistent divergence in strategic goals and means, the three countries have shown greater convergence in their perceptions of the strategic environment and that while their preferences on cooperation patterns are largely unchanged, they seem to be accepting the EU as a legitimate and favourable platform for security and defence cooperation. These findings suggest that the prospects for the emergence of a European strategic culture and further developments of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy are both challenging and promising.
{"title":"Strategic cultures between the EU member states: convergence or divergence?","authors":"Xue Mi","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2159384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2159384","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Given the push to strengthen European defence cooperation, the topic of whether a European strategic culture is emerging has become widely contested. Since convergence between member states is the key that would unlock the way to a European strategic culture, this paper examines how they perceive crucial aspects of strategic culture and in what aspects they have converged and diverged. This study selected Germany, Poland, and Ireland as cases of the EU-27 member states. It compared the three national strategic cultures in three aspects: strategic environment, cooperation patterns, and strategic goals and means, by conducting a computer-based content analysis of strategic documents and official speeches of high-level national policymakers between 2000 and 2020. This study found that despite the persistent divergence in strategic goals and means, the three countries have shown greater convergence in their perceptions of the strategic environment and that while their preferences on cooperation patterns are largely unchanged, they seem to be accepting the EU as a legitimate and favourable platform for security and defence cooperation. These findings suggest that the prospects for the emergence of a European strategic culture and further developments of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy are both challenging and promising.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43315784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-23DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2144728
Susanne Therese Hansen
ABSTRACT While ambiguity is a common feature of international obligations, there is a strong theoretical anticipation that ambiguities may be exploited, and obligations circumvented, under competing interests. This article largely backs this anticipation. The article scrutinises how ambiguous arms export control obligations are handled under strong incentives for arms export. The empirical case explored is the UK government’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen. Exports continued despite evidence that the Saudi-led coalition was violating international humanitarian law (IHL) in Yemen, and despite obligations not to export if there is a risk that the exported equipment can be used in IHL violations. A resulting legal challenge against the UK government provides valuable information about the role of ambiguity in the implementation of arms export controls. Drawing on primary sources from the legal process, this article argues that the UK government has taken advantage of linguistic ambiguity. The article also argues that the government has engaged in the continuous construction of ambiguity around events in Yemen and around the ideal parameters for arms trade risk assessment. Together, these strategies have facilitated continued arms exports to Saudi Arabia.
{"title":"Exploiting and constructing legal ambiguity. UK arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen","authors":"Susanne Therese Hansen","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2144728","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2144728","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While ambiguity is a common feature of international obligations, there is a strong theoretical anticipation that ambiguities may be exploited, and obligations circumvented, under competing interests. This article largely backs this anticipation. The article scrutinises how ambiguous arms export control obligations are handled under strong incentives for arms export. The empirical case explored is the UK government’s arms exports to Saudi Arabia during the war in Yemen. Exports continued despite evidence that the Saudi-led coalition was violating international humanitarian law (IHL) in Yemen, and despite obligations not to export if there is a risk that the exported equipment can be used in IHL violations. A resulting legal challenge against the UK government provides valuable information about the role of ambiguity in the implementation of arms export controls. Drawing on primary sources from the legal process, this article argues that the UK government has taken advantage of linguistic ambiguity. The article also argues that the government has engaged in the continuous construction of ambiguity around events in Yemen and around the ideal parameters for arms trade risk assessment. Together, these strategies have facilitated continued arms exports to Saudi Arabia.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59488620","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-11DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2142040
Yf Reykers, Johan Adriaensen
ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that staffing of international organisations (IOs) is politics. Understaffing of IOs, by contrast, has hardly received scholarly attention. By drawing upon the principal-agent model and refining the concept of “principal slack”, we explain why member states – as principals – might not provide the required resources to an IO and its substructures. We focus specifically on the case of the European Union’s (EU) Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which was established in June 2017. The MPCC has since then been hindered by systematic understaffing. Our analysis reveals that understaffing of the MPCC results from member states’ individual cost calculations, which are determined by national resource constraints and concerns over control. A limited pool of resources stretched thinly across rivalling institutions is a central problem to the MPCC’s development, exacerbated by rapidly growing expectations and the largely voluntary nature of staff provision. These are considerable obstacles to the EU’s ambition to become a credible and responsive security provider.
{"title":"The politics of understaffing international organisations: the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)","authors":"Yf Reykers, Johan Adriaensen","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2142040","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2142040","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Previous research has shown that staffing of international organisations (IOs) is politics. Understaffing of IOs, by contrast, has hardly received scholarly attention. By drawing upon the principal-agent model and refining the concept of “principal slack”, we explain why member states – as principals – might not provide the required resources to an IO and its substructures. We focus specifically on the case of the European Union’s (EU) Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), which was established in June 2017. The MPCC has since then been hindered by systematic understaffing. Our analysis reveals that understaffing of the MPCC results from member states’ individual cost calculations, which are determined by national resource constraints and concerns over control. A limited pool of resources stretched thinly across rivalling institutions is a central problem to the MPCC’s development, exacerbated by rapidly growing expectations and the largely voluntary nature of staff provision. These are considerable obstacles to the EU’s ambition to become a credible and responsive security provider.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46229456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-11DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2140009
Nikki Ikani, Christoph O. Meyer
ABSTRACT The study of why and when governments are caught out by strategic surprise has been a major occupation of intelligence studies, international relations, public administration and crisis management studies. Still little is known, however, about the structural vulnerabilities to such surprises in international organisations such as the European Union (EU). EU institutions themselves have not undertaken rigorous investigations or public inquiries of recent strategic surprises, instead relying on internal review processes. In order to understand the most common underlying problems causing surprise in the EU context, this paper adapts and tests insights from the strategic surprise literature. It elaborates a theoretical framework with five hypotheses about why the leadership of EU institutions has been prone to being caught by surprises in foreign affairs: limitations in collection capacity, institutional fragmentation of policymaking, organisational culture, member state politicisation, and cognitive biases arising from collective ideas and norms. These hypotheses are tested using a post-mortem approach investigating two significant strategic surprises: the start and spread of the Arab uprisings of 2010/11 and Ukraine–Russia crisis of 2013/14.
{"title":"The underlying causes of strategic surprise in EU foreign policy: a post-mortem investigation of the Arab uprisings and the Ukraine–Russia crisis of 2013/14","authors":"Nikki Ikani, Christoph O. Meyer","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2140009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2140009","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The study of why and when governments are caught out by strategic surprise has been a major occupation of intelligence studies, international relations, public administration and crisis management studies. Still little is known, however, about the structural vulnerabilities to such surprises in international organisations such as the European Union (EU). EU institutions themselves have not undertaken rigorous investigations or public inquiries of recent strategic surprises, instead relying on internal review processes. In order to understand the most common underlying problems causing surprise in the EU context, this paper adapts and tests insights from the strategic surprise literature. It elaborates a theoretical framework with five hypotheses about why the leadership of EU institutions has been prone to being caught by surprises in foreign affairs: limitations in collection capacity, institutional fragmentation of policymaking, organisational culture, member state politicisation, and cognitive biases arising from collective ideas and norms. These hypotheses are tested using a post-mortem approach investigating two significant strategic surprises: the start and spread of the Arab uprisings of 2010/11 and Ukraine–Russia crisis of 2013/14.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"270 - 293"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42401361","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-04DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2138350
Alexandros Lefteratos
ABSTRACT The emergence, longevity and resilience of contested states have redefined the relationship between sovereignty and territoriality. While fully-fledged states uphold the monopoly of authority, contested states seek to rewrite the sovereignty playbook and gain a seat among sovereign equals. This atypical antagonism, propped up by post-Westphalian statehood aspirations, has changed the way sovereignty is perceived and understood nowadays. Approaching sovereignty as multi-faceted, this article discusses contested statehood in the context of the EU's engagement overseas. Drawing on the literature of Europeanisation and complex sovereignty, it accounts for the influence of contested statehood on the EU's role and policies in contested states. Specifically, by delving into Kosovo's complex sovereignty (internal/external), the analysis measures the fluctuating impact of contestedness on the EU's employed policy frameworks and deployed crisis management tools unfolding a paradox that has defined the EU's foreign policy in Kosovo for years.
{"title":"Contested statehood, complex sovereignty and the European Union's role in Kosovo","authors":"Alexandros Lefteratos","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2138350","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2138350","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The emergence, longevity and resilience of contested states have redefined the relationship between sovereignty and territoriality. While fully-fledged states uphold the monopoly of authority, contested states seek to rewrite the sovereignty playbook and gain a seat among sovereign equals. This atypical antagonism, propped up by post-Westphalian statehood aspirations, has changed the way sovereignty is perceived and understood nowadays. Approaching sovereignty as multi-faceted, this article discusses contested statehood in the context of the EU's engagement overseas. Drawing on the literature of Europeanisation and complex sovereignty, it accounts for the influence of contested statehood on the EU's role and policies in contested states. Specifically, by delving into Kosovo's complex sovereignty (internal/external), the analysis measures the fluctuating impact of contestedness on the EU's employed policy frameworks and deployed crisis management tools unfolding a paradox that has defined the EU's foreign policy in Kosovo for years.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"294 - 313"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-11-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47161332","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-19DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2133564
Philippe Lagassé
ABSTRACT This article examines how the French Senate engaged in legislative oversight of the military between 2015 and 2020. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with French parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, and serving and retired military leaders, the article argues that the French Senate performed “community policing” oversight of the military during this period. This community policing approach, which relies on mutual trust and cooperation between the principal and the agent, allowed senators to oversee the military and check the executive at relatively low cost, while giving military leaders a parliamentary ally in their disagreements with the President and Cabinet. The article examines what conditions enabled and encouraged the French Senate to perform this type of oversight, as well as what civil–military dynamics led the French military to view senators as allies in their policy disagreements with the President. The article finds that the 2015 terrorist attacks on French soil played an important role in establishing closer ties between the upper house and the armed forces, with the Senate securing additional capabilities for the armed forces during this time. The article concludes with avenues for future research focusing on upper houses and legislative oversight of the military.
{"title":"Cooperating to contrôle: French senators as defence overseers and civil-military actors","authors":"Philippe Lagassé","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2133564","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2133564","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article examines how the French Senate engaged in legislative oversight of the military between 2015 and 2020. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with French parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, and serving and retired military leaders, the article argues that the French Senate performed “community policing” oversight of the military during this period. This community policing approach, which relies on mutual trust and cooperation between the principal and the agent, allowed senators to oversee the military and check the executive at relatively low cost, while giving military leaders a parliamentary ally in their disagreements with the President and Cabinet. The article examines what conditions enabled and encouraged the French Senate to perform this type of oversight, as well as what civil–military dynamics led the French military to view senators as allies in their policy disagreements with the President. The article finds that the 2015 terrorist attacks on French soil played an important role in establishing closer ties between the upper house and the armed forces, with the Senate securing additional capabilities for the armed forces during this time. The article concludes with avenues for future research focusing on upper houses and legislative oversight of the military.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"252 - 269"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44352093","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-18DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2022.2129967
Burak Tangör, Alpay Alpaydin
ABSTRACT This study examines the cooperation and coordination mechanisms established by Turkey, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) to ensure Syrians’ human security in Turkey. Focusing empirically on security governance processes and practices that have been applied to increase the human security of Syrians in Turkey since 2011. To this end, policies on burden sharing, freedom from fear, and freedom from want regarding Syrians in Turkey are presented. To identify the security needs of Syrians in Turkey and develop solutions adjusted to their needs, the UN and the EU cooperate with the public authorities in Turkey on policy-making processes and provide input for the institutionalisation of Turkey’s asylum system. This study argues that in theory, the actors, who set the security agenda, can create joint policies by focusing on human security and that in practice, this has produced policy implications regarding the human security of Syrians in Turkey.
{"title":"Human security governance: the case of Syrians in Turkey","authors":"Burak Tangör, Alpay Alpaydin","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2022.2129967","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2129967","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This study examines the cooperation and coordination mechanisms established by Turkey, the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) to ensure Syrians’ human security in Turkey. Focusing empirically on security governance processes and practices that have been applied to increase the human security of Syrians in Turkey since 2011. To this end, policies on burden sharing, freedom from fear, and freedom from want regarding Syrians in Turkey are presented. To identify the security needs of Syrians in Turkey and develop solutions adjusted to their needs, the UN and the EU cooperate with the public authorities in Turkey on policy-making processes and provide input for the institutionalisation of Turkey’s asylum system. This study argues that in theory, the actors, who set the security agenda, can create joint policies by focusing on human security and that in practice, this has produced policy implications regarding the human security of Syrians in Turkey.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"32 1","pages":"314 - 334"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46864475","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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