Pub Date : 2023-09-18DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2257778
Micah D. Tillman
ABSTRACTBernard Suits is commonly thought to have defined games as challenges. This paper argues that Suits could not have done so without ruining his larger philosophical project. It then argues that he did not do so. Suits defined game playing in quantitative terms (i.e. being more or less efficient) not qualitative ones (e.g. difficulty, struggle). The paper concludes by exploring the consequences of this shift in perspective.KEYWORDS: Bernard Suitsgameschallengedifficultyefficiency Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. This is not Juul’s only problem with applying Suitsian theory to video games, but it is the one that is relevant here.2. Upton, apparently, was unaware of chapters 9 through 12 of The Grasshopper (Suits Citation2014), which Suits devoted to dealing with make-believe specifically, and role-playing games more generally.3. Nguyen (Citation2020) won the American Philosophical Association’s Book Prize for 2021 (see American Philosophical Association Citationn.d.).4. ‘Beyond formal and historical considerations, there are countless personal or idiosyncratic reasons that particular players might find a game difficult’ (Jagoda Citation2018, 207). See Strojny, et al. (Citation2023, 7) on ‘subjective difficulty’. See also Dziedzic and Włodarczyk (Citation2018, 710–11) and Paraschos and Koulouriotis (Citation2023, 1). Cf. also Suits (Citation2014, 40) and Boutros (Citation2008).5. In this paragraph, I imitate a line of argument by Suits himself from chapter 13 of The Grasshopper (Suits Citation2014, 155).6. The original version of Suits’s definition says that the rules of a game limit the means available to players. The final version of his definition says that those rules limit players to means that are less efficient than would otherwise be available.7. In fact, Suits worked ‘Is Life a Game We Are Playing?’ into Return of the Grasshopper as chapter 5.8. See, e.g. Suits (Citation1981; Citation1989, Citation2004, Citation2006).9. There is not enough room to quote these passages in full, but here are the relevant terms and their locations (all from Suits Citation2014) – Within chapter 3: a) p. 32: ‘dull’ and ‘easy’; b) p. 33: ‘harder’ vs. ‘more efficient’; c) p. 39: ‘effective’ d) p. 39: ‘useful’; e) p. 40: ‘simplest’, ‘easiest’, ‘most direct’, and ‘most efficient’ vs. ‘more complex’, ‘more difficult’, and ‘more indirect’. Outside chapter 3 there are also relevant passages: f) p. 64: ‘effective’; g) p. 90: ‘more difficult’; h) p. 91: ‘easier’ vs. ‘more difficult’; i) p. 91: ‘more efficient’ vs. ‘less efficient’ and ‘difficult’; j) p. 191: ‘challenge’, ‘difficult’.10. He used to be on the island with Jones, but they were playing a game called ‘Homicide’ and Smith ‘won’ (Suits Citation2023, 58–59).
{"title":"Easy games are still games for Suits","authors":"Micah D. Tillman","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2257778","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2257778","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTBernard Suits is commonly thought to have defined games as challenges. This paper argues that Suits could not have done so without ruining his larger philosophical project. It then argues that he did not do so. Suits defined game playing in quantitative terms (i.e. being more or less efficient) not qualitative ones (e.g. difficulty, struggle). The paper concludes by exploring the consequences of this shift in perspective.KEYWORDS: Bernard Suitsgameschallengedifficultyefficiency Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. This is not Juul’s only problem with applying Suitsian theory to video games, but it is the one that is relevant here.2. Upton, apparently, was unaware of chapters 9 through 12 of The Grasshopper (Suits Citation2014), which Suits devoted to dealing with make-believe specifically, and role-playing games more generally.3. Nguyen (Citation2020) won the American Philosophical Association’s Book Prize for 2021 (see American Philosophical Association Citationn.d.).4. ‘Beyond formal and historical considerations, there are countless personal or idiosyncratic reasons that particular players might find a game difficult’ (Jagoda Citation2018, 207). See Strojny, et al. (Citation2023, 7) on ‘subjective difficulty’. See also Dziedzic and Włodarczyk (Citation2018, 710–11) and Paraschos and Koulouriotis (Citation2023, 1). Cf. also Suits (Citation2014, 40) and Boutros (Citation2008).5. In this paragraph, I imitate a line of argument by Suits himself from chapter 13 of The Grasshopper (Suits Citation2014, 155).6. The original version of Suits’s definition says that the rules of a game limit the means available to players. The final version of his definition says that those rules limit players to means that are less efficient than would otherwise be available.7. In fact, Suits worked ‘Is Life a Game We Are Playing?’ into Return of the Grasshopper as chapter 5.8. See, e.g. Suits (Citation1981; Citation1989, Citation2004, Citation2006).9. There is not enough room to quote these passages in full, but here are the relevant terms and their locations (all from Suits Citation2014) – Within chapter 3: a) p. 32: ‘dull’ and ‘easy’; b) p. 33: ‘harder’ vs. ‘more efficient’; c) p. 39: ‘effective’ d) p. 39: ‘useful’; e) p. 40: ‘simplest’, ‘easiest’, ‘most direct’, and ‘most efficient’ vs. ‘more complex’, ‘more difficult’, and ‘more indirect’. Outside chapter 3 there are also relevant passages: f) p. 64: ‘effective’; g) p. 90: ‘more difficult’; h) p. 91: ‘easier’ vs. ‘more difficult’; i) p. 91: ‘more efficient’ vs. ‘less efficient’ and ‘difficult’; j) p. 191: ‘challenge’, ‘difficult’.10. He used to be on the island with Jones, but they were playing a game called ‘Homicide’ and Smith ‘won’ (Suits Citation2023, 58–59).","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135149715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-10DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2228385
M. Howes
{"title":"Surfing and the philosophy of sport","authors":"M. Howes","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2228385","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2228385","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42897787","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-27DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2228391
A. Hamzah, W. Suherman, Ali Satia Graha, Muhammad Zulfikar
{"title":"Phenomenology and pedagogy in physical education","authors":"A. Hamzah, W. Suherman, Ali Satia Graha, Muhammad Zulfikar","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2228391","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2228391","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49664861","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-20DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2227384
I. Jirásek
{"title":"On the eighth day: a catholic theology of sport","authors":"I. Jirásek","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2227384","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2227384","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49227731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-01DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2216387
Lou Matz
{"title":"Beyond the Fields","authors":"Lou Matz","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2216387","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2216387","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58939247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2216883
J. Parry, Jacob Giesbrecht
ABSTRACT Despite reservations over the status of esports as sports, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has, for policy reasons, encouraged International Federations to pursue links with providers of ‘virtual and simulated’ sports, in part by the introduction of an event, the Olympic Virtual Series, first held in 2021. In providing an account of ‘virtuality’ and ‘simulation’, we query the theoretical basis of the Olympic Virtual Series. In particular, we query the IOC’s use of the term ‘virtual’ in the description of two very different activities: what it calls ‘physical virtual sports’ (which we argue are simply Olympic-type sports – real sports! – and should just be called ‘sports’) and ‘non-physical virtual sports’ (which we argue are not sports at all, and should be recognized for what they are – computer games).
{"title":"Esports, real sports and the Olympic Virtual Series","authors":"J. Parry, Jacob Giesbrecht","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2216883","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2216883","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Despite reservations over the status of esports as sports, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has, for policy reasons, encouraged International Federations to pursue links with providers of ‘virtual and simulated’ sports, in part by the introduction of an event, the Olympic Virtual Series, first held in 2021. In providing an account of ‘virtuality’ and ‘simulation’, we query the theoretical basis of the Olympic Virtual Series. In particular, we query the IOC’s use of the term ‘virtual’ in the description of two very different activities: what it calls ‘physical virtual sports’ (which we argue are simply Olympic-type sports – real sports! – and should just be called ‘sports’) and ‘non-physical virtual sports’ (which we argue are not sports at all, and should be recognized for what they are – computer games).","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"50 1","pages":"208 - 228"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"58939267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2214951
Patrick Findler
ABSTRACT This essay replies to Phillip Reichling’s recent article in this journal defending a principle of rescue I proposed, but rejected, in my paper, ‘Climbing high and letting die’ (2021). I argued that ‘the comparable risk principle’ imposes unreasonable demands on adventure sport athletes, for it implies that because they assume substantial risks for sport, they have duties to assume comparable risks to rescue others – duties that would otherwise be supererogatory precisely because of the risks involved. Reichling (2022) defends the principle and contends that once these athletes have assumed substantial risks for sport, they cannot reasonably claim that a rescue that involves comparable risks is too risky. I argue here, however, that Reichling fails to recognize that one can have good personal reasons for assuming risks that do not prevent one from reasonably citing comparable risks as a justification for not rescuing others. So although adventure sport athletes assume risks for personal reasons, it does not follow that they have a duty to assume comparable risks to rescue others. Reichling’s defence of the comparable risk principle is therefore unsuccessful.
{"title":"Risky rescues revisited","authors":"Patrick Findler","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2214951","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2214951","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This essay replies to Phillip Reichling’s recent article in this journal defending a principle of rescue I proposed, but rejected, in my paper, ‘Climbing high and letting die’ (2021). I argued that ‘the comparable risk principle’ imposes unreasonable demands on adventure sport athletes, for it implies that because they assume substantial risks for sport, they have duties to assume comparable risks to rescue others – duties that would otherwise be supererogatory precisely because of the risks involved. Reichling (2022) defends the principle and contends that once these athletes have assumed substantial risks for sport, they cannot reasonably claim that a rescue that involves comparable risks is too risky. I argue here, however, that Reichling fails to recognize that one can have good personal reasons for assuming risks that do not prevent one from reasonably citing comparable risks as a justification for not rescuing others. So although adventure sport athletes assume risks for personal reasons, it does not follow that they have a duty to assume comparable risks to rescue others. Reichling’s defence of the comparable risk principle is therefore unsuccessful.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"50 1","pages":"247 - 255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42319956","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2226873
R. Kretchmar
ABSTRACT In this analysis, I employ Husserl’s three-part description of intentionality to show how a player/play act/play object model for consciousness helps us see play more clearly. I review Suits’ logic-based attempts to amend Huizinga’s overly inclusive characterization of play. However, I do so on what I see as stronger phenomenological grounds by describing four kinds of experience embedded in Suits’ work-play dichotomy. I analyze two species of play-fortified work – namely, work that requires intrinsic enhancement and work that does not. I also describe two species of play – namely, play that is compromised and play that is unfettered. I conclude by summarizing advantages of phenomenological analyses and underlining the important distinctions this philosophic method uncovers within traditional work and play categories.
{"title":"Husserl’s three-part model for intentionality: an examination of players, play acts, and playgrounds","authors":"R. Kretchmar","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2226873","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2226873","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this analysis, I employ Husserl’s three-part description of intentionality to show how a player/play act/play object model for consciousness helps us see play more clearly. I review Suits’ logic-based attempts to amend Huizinga’s overly inclusive characterization of play. However, I do so on what I see as stronger phenomenological grounds by describing four kinds of experience embedded in Suits’ work-play dichotomy. I analyze two species of play-fortified work – namely, work that requires intrinsic enhancement and work that does not. I also describe two species of play – namely, play that is compromised and play that is unfettered. I conclude by summarizing advantages of phenomenological analyses and underlining the important distinctions this philosophic method uncovers within traditional work and play categories.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"50 1","pages":"229 - 246"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46522735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2235414
Alexander Pho
ABSTRACT This article develops a novel theory of sport that I call ‘Confucian mutualism’. Confucian mutualism is underpinned by the Confucian Golden Rule and the Confucian conception of human dignity. It resembles the mutualist theory of sport developed by Robert L. Simon in maintaining that sport participants ethically ought to prioritize promoting sporting excellence both in themselves and in their co-participants. However, while Simon’s mutualism maintains that sporting excellence consists in proficiency at sport constitutive skills, Confucian mutualism maintains that sporting excellence consists in success at achieving the Confucian virtues through sport participation. I provide a preliminary case for why Confucian mutualism’s virtue-centric conception of sporting excellence makes it better able than Simon’s mutualism to explain why sporting excellence is stance-independently ethically significant for all sport participants. I do so by trying to show that we have prima facie justification for believing that Confucian mutualism is not vulnerable to certain kinds of criticisms that have been leveled at Simon’s mutualism.
本文发展了一种新的体育理论，我称之为“儒家互惠主义”。儒家的互惠主义以儒家的黄金法则和儒家的人类尊严观念为基础。它类似于罗伯特·l·西蒙(Robert L. Simon)提出的体育互惠主义理论，认为体育参与者在道德上应该优先促进自己和共同参与者的体育成就。然而，尽管西蒙的互惠主义认为体育运动的卓越在于对体育构成技能的精通，儒家的互惠主义认为体育运动的卓越在于通过体育参与成功地实现儒家的美德。我提供了一个初步的案例，说明为什么儒家互惠主义以美德为中心的体育卓越概念比西蒙的互惠主义更能解释为什么体育卓越对所有体育参与者都具有独立的伦理意义。我试图证明，我们有初步的理由相信儒家的互惠主义不会受到某些针对西蒙互惠主义的批评。
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Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2023.2234978
Adrian Kind, E. Helms
ABSTRACT Since its beginnings, modern bodybuilding has been accompanied by the background issue of whether it should be considered a sport. The problem, culminating in its provisional acceptance as a sport by the International Olympic Committee, was later retracted. The uncertainty of whether bodybuilding is a sport or not seems to linger. Addressing this issue, Aranyosi (2018) provided an account to determine the status of bodybuilding as a sport that arrives at the negative answer: bodybuilding is not a sport but rather a form of artistic presentation. In this paper, we disagree with Aranyosi. We argue that by the standards he presents in his first argument, bodybuilding should be considered a sport. Further, we argue that his alternative approach on how to evaluate a discipline as more sport- or art-like on a spectrum, is not a valid basis to make such a judgment regarding bodybuilding. Further, even if his spectrum was modified to enable such a judgment, again it would result in bodybuilding being evaluated as a sport. Therefore, we conclude that everyone who accepts Aranyosi´s (or any less restrictive) requirements to decide whether bodybuilding is a sport, has to consider bodybuilding as a sport or refrain from making claims about its status.
{"title":"Is bodybuilding a sport?","authors":"Adrian Kind, E. Helms","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2023.2234978","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2023.2234978","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Since its beginnings, modern bodybuilding has been accompanied by the background issue of whether it should be considered a sport. The problem, culminating in its provisional acceptance as a sport by the International Olympic Committee, was later retracted. The uncertainty of whether bodybuilding is a sport or not seems to linger. Addressing this issue, Aranyosi (2018) provided an account to determine the status of bodybuilding as a sport that arrives at the negative answer: bodybuilding is not a sport but rather a form of artistic presentation. In this paper, we disagree with Aranyosi. We argue that by the standards he presents in his first argument, bodybuilding should be considered a sport. Further, we argue that his alternative approach on how to evaluate a discipline as more sport- or art-like on a spectrum, is not a valid basis to make such a judgment regarding bodybuilding. Further, even if his spectrum was modified to enable such a judgment, again it would result in bodybuilding being evaluated as a sport. Therefore, we conclude that everyone who accepts Aranyosi´s (or any less restrictive) requirements to decide whether bodybuilding is a sport, has to consider bodybuilding as a sport or refrain from making claims about its status.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"50 1","pages":"281 - 299"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48452718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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