Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2137030
Federico Luzzi
ABSTRACT Martínková et al provide an overview of a tendency to use gender terms in key sports contexts, including eligibility criteria and testing, where gender is unintended. They argue that to avoid conceptual confusion and aid clarity, we should disentangle gender and sex, acknowledging that often gender talk should be interpreted as talk of sex. One of their recommendations is that the labels of competitive categories ‘women’s’/’men’s’ should change to ‘female’/’male’. I first make their argument against gendered labelling more precise by showing that important yet neglected moral and practical reasons support their abandonment. I then argue that in the case of WA regulations, those moral reasons also cut against Martínková et al.’s relabelling proposal ‘female’/’male’. I sketch a testosterone-based proposal which circumvents the problem and which WA itself should accept. More generally, I argue we should be more mindful of the risk that competitive category labels unnecessarily harm athletes.
{"title":"Conflating and misgendering: why World Athletics (and other sports governing bodies) should jettison the competitive labels ‘Women’s’/‘Men’s’","authors":"Federico Luzzi","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2137030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2137030","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Martínková et al provide an overview of a tendency to use gender terms in key sports contexts, including eligibility criteria and testing, where gender is unintended. They argue that to avoid conceptual confusion and aid clarity, we should disentangle gender and sex, acknowledging that often gender talk should be interpreted as talk of sex. One of their recommendations is that the labels of competitive categories ‘women’s’/’men’s’ should change to ‘female’/’male’. I first make their argument against gendered labelling more precise by showing that important yet neglected moral and practical reasons support their abandonment. I then argue that in the case of WA regulations, those moral reasons also cut against Martínková et al.’s relabelling proposal ‘female’/’male’. I sketch a testosterone-based proposal which circumvents the problem and which WA itself should accept. More generally, I argue we should be more mindful of the risk that competitive category labels unnecessarily harm athletes.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"366 - 382"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42499265","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-02DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2126848
D. Hochstetler
ABSTRACT The American philosophical tradition emphasizes the role of experience as part of philosophical discourse and scholarship. Individuals like Henry Bugbee and Henry David Thoreau described their experiences walking, for example, and connected these experiences with philosophical concepts. My overall contention is to remind us of the importance of sport experiences for our scholarly work. In Part One, I outline the nature of experience and why this is crucial for sport philosophers and sport philosophy. In Part Two, I turn to the process of reflecting on experience, exploring how reflection happens and the import of reflection for our lives and writing. Finally, in Part Three, I move to the writing process related to sport experiences. The manner in which we articulate philosophic principles and arguments, even though these points may be written in third-person, may also be informed by and through an experiential lens.
{"title":"Rocks, scorned facts, and diamonds: experience, recollection, and sport philosophy scholarship","authors":"D. Hochstetler","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2126848","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2126848","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The American philosophical tradition emphasizes the role of experience as part of philosophical discourse and scholarship. Individuals like Henry Bugbee and Henry David Thoreau described their experiences walking, for example, and connected these experiences with philosophical concepts. My overall contention is to remind us of the importance of sport experiences for our scholarly work. In Part One, I outline the nature of experience and why this is crucial for sport philosophers and sport philosophy. In Part Two, I turn to the process of reflecting on experience, exploring how reflection happens and the import of reflection for our lives and writing. Finally, in Part Three, I move to the writing process related to sport experiences. The manner in which we articulate philosophic principles and arguments, even though these points may be written in third-person, may also be informed by and through an experiential lens.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"303 - 321"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44649894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-01DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2119146
Steven G. Smith
ABSTRACT Rooting, defined as a spectator’s demonstrative encouragement of a contestant’s effort, ideally has the morally positive aspects of benevolent concern and helpfulness but in practice strains against reasonable standards of conduct by being rude, excessively biased, exploitative, fanatical, and superstitious. Rooting may activate an atavistic, morally cogent sense of fighting for one’s group that is at odds with the universalism of civilized morality. The ‘merely play’ excuse can cut both ways, deflecting moral objections but also removing moral credit from rooting. Although rooting is often not humane, humane rooting can occur and is supported by humane commentary by sports participants, broadcasters, and journalists. Humane rooting supports the premise of benevolence theories (Mengzi, Hutcheson) that morally ideal benevolence has a foothold in an innate general benevolence – seen in this area especially in benevolence toward efforts. Being partisan, excited, and demonstrative, rooters cannot perfectly embody ‘universal calm benevolence’, but they can consciously minimize the inhumane aspects of rooting and achieve a more fully prosocial satisfaction.
{"title":"The moral proximity of rooting","authors":"Steven G. Smith","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2119146","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2119146","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Rooting, defined as a spectator’s demonstrative encouragement of a contestant’s effort, ideally has the morally positive aspects of benevolent concern and helpfulness but in practice strains against reasonable standards of conduct by being rude, excessively biased, exploitative, fanatical, and superstitious. Rooting may activate an atavistic, morally cogent sense of fighting for one’s group that is at odds with the universalism of civilized morality. The ‘merely play’ excuse can cut both ways, deflecting moral objections but also removing moral credit from rooting. Although rooting is often not humane, humane rooting can occur and is supported by humane commentary by sports participants, broadcasters, and journalists. Humane rooting supports the premise of benevolence theories (Mengzi, Hutcheson) that morally ideal benevolence has a foothold in an innate general benevolence – seen in this area especially in benevolence toward efforts. Being partisan, excited, and demonstrative, rooters cannot perfectly embody ‘universal calm benevolence’, but they can consciously minimize the inhumane aspects of rooting and achieve a more fully prosocial satisfaction.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"351 - 365"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49338709","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-08-09DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2105705
J. Cooper
The central premise of the book draws on the familiar observation that sport and state based legal systems are both rule governed practices that share a great deal in common: as the authors put it, ‘sports and games are, in a clear and recogniz-able sense, legal systems’. With that premise in mind, the book aims to both put some flesh on the bones (by suggesting examples and putting forward relevant comparisons) and, more interestingly, to prompt the reader to consider whether there is anything that each can take from the other. However, the authors also make interesting comparisons between sports and provide introductions to theoretical and philosophical concepts to help underpin and justify comparisons and to assist the reader in thinking about the aims and purposes or creating and interpreting rules in any context. As a result, the book is an excellent resource for law students and law tutors (and not just those interested in sport) who should be able to latch on to the well-chosen examples and extracts to develop under-standing of key legal concepts and skills and also underlying ethical and philosophical concepts that are equally relevant to law and sport. Of particular note are the recurring themes of definition and interpretation, the purpose and nature of sanctions, the difference between rules and standards, the use of discretion and the rationale for choosing standards of proof. Whilst the book is primarily aimed at a legal audience, it should prove of interest for philosophers of sport as an opportunity to reflect on how different sports and legal systems deal with some of the ethical problems that arise. It also provides a source of sporting examples from which to draw interesting ethical dilemmas to engage students with.
{"title":"The jurisprudence of sport: sports and games as legal systems","authors":"J. Cooper","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2105705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2105705","url":null,"abstract":"The central premise of the book draws on the familiar observation that sport and state based legal systems are both rule governed practices that share a great deal in common: as the authors put it, ‘sports and games are, in a clear and recogniz-able sense, legal systems’. With that premise in mind, the book aims to both put some flesh on the bones (by suggesting examples and putting forward relevant comparisons) and, more interestingly, to prompt the reader to consider whether there is anything that each can take from the other. However, the authors also make interesting comparisons between sports and provide introductions to theoretical and philosophical concepts to help underpin and justify comparisons and to assist the reader in thinking about the aims and purposes or creating and interpreting rules in any context. As a result, the book is an excellent resource for law students and law tutors (and not just those interested in sport) who should be able to latch on to the well-chosen examples and extracts to develop under-standing of key legal concepts and skills and also underlying ethical and philosophical concepts that are equally relevant to law and sport. Of particular note are the recurring themes of definition and interpretation, the purpose and nature of sanctions, the difference between rules and standards, the use of discretion and the rationale for choosing standards of proof. Whilst the book is primarily aimed at a legal audience, it should prove of interest for philosophers of sport as an opportunity to reflect on how different sports and legal systems deal with some of the ethical problems that arise. It also provides a source of sporting examples from which to draw interesting ethical dilemmas to engage students with.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"414 - 419"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44174267","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-26DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2103423
Philipp Reichling
ABSTRACT In 2006, mountaineer David Sharp died on the slopes of Mount Everest. Sharp’s death led to public outrage after allegedly 40 climbers passed by the dying Sharp on their way to the peak, without stopping to help. But, since the slopes of Everest are a high-risk environment and rescuing Sharp would have entailed great risks for the rescuers, it is not clear whether the other mountaineers had a moral duty to rescue him. In a recent article, Patrick Findler introduces a principle to analyse such cases which states that we have a duty to rescue under dangerous circumstances, if the involved risks are not higher than the risks we are already taking in the pursuit of our own, morally less worthy ends. However, Findler then rejects this principle as too demanding. In this paper I will defend the principle against its inventor and argue in favour of such a duty. And while it may be true that the other mountaineers were justified in passing Sharp for different reasons, the principle shows that not only climbers, but adventure-sport athletes in general and people who engage in high-risk endeavours, may have a duty to rescue that doesn’t apply to others.
{"title":"Risky rescues – a reply to Patrick Findler","authors":"Philipp Reichling","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2103423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2103423","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In 2006, mountaineer David Sharp died on the slopes of Mount Everest. Sharp’s death led to public outrage after allegedly 40 climbers passed by the dying Sharp on their way to the peak, without stopping to help. But, since the slopes of Everest are a high-risk environment and rescuing Sharp would have entailed great risks for the rescuers, it is not clear whether the other mountaineers had a moral duty to rescue him. In a recent article, Patrick Findler introduces a principle to analyse such cases which states that we have a duty to rescue under dangerous circumstances, if the involved risks are not higher than the risks we are already taking in the pursuit of our own, morally less worthy ends. However, Findler then rejects this principle as too demanding. In this paper I will defend the principle against its inventor and argue in favour of such a duty. And while it may be true that the other mountaineers were justified in passing Sharp for different reasons, the principle shows that not only climbers, but adventure-sport athletes in general and people who engage in high-risk endeavours, may have a duty to rescue that doesn’t apply to others.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"336 - 350"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49408871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-25DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2103424
Lou Matz
ABSTRACT Commentators on strategic fouling have not focused on what is most ethically relevant. I contend that strategic fouling in basketball is unethical in all of its forms because it violates the essence or true ethos of the sport: the display of the full realization of the skills of the game. I give an account of the essential skills, how they are determined, and how historical rule changes about fouling have principally been directed toward rewarding skill and increasing freedom of player movement. I explain why the disciplined restraint from strategically fouling is a competitive virtue as well as a way to show full respect to opponents. Moreover, I contend that the physical contact involved in strategic fouling can elicit a desire to retaliate, an indication of an ethical aspect of strategic fouling that has been overlooked in the scholarly debate.
{"title":"The real ethical problems with strategic fouling in basketball","authors":"Lou Matz","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2103424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2103424","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Commentators on strategic fouling have not focused on what is most ethically relevant. I contend that strategic fouling in basketball is unethical in all of its forms because it violates the essence or true ethos of the sport: the display of the full realization of the skills of the game. I give an account of the essential skills, how they are determined, and how historical rule changes about fouling have principally been directed toward rewarding skill and increasing freedom of player movement. I explain why the disciplined restraint from strategically fouling is a competitive virtue as well as a way to show full respect to opponents. Moreover, I contend that the physical contact involved in strategic fouling can elicit a desire to retaliate, an indication of an ethical aspect of strategic fouling that has been overlooked in the scholarly debate.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"322 - 335"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48684758","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2072852
Micah D. Tillman
ABSTRACT Johnson and Hudecki argue that Bernard Suits fails to refute Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ view of games because Suits’s account of how games begin, how they are played, and the ends they involve, fails to match basic facts of player experience. In reply, the current paper describes three keys to interpreting The Grasshopper: (1) distinguishing the four perspectives from which Suits describes games, (2) recognizing Suits' dispositional view of rule following, and (3) understanding the geometrical metaphor Suits uses to describe rules. In light of these, this paper argues that Johnson and Hudecki’s critiques are either mistaken or are actually affirmations of Suits' position.
{"title":"Suits and the phenomenology of games: a reply to Johnson and Hudecki","authors":"Micah D. Tillman","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2072852","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2072852","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Johnson and Hudecki argue that Bernard Suits fails to refute Wittgenstein’s ‘family resemblance’ view of games because Suits’s account of how games begin, how they are played, and the ends they involve, fails to match basic facts of player experience. In reply, the current paper describes three keys to interpreting The Grasshopper: (1) distinguishing the four perspectives from which Suits describes games, (2) recognizing Suits' dispositional view of rule following, and (3) understanding the geometrical metaphor Suits uses to describe rules. In light of these, this paper argues that Johnson and Hudecki’s critiques are either mistaken or are actually affirmations of Suits' position.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"230 - 245"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44290206","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2080686
J. Kornbeck
disappointing that excellent and relevant work published within the literature goes relatively unnoticed. This is not an uncommon critique of works (see Edgar 2022) that delve into sport philosophy topics. Recognition for the previous spadework done would greatly benefit the sport humanities literature, but it is still a strength of the book that new voices and alternative perspectives are on offer. As such, this is a valuable resource for academics interested in non-analytic philosophy, as a tool for developing sociocultural/historical course content, or for graduate students interested broadly in the sport humanities. It is an important work that helps us grapple with our understanding, for better or worse, of sport’s importance.
{"title":"Governing the society of competition: cycling, doping and the law","authors":"J. Kornbeck","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2080686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2080686","url":null,"abstract":"disappointing that excellent and relevant work published within the literature goes relatively unnoticed. This is not an uncommon critique of works (see Edgar 2022) that delve into sport philosophy topics. Recognition for the previous spadework done would greatly benefit the sport humanities literature, but it is still a strength of the book that new voices and alternative perspectives are on offer. As such, this is a valuable resource for academics interested in non-analytic philosophy, as a tool for developing sociocultural/historical course content, or for graduate students interested broadly in the sport humanities. It is an important work that helps us grapple with our understanding, for better or worse, of sport’s importance.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"297 - 302"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48314474","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2092486
Megs S. Gendreau
ABSTRACT The private lives of elite athletes are frequently subject to the curiosity, scrutiny, and judgment of the general public. While this interest in life ‘off the field’ is not unique to athletes, this paper argues that our focus on athletes’ lives results, in part, from the fact that athletic achievement is deeply tied to the person. I will argue that athletic performance is distinct because it is both embodied and does not issue in an artifact. These features inextricably tie athletic achievements to the persons whose achievements they are, making an appreciation of athletic achievement an appreciation of the athlete qua person and not merely qua athlete. Thus, in emulating athletes, we not only want to ‘play’ like them, we want to ‘be’ like them. While this helps to explain why the public is so concerned with features of elite athletes’ lives that have little bearing on athletic performance, it may also generate a responsibility on the part of athletes to live up to a basic standard of decency in all aspects of their lives and a correlative obligation on the part of fans to recognize and respect athletes as persons.
{"title":"Why we care about who athletes are: on the peculiar nature of athletic achievement","authors":"Megs S. Gendreau","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2092486","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2092486","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The private lives of elite athletes are frequently subject to the curiosity, scrutiny, and judgment of the general public. While this interest in life ‘off the field’ is not unique to athletes, this paper argues that our focus on athletes’ lives results, in part, from the fact that athletic achievement is deeply tied to the person. I will argue that athletic performance is distinct because it is both embodied and does not issue in an artifact. These features inextricably tie athletic achievements to the persons whose achievements they are, making an appreciation of athletic achievement an appreciation of the athlete qua person and not merely qua athlete. Thus, in emulating athletes, we not only want to ‘play’ like them, we want to ‘be’ like them. While this helps to explain why the public is so concerned with features of elite athletes’ lives that have little bearing on athletic performance, it may also generate a responsibility on the part of athletes to live up to a basic standard of decency in all aspects of their lives and a correlative obligation on the part of fans to recognize and respect athletes as persons.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"278 - 291"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44946973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00948705.2022.2080070
Breana McCoy, I. Martínková
ABSTRACT The three social practices – democracy, philosophy and sport – are more similar than we might initially suspect. They can be described as ‘essentially agonistic social practices’, that is, they are manifestations of ‘agon’ (contest). The possibility to participate in agonistic social practices derives from the human condition, i.e. from the necessity to care for one’s existence, which requires ongoing attention and decision-making, and which sometimes means going against others. We call this character of human existence by the ancient Greek term ‘polemos’ (struggle), which can be manifested through various types of agon. If society cherishes agonistic social practices, it enables its citizens to compete to prove themselves and achieve goals (e.g. to push through a persuasive argument, or to win in sport) in a respectful, peaceful and productive way. Believed to have played a significant role in ancient Greece, agon presents itself in both intellectual and physical forms – in philosophy, democratic politics and sport – suggesting that the relationship between these practices is deep-rooted and significant. This paper explores the idea that developing our understanding of polemos and agon can enhance our experience of agonistic social practices and enable our existence to proceed in a more free, pro-social and enriching way.
{"title":"Democracy, philosophy and sport: animating the agonistic spirit","authors":"Breana McCoy, I. Martínková","doi":"10.1080/00948705.2022.2080070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2022.2080070","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The three social practices – democracy, philosophy and sport – are more similar than we might initially suspect. They can be described as ‘essentially agonistic social practices’, that is, they are manifestations of ‘agon’ (contest). The possibility to participate in agonistic social practices derives from the human condition, i.e. from the necessity to care for one’s existence, which requires ongoing attention and decision-making, and which sometimes means going against others. We call this character of human existence by the ancient Greek term ‘polemos’ (struggle), which can be manifested through various types of agon. If society cherishes agonistic social practices, it enables its citizens to compete to prove themselves and achieve goals (e.g. to push through a persuasive argument, or to win in sport) in a respectful, peaceful and productive way. Believed to have played a significant role in ancient Greece, agon presents itself in both intellectual and physical forms – in philosophy, democratic politics and sport – suggesting that the relationship between these practices is deep-rooted and significant. This paper explores the idea that developing our understanding of polemos and agon can enhance our experience of agonistic social practices and enable our existence to proceed in a more free, pro-social and enriching way.","PeriodicalId":46532,"journal":{"name":"Journal of the Philosophy of Sport","volume":"49 1","pages":"246 - 262"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2022-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43922955","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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