The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) guarantees that persons with disabilities (‘PWD’) are to be equal before and under the law. There are almost identical equality guarantees in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Hong Kong's mini constitution – the Basic Law. Australia boasts similar legislative equality guarantees for PWD. The CRPD Committee has interpreted the right broadly, whereas constitutional courts have taken a proportionality approach, balancing the right to substantive equality against competing concerns. The tension between these methods of rights protection means the CRPD is being positioned as an alternative model of rights protection, but it is not an alternative mechanism for enforcement. This article calls on the Committee to modify its guidance to make suggestions to state parties as to how incremental advances in rights protection can be immediately implemented, even if in the short-term, these advances fall short of full inclusion.
{"title":"An Incremental Approach to Filling Protection Gaps in Equality Rights for Persons with Disabilities","authors":"Jane Richards","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) guarantees that persons with disabilities (‘PWD’) are to be equal before and under the law. There are almost identical equality guarantees in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Hong Kong's mini constitution – the Basic Law. Australia boasts similar legislative equality guarantees for PWD. The CRPD Committee has interpreted the right broadly, whereas constitutional courts have taken a proportionality approach, balancing the right to substantive equality against competing concerns. The tension between these methods of rights protection means the CRPD is being positioned as an alternative model of rights protection, but it is not an alternative mechanism for enforcement. This article calls on the Committee to modify its guidance to make suggestions to state parties as to how incremental advances in rights protection can be immediately implemented, even if in the short-term, these advances fall short of full inclusion.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB013","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42386554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Children often face discrimination, bullying and even violence because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, as do children raised by parents who are lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT). This article considers what the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child is doing to protect the rights of LGBT children and children with LGBT parents. To make such an assessment, this article critically analyses the Committee’s Concluding Observations over a ten-year period, its General Comments and its Views on Individual Communications. The conclusion reached is that while the Committee has made encouraging progress in recent years when it comes to addressing LGBT related issues, there is still room for improvement in the way the Committee seeks to protect children from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.
{"title":"Is the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Doing Enough to Protect the Rights of LGBT Children and Children with Same-Sex Parents?","authors":"P. Gerber, A. Timoshanko","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB012","url":null,"abstract":"Children often face discrimination, bullying and even violence because of their sexual orientation or gender identity, as do children raised by parents who are lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender (LGBT). This article considers what the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child is doing to protect the rights of LGBT children and children with LGBT parents. To make such an assessment, this article critically analyses the Committee’s Concluding Observations over a ten-year period, its General Comments and its Views on Individual Communications. The conclusion reached is that while the Committee has made encouraging progress in recent years when it comes to addressing LGBT related issues, there is still room for improvement in the way the Committee seeks to protect children from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB012","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44599944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Infrastructure projects, including roads, railways, power, telecommunications and water facilities, are considered necessary to promote many different human rights and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Infrastructure development has been a central feature of the Myanmar government’s policies, including the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018–2030, to sustain economic growth and achieve the SDGs. As in many countries, public–private partnerships are promoted to help implement these policies. Yet, infrastructure projects have been associated with serious human rights violations, including in Myanmar. This article explores the links between infrastructure, international human rights law and the SDGs. It analyses how this relationship is governed by international, domestic, ‘soft’ law and self-regulatory mechanisms. It then assesses Myanmar’s legal and policy framework for promoting infrastructure investment and implementing the SDGs. It concludes that there is scope to further clarify responsibilities and accountability mechanisms for the human rights impacts of infrastructure investment.
{"title":"Regulating Infrastructure: Human Rights and the Sustainable Development Goals in Myanmar","authors":"Emma J. Palmer","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Infrastructure projects, including roads, railways, power, telecommunications and water facilities, are considered necessary to promote many different human rights and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Infrastructure development has been a central feature of the Myanmar government’s policies, including the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018–2030, to sustain economic growth and achieve the SDGs. As in many countries, public–private partnerships are promoted to help implement these policies. Yet, infrastructure projects have been associated with serious human rights violations, including in Myanmar. This article explores the links between infrastructure, international human rights law and the SDGs. It analyses how this relationship is governed by international, domestic, ‘soft’ law and self-regulatory mechanisms. It then assesses Myanmar’s legal and policy framework for promoting infrastructure investment and implementing the SDGs. It concludes that there is scope to further clarify responsibilities and accountability mechanisms for the human rights impacts of infrastructure investment.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB004","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43002564","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Athletes are not just sports people; they are certainly among the most prominent figures of their present time, playing an important role in shaping opinions with their power to inspire. For this very reason, athletes’ freedom of expression is strongly limited by the sport authorities in light of the fundamental principle of sport neutrality. This study analyses and questions the traditional constraints to athletes’ free speech by taking into consideration the role of human rights in sports legal order and in sporting affairs. By assuming an emerging relativization of sport political neutrality, the essay investigates the case-law concerning athletes’ freedom of expression identifying limits and perspectives of the current evolutions on athletes’ public statements, establishing to what extent a reform of the present sporting regulation on freedom of expression is needed.
{"title":"Athletes’ Freedom of Expression: The Relative Political Neutrality of Sport","authors":"A. Marco","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Athletes are not just sports people; they are certainly among the most prominent figures of their present time, playing an important role in shaping opinions with their power to inspire. For this very reason, athletes’ freedom of expression is strongly limited by the sport authorities in light of the fundamental principle of sport neutrality. This study analyses and questions the traditional constraints to athletes’ free speech by taking into consideration the role of human rights in sports legal order and in sporting affairs. By assuming an emerging relativization of sport political neutrality, the essay investigates the case-law concerning athletes’ freedom of expression identifying limits and perspectives of the current evolutions on athletes’ public statements, establishing to what extent a reform of the present sporting regulation on freedom of expression is needed.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB009","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43036603","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Under the League of Arab States’ human rights regime, Arab countries are governed by the Arab Charter of Human Rights 2004. The Charter, however, lacks an enforcement mechanism. The Statute of the Arab Court of Human Rights 2014 aims to fill this enforcement void. This article addresses the criticism that, because it fails to provide for a direct right of individual petition, the Statute is not fit for purpose. It is argued contrarily that, within the context of an Arab human rights system, the Court should be welcomed as an important step in the process of establishing an effective regime.
{"title":"The Arab Court of Human Rights and the Enforcement of the Arab Charter on Human Rights","authors":"A. Almutawa","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB008","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Under the League of Arab States’ human rights regime, Arab countries are governed by the Arab Charter of Human Rights 2004. The Charter, however, lacks an enforcement mechanism. The Statute of the Arab Court of Human Rights 2014 aims to fill this enforcement void. This article addresses the criticism that, because it fails to provide for a direct right of individual petition, the Statute is not fit for purpose. It is argued contrarily that, within the context of an Arab human rights system, the Court should be welcomed as an important step in the process of establishing an effective regime.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47995555","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Article 31(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides all children, everywhere, with the right to play. The CRC is the most widely ratified international human rights treaty, yet children’s right to play is considered ‘the forgotten right’. The widespread State inaction to fulfil this right could be partly due to continued uncertainty about how to define play. This Article argues for the application a large body of recent research with the group most qualified to determine whether activities are play or not: young children. This research demonstrates that choice and autonomy are two universal and essential indicia for an activity to be experienced as play. The Article contends that the fulfilment of young children’s right to play would significantly increase if early childhood education and care (ECEC) institutions within States utilised these two indicia within daily programmed activities and in ECEC policies.
{"title":"Article 31, 31 Years On: Choice and Autonomy as a Framework for Implementing Children’s Right to Play in Early Childhood Services","authors":"Yeshe Colliver, Holly Doel-Mackaway","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Article 31(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) provides all children, everywhere, with the right to play. The CRC is the most widely ratified international human rights treaty, yet children’s right to play is considered ‘the forgotten right’. The widespread State inaction to fulfil this right could be partly due to continued uncertainty about how to define play. This Article argues for the application a large body of recent research with the group most qualified to determine whether activities are play or not: young children. This research demonstrates that choice and autonomy are two universal and essential indicia for an activity to be experienced as play. The Article contends that the fulfilment of young children’s right to play would significantly increase if early childhood education and care (ECEC) institutions within States utilised these two indicia within daily programmed activities and in ECEC policies.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB011","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42725161","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Suicide is a major global public health problem, but rarely is the subject viewed as a human right. With the sole exception of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), no international authority has taken a strong position on whether a human right to suicide exists. Even that court’s jurisprudence goes no further than intimating that such a right falls within the scope of the human right to private life. This essay tackles the question of whether there is a human right to suicide under existing international law and, if so, what are its sources and limits. It concludes with an analysis of what obligations, both negative and positive, a right to suicide would impose on the state.
{"title":"The Human Right to Suicide under International Law","authors":"A. Fellmeth, Nourin Abourahma","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Suicide is a major global public health problem, but rarely is the subject viewed as a human right. With the sole exception of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), no international authority has taken a strong position on whether a human right to suicide exists. Even that court’s jurisprudence goes no further than intimating that such a right falls within the scope of the human right to private life. This essay tackles the question of whether there is a human right to suicide under existing international law and, if so, what are its sources and limits. It concludes with an analysis of what obligations, both negative and positive, a right to suicide would impose on the state.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49121829","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article considers a scarcely explored perspective in relation to the execution of judgments of the ECtHR, notably, the formal involvement of NGOs and NHRIs. Rule 9(2) of the Committee of Minister Rules’ allows NGOs and NHRIs to participate in the supervision process for the execution of the Court’s judgments by submitting reports (Communications) in which these actors review and assess domestic authorities’ performance with respect to judgment execution. On the basis of interviews with important stakeholders, this article provides an all-round user-based perspective of this Rule 9 mechanism and its perceived impact. Doing so elucidates whether the Rule 9 procedure allows NGOs and NHRIs to engage in the important cycle of reporting and pressuring for change, the conclusions of which are important in assessing if and how Rule 9 works to advance the execution of judgments of the ECtHR.
{"title":"Non-Governmental Organisations and National Human Rights Institutions monitoring the execution of Strasbourg Judgments: An Empirical Perspective on Rule 9 Communications","authors":"E. Erken","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article considers a scarcely explored perspective in relation to the execution of judgments of the ECtHR, notably, the formal involvement of NGOs and NHRIs. Rule 9(2) of the Committee of Minister Rules’ allows NGOs and NHRIs to participate in the supervision process for the execution of the Court’s judgments by submitting reports (Communications) in which these actors review and assess domestic authorities’ performance with respect to judgment execution. On the basis of interviews with important stakeholders, this article provides an all-round user-based perspective of this Rule 9 mechanism and its perceived impact. Doing so elucidates whether the Rule 9 procedure allows NGOs and NHRIs to engage in the important cycle of reporting and pressuring for change, the conclusions of which are important in assessing if and how Rule 9 works to advance the execution of judgments of the ECtHR.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB007","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47531634","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Y. Daly, A. Pivaty, Diletta Marchesi, Peggy ter Vrugt
This article sheds comparative and contextual light on European and international human rights debates around the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. It does so through an examination of adverse inferences from criminal suspect’s silence in three European jurisdictions with differing procedural traditions: Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. The article highlights the manner in which adverse inferences have come to be drawn at trial in the three jurisdictions, despite the existence of both European and domestic legal protections for the right to silence. It also explores differing approaches to the practical operation of inference-drawing procedures, including threshold requirements, varying evidential uses of silence and procedural safeguards. The authors argue that human rights’ standard-setting institutions ought to provide clarity on the conditions under which adverse inferences may be tolerated, including the purpose(s) for which inferences may be used, and the necessary surrounding safeguards.
{"title":"Human Rights Protections in Drawing Inferences from Criminal Suspects’ Silence","authors":"Y. Daly, A. Pivaty, Diletta Marchesi, Peggy ter Vrugt","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAB006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article sheds comparative and contextual light on European and international human rights debates around the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence. It does so through an examination of adverse inferences from criminal suspect’s silence in three European jurisdictions with differing procedural traditions: Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands. The article highlights the manner in which adverse inferences have come to be drawn at trial in the three jurisdictions, despite the existence of both European and domestic legal protections for the right to silence. It also explores differing approaches to the practical operation of inference-drawing procedures, including threshold requirements, varying evidential uses of silence and procedural safeguards. The authors argue that human rights’ standard-setting institutions ought to provide clarity on the conditions under which adverse inferences may be tolerated, including the purpose(s) for which inferences may be used, and the necessary surrounding safeguards.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/HRLR/NGAB006","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42173425","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This contribution argues for the recognition of digital integrity as a human right, either as a right on its own or as an interpretative principle for related rights. The right to digital integrity represents a legal norm that crystallizes a certain vision of the individual, as well as the protections that he/she ought to be afforded in a world where digital technologies are omnipresent and pervasive. The main function which digital integrity would fulfil as a human right is a consistency-providing function between the protection of human dignity, the protection of freedom and the protection of privacy. Digital integrity is a concretization of the protection of human dignity in terms of the specific threats that are posed by digital technologies. It serves to promote a substantial definition of what freedom should be about and how this freedom relates to the protection of privacy in informational matters. This contribution illustrates this claim by outlining a republican view of digital integrity and exemplifying its impact on related rights.
{"title":"Connecting the Dots: Digital Integrity as a Human Right","authors":"J. Rochel","doi":"10.1093/HRLR/NGAA063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/HRLR/NGAA063","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This contribution argues for the recognition of digital integrity as a human right, either as a right on its own or as an interpretative principle for related rights. The right to digital integrity represents a legal norm that crystallizes a certain vision of the individual, as well as the protections that he/she ought to be afforded in a world where digital technologies are omnipresent and pervasive. The main function which digital integrity would fulfil as a human right is a consistency-providing function between the protection of human dignity, the protection of freedom and the protection of privacy. Digital integrity is a concretization of the protection of human dignity in terms of the specific threats that are posed by digital technologies. It serves to promote a substantial definition of what freedom should be about and how this freedom relates to the protection of privacy in informational matters. This contribution illustrates this claim by outlining a republican view of digital integrity and exemplifying its impact on related rights.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":"21 1","pages":"358-383"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2021-03-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1093/HRLR/NGAA063","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45850170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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