The article focuses on the critical moment when the idea of equality entered international law. The article argues that a political claim to equality of all human beings surfaced at the international level already in the 1920s and 1930s, long before human rights were discussed at the United Nations. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), established in 1919, provided the venue for delegates from non-European countries or territories—most of them confronting some form of colonialism—to raise their voices against the exploitation of labour in India, China and other places under the domination of colonial powers. The delegates’ idea of equality was present in arguments attacking racial hierarchies and in arguments criticizing unequal treatment in ‘native labour’ relations. The universalistic idea of the equal worth of all human beings and the idea of equal treatment was advanced to de-legitimize narrow concepts of equality based on race.
{"title":"Decolonizing Equality—The Legacies of Anti-Colonial Struggles at International Labour Conferences, 1920–1940","authors":"Ulrike Davy","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The article focuses on the critical moment when the idea of equality entered international law. The article argues that a political claim to equality of all human beings surfaced at the international level already in the 1920s and 1930s, long before human rights were discussed at the United Nations. The International Labour Organisation (ILO), established in 1919, provided the venue for delegates from non-European countries or territories—most of them confronting some form of colonialism—to raise their voices against the exploitation of labour in India, China and other places under the domination of colonial powers. The delegates’ idea of equality was present in arguments attacking racial hierarchies and in arguments criticizing unequal treatment in ‘native labour’ relations. The universalistic idea of the equal worth of all human beings and the idea of equal treatment was advanced to de-legitimize narrow concepts of equality based on race.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46496493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Climate change presents existential challenges for the livelihoods of indigenous peoples, which depend on vulnerable ecosystems prone to extreme weather phenomena. Of all indigenous communities, those living in the Arctic have been worst affected. This raises the question to what extent international law can be mobilized to address the endangered livelihoods of Arctic indigenous peoples in light of rapid changes in the Arctic environment. This article examines two dimensions of the protection of livelihoods: an internal one—i.e. legal entitlements over assets, land and income—and an external one—i.e. the living environment in the Arctic. In so doing, the article analyses the right to property under regional human rights law and rules on the protection of marine resources under the law of the sea. Reflecting on relevant jurisprudence, it shows that both legal areas could provide important elements of litigation strategies to address the human rights costs of climate change.
{"title":"Protecting the Arctic Indigenous Peoples’ Livelihoods in the Face of Climate Change: The Potential of Regional Human Rights Law and the Law of the Sea","authors":"L. Mardikian, Sofia Galani","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Climate change presents existential challenges for the livelihoods of indigenous peoples, which depend on vulnerable ecosystems prone to extreme weather phenomena. Of all indigenous communities, those living in the Arctic have been worst affected. This raises the question to what extent international law can be mobilized to address the endangered livelihoods of Arctic indigenous peoples in light of rapid changes in the Arctic environment. This article examines two dimensions of the protection of livelihoods: an internal one—i.e. legal entitlements over assets, land and income—and an external one—i.e. the living environment in the Arctic. In so doing, the article analyses the right to property under regional human rights law and rules on the protection of marine resources under the law of the sea. Reflecting on relevant jurisprudence, it shows that both legal areas could provide important elements of litigation strategies to address the human rights costs of climate change.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47312305","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This study argues that the Minimum Wages Directive reveals a shift in the Union’s political-economic approach to the social competition in the Single Market, which introduces a creeping extension of the Treaty’s scope and a potential enlargement of the Union’s competences on social matters. While representing a timid starting point for the right to a minimum wage protection, it recognises that the dumping wages phenomena are partly triggered by an (unresolved) structural legal vacuum. By analysing the instrumental function of the fair remuneration towards human dignity, the idea of the right to fair and just working conditions as an open scoped right is advanced; the thesis of a general Union competence on working conditions is finally proposed. The aim is to illustrate what limits and perspectives the European upward social convergence is currently facing, and to what extent the Union is not necessarily a mere reflection of market completion interests.
{"title":"Minimum Wages Directive and Beyond: Workers’ Dignity Taken (Almost) Seriously","authors":"Antonio Di Marco","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad012","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This study argues that the Minimum Wages Directive reveals a shift in the Union’s political-economic approach to the social competition in the Single Market, which introduces a creeping extension of the Treaty’s scope and a potential enlargement of the Union’s competences on social matters. While representing a timid starting point for the right to a minimum wage protection, it recognises that the dumping wages phenomena are partly triggered by an (unresolved) structural legal vacuum. By analysing the instrumental function of the fair remuneration towards human dignity, the idea of the right to fair and just working conditions as an open scoped right is advanced; the thesis of a general Union competence on working conditions is finally proposed. The aim is to illustrate what limits and perspectives the European upward social convergence is currently facing, and to what extent the Union is not necessarily a mere reflection of market completion interests.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136169668","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the face of women’s disproportionate experience of violence and the growing scholarly literature and advocacy on this issue, there is no international treaty recognising violence against women (VAW) as a human rights violation in and of itself. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) does not include a definition of gender-based violence, violence against women or even domestic violence. Many soft law documents address VAW, including the CEDAW committee’s general recommendations. However, even though soft laws are persuasive in developing norms, their non-binding character effectively means that States cannot be held responsible for violations. Currently, to accommodate VAW within various treaties, certain ‘jurisdictional gymnastics’ must be done. This article argues that a critical re-characterization is necessary. The reality of women’s lives in many parts of the world necessitates an effective international legal framework that explicitly defines VAW, in all its forms, as a human rights violation.
{"title":"The Silences of International Human Rights Law: The Need for a UN Treaty on Violence Against Women","authors":"Julie Ada Tchoukou","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In the face of women’s disproportionate experience of violence and the growing scholarly literature and advocacy on this issue, there is no international treaty recognising violence against women (VAW) as a human rights violation in and of itself. The Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) does not include a definition of gender-based violence, violence against women or even domestic violence. Many soft law documents address VAW, including the CEDAW committee’s general recommendations. However, even though soft laws are persuasive in developing norms, their non-binding character effectively means that States cannot be held responsible for violations. Currently, to accommodate VAW within various treaties, certain ‘jurisdictional gymnastics’ must be done. This article argues that a critical re-characterization is necessary. The reality of women’s lives in many parts of the world necessitates an effective international legal framework that explicitly defines VAW, in all its forms, as a human rights violation.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44157554","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper contributes to an ongoing debate concerning the perceived judicial activism of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It argues that the output of the Court should be better viewed as the phenomenon of judicial law-making, not unlike in domestic jurisdictions. However, unlike many domestic legal systems, the European Convention on Human Rights framework promotes large quantities of judge-made law. This outcome results from a combination of objective factors that, taken together, enhance the process of judicial law-making by the ECtHR. Those factors include the applied mode of interpretation of the Convention, the approach to its construction, the weak textual basis, the existence of positive obligations, the lack of the doctrine of precedent, the extremely high case law and judicial turnovers, the concurrent legislative inactivity, the existence of the inter-state jurisdiction and the doctrine of autonomous meaning. At the same time, the judicial law-making is only hindered by the doctrine of subsidiarity, the principle of margin of appreciation and the Fourth Instance doctrine. As a consequence of this overwhelming dominance of the factors enhancing the process of judicial law-making over those that hinder it, the ECtHR produces large quantities of judge-made law.
{"title":"Judicial Activism and Judge-Made Law at the ECtHR","authors":"Maro Bosnjak, K. Zajac","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper contributes to an ongoing debate concerning the perceived judicial activism of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It argues that the output of the Court should be better viewed as the phenomenon of judicial law-making, not unlike in domestic jurisdictions. However, unlike many domestic legal systems, the European Convention on Human Rights framework promotes large quantities of judge-made law. This outcome results from a combination of objective factors that, taken together, enhance the process of judicial law-making by the ECtHR. Those factors include the applied mode of interpretation of the Convention, the approach to its construction, the weak textual basis, the existence of positive obligations, the lack of the doctrine of precedent, the extremely high case law and judicial turnovers, the concurrent legislative inactivity, the existence of the inter-state jurisdiction and the doctrine of autonomous meaning. At the same time, the judicial law-making is only hindered by the doctrine of subsidiarity, the principle of margin of appreciation and the Fourth Instance doctrine. As a consequence of this overwhelming dominance of the factors enhancing the process of judicial law-making over those that hinder it, the ECtHR produces large quantities of judge-made law.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45220926","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars have identified challenges to protecting individuals from discrimination in contexts where organisations deploy artificial intelligence decision-making processes. While scholarship on ‘digital discrimination’ is growing, scholars have paid less attention to the impact of the use of artificial intelligence decision-making processes on persons with disabilities. This article posits that while the use of artificial intelligence technology can be beneficial for some purposes, its deployment can also construct a disability. The article demonstrates that the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities can be interpreted in a manner that confers a wide variety of human rights on persons with disabilities in the context when entities deploy artificial intelligence decision-making processes. The article proposes a test for digital discrimination based on disability and shows how it can be incorporated into the treaty through legal interpretation. Thereafter, it moves to developing an analogous general test for digital discrimination under international human rights law, applicable beyond a catalogue of protected characteristics.
{"title":"Disability Discrimination in the Digital Realm: How the ICRPD Applies to Artificial Intelligence Decision-Making Processes and Helps in Determining the State of International Human Rights Law","authors":"T. Krupiy, M. Scheinin","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Scholars have identified challenges to protecting individuals from discrimination in contexts where organisations deploy artificial intelligence decision-making processes. While scholarship on ‘digital discrimination’ is growing, scholars have paid less attention to the impact of the use of artificial intelligence decision-making processes on persons with disabilities. This article posits that while the use of artificial intelligence technology can be beneficial for some purposes, its deployment can also construct a disability. The article demonstrates that the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities can be interpreted in a manner that confers a wide variety of human rights on persons with disabilities in the context when entities deploy artificial intelligence decision-making processes. The article proposes a test for digital discrimination based on disability and shows how it can be incorporated into the treaty through legal interpretation. Thereafter, it moves to developing an analogous general test for digital discrimination under international human rights law, applicable beyond a catalogue of protected characteristics.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43685216","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights can be framed with different levels of concreteness. The level chosen is essential for understanding the analytical distinction between the existence of an obligation and its breach. The level of concreteness is an important conceptual framework because it has an impact even on the possibility of making an assessment as to whether the State has breached the obligation, and on how this assessment is performed in the reasoning. Kurt v Austria is used to illustrate how positive obligations can be framed both in more abstract and concrete terms, and how the reasoning mediates between the two. The more it tilts towards a concrete formulation of the obligation, the more the Court appears to assume the role of a rule-maker, which is in tension with the principle that States have discretion as to the concrete measures to fulfill their positive obligations.
{"title":"Framing Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights Law: Mediating between the Abstract and the Concrete","authors":"V. Stoyanova","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights can be framed with different levels of concreteness. The level chosen is essential for understanding the analytical distinction between the existence of an obligation and its breach. The level of concreteness is an important conceptual framework because it has an impact even on the possibility of making an assessment as to whether the State has breached the obligation, and on how this assessment is performed in the reasoning. Kurt v Austria is used to illustrate how positive obligations can be framed both in more abstract and concrete terms, and how the reasoning mediates between the two. The more it tilts towards a concrete formulation of the obligation, the more the Court appears to assume the role of a rule-maker, which is in tension with the principle that States have discretion as to the concrete measures to fulfill their positive obligations.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48146910","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyses the human right to science (RtS) in relation to data science (DS) and its applications, particularly, data monetization. It advances an approach that balances three aspects of RtS, namely, protection from harmful science, benefit-sharing and participation in science and derives three corresponding sets of state duties. First, RtS implies the duty to end data monetization in so far as it entails practices harmful to human rights, including unlawful interference with privacy. Second, while data monetization exists, RtS entails the duty to distribute monetary benefits through an RtS-based universal basic income (UBI). Third, RtS entails the duty to facilitate ordinary people’s participation in DS and prioritize non-profit pro-social uses of DS as in citizen or community DS. The proposed RtS analysis of DS engages policy responses to artificial intelligence (AI) and material inequality, namely, AI regulation, monetary benefits from data, UBI and the ‘data for good’ movement. No new data were generated or analysed in support of this research.
{"title":"Ensuring Data Science and Its Applications Benefit Humanity: Data Monetization and the Right to Science","authors":"Jayson Lamchek","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper analyses the human right to science (RtS) in relation to data science (DS) and its applications, particularly, data monetization. It advances an approach that balances three aspects of RtS, namely, protection from harmful science, benefit-sharing and participation in science and derives three corresponding sets of state duties. First, RtS implies the duty to end data monetization in so far as it entails practices harmful to human rights, including unlawful interference with privacy. Second, while data monetization exists, RtS entails the duty to distribute monetary benefits through an RtS-based universal basic income (UBI). Third, RtS entails the duty to facilitate ordinary people’s participation in DS and prioritize non-profit pro-social uses of DS as in citizen or community DS. The proposed RtS analysis of DS engages policy responses to artificial intelligence (AI) and material inequality, namely, AI regulation, monetary benefits from data, UBI and the ‘data for good’ movement. No new data were generated or analysed in support of this research.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41473853","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article argues that international human rights (quasi-)adjudicatory institutions should do better in considering the best interests of the child and freedom of religion in cases involving human rights aspects of alternative care and adoption. The European Court of Human Rights, particularly, has been using obscure and contradictory standards, which ultimately do not privilege the child’s best interests in matters affecting them directly. Recent Grand Chamber jurisprudence instead puts parents’ interests above the child’s. A child-centred approach where children are not objectified, but treated as autonomous, rights-bearing, legal persons, with independent interests that may override those of other stakeholders is needed. This article explores general international and European rules governing children’s religious rights in alternative care and adoption to expose the Court’s pitfalls in centring children in decision-making involving religion particularly. It generally promotes adoption of a child-centred approach in international human rights courts, and particularly highlights existing hurdles in such approach where the decision-making involves conflicting interests concerning religion.
{"title":"Children’s Religious Identity in Alternative Care and Adoption: The Need to Recentre the Child’s Best Interest in International Human Rights Adjudication","authors":"Ayla do Vale Alves","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article argues that international human rights (quasi-)adjudicatory institutions should do better in considering the best interests of the child and freedom of religion in cases involving human rights aspects of alternative care and adoption. The European Court of Human Rights, particularly, has been using obscure and contradictory standards, which ultimately do not privilege the child’s best interests in matters affecting them directly. Recent Grand Chamber jurisprudence instead puts parents’ interests above the child’s. A child-centred approach where children are not objectified, but treated as autonomous, rights-bearing, legal persons, with independent interests that may override those of other stakeholders is needed. This article explores general international and European rules governing children’s religious rights in alternative care and adoption to expose the Court’s pitfalls in centring children in decision-making involving religion particularly. It generally promotes adoption of a child-centred approach in international human rights courts, and particularly highlights existing hurdles in such approach where the decision-making involves conflicting interests concerning religion.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45540210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article identifies a troubling omission on the part of the European Court of Human Rights, when it considers cases involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Such cases often involve one parent, who has abducted the child, alleging that their actions were necessary to protect themselves or the child from violence by the other parent. The Court has avoided considering arguments based on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in such cases, despite the now established relevance of that Article to the risks of family violence. A change of course is needed, in order to articulate clear principles for the ECtHR’s own Hague cases, and reinforce the absoluteness of Article 3 protection elsewhere.
{"title":"Evasive Manoeuvres: Strasbourg, the Hague Child Abduction Convention and the Absolute Prohibition on Ill-Treatment","authors":"E. Robinson","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article identifies a troubling omission on the part of the European Court of Human Rights, when it considers cases involving the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Such cases often involve one parent, who has abducted the child, alleging that their actions were necessary to protect themselves or the child from violence by the other parent. The Court has avoided considering arguments based on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in such cases, despite the now established relevance of that Article to the risks of family violence. A change of course is needed, in order to articulate clear principles for the ECtHR’s own Hague cases, and reinforce the absoluteness of Article 3 protection elsewhere.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46702745","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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