In September 2022, 10 years had passed since the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights were adopted by the Human Rights Council. The Guiding Principles, as a soft law human rights instrument, were designed to be a useful tool for states in the formulation and implementation of poverty reduction and eradication policies. In this piece, I examine to what extent this objective has been met. Based on empirical research involving states’ representatives and civil society organizations, and analysis of the documents produced by United Nations bodies that played a key role in developing a human rights-based approach to poverty, I argue that this objective has been met only to a limited extent.
{"title":"All Beginnings Are Difficult: The Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights a Decade After Their Adoption","authors":"Adam Ploszka","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In September 2022, 10 years had passed since the Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights were adopted by the Human Rights Council. The Guiding Principles, as a soft law human rights instrument, were designed to be a useful tool for states in the formulation and implementation of poverty reduction and eradication policies. In this piece, I examine to what extent this objective has been met. Based on empirical research involving states’ representatives and civil society organizations, and analysis of the documents produced by United Nations bodies that played a key role in developing a human rights-based approach to poverty, I argue that this objective has been met only to a limited extent.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47652358","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
There is no formal hierarchy between, or international rule of precedent applicable to, the three regional human rights systems and the eight UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies with active competence to entertain individual complaints. By scrutinising the practice of duplicative proceedings of UN Treaty Bodies (UNTBs), this article makes the argument that the res judicata and lis pendens principles have not prevented the UNTBs from reviewing cases previously examined by a regional human rights court. In doing so, the case is made that while the UNTBs usually defer to regional courts’ factual and legal findings when analyzing cases with the same parties, substantive rights, facts and events, judgments that apply the margin of appreciation doctrine are much more at risk of being revised and contradicted by UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies. Distinct opportunities for horizontal dialogue between UNTBs and regional human rights courts are thus opened.
{"title":"Defer or Revise? Horizontal Dialogue Between UN Treaty Bodies and Regional Human Rights Courts in Duplicative Legal Proceedings","authors":"Alexandre Skander Galand","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 There is no formal hierarchy between, or international rule of precedent applicable to, the three regional human rights systems and the eight UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies with active competence to entertain individual complaints. By scrutinising the practice of duplicative proceedings of UN Treaty Bodies (UNTBs), this article makes the argument that the res judicata and lis pendens principles have not prevented the UNTBs from reviewing cases previously examined by a regional human rights court. In doing so, the case is made that while the UNTBs usually defer to regional courts’ factual and legal findings when analyzing cases with the same parties, substantive rights, facts and events, judgments that apply the margin of appreciation doctrine are much more at risk of being revised and contradicted by UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies. Distinct opportunities for horizontal dialogue between UNTBs and regional human rights courts are thus opened.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43147988","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
J. Bueno de Mesquita, C. Lougarre, L. Montel, S. Sekalala
While the right to health has gained significant momentum in international law over the past two years, there is little clarity on what it means for States to comply with this right in times of COVID-19. Taking Articles 2(1) and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a starting point, our article follows an approach guided by the rules of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to suggest how right to health obligations to prevent, treat and control infectious diseases should be interpreted in relation to COVID-19, and how these obligations interact with general obligations of immediacy, progressive realisation, minimum core and international assistance and cooperation in this context. This article makes a novel contribution to clarifying the right to health during COVID-19, thus enhancing capacity for the oversight of this right; its incorporation in global health law; and the understanding of its corresponding obligations in future global health emergencies.
{"title":"Lodestar in the Time of Coronavirus? Interpreting International Obligations to Realise the Right to Health During the COVID-19 Pandemic","authors":"J. Bueno de Mesquita, C. Lougarre, L. Montel, S. Sekalala","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngac036","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac036","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 While the right to health has gained significant momentum in international law over the past two years, there is little clarity on what it means for States to comply with this right in times of COVID-19. Taking Articles 2(1) and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a starting point, our article follows an approach guided by the rules of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to suggest how right to health obligations to prevent, treat and control infectious diseases should be interpreted in relation to COVID-19, and how these obligations interact with general obligations of immediacy, progressive realisation, minimum core and international assistance and cooperation in this context. This article makes a novel contribution to clarifying the right to health during COVID-19, thus enhancing capacity for the oversight of this right; its incorporation in global health law; and the understanding of its corresponding obligations in future global health emergencies.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46895490","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article analyses the recent judgments of Buturugă v Romania and Volodina v Russia (No 2), the first judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (Court) to recognise cyberviolence against women as a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR in circumstances where the respondent states failed to discharge their positive obligations to prevent, protect from and punish acts of cyberviolence against women. While the Court’s judgments in both cases have much to commend insofar as they expressly recognise cyberviolence against women as a human rights violation, this article posits that the Court’s framing of its analyses in both judgments under Article 8 rather than Article 3 is problematic for several reasons: first, Article 8 is a qualified right that may be subject to lawful interference by states; secondly, the invocation of Article 8 does not adequately capture the gravity of the human rights violation and, more broadly, undermines the significant progress made in establishing violence against women as a violation of the prohibition of torture, in human or degrading treatment or punishment under international law; and thirdly, the recognition of cyberviolence against women as a violation of Article 8 does little to address the recalibrated public/private distinction under international law in the digital era, which has contributed to the prevalence of cyberviolence against women. This article contends that in the future the Court’s analysis of complaints concerning cyberviolence against women would be considerably improved by examining complaints under Article 3 rather than Article 8.
{"title":"Cyberviolence Against Women Under International Human Rights Law: Buturugă v Romania and Volodina v Russia (No 2)","authors":"Adaena Sinclair-Blakemore","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngac033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac033","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyses the recent judgments of Buturugă v Romania and Volodina v Russia (No 2), the first judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (Court) to recognise cyberviolence against women as a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR in circumstances where the respondent states failed to discharge their positive obligations to prevent, protect from and punish acts of cyberviolence against women. While the Court’s judgments in both cases have much to commend insofar as they expressly recognise cyberviolence against women as a human rights violation, this article posits that the Court’s framing of its analyses in both judgments under Article 8 rather than Article 3 is problematic for several reasons: first, Article 8 is a qualified right that may be subject to lawful interference by states; secondly, the invocation of Article 8 does not adequately capture the gravity of the human rights violation and, more broadly, undermines the significant progress made in establishing violence against women as a violation of the prohibition of torture, in human or degrading treatment or punishment under international law; and thirdly, the recognition of cyberviolence against women as a violation of Article 8 does little to address the recalibrated public/private distinction under international law in the digital era, which has contributed to the prevalence of cyberviolence against women. This article contends that in the future the Court’s analysis of complaints concerning cyberviolence against women would be considerably improved by examining complaints under Article 3 rather than Article 8.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-12-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46934705","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question of whether the monitoring bodies have competence concerning reservations is at the centre of the discussion of reservations to human rights treaties that has occupied many international legal scholars over the last few decades. The Istanbul Convention’s treaty monitoring body, GREVIO, is the only human rights treaty monitoring body with a direct competence concerning reservations. However, as practice to date shows, it does not make much use of this power. This is a big disappointment considering all the efforts of other bodies in the past and the doctrinal positions of various scholars. The main aims of this article are threefold to: present GREVIO’s practice to date concerning reservations, provide a brief historical overview of how other human rights treaty bodies have approached their role concerning reservations, and finally, attempt to explain why GREVIO has abandoned a more proactive position on reservations.
{"title":"Reservations to the Istanbul Convention and the Role of GREVIO: A Call for New Approach","authors":"Wojciech Burek","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngac030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac030","url":null,"abstract":"The question of whether the monitoring bodies have competence concerning reservations is at the centre of the discussion of reservations to human rights treaties that has occupied many international legal scholars over the last few decades. The Istanbul Convention’s treaty monitoring body, GREVIO, is the only human rights treaty monitoring body with a direct competence concerning reservations. However, as practice to date shows, it does not make much use of this power. This is a big disappointment considering all the efforts of other bodies in the past and the doctrinal positions of various scholars. The main aims of this article are threefold to: present GREVIO’s practice to date concerning reservations, provide a brief historical overview of how other human rights treaty bodies have approached their role concerning reservations, and finally, attempt to explain why GREVIO has abandoned a more proactive position on reservations.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-11-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138516572","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Patents, Human Rights, and Access to Medicines. By Emmanuel Kolawole Oke. (Cambridge University Press, 2022, 175 pp) Hardback, GBP 95, ISBN 9781108472104.","authors":"P. Sean Morris","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngac029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac029","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47203318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Correction to: Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, Valerie Sperling, and Melike Sayoglu, Courting Gender Justice: Russia, Turkey, and the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2019, 296pp, £61.00) ISBN: 9780190932831","authors":"","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngac031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac031","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48850534","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article examines European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence concerning free elections and identifies relevant approaches that can be applied to electoral disinformation. The relationship between disinformation and freedom of expression has attracted considerable academic scrutiny in recent years. However, surprisingly little attention has been given to the right to free elections. This article addresses this gap by identifying key ECtHR approaches to free elections under Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR and evaluating the Court’s interpretive reasoning in the disinformation context. Focus is given to cases where the Court has addressed falsified information in the electoral process. Considering the special relationship between freedom of expression and free elections in Strasbourg jurisprudence, focus is also given to the Court’s contemplation of acceptable limitations to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR in response to deceptive political expression. Mapping the Court’s reasoning in key decisions, this article identifies informed democratic engagement as a crucial requirement that permeates the Court’s approach to elections. Considering the importance of democracy in the Court’s reasoning, this article argues that the Court should be more proactive in elucidating key standards for Contracting Parties to make democracies more resilient to electoral disinformation.
{"title":"Free and Informed Elections? Disinformation and Democratic Elections Under Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR","authors":"E. Shattock","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngac023","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac023","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence concerning free elections and identifies relevant approaches that can be applied to electoral disinformation. The relationship between disinformation and freedom of expression has attracted considerable academic scrutiny in recent years. However, surprisingly little attention has been given to the right to free elections. This article addresses this gap by identifying key ECtHR approaches to free elections under Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR and evaluating the Court’s interpretive reasoning in the disinformation context. Focus is given to cases where the Court has addressed falsified information in the electoral process. Considering the special relationship between freedom of expression and free elections in Strasbourg jurisprudence, focus is also given to the Court’s contemplation of acceptable limitations to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR in response to deceptive political expression. Mapping the Court’s reasoning in key decisions, this article identifies informed democratic engagement as a crucial requirement that permeates the Court’s approach to elections. Considering the importance of democracy in the Court’s reasoning, this article argues that the Court should be more proactive in elucidating key standards for Contracting Parties to make democracies more resilient to electoral disinformation.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47240901","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although the concept of human dignity is absent from the text of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is mentioned in more than 2100 judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The judges at the Court have used dignity to develop the scope of Convention rights, but also to signal to respondent states just how serious a violation is and to nudge them toward better compliance. However, these strategies reach dead ends when the Court is faced with government submissions that are based on a conception of dignity that is different from the notion of human dignity relied on by the Court. Through empirical analysis and by focusing on Russia, the country against which the term dignity is used most frequently, the paper maps out situations of conceptual contestation and overlap. We reveal how the Court strategically uses mirroring, substitutes dignity for other Convention values, or altogether avoids confrontation. In such situations, the Court’s use (and non-use) of dignity becomes less about persuading states to comply with the Convention and more about preserving its authority and managing its relationship with states.
{"title":"Language and Persuasion: Human Dignity at the European Court of Human Rights","authors":"Veronika Fikfak, Lora Izvorova","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngac018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac018","url":null,"abstract":"Although the concept of human dignity is absent from the text of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is mentioned in more than 2100 judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The judges at the Court have used dignity to develop the scope of Convention rights, but also to signal to respondent states just how serious a violation is and to nudge them toward better compliance. However, these strategies reach dead ends when the Court is faced with government submissions that are based on a conception of dignity that is different from the notion of human dignity relied on by the Court. Through empirical analysis and by focusing on Russia, the country against which the term dignity is used most frequently, the paper maps out situations of conceptual contestation and overlap. We reveal how the Court strategically uses mirroring, substitutes dignity for other Convention values, or altogether avoids confrontation. In such situations, the Court’s use (and non-use) of dignity becomes less about persuading states to comply with the Convention and more about preserving its authority and managing its relationship with states.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138516576","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The cessation of violent conflict offers crucial opportunities to increase the likelihood that children’s rights are respected, protected and realized in the post-conflict state. Peace processes—which include peace negotiations, peace agreement(s) and the implementation of peace agreement provisions—can be central to the realization of this objective. This article examines the concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child through the lens of process-based performance. The objective is to demonstrate contributions that the Committee can make to advancing children’s rights at different stages of a peace process, often in combination with other actors and mechanisms seeking to do the same. After identifying some of the challenges associated with translating this potential into practice, suggestions are made to help bridge the chasm between potential and practice.
{"title":"Advancing Children’s Rights in Peace Processes: The Role of the Committee on the Rights of the Child","authors":"Seán Molloy","doi":"10.1093/hrlr/ngac022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngac022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The cessation of violent conflict offers crucial opportunities to increase the likelihood that children’s rights are respected, protected and realized in the post-conflict state. Peace processes—which include peace negotiations, peace agreement(s) and the implementation of peace agreement provisions—can be central to the realization of this objective. This article examines the concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child through the lens of process-based performance. The objective is to demonstrate contributions that the Committee can make to advancing children’s rights at different stages of a peace process, often in combination with other actors and mechanisms seeking to do the same. After identifying some of the challenges associated with translating this potential into practice, suggestions are made to help bridge the chasm between potential and practice.","PeriodicalId":46556,"journal":{"name":"Human Rights Law Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5,"publicationDate":"2022-06-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44422269","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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