Vindicating the claim that agents ought to be consistent has proved to be a difficult task. Recently, some have argued that we can use accuracy-dominance arguments to vindicate the normativity of such requirements. But what do these arguments prove, exactly? In this paper, I argue that we can make a distinction between two theses on the normativity of consistency: the view that one ought to be consistent and the view that one ought to avoid being inconsistent. I argue that accuracy-dominance arguments for consistency support the latter view, but not necessarily the former. I also argue that the distinction between these two theses matters in the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. Specifically, the distinction suggests that there are interesting alternatives to vindicating the strong claim that one ought to be consistent.
{"title":"Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications","authors":"Marc‐Kevin Daoust","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i1.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i1.07","url":null,"abstract":"Vindicating the claim that agents ought to be consistent has proved to be a difficult task. Recently, some have argued that we can use accuracy-dominance arguments to vindicate the normativity of such requirements. But what do these arguments prove, exactly? In this paper, I argue that we can make a distinction between two theses on the normativity of consistency: the view that one ought to be consistent and the view that one ought to avoid being inconsistent. I argue that accuracy-dominance arguments for consistency support the latter view, but not necessarily the former. I also argue that the distinction between these two theses matters in the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. Specifically, the distinction suggests that there are interesting alternatives to vindicating the strong claim that one ought to be consistent.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70560537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The purpose of this introduction is to give a rough overview of the discussion of the formalization of arguments, focusing on deductive arguments. The discussion is structured around four important junctions: i) the notion of support, which captures the relation between the conclusion and premises of an argument, ii) the choice of a formal language into which the argument is translated in order to make it amenable to evaluation via formal methods, iii) the question of quality criteria for such formalizations, and finally iv) the choice of the underlying logic. This introductory discussion is supplemented by a brief description of the genesis of the special issue, acknowledgements, and summaries of each article.
{"title":"Formalization of Arguments","authors":"R. Michels","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i2.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i2.01","url":null,"abstract":"The purpose of this introduction is to give a rough overview of the discussion of the formalization of arguments, focusing on deductive arguments. The discussion is structured around four important junctions: i) the notion of support, which captures the relation between the conclusion and premises of an argument, ii) the choice of a formal language into which the argument is translated in order to make it amenable to evaluation via formal methods, iii) the question of quality criteria for such formalizations, and finally iv) the choice of the underlying logic. This introductory discussion is supplemented by a brief description of the genesis of the special issue, acknowledgements, and summaries of each article.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46814943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Processes are occurrents that were, are, or will be happening. They endure or they perdure, i.e. they are either "fully" present at every time they happen, or they rather have temporal parts. According to Stout (2016), they endure. His argument assumes that processes may change. Then, Stout argues that, if something changes, it endures. As I show, Stout's Argument misses its target. In particular, it makes use of a notion of change that is either intuitive but illegitimate or technical but question-begging.
{"title":"Are There Occurrent Continuants?","authors":"Riccardo Baratella","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.04","url":null,"abstract":"Processes are occurrents that were, are, or will be happening. They endure or they perdure, i.e. they are either \"fully\" present at every time they happen, or they rather have temporal parts. According to Stout (2016), they endure. His argument assumes that processes may change. Then, Stout argues that, if something changes, it endures. As I show, Stout's Argument misses its target. In particular, it makes use of a notion of change that is either intuitive but illegitimate or technical but question-begging.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41421182","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Critics have charged constitutive panpsychism with inconsistency.Panpsychists reject physicalism for its seeming inability to explainconsciousness. In making this argument, they commit themselves tothe idea of "revelation": that we know, in some especially direct way,the nature of consciousness. Yet they then attribute properties to ourconsciousness---like being constituted out of trillions of simplerexperiential parts---that conflict with how it seems introspectively.This seems to pose a dilemma: either revelation is false, andphysicalism remains intact, or revelation is true, and constitutivepanpsychists are hoist by their own petard. But this is too simplistic.Constitutive panpsychists can say that our minds contain innumerablephenomenal states that are "confused" with one another: immediatelypresent to introspection only en masse, not individually. Acceptingrevelation does not require ignoring the attentional, conceptual, andinterpretive limitations of introspection, and these familiarlimitations remove the tension between panpsychism and relevation.
{"title":"Consciousness, Revelation, and Confusion","authors":"L. Roelofs","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i1.04","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i1.04","url":null,"abstract":"Critics have charged constitutive panpsychism with inconsistency.Panpsychists reject physicalism for its seeming inability to explainconsciousness. In making this argument, they commit themselves tothe idea of \"revelation\": that we know, in some especially direct way,the nature of consciousness. Yet they then attribute properties to ourconsciousness---like being constituted out of trillions of simplerexperiential parts---that conflict with how it seems introspectively.This seems to pose a dilemma: either revelation is false, andphysicalism remains intact, or revelation is true, and constitutivepanpsychists are hoist by their own petard. But this is too simplistic.Constitutive panpsychists can say that our minds contain innumerablephenomenal states that are \"confused\" with one another: immediatelypresent to introspection only en masse, not individually. Acceptingrevelation does not require ignoring the attentional, conceptual, andinterpretive limitations of introspection, and these familiarlimitations remove the tension between panpsychism and relevation.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48824627","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite different arguments from the vagueness of composite objects to the conclusion that I am not a physical object at all. One of them, developed over the course of several chapters, takes the following form: All composite physical objects (and only composite physical objects are candidates to be a human being) are non-fundamental; non-fundamental things are inevitably vague in various ways; this vagueness shows that we must "make a conceptual interpretation of them", treating them as "artefacts of conceptualisation"; and this in turn precludes our identifying ourselves with any such things. Some interesting morals fall out of close consideration of Robinson's argument; but, in the end, materialists can reasonably resist it.
{"title":"Robinson's Regress Argument from Vagueness to Dualism","authors":"D. Zimmerman","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.05","url":null,"abstract":"Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite different arguments from the vagueness of composite objects to the conclusion that I am not a physical object at all. One of them, developed over the course of several chapters, takes the following form: All composite physical objects (and only composite physical objects are candidates to be a human being) are non-fundamental; non-fundamental things are inevitably vague in various ways; this vagueness shows that we must \"make a conceptual interpretation of them\", treating them as \"artefacts of conceptualisation\"; and this in turn precludes our identifying ourselves with any such things. Some interesting morals fall out of close consideration of Robinson's argument; but, in the end, materialists can reasonably resist it.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41321081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marta Campdelacreu, Ramon García-Moya, G. Martí, E. Terrone
The story of the Ship of Theseus is one of the most venerable conundrums in philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle. Others deny that it is so. It is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in the Ship of Theseus story. So, arguably, it makes sense to test empirically whether people perceive the case as a puzzle. Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-two other researchers from different countries have undertaken that task. We argue that their tests do not provide any evidence that bears on the question as to whether the Ship of Theseus case is a genuine puzzle. In our discussion we address also what should be taken into account if one wishes to test the puzzling, or not puzzling, status of the Ship of Theseus story.
{"title":"How to Test the Ship of Theseus","authors":"Marta Campdelacreu, Ramon García-Moya, G. Martí, E. Terrone","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.06","url":null,"abstract":"The story of the Ship of Theseus is one of the most venerable conundrums in philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle. Others deny that it is so. It is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in the Ship of Theseus story. So, arguably, it makes sense to test empirically whether people perceive the case as a puzzle. Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-two other researchers from different countries have undertaken that task. We argue that their tests do not provide any evidence that bears on the question as to whether the Ship of Theseus case is a genuine puzzle. In our discussion we address also what should be taken into account if one wishes to test the puzzling, or not puzzling, status of the Ship of Theseus story.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46502296","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sungho Choi has criticised Michael Strevens's counterexample to DavidLewis's final theory of "token" causation, causation as "influence." Iargue that, even if Choi's points are correct, Strevens's counterexampleremains useful in revealing a shortcoming of Lewis's theory. Thisshortcoming is that Lewis's theory does not properly account for*degrees* of causation. That is, even if Choi's points are correct,Lewis's theory does not capture an intuition we have about the*comparative* causal statuses of those events involved in Strevens'scounterexample (we might, for example, intuit that Sylvie's ball-firingis *as much*/*more*/*less* a cause of the jar's shattering as/than isBruno's ball-firing).
{"title":"Strevens's Counterexample to Lewis's \"Causation as Influence\", and Degrees of Causation","authors":"Joshua Goh","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i1.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i1.06","url":null,"abstract":"Sungho Choi has criticised Michael Strevens's counterexample to DavidLewis's final theory of \"token\" causation, causation as \"influence.\" Iargue that, even if Choi's points are correct, Strevens's counterexampleremains useful in revealing a shortcoming of Lewis's theory. Thisshortcoming is that Lewis's theory does not properly account for*degrees* of causation. That is, even if Choi's points are correct,Lewis's theory does not capture an intuition we have about the*comparative* causal statuses of those events involved in Strevens'scounterexample (we might, for example, intuit that Sylvie's ball-firingis *as much*/*more*/*less* a cause of the jar's shattering as/than isBruno's ball-firing).","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44109165","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay is about two familiar theses in the philosophy of mind: constitutivism about instrumental desires, and constitutivism about introspective beliefs, and the arguments for and against them. Constitutivism about instrumental desire is the thesis that instrumental desires are at least partly constituted by the desires and means-end beliefs which explain them, and is a thesis which has been championed most prominently by Michael Smith. Constitutivism about introspective belief is the thesis that introspective beliefs are at least partly constituted by the mental states they are about, and is a thesis which has been championed most prominently by Sydney Shoemaker. Despite their similarities, the fortunes of these two theses could not be more opposed: constitutivism about instrumental desire is widely accepted, and constitutivism about introspective belief is widely rejected. Yet, the arguments for both theses are roughly analogous. This essay explores these arguments. I argue that the argument which is widely taken to be the best argument for constitutivism about instrumental desires---what I call the argument from necessitation---does not provide the support for the thesis it is widely taken to provide, and that it fails for much the same reasons that it fails to provide support for constitutivism about introspective belief. Furthermore, I argue that the best argument for constitutivism about instrumental desires---what I will call the argument from cognitive dynamics---is also a good argument, if not equally good, for constitutivism about introspective belief (at least when the thesis is suitably qualified).
{"title":"Constitutivism About Instrumental Desire and Introspective Belief","authors":"Ryan Cox","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i4.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i4.02","url":null,"abstract":"This essay is about two familiar theses in the philosophy of mind: constitutivism about instrumental desires, and constitutivism about introspective beliefs, and the arguments for and against them. Constitutivism about instrumental desire is the thesis that instrumental desires are at least partly constituted by the desires and means-end beliefs which explain them, and is a thesis which has been championed most prominently by Michael Smith. Constitutivism about introspective belief is the thesis that introspective beliefs are at least partly constituted by the mental states they are about, and is a thesis which has been championed most prominently by Sydney Shoemaker. Despite their similarities, the fortunes of these two theses could not be more opposed: constitutivism about instrumental desire is widely accepted, and constitutivism about introspective belief is widely rejected. Yet, the arguments for both theses are roughly analogous. This essay explores these arguments. I argue that the argument which is widely taken to be the best argument for constitutivism about instrumental desires---what I call the argument from necessitation---does not provide the support for the thesis it is widely taken to provide, and that it fails for much the same reasons that it fails to provide support for constitutivism about introspective belief. Furthermore, I argue that the best argument for constitutivism about instrumental desires---what I will call the argument from cognitive dynamics---is also a good argument, if not equally good, for constitutivism about introspective belief (at least when the thesis is suitably qualified).","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48923365","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Susanna Schellenberg has presented several arguments for the "situation-dependency thesis" (SDT), i.e. the claim that (visual) perceptual experiences are necessarily situation-dependent, insofar as they represent objects' situation-dependent properties. In my critical response to her paper, I focus on her argument from the "epistemic dependence thesis" (EDT), according to which "perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representations of the relevant situation-dependent properties" (Schellenberg 2008, 75). I consider what support she musters for EDT, so as to make an objection to her argument from EDT. To address this objection (or, rather, to bypass it), I will re-formulate the EDT, as a different but closely related thesis that I will call EDT*, informed by the admittedly radical Husserlian view that perception is epistemically rational.
{"title":"Perspectivity and Rationality of Perception","authors":"Kristjan Laasik","doi":"10.48106/dial.v75.i1.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v75.i1.06","url":null,"abstract":"Susanna Schellenberg has presented several arguments for the \"situation-dependency thesis\" (SDT), i.e. the claim that (visual) perceptual experiences are necessarily situation-dependent, insofar as they represent objects' situation-dependent properties. In my critical response to her paper, I focus on her argument from the \"epistemic dependence thesis\" (EDT), according to which \"perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representations of the relevant situation-dependent properties\" (Schellenberg 2008, 75). I consider what support she musters for EDT, so as to make an objection to her argument from EDT. To address this objection (or, rather, to bypass it), I will re-formulate the EDT, as a different but closely related thesis that I will call EDT*, informed by the admittedly radical Husserlian view that perception is epistemically rational.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47924982","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Proponents of cognitive penetration often argue for the thesis on the basis of combined intuitions about categorical perception and perceptual learning. The claim is that beliefs penetrate perceptions in the course of learning to perceive categories. I argue that this "diachronic" penetration thesis is false. In order to substantiate a robust notion of penetration, the beliefs that enable learning must describe the particular ability that subjects learn. However, they cannot do so, since in order to help with learning they must instruct learners to employ previously existing abilities. I argue that a better approach recognizes that we can have sophisticated causal precursors to perceptual learning, but that the learning process itself must operate outside of cognitive influence.
{"title":"Perceptual Learning, Categorical Perception, and Cognitive Permeation","authors":"Daniel C. Burnston","doi":"10.48106/dial.v75.i1.03","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v75.i1.03","url":null,"abstract":"Proponents of cognitive penetration often argue for the thesis on the basis of combined intuitions about categorical perception and perceptual learning. The claim is that beliefs penetrate perceptions in the course of learning to perceive categories. I argue that this \"diachronic\" penetration thesis is false. In order to substantiate a robust notion of penetration, the beliefs that enable learning must describe the particular ability that subjects learn. However, they cannot do so, since in order to help with learning they must instruct learners to employ previously existing abilities. I argue that a better approach recognizes that we can have sophisticated causal precursors to perceptual learning, but that the learning process itself must operate outside of cognitive influence.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-03-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46911746","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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