Fraser MacBride, On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.
弗雷泽·麦克布莱德，《论共相的谱系:分析哲学的形而上学起源》，牛津:牛津大学出版社，2018年。
{"title":"Review of MacBride (2018)","authors":"C. Daly","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i3.10","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i3.10","url":null,"abstract":"Fraser MacBride, On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46639882","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made upof non-factual constituents such as properties, relations andproperty-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unityproblem, the problem of explaining why various constituents arecombined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could haveexisted without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what arethey so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity problem.First, facts which are grounded are unified by the obtaining of theirgrounds. Second, many ungrounded facts are such that they must obtainif their non-factual constituents exist (e.g. if the property $F$nessis essential to a particular, $a$, then if $a$ exists the fact that$a$ is $F$ must obtain). In this way the obtaining of these facts isexplained by the essence of some of their constituents. I alsoaddress the possibility of facts which are brutely unified(i.e. neither grounded nor essentially unified), and compare theaccount I offer with some of the main alternatives.
{"title":"Grounding, Essential Properties and the Unity Problem","authors":"Donnchadh O’Conaill","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i1.05","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i1.05","url":null,"abstract":"A common conception of facts is as worldly entities, complexes made upof non-factual constituents such as properties, relations andproperty-bearers. Understood in this way facts face the unityproblem, the problem of explaining why various constituents arecombined to form a fact. In many cases the constituents could haveexisted without being unified in the fact---so in virtue of what arethey so unified? I shall present a new approach to the unity problem.First, facts which are grounded are unified by the obtaining of theirgrounds. Second, many ungrounded facts are such that they must obtainif their non-factual constituents exist (e.g. if the property $F$nessis essential to a particular, $a$, then if $a$ exists the fact that$a$ is $F$ must obtain). In this way the obtaining of these facts isexplained by the essence of some of their constituents. I alsoaddress the possibility of facts which are brutely unified(i.e. neither grounded nor essentially unified), and compare theaccount I offer with some of the main alternatives.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47100189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
David Kaplan's semantic theory for indexicals yields a distinct logic for indexical languages that generates contingent a priori truths. These special truths of the logic of indexicals include examples like "I am here now", an utterance of which expresses a contingent state of affairs and yet which, according to Kaplan, cannot fail to be true when it is uttered. This claim is threatened by the problem of displaced communications: answerphone messages, for example, seem to facilitate true instances of the negation of this supposed logical truth as they allow the agent of the message to no longer be at the location of the message when it is encountered by an audience. Many such displaced communications can be identified in everyday natural language uses of indexicals. Recent discussion has suggested that Kaplan's error is to be overly restrictive in the possible contexts of utterance his semantic theory recognizes, as he fails to acknowledge the possibility of utterances that occur at a context distinct from that in which they are constructed. I reject this diagnosis and defend Kaplan's semantic theory. Displaced communications, I argue, are best understood as resulting from a pragmatically introduced metalinguistic context-shifting operation and hence do not demand revision of Kaplan's semantic theory. I provide an analysis of the pragmatic process underlying this operation and make the case for its merits over those of rival accounts of displaced communications.
David Kaplan的索引语义学理论为索引语言提供了一种独特的逻辑，这种逻辑产生偶然的先验真理。索引逻辑的这些特殊真理包括像“我现在在这里”这样的例子，它的话语表达了事件的偶然状态，但根据卡普兰的说法，当它被说出时，它不可能不真实。这一主张受到了替代通信问题的威胁:例如，应答电话信息似乎促进了否定这一假定的逻辑真理的真实实例，因为它们允许信息的代理在受众遇到信息时不再处于信息的位置。在日常自然语言的索引使用中，可以识别出许多这种被取代的通信。最近的讨论表明，卡普兰的错误在于他的语义理论对话语可能的语境进行了过度的限制，因为他没有承认话语在不同的语境中发生的可能性，而不是在它们被构建的语境中。我反对这种诊断，并为卡普兰的语义理论辩护。我认为，移位交际最好被理解为语用上引入的元语言语境转移操作的结果，因此不需要修改卡普兰的语义理论。我对这一行动背后的实际过程进行了分析，并说明其优点优于其他关于流离失所通信的说法。
{"title":"Metalinguistic Monstrosity and Displaced Communications","authors":"G. Stevens","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i4.01","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i4.01","url":null,"abstract":"David Kaplan's semantic theory for indexicals yields a distinct logic for indexical languages that generates contingent a priori truths. These special truths of the logic of indexicals include examples like \"I am here now\", an utterance of which expresses a contingent state of affairs and yet which, according to Kaplan, cannot fail to be true when it is uttered. This claim is threatened by the problem of displaced communications: answerphone messages, for example, seem to facilitate true instances of the negation of this supposed logical truth as they allow the agent of the message to no longer be at the location of the message when it is encountered by an audience. Many such displaced communications can be identified in everyday natural language uses of indexicals. Recent discussion has suggested that Kaplan's error is to be overly restrictive in the possible contexts of utterance his semantic theory recognizes, as he fails to acknowledge the possibility of utterances that occur at a context distinct from that in which they are constructed. I reject this diagnosis and defend Kaplan's semantic theory. Displaced communications, I argue, are best understood as resulting from a pragmatically introduced metalinguistic context-shifting operation and hence do not demand revision of Kaplan's semantic theory. I provide an analysis of the pragmatic process underlying this operation and make the case for its merits over those of rival accounts of displaced communications.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46336996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scott Soames, The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy, Volume 2: A New Vision, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
斯科特·索姆斯:《哲学分析传统》，第二卷:新视野，普林斯顿:普林斯顿大学出版社，2018年。
{"title":"Review of Soames (2018)","authors":"F. MacBride","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i1.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i1.08","url":null,"abstract":"Scott Soames, The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy, Volume 2: A New Vision, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46565110","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is about the distinction between arguments and conditionals, and the corresponding distinction between premises and antecedents. I will also propose a further distinction between two different kinds of argument, and, correspondingly, two kinds of premise that I will call "assumption" and "hypothesis." The distinction between assumptions, hypotheses, and antecedents is easily made in artificial languages, and we are already familiar with it from our first logic courses (although not necessarily under those names, since there is no standard terminology for the distinction). After explaining their differences in artificial languages, I will argue that there are ordinary-language counterparts of these three notions, meaning that some formal properties of the artificial notions nicely capture some features of the ordinary-language counterparts and their behavior in contexts of reasoning. My next crucial claim is that these three notions often get confused in ordinary language, which leads to problems for translation into symbols. I will suggest a solution to the translation problem by pointing to some distinctive characteristics of the three notions that link them to their artificial-language counterparts. Next, I will argue that this confusion is behind some well-known philosophical problems and puzzles. I will apply the distinctions in order to explain away some famous paradoxes: the direct argument (also known as or-to-if inference), a standard argument for fatalism, and McGee's counterexample to modus ponens. As Stalnaker also solved the first two of these paradoxes by using his theory of reasonable inference, I will elucidate the similarities between our solutions, and also explain why my distinctions apply more broadly, to some cases involving indicative and counterfactuals conditionals, where reasonable inference does not apply.
{"title":"Assumptions, Hypotheses, and Antecedents","authors":"V. Djordjević","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i2.08","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i2.08","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is about the distinction between arguments and conditionals, and the corresponding distinction between premises and antecedents. I will also propose a further distinction between two different kinds of argument, and, correspondingly, two kinds of premise that I will call \"assumption\" and \"hypothesis.\" The distinction between assumptions, hypotheses, and antecedents is easily made in artificial languages, and we are already familiar with it from our first logic courses (although not necessarily under those names, since there is no standard terminology for the distinction). After explaining their differences in artificial languages, I will argue that there are ordinary-language counterparts of these three notions, meaning that some formal properties of the artificial notions nicely capture some features of the ordinary-language counterparts and their behavior in contexts of reasoning. My next crucial claim is that these three notions often get confused in ordinary language, which leads to problems for translation into symbols. I will suggest a solution to the translation problem by pointing to some distinctive characteristics of the three notions that link them to their artificial-language counterparts. Next, I will argue that this confusion is behind some well-known philosophical problems and puzzles. I will apply the distinctions in order to explain away some famous paradoxes: the direct argument (also known as or-to-if inference), a standard argument for fatalism, and McGee's counterexample to modus ponens. As Stalnaker also solved the first two of these paradoxes by using his theory of reasonable inference, I will elucidate the similarities between our solutions, and also explain why my distinctions apply more broadly, to some cases involving indicative and counterfactuals conditionals, where reasonable inference does not apply.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46831662","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The proper translation of "unless" into intuitionistic formalisms is examined. After a brief examination of intuitionistic writings on "unless", and on translation in general, and a close examination of Dummett's use of "unless" in Elements of Intuitionism (1975b), I argue that the correct intuitionistic translation of "A unless B" is no stronger than "-B -> A". In particular, "unless" is demonstrably weaker than disjunction. I conclude with some observations regarding how this shows that one's choice of logic is methodologically prior to translation from informal natural language to formal systems.
{"title":"'Unless' is 'Or', Unless '¬A Unless A' is Invalid","authors":"R. Cook","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i2.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i2.07","url":null,"abstract":"The proper translation of \"unless\" into intuitionistic formalisms is examined. After a brief examination of intuitionistic writings on \"unless\", and on translation in general, and a close examination of Dummett's use of \"unless\" in Elements of Intuitionism (1975b), I argue that the correct intuitionistic translation of \"A unless B\" is no stronger than \"-B -> A\". In particular, \"unless\" is demonstrably weaker than disjunction. I conclude with some observations regarding how this shows that one's choice of logic is methodologically prior to translation from informal natural language to formal systems.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44510313","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a recent article, “Logical Consequence and Natural Language,” Michael Glanzberg claims that there is no relation of logical consequence in natural language (2015). The present paper counters that claim. I shall discuss Glanzberg’s arguments and show why they don’t hold. I further show how Glanzberg’s claims may be used to rather support the existence of logical consequence in natural language.
{"title":"Considerations on Logical Consequence and Natural Language","authors":"Gil Sagi","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i2.06","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i2.06","url":null,"abstract":"In a recent article, “Logical Consequence and Natural Language,” Michael Glanzberg claims that there is no relation of logical consequence in natural language (2015). The present paper counters that claim. I shall discuss Glanzberg’s arguments and show why they don’t hold. I further show how Glanzberg’s claims may be used to rather support the existence of logical consequence in natural language.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43450742","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The formalisation of natural language arguments in a formal language close to it in syntax has been a central aim of Moss's Natural Logic. I examine how the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc) can handle the inferences Moss has considered. I show that they can be incorporated in existing versions of Quarc or in straightforward extensions of it, all within sound and complete systems. Moreover, Quarc is closer in some respects to natural language than are Moss's systems---for instance, it does not use negative nouns. The process also sheds light on formal properties and presuppositions of some inferences it formalises. Directions for future work are outlined.
{"title":"The Quantified Argument Calculus and Natural Logic","authors":"Hanoch Ben-Yami","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i2.02","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i2.02","url":null,"abstract":"The formalisation of natural language arguments in a formal language close to it in syntax has been a central aim of Moss's Natural Logic. I examine how the Quantified Argument Calculus (Quarc) can handle the inferences Moss has considered. I show that they can be incorporated in existing versions of Quarc or in straightforward extensions of it, all within sound and complete systems. Moreover, Quarc is closer in some respects to natural language than are Moss's systems---for instance, it does not use negative nouns. The process also sheds light on formal properties and presuppositions of some inferences it formalises. Directions for future work are outlined.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48363753","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Vindicating the claim that agents ought to be consistent has proved to be a difficult task. Recently, some have argued that we can use accuracy-dominance arguments to vindicate the normativity of such requirements. But what do these arguments prove, exactly? In this paper, I argue that we can make a distinction between two theses on the normativity of consistency: the view that one ought to be consistent and the view that one ought to avoid being inconsistent. I argue that accuracy-dominance arguments for consistency support the latter view, but not necessarily the former. I also argue that the distinction between these two theses matters in the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. Specifically, the distinction suggests that there are interesting alternatives to vindicating the strong claim that one ought to be consistent.
{"title":"Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications","authors":"Marc‐Kevin Daoust","doi":"10.48106/dial.v74.i1.07","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.48106/dial.v74.i1.07","url":null,"abstract":"Vindicating the claim that agents ought to be consistent has proved to be a difficult task. Recently, some have argued that we can use accuracy-dominance arguments to vindicate the normativity of such requirements. But what do these arguments prove, exactly? In this paper, I argue that we can make a distinction between two theses on the normativity of consistency: the view that one ought to be consistent and the view that one ought to avoid being inconsistent. I argue that accuracy-dominance arguments for consistency support the latter view, but not necessarily the former. I also argue that the distinction between these two theses matters in the debate on the normativity of epistemic rationality. Specifically, the distinction suggests that there are interesting alternatives to vindicating the strong claim that one ought to be consistent.","PeriodicalId":46676,"journal":{"name":"DIALECTICA","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"70560537","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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