Pub Date : 2023-10-19DOI: 10.1177/14778785231207976
Kunimasa Sato
The most important and general aim of the education system is to edify students, epistemically speaking. However, it is a sad reality that the education system is sometimes a corruptive epistemic environment in which a variety of epistemic injustices occur. In this article, I first argue that the special character of educational institutions means that children sometimes suffer testimonial, participant, and hermeneutical betrayals as specifically educational variants of epistemic injustices. Next, I ask what our response should be to such epistemic injustices. I draw a distinction between an ‘ideal’ and a ‘non-ideal’ solution to these problems. I hold that consideration of (a) environmental bad luck and (b) children’s lack of control over their epistemic environments should lead us to favor a non-ideal solution to the problem of epistemic injustice in education. I propose that the non-ideal approach to epistemic injustice in education should focus not on the reduction or neutralization of our implicit prejudices, as has commonly been proposed in the literature, but on providing for the epistemic needs of those who suffer epistemic injustices in corruptive environments in two ways. First, we should aim to care for children who are afflicted by injustice by having their epistemic needs legitimately recognized by caring educators. Second, we should aim systemically to offer an educational curriculum for any child and teacher to develop critical imagination to care about the epistemic needs of those who are vulnerable to epistemic injustices. I conclude by explaining the acts of epistemic caring and critical imagining as parts of restorative epistemic justice that affords vulnerable children due recognition of their epistemic needs beyond merely knowing the mechanisms of implicit prejudices and the epistemic injustices associated with them.
{"title":"A non-ideal aim of redressing epistemic injustices in corruptive educational environments: Toward restorative epistemic justice","authors":"Kunimasa Sato","doi":"10.1177/14778785231207976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231207976","url":null,"abstract":"The most important and general aim of the education system is to edify students, epistemically speaking. However, it is a sad reality that the education system is sometimes a corruptive epistemic environment in which a variety of epistemic injustices occur. In this article, I first argue that the special character of educational institutions means that children sometimes suffer testimonial, participant, and hermeneutical betrayals as specifically educational variants of epistemic injustices. Next, I ask what our response should be to such epistemic injustices. I draw a distinction between an ‘ideal’ and a ‘non-ideal’ solution to these problems. I hold that consideration of (a) environmental bad luck and (b) children’s lack of control over their epistemic environments should lead us to favor a non-ideal solution to the problem of epistemic injustice in education. I propose that the non-ideal approach to epistemic injustice in education should focus not on the reduction or neutralization of our implicit prejudices, as has commonly been proposed in the literature, but on providing for the epistemic needs of those who suffer epistemic injustices in corruptive environments in two ways. First, we should aim to care for children who are afflicted by injustice by having their epistemic needs legitimately recognized by caring educators. Second, we should aim systemically to offer an educational curriculum for any child and teacher to develop critical imagination to care about the epistemic needs of those who are vulnerable to epistemic injustices. I conclude by explaining the acts of epistemic caring and critical imagining as parts of restorative epistemic justice that affords vulnerable children due recognition of their epistemic needs beyond merely knowing the mechanisms of implicit prejudices and the epistemic injustices associated with them.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135729823","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1177/14778785231206342
William Walker Ballard
This article argues for the need of a new, pragmatic response to claims of indoctrination in public school classrooms across the United States. While attempts at defining indoctrination and moral arguments for and against certain pedagogical practices may be worthwhile, the article maintains that claims of indoctrination, whether substantive or not, are an impediment to effective teaching, especially for educators who are primarily interested in perspective transformation. Drawing on recent scholarship regarding epiphany and transformative education, an argument is presented that teaching for epiphanic experience may be a pragmatic solution for teachers to adopt to remain effective in the classroom amid ever-increasing political polarization and professional scrutiny. After establishing this point, the article turns to arts education as a possible source for understanding the pedagogical technique that may lead to the creation of a classroom ethos for epiphany.
{"title":"Epiphany as a pragmatic response to claims of indoctrination in public schools","authors":"William Walker Ballard","doi":"10.1177/14778785231206342","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231206342","url":null,"abstract":"This article argues for the need of a new, pragmatic response to claims of indoctrination in public school classrooms across the United States. While attempts at defining indoctrination and moral arguments for and against certain pedagogical practices may be worthwhile, the article maintains that claims of indoctrination, whether substantive or not, are an impediment to effective teaching, especially for educators who are primarily interested in perspective transformation. Drawing on recent scholarship regarding epiphany and transformative education, an argument is presented that teaching for epiphanic experience may be a pragmatic solution for teachers to adopt to remain effective in the classroom amid ever-increasing political polarization and professional scrutiny. After establishing this point, the article turns to arts education as a possible source for understanding the pedagogical technique that may lead to the creation of a classroom ethos for epiphany.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135884607","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1177/14778785231208057
Tarna Kannisto
In this article, I argue that parental privacy has often been given too much weight in theorising about justice at schools. Susan Okin famously stated that as the family serves as the children’s ‘first school of justice’, 1 it should also be internally just. However, she agreed with John Rawls on that interfering directly within the family life, even in the name of equality and justice, would risk causing injustice to those who do not share these liberal ideals. I ask in what sense this principle of non-intrusion into the private should be extended over the school institution. If the principles of public justice and private morality came into conflict in school education, which set of principles should be given priority? I pose Rawls’ suggestion concerning children’s schooling against his depiction of the family and claim that these two are normatively at odds with each other. Of the two, the latter seems paradoxically to allow for more extensive public regulation and therefore his view of the school must be modified accordingly. Moreover, I revisit one of Okin’s main arguments that countering injustices requires active and explicated countermeasures where education plays a key role. Therefore, it is justified to prioritise principles of public morality, and teach related substantial values at schools, given that they accord with the demands of justice. Parental privacy applies to schools only in a limited sense.
{"title":"Schools and the principle of non-intrusion into the private","authors":"Tarna Kannisto","doi":"10.1177/14778785231208057","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231208057","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I argue that parental privacy has often been given too much weight in theorising about justice at schools. Susan Okin famously stated that as the family serves as the children’s ‘first school of justice’, 1 it should also be internally just. However, she agreed with John Rawls on that interfering directly within the family life, even in the name of equality and justice, would risk causing injustice to those who do not share these liberal ideals. I ask in what sense this principle of non-intrusion into the private should be extended over the school institution. If the principles of public justice and private morality came into conflict in school education, which set of principles should be given priority? I pose Rawls’ suggestion concerning children’s schooling against his depiction of the family and claim that these two are normatively at odds with each other. Of the two, the latter seems paradoxically to allow for more extensive public regulation and therefore his view of the school must be modified accordingly. Moreover, I revisit one of Okin’s main arguments that countering injustices requires active and explicated countermeasures where education plays a key role. Therefore, it is justified to prioritise principles of public morality, and teach related substantial values at schools, given that they accord with the demands of justice. Parental privacy applies to schools only in a limited sense.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135884924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1177/14778785231208268
Tatiana Geron
{"title":"Book review: Walter C Parker, <i>Education for Liberal Democracy: Using Classroom Discussion to Build Knowledge and Voice</i>","authors":"Tatiana Geron","doi":"10.1177/14778785231208268","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231208268","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"115 6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1177/14778785231206286
Christian Norefalk, Marianna Papastephanou
This article investigates whether there is any place for the school of thought that is known as analytic philosophy of education in the aftermath of postmodernism, and whether analytic philosophy of education can be treated as a ‘method’, among other alternative ‘methods’, that can be applied regardless of what kind of ‘-ism’ or ideology one embraces. An additional aim is to suggest some important questions for analytic philosophy of education to take into consideration. We argue that conceptual engineering may be a promising avenue for analytic educational theory if it is used with a critical intent that is more heuristic and inconclusive than prescriptively ideal.
{"title":"Analytic philosophy of education: Some suggested questions and directions","authors":"Christian Norefalk, Marianna Papastephanou","doi":"10.1177/14778785231206286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231206286","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates whether there is any place for the school of thought that is known as analytic philosophy of education in the aftermath of postmodernism, and whether analytic philosophy of education can be treated as a ‘method’, among other alternative ‘methods’, that can be applied regardless of what kind of ‘-ism’ or ideology one embraces. An additional aim is to suggest some important questions for analytic philosophy of education to take into consideration. We argue that conceptual engineering may be a promising avenue for analytic educational theory if it is used with a critical intent that is more heuristic and inconclusive than prescriptively ideal.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"168 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136033268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1177/14778785231208269
A. C. Nikolaidis
{"title":"Book review: Randall Curren, <i>Handbook of Philosophy of Education</i>","authors":"A. C. Nikolaidis","doi":"10.1177/14778785231208269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231208269","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"177 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136113846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1177/14778785231203100
Luke Tucker
This article examines the question of whether and under what conditions teaching open-mindedness to students could have negative effects. While there has been much discussion in the literature about the potential downsides of being open-minded, the question of whether teaching this trait to young, untutored minds could result in more negative effects than positive has received little attention. Yet, given that a primary focus of the literature is providing models for use in educational contexts, exploring the potential risks of encouraging students to emulate such models is imperative. In this regard, the article presents three concerns. The first is that students may lack the full intellectual character to avoid the pitfalls of open-mindedness that have already been noted in the literature. The second concern is that students who exercise open-mindedness may incur social costs that cannot be compensated for by epistemic goods. The third concern is that educators, particularly at universities, often face certain non-ideal conditions that may make it difficult for them to effectively cultivate open-mindedness in students. I ultimately conclude that, in light of these concerns, we should approach teaching for open-mindedness with great caution. However, we should not avoid it altogether. Preliminary suggestions are offered on how instructors may attune their approach to teaching for open-mindedness to mitigate the identified concerns.
{"title":"Open-mindedness: A double-edged sword in education","authors":"Luke Tucker","doi":"10.1177/14778785231203100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231203100","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the question of whether and under what conditions teaching open-mindedness to students could have negative effects. While there has been much discussion in the literature about the potential downsides of being open-minded, the question of whether teaching this trait to young, untutored minds could result in more negative effects than positive has received little attention. Yet, given that a primary focus of the literature is providing models for use in educational contexts, exploring the potential risks of encouraging students to emulate such models is imperative. In this regard, the article presents three concerns. The first is that students may lack the full intellectual character to avoid the pitfalls of open-mindedness that have already been noted in the literature. The second concern is that students who exercise open-mindedness may incur social costs that cannot be compensated for by epistemic goods. The third concern is that educators, particularly at universities, often face certain non-ideal conditions that may make it difficult for them to effectively cultivate open-mindedness in students. I ultimately conclude that, in light of these concerns, we should approach teaching for open-mindedness with great caution. However, we should not avoid it altogether. Preliminary suggestions are offered on how instructors may attune their approach to teaching for open-mindedness to mitigate the identified concerns.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135350289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-30DOI: 10.1177/14778785231203104
Emerald Henderson
A new theory of emulation – the method by which one learns from moral role models – is emerging through the combined efforts of philosophers, psychologists and educationists. Using a previous argument reconceptualising emulation as a moral virtue as a philosophical springboard, in this paper, I extend this theory by building a more robust case for how emulation qua role modelling works in practice through direct appeal to Aristotle’s account of causation: the four causes. Historically revered for their explanatory power, I argue that reconstructing the four causes and synthesising them with emulation enables us to better comprehend it as a quadripartite causal process. Through doing so, I propose that emulation is driven by ‘entangled phronesis’ – a mechanism which enables immature moral learners to acquire virtue by sharing in the phronesis, that is, practical wisdom, of a role model. Since the degree of entanglement depends upon a learner’s phase of virtuous character development, I also divide emulation into two types: pre-phronetic ‘habituated emulation’ and phronetically-informed ‘complete emulation’. Combined with my four-causal account of emulation, these concepts represent a novel contribution to neo-Aristotelian character developmental theory and help explain – step-by-step – the method by which one potentially acquires moral virtue and phronesis from moral role models.
{"title":"Entangled <i>phronesis</i> and the four causes of emulation: Developmental insights into role modelling","authors":"Emerald Henderson","doi":"10.1177/14778785231203104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231203104","url":null,"abstract":"A new theory of emulation – the method by which one learns from moral role models – is emerging through the combined efforts of philosophers, psychologists and educationists. Using a previous argument reconceptualising emulation as a moral virtue as a philosophical springboard, in this paper, I extend this theory by building a more robust case for how emulation qua role modelling works in practice through direct appeal to Aristotle’s account of causation: the four causes. Historically revered for their explanatory power, I argue that reconstructing the four causes and synthesising them with emulation enables us to better comprehend it as a quadripartite causal process. Through doing so, I propose that emulation is driven by ‘entangled phronesis’ – a mechanism which enables immature moral learners to acquire virtue by sharing in the phronesis, that is, practical wisdom, of a role model. Since the degree of entanglement depends upon a learner’s phase of virtuous character development, I also divide emulation into two types: pre-phronetic ‘habituated emulation’ and phronetically-informed ‘complete emulation’. Combined with my four-causal account of emulation, these concepts represent a novel contribution to neo-Aristotelian character developmental theory and help explain – step-by-step – the method by which one potentially acquires moral virtue and phronesis from moral role models.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"96 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136341737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231184870
S. Daniels, P. Enslin
Of all possible future directions for analytic philosophy of education, few are as overdue as thoroughly confronting the legacy of colonialism and the postcolonial moment. Rightly credited with establishing the credibility and standing of philosophy of education, by 1980, analytic philosophy of education was the dominant though not unchallenged approach to philosophy of education in the Anglo-American world. While its dominance has declined and philosophy of education has become more diverse, analytic philosophy of education retains a strong international presence in educational theory. By contrast, postcolonial theory – the critical study of colonialism and its aftermath – has attracted growing interest across many academic disciplines, developing from the 1970s onwards from its early location in literary and cultural studies. After outlining the emergence of analytic philosophy of education, and the subsequent reshaping of philosophy of education, we describe postcolonial theory and the place of education in both colonialism and postcolonial thought. Having thus located analytic philosophy of education and the postcolonial turn in their own times and contexts, we consider the postcolonial challenge to Western philosophy and how analytic philosophy of education could respond, developing our stance on a postcolonial future direction for analytic philosophy of education. We argue that the future of philosophy of education is now inescapably postcolonial and that it should retain its analytical strengths.
{"title":"Analytic philosophy of education and the postcolonial moment","authors":"S. Daniels, P. Enslin","doi":"10.1177/14778785231184870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231184870","url":null,"abstract":"Of all possible future directions for analytic philosophy of education, few are as overdue as thoroughly confronting the legacy of colonialism and the postcolonial moment. Rightly credited with establishing the credibility and standing of philosophy of education, by 1980, analytic philosophy of education was the dominant though not unchallenged approach to philosophy of education in the Anglo-American world. While its dominance has declined and philosophy of education has become more diverse, analytic philosophy of education retains a strong international presence in educational theory. By contrast, postcolonial theory – the critical study of colonialism and its aftermath – has attracted growing interest across many academic disciplines, developing from the 1970s onwards from its early location in literary and cultural studies. After outlining the emergence of analytic philosophy of education, and the subsequent reshaping of philosophy of education, we describe postcolonial theory and the place of education in both colonialism and postcolonial thought. Having thus located analytic philosophy of education and the postcolonial turn in their own times and contexts, we consider the postcolonial challenge to Western philosophy and how analytic philosophy of education could respond, developing our stance on a postcolonial future direction for analytic philosophy of education. We argue that the future of philosophy of education is now inescapably postcolonial and that it should retain its analytical strengths.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"216 - 231"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44865156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231187197
Emily Y. Tran
curtailed by court cases in the name of preventing a disruptive learning environment (pp. 92–95). This is clearly part of the problem. The concrete recommendations in the final chapter are perhaps the most illuminating and practically useful part of the book. Here, Ben-Porath offers detailed guidance for students, faculty, staff, and administrators. Students need to be willing to collaborate across identity groups, and administrators can incentivize this collaboration by sponsoring social events between groups typically at odds (p. 151). Campus events can employ ‘free speech observers’, individuals trained in university speech policies who can intervene when necessary to ensure the speech rights of all relevant parties are honored, protestors and speakers alike (pp. 145–146). Faculty can be more deliberate about courting controversy in the classroom, constructing lesson plans with more care and attention to the issues (pp. 147–151). Her tips are applicable, actionable, and ethically wise. The bottom line is that we find ourselves in a world historic crisis of distrust, disinformation, and polarization. Cancel Wars is the kind of book we need to help manage that crisis. Ben-Porath makes a strong case that the university should serve as a beacon in these troubling times – a facilitator of knowledge, speech, inclusion, and trust.
{"title":"Book reviews: Lauren Bialystok and Lisa M. F. Andersen, Touchy Subject: The History and Philosophy of Sex Education","authors":"Emily Y. Tran","doi":"10.1177/14778785231187197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231187197","url":null,"abstract":"curtailed by court cases in the name of preventing a disruptive learning environment (pp. 92–95). This is clearly part of the problem. The concrete recommendations in the final chapter are perhaps the most illuminating and practically useful part of the book. Here, Ben-Porath offers detailed guidance for students, faculty, staff, and administrators. Students need to be willing to collaborate across identity groups, and administrators can incentivize this collaboration by sponsoring social events between groups typically at odds (p. 151). Campus events can employ ‘free speech observers’, individuals trained in university speech policies who can intervene when necessary to ensure the speech rights of all relevant parties are honored, protestors and speakers alike (pp. 145–146). Faculty can be more deliberate about courting controversy in the classroom, constructing lesson plans with more care and attention to the issues (pp. 147–151). Her tips are applicable, actionable, and ethically wise. The bottom line is that we find ourselves in a world historic crisis of distrust, disinformation, and polarization. Cancel Wars is the kind of book we need to help manage that crisis. Ben-Porath makes a strong case that the university should serve as a beacon in these troubling times – a facilitator of knowledge, speech, inclusion, and trust.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"234 - 237"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47114790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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