Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1177/14778785231206286
Christian Norefalk, Marianna Papastephanou
This article investigates whether there is any place for the school of thought that is known as analytic philosophy of education in the aftermath of postmodernism, and whether analytic philosophy of education can be treated as a ‘method’, among other alternative ‘methods’, that can be applied regardless of what kind of ‘-ism’ or ideology one embraces. An additional aim is to suggest some important questions for analytic philosophy of education to take into consideration. We argue that conceptual engineering may be a promising avenue for analytic educational theory if it is used with a critical intent that is more heuristic and inconclusive than prescriptively ideal.
{"title":"Analytic philosophy of education: Some suggested questions and directions","authors":"Christian Norefalk, Marianna Papastephanou","doi":"10.1177/14778785231206286","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231206286","url":null,"abstract":"This article investigates whether there is any place for the school of thought that is known as analytic philosophy of education in the aftermath of postmodernism, and whether analytic philosophy of education can be treated as a ‘method’, among other alternative ‘methods’, that can be applied regardless of what kind of ‘-ism’ or ideology one embraces. An additional aim is to suggest some important questions for analytic philosophy of education to take into consideration. We argue that conceptual engineering may be a promising avenue for analytic educational theory if it is used with a critical intent that is more heuristic and inconclusive than prescriptively ideal.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136033268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-16DOI: 10.1177/14778785231208269
A. C. Nikolaidis
{"title":"Book review: Randall Curren, <i>Handbook of Philosophy of Education</i>","authors":"A. C. Nikolaidis","doi":"10.1177/14778785231208269","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231208269","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136113846","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-06DOI: 10.1177/14778785231203100
Luke Tucker
This article examines the question of whether and under what conditions teaching open-mindedness to students could have negative effects. While there has been much discussion in the literature about the potential downsides of being open-minded, the question of whether teaching this trait to young, untutored minds could result in more negative effects than positive has received little attention. Yet, given that a primary focus of the literature is providing models for use in educational contexts, exploring the potential risks of encouraging students to emulate such models is imperative. In this regard, the article presents three concerns. The first is that students may lack the full intellectual character to avoid the pitfalls of open-mindedness that have already been noted in the literature. The second concern is that students who exercise open-mindedness may incur social costs that cannot be compensated for by epistemic goods. The third concern is that educators, particularly at universities, often face certain non-ideal conditions that may make it difficult for them to effectively cultivate open-mindedness in students. I ultimately conclude that, in light of these concerns, we should approach teaching for open-mindedness with great caution. However, we should not avoid it altogether. Preliminary suggestions are offered on how instructors may attune their approach to teaching for open-mindedness to mitigate the identified concerns.
{"title":"Open-mindedness: A double-edged sword in education","authors":"Luke Tucker","doi":"10.1177/14778785231203100","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231203100","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the question of whether and under what conditions teaching open-mindedness to students could have negative effects. While there has been much discussion in the literature about the potential downsides of being open-minded, the question of whether teaching this trait to young, untutored minds could result in more negative effects than positive has received little attention. Yet, given that a primary focus of the literature is providing models for use in educational contexts, exploring the potential risks of encouraging students to emulate such models is imperative. In this regard, the article presents three concerns. The first is that students may lack the full intellectual character to avoid the pitfalls of open-mindedness that have already been noted in the literature. The second concern is that students who exercise open-mindedness may incur social costs that cannot be compensated for by epistemic goods. The third concern is that educators, particularly at universities, often face certain non-ideal conditions that may make it difficult for them to effectively cultivate open-mindedness in students. I ultimately conclude that, in light of these concerns, we should approach teaching for open-mindedness with great caution. However, we should not avoid it altogether. Preliminary suggestions are offered on how instructors may attune their approach to teaching for open-mindedness to mitigate the identified concerns.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135350289","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-30DOI: 10.1177/14778785231203104
Emerald Henderson
A new theory of emulation – the method by which one learns from moral role models – is emerging through the combined efforts of philosophers, psychologists and educationists. Using a previous argument reconceptualising emulation as a moral virtue as a philosophical springboard, in this paper, I extend this theory by building a more robust case for how emulation qua role modelling works in practice through direct appeal to Aristotle’s account of causation: the four causes. Historically revered for their explanatory power, I argue that reconstructing the four causes and synthesising them with emulation enables us to better comprehend it as a quadripartite causal process. Through doing so, I propose that emulation is driven by ‘entangled phronesis’ – a mechanism which enables immature moral learners to acquire virtue by sharing in the phronesis, that is, practical wisdom, of a role model. Since the degree of entanglement depends upon a learner’s phase of virtuous character development, I also divide emulation into two types: pre-phronetic ‘habituated emulation’ and phronetically-informed ‘complete emulation’. Combined with my four-causal account of emulation, these concepts represent a novel contribution to neo-Aristotelian character developmental theory and help explain – step-by-step – the method by which one potentially acquires moral virtue and phronesis from moral role models.
{"title":"Entangled <i>phronesis</i> and the four causes of emulation: Developmental insights into role modelling","authors":"Emerald Henderson","doi":"10.1177/14778785231203104","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231203104","url":null,"abstract":"A new theory of emulation – the method by which one learns from moral role models – is emerging through the combined efforts of philosophers, psychologists and educationists. Using a previous argument reconceptualising emulation as a moral virtue as a philosophical springboard, in this paper, I extend this theory by building a more robust case for how emulation qua role modelling works in practice through direct appeal to Aristotle’s account of causation: the four causes. Historically revered for their explanatory power, I argue that reconstructing the four causes and synthesising them with emulation enables us to better comprehend it as a quadripartite causal process. Through doing so, I propose that emulation is driven by ‘entangled phronesis’ – a mechanism which enables immature moral learners to acquire virtue by sharing in the phronesis, that is, practical wisdom, of a role model. Since the degree of entanglement depends upon a learner’s phase of virtuous character development, I also divide emulation into two types: pre-phronetic ‘habituated emulation’ and phronetically-informed ‘complete emulation’. Combined with my four-causal account of emulation, these concepts represent a novel contribution to neo-Aristotelian character developmental theory and help explain – step-by-step – the method by which one potentially acquires moral virtue and phronesis from moral role models.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136341737","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231184870
S. Daniels, P. Enslin
Of all possible future directions for analytic philosophy of education, few are as overdue as thoroughly confronting the legacy of colonialism and the postcolonial moment. Rightly credited with establishing the credibility and standing of philosophy of education, by 1980, analytic philosophy of education was the dominant though not unchallenged approach to philosophy of education in the Anglo-American world. While its dominance has declined and philosophy of education has become more diverse, analytic philosophy of education retains a strong international presence in educational theory. By contrast, postcolonial theory – the critical study of colonialism and its aftermath – has attracted growing interest across many academic disciplines, developing from the 1970s onwards from its early location in literary and cultural studies. After outlining the emergence of analytic philosophy of education, and the subsequent reshaping of philosophy of education, we describe postcolonial theory and the place of education in both colonialism and postcolonial thought. Having thus located analytic philosophy of education and the postcolonial turn in their own times and contexts, we consider the postcolonial challenge to Western philosophy and how analytic philosophy of education could respond, developing our stance on a postcolonial future direction for analytic philosophy of education. We argue that the future of philosophy of education is now inescapably postcolonial and that it should retain its analytical strengths.
{"title":"Analytic philosophy of education and the postcolonial moment","authors":"S. Daniels, P. Enslin","doi":"10.1177/14778785231184870","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231184870","url":null,"abstract":"Of all possible future directions for analytic philosophy of education, few are as overdue as thoroughly confronting the legacy of colonialism and the postcolonial moment. Rightly credited with establishing the credibility and standing of philosophy of education, by 1980, analytic philosophy of education was the dominant though not unchallenged approach to philosophy of education in the Anglo-American world. While its dominance has declined and philosophy of education has become more diverse, analytic philosophy of education retains a strong international presence in educational theory. By contrast, postcolonial theory – the critical study of colonialism and its aftermath – has attracted growing interest across many academic disciplines, developing from the 1970s onwards from its early location in literary and cultural studies. After outlining the emergence of analytic philosophy of education, and the subsequent reshaping of philosophy of education, we describe postcolonial theory and the place of education in both colonialism and postcolonial thought. Having thus located analytic philosophy of education and the postcolonial turn in their own times and contexts, we consider the postcolonial challenge to Western philosophy and how analytic philosophy of education could respond, developing our stance on a postcolonial future direction for analytic philosophy of education. We argue that the future of philosophy of education is now inescapably postcolonial and that it should retain its analytical strengths.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44865156","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231187197
Emily Y. Tran
curtailed by court cases in the name of preventing a disruptive learning environment (pp. 92–95). This is clearly part of the problem. The concrete recommendations in the final chapter are perhaps the most illuminating and practically useful part of the book. Here, Ben-Porath offers detailed guidance for students, faculty, staff, and administrators. Students need to be willing to collaborate across identity groups, and administrators can incentivize this collaboration by sponsoring social events between groups typically at odds (p. 151). Campus events can employ ‘free speech observers’, individuals trained in university speech policies who can intervene when necessary to ensure the speech rights of all relevant parties are honored, protestors and speakers alike (pp. 145–146). Faculty can be more deliberate about courting controversy in the classroom, constructing lesson plans with more care and attention to the issues (pp. 147–151). Her tips are applicable, actionable, and ethically wise. The bottom line is that we find ourselves in a world historic crisis of distrust, disinformation, and polarization. Cancel Wars is the kind of book we need to help manage that crisis. Ben-Porath makes a strong case that the university should serve as a beacon in these troubling times – a facilitator of knowledge, speech, inclusion, and trust.
{"title":"Book reviews: Lauren Bialystok and Lisa M. F. Andersen, Touchy Subject: The History and Philosophy of Sex Education","authors":"Emily Y. Tran","doi":"10.1177/14778785231187197","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231187197","url":null,"abstract":"curtailed by court cases in the name of preventing a disruptive learning environment (pp. 92–95). This is clearly part of the problem. The concrete recommendations in the final chapter are perhaps the most illuminating and practically useful part of the book. Here, Ben-Porath offers detailed guidance for students, faculty, staff, and administrators. Students need to be willing to collaborate across identity groups, and administrators can incentivize this collaboration by sponsoring social events between groups typically at odds (p. 151). Campus events can employ ‘free speech observers’, individuals trained in university speech policies who can intervene when necessary to ensure the speech rights of all relevant parties are honored, protestors and speakers alike (pp. 145–146). Faculty can be more deliberate about courting controversy in the classroom, constructing lesson plans with more care and attention to the issues (pp. 147–151). Her tips are applicable, actionable, and ethically wise. The bottom line is that we find ourselves in a world historic crisis of distrust, disinformation, and polarization. Cancel Wars is the kind of book we need to help manage that crisis. Ben-Porath makes a strong case that the university should serve as a beacon in these troubling times – a facilitator of knowledge, speech, inclusion, and trust.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47114790","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231187304
Anniina Leiviskä
This article examines the challenges that an epistemic account of deliberative democracy, according to which democratic deliberation has ‘truth-tracking’ capacities, encounters in contemporary polarized societies, and then discusses how these challenges could be addressed through democratic education. The focus of the article is especially on two phenomena indicated by recent empirical research: the increasing public distrust in experts and motivated reasoning that affects citizens’ belief-formation. The article suggests that some of the idealizing core assumptions of epistemic democracy make it difficult to recognize and address these phenomena as serious challenges to the epistemic quality of public deliberation. With these challenges in view, the article then addresses the question how the deliberative model of education should be revised or complemented for it to prepare students for epistemically good-quality public deliberation. The article proposes two pedagogical approaches: (1) fostering students’ epistemic trust through a ‘realistic’ account of science education, and by familiarizing students with adequate criteria for recognizing trustworthy experts, and (2) teaching integrative negotiation, which focuses on examining and explicating students’ interests and needs in situations in which motivated reasoning prevents them from meaningfully engaging with educationally and epistemically productive practices.
{"title":"Democratic education and the epistemic quality of democratic deliberation","authors":"Anniina Leiviskä","doi":"10.1177/14778785231187304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231187304","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the challenges that an epistemic account of deliberative democracy, according to which democratic deliberation has ‘truth-tracking’ capacities, encounters in contemporary polarized societies, and then discusses how these challenges could be addressed through democratic education. The focus of the article is especially on two phenomena indicated by recent empirical research: the increasing public distrust in experts and motivated reasoning that affects citizens’ belief-formation. The article suggests that some of the idealizing core assumptions of epistemic democracy make it difficult to recognize and address these phenomena as serious challenges to the epistemic quality of public deliberation. With these challenges in view, the article then addresses the question how the deliberative model of education should be revised or complemented for it to prepare students for epistemically good-quality public deliberation. The article proposes two pedagogical approaches: (1) fostering students’ epistemic trust through a ‘realistic’ account of science education, and by familiarizing students with adequate criteria for recognizing trustworthy experts, and (2) teaching integrative negotiation, which focuses on examining and explicating students’ interests and needs in situations in which motivated reasoning prevents them from meaningfully engaging with educationally and epistemically productive practices.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41655392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231187193
M. Levinson
During the early years of the COVID-19 pandemic, decision-makers faced numerous ethical questions in biomedical science, public health, educational policy, and education practice. Bioethicists were key partners in informing decision-making in their areas of expertise; educational ethicists, on the other hand, had to fight our way to the table if we got in the building at all. How did bioethics go from non-existent as a field in 1960 to ubiquitous a half-century later, and how could normative work in and about education make the same leap? This article uses bioethics as a foil to argue for why we need a new field of educational ethics, what such a field could accomplish, and how it might do so. It describes the kinds of problems that bioethics was created to address and the different roles that bioethicists play. The article argues that edethicists can and should address the same kinds of problems as well as play similar scholarly, clinical, and policy-oriented roles.
{"title":"We need a field of educational ethics","authors":"M. Levinson","doi":"10.1177/14778785231187193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231187193","url":null,"abstract":"During the early years of the COVID-19 pandemic, decision-makers faced numerous ethical questions in biomedical science, public health, educational policy, and education practice. Bioethicists were key partners in informing decision-making in their areas of expertise; educational ethicists, on the other hand, had to fight our way to the table if we got in the building at all. How did bioethics go from non-existent as a field in 1960 to ubiquitous a half-century later, and how could normative work in and about education make the same leap? This article uses bioethics as a foil to argue for why we need a new field of educational ethics, what such a field could accomplish, and how it might do so. It describes the kinds of problems that bioethics was created to address and the different roles that bioethicists play. The article argues that edethicists can and should address the same kinds of problems as well as play similar scholarly, clinical, and policy-oriented roles.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44572477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-21DOI: 10.1177/14778785231180820
Benjamin Sachs-Cobbe
Since the 1990s, education for the virtues of citizenship has become widespread in the United States and United Kingdom. It is intended to inculcate virtues such as courtesy, respect and truthfulness in school children. This essay defends education for the virtues of citizenship against two criticisms. According to the first, which might be called the ‘status quo bias’ criticism, inculcating such virtues is a recipe for stasis. According to the second, which might be called the ‘individualism’ criticism, EVC sends the message that the citizen herself is primarily responsible for her fate. The authors who raise these two criticisms tend to link EVC with ‘conservatism’ or one of its cognate terms. If education for the virtues of citizenship really is conservative, this raises the worry that education for the virtues of citizenship is partisan, which would surely render it morally objectionable. In this paper, I distinguish big-C Conservatism from small-c conservatism, and interpret the education for the virtues of citizenship critics as contending that education for the virtues of citizenship is Conservative (i.e. aligned with the political philosophies of right-leaning parties) in virtue of being individualistic, and conservative in virtue of being status quo biased. Against the individualism criticism, I point out that the strand of conservatism of which economists like Hayek and Friedman are the standard-bearers is anti-individualistic in virtue of holding that we need good economic policy to make up for the fact that we cannot count on individual economic actors to exercise sound moral judgement, and that the strand of conservatism inspired by commentators like Burke, Nisbet and Scruton is anti-individualistic in virtue of its emphasis on community. Hence, the inference from individualism to Conservatism doesn’t go through. Against the status quo bias criticism, I contend that it is unpredictable who will benefit from citizens being resistant to change. Hence, while it may be right to label such resistance ‘conservative’, such conservatism is not partisan.
{"title":"The conservatism objection to educating for the virtues of citizenship","authors":"Benjamin Sachs-Cobbe","doi":"10.1177/14778785231180820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231180820","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 1990s, education for the virtues of citizenship has become widespread in the United States and United Kingdom. It is intended to inculcate virtues such as courtesy, respect and truthfulness in school children. This essay defends education for the virtues of citizenship against two criticisms. According to the first, which might be called the ‘status quo bias’ criticism, inculcating such virtues is a recipe for stasis. According to the second, which might be called the ‘individualism’ criticism, EVC sends the message that the citizen herself is primarily responsible for her fate. The authors who raise these two criticisms tend to link EVC with ‘conservatism’ or one of its cognate terms. If education for the virtues of citizenship really is conservative, this raises the worry that education for the virtues of citizenship is partisan, which would surely render it morally objectionable. In this paper, I distinguish big-C Conservatism from small-c conservatism, and interpret the education for the virtues of citizenship critics as contending that education for the virtues of citizenship is Conservative (i.e. aligned with the political philosophies of right-leaning parties) in virtue of being individualistic, and conservative in virtue of being status quo biased. Against the individualism criticism, I point out that the strand of conservatism of which economists like Hayek and Friedman are the standard-bearers is anti-individualistic in virtue of holding that we need good economic policy to make up for the fact that we cannot count on individual economic actors to exercise sound moral judgement, and that the strand of conservatism inspired by commentators like Burke, Nisbet and Scruton is anti-individualistic in virtue of its emphasis on community. Hence, the inference from individualism to Conservatism doesn’t go through. Against the status quo bias criticism, I contend that it is unpredictable who will benefit from citizens being resistant to change. Hence, while it may be right to label such resistance ‘conservative’, such conservatism is not partisan.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48802543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-17DOI: 10.1177/14778785231180469
M. Merry
In this article, I examine a case involving an equity-minded parent caught in a quandary about which school to select for her child, knowing that her decision may have consequences for others. To do so, I heuristically construct a fictional portrait and explore the deliberative process a parent might have through a dialogue taking place among ‘friends’, where each friend personifies a different set of ethical considerations. I then briefly consider two competing philosophical assessments but argue that neither position helpfully assists in resolving the quandary. To conclude, I ask the provocative question whether parental motives – but also their school choices – actually matter if the inequitable outcomes seem to remain unchanged.
{"title":"Caught in a school choice quandary: What should an equity-minded parent do?","authors":"M. Merry","doi":"10.1177/14778785231180469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231180469","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I examine a case involving an equity-minded parent caught in a quandary about which school to select for her child, knowing that her decision may have consequences for others. To do so, I heuristically construct a fictional portrait and explore the deliberative process a parent might have through a dialogue taking place among ‘friends’, where each friend personifies a different set of ethical considerations. I then briefly consider two competing philosophical assessments but argue that neither position helpfully assists in resolving the quandary. To conclude, I ask the provocative question whether parental motives – but also their school choices – actually matter if the inequitable outcomes seem to remain unchanged.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49428964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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