Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231187304
Anniina Leiviskä
This article examines the challenges that an epistemic account of deliberative democracy, according to which democratic deliberation has ‘truth-tracking’ capacities, encounters in contemporary polarized societies, and then discusses how these challenges could be addressed through democratic education. The focus of the article is especially on two phenomena indicated by recent empirical research: the increasing public distrust in experts and motivated reasoning that affects citizens’ belief-formation. The article suggests that some of the idealizing core assumptions of epistemic democracy make it difficult to recognize and address these phenomena as serious challenges to the epistemic quality of public deliberation. With these challenges in view, the article then addresses the question how the deliberative model of education should be revised or complemented for it to prepare students for epistemically good-quality public deliberation. The article proposes two pedagogical approaches: (1) fostering students’ epistemic trust through a ‘realistic’ account of science education, and by familiarizing students with adequate criteria for recognizing trustworthy experts, and (2) teaching integrative negotiation, which focuses on examining and explicating students’ interests and needs in situations in which motivated reasoning prevents them from meaningfully engaging with educationally and epistemically productive practices.
{"title":"Democratic education and the epistemic quality of democratic deliberation","authors":"Anniina Leiviskä","doi":"10.1177/14778785231187304","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231187304","url":null,"abstract":"This article examines the challenges that an epistemic account of deliberative democracy, according to which democratic deliberation has ‘truth-tracking’ capacities, encounters in contemporary polarized societies, and then discusses how these challenges could be addressed through democratic education. The focus of the article is especially on two phenomena indicated by recent empirical research: the increasing public distrust in experts and motivated reasoning that affects citizens’ belief-formation. The article suggests that some of the idealizing core assumptions of epistemic democracy make it difficult to recognize and address these phenomena as serious challenges to the epistemic quality of public deliberation. With these challenges in view, the article then addresses the question how the deliberative model of education should be revised or complemented for it to prepare students for epistemically good-quality public deliberation. The article proposes two pedagogical approaches: (1) fostering students’ epistemic trust through a ‘realistic’ account of science education, and by familiarizing students with adequate criteria for recognizing trustworthy experts, and (2) teaching integrative negotiation, which focuses on examining and explicating students’ interests and needs in situations in which motivated reasoning prevents them from meaningfully engaging with educationally and epistemically productive practices.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"113 - 134"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41655392","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231187193
M. Levinson
During the early years of the COVID-19 pandemic, decision-makers faced numerous ethical questions in biomedical science, public health, educational policy, and education practice. Bioethicists were key partners in informing decision-making in their areas of expertise; educational ethicists, on the other hand, had to fight our way to the table if we got in the building at all. How did bioethics go from non-existent as a field in 1960 to ubiquitous a half-century later, and how could normative work in and about education make the same leap? This article uses bioethics as a foil to argue for why we need a new field of educational ethics, what such a field could accomplish, and how it might do so. It describes the kinds of problems that bioethics was created to address and the different roles that bioethicists play. The article argues that edethicists can and should address the same kinds of problems as well as play similar scholarly, clinical, and policy-oriented roles.
{"title":"We need a field of educational ethics","authors":"M. Levinson","doi":"10.1177/14778785231187193","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231187193","url":null,"abstract":"During the early years of the COVID-19 pandemic, decision-makers faced numerous ethical questions in biomedical science, public health, educational policy, and education practice. Bioethicists were key partners in informing decision-making in their areas of expertise; educational ethicists, on the other hand, had to fight our way to the table if we got in the building at all. How did bioethics go from non-existent as a field in 1960 to ubiquitous a half-century later, and how could normative work in and about education make the same leap? This article uses bioethics as a foil to argue for why we need a new field of educational ethics, what such a field could accomplish, and how it might do so. It describes the kinds of problems that bioethics was created to address and the different roles that bioethicists play. The article argues that edethicists can and should address the same kinds of problems as well as play similar scholarly, clinical, and policy-oriented roles.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"197 - 215"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44572477","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-21DOI: 10.1177/14778785231180820
Benjamin Sachs-Cobbe
Since the 1990s, education for the virtues of citizenship has become widespread in the United States and United Kingdom. It is intended to inculcate virtues such as courtesy, respect and truthfulness in school children. This essay defends education for the virtues of citizenship against two criticisms. According to the first, which might be called the ‘status quo bias’ criticism, inculcating such virtues is a recipe for stasis. According to the second, which might be called the ‘individualism’ criticism, EVC sends the message that the citizen herself is primarily responsible for her fate. The authors who raise these two criticisms tend to link EVC with ‘conservatism’ or one of its cognate terms. If education for the virtues of citizenship really is conservative, this raises the worry that education for the virtues of citizenship is partisan, which would surely render it morally objectionable. In this paper, I distinguish big-C Conservatism from small-c conservatism, and interpret the education for the virtues of citizenship critics as contending that education for the virtues of citizenship is Conservative (i.e. aligned with the political philosophies of right-leaning parties) in virtue of being individualistic, and conservative in virtue of being status quo biased. Against the individualism criticism, I point out that the strand of conservatism of which economists like Hayek and Friedman are the standard-bearers is anti-individualistic in virtue of holding that we need good economic policy to make up for the fact that we cannot count on individual economic actors to exercise sound moral judgement, and that the strand of conservatism inspired by commentators like Burke, Nisbet and Scruton is anti-individualistic in virtue of its emphasis on community. Hence, the inference from individualism to Conservatism doesn’t go through. Against the status quo bias criticism, I contend that it is unpredictable who will benefit from citizens being resistant to change. Hence, while it may be right to label such resistance ‘conservative’, such conservatism is not partisan.
{"title":"The conservatism objection to educating for the virtues of citizenship","authors":"Benjamin Sachs-Cobbe","doi":"10.1177/14778785231180820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231180820","url":null,"abstract":"Since the 1990s, education for the virtues of citizenship has become widespread in the United States and United Kingdom. It is intended to inculcate virtues such as courtesy, respect and truthfulness in school children. This essay defends education for the virtues of citizenship against two criticisms. According to the first, which might be called the ‘status quo bias’ criticism, inculcating such virtues is a recipe for stasis. According to the second, which might be called the ‘individualism’ criticism, EVC sends the message that the citizen herself is primarily responsible for her fate. The authors who raise these two criticisms tend to link EVC with ‘conservatism’ or one of its cognate terms. If education for the virtues of citizenship really is conservative, this raises the worry that education for the virtues of citizenship is partisan, which would surely render it morally objectionable. In this paper, I distinguish big-C Conservatism from small-c conservatism, and interpret the education for the virtues of citizenship critics as contending that education for the virtues of citizenship is Conservative (i.e. aligned with the political philosophies of right-leaning parties) in virtue of being individualistic, and conservative in virtue of being status quo biased. Against the individualism criticism, I point out that the strand of conservatism of which economists like Hayek and Friedman are the standard-bearers is anti-individualistic in virtue of holding that we need good economic policy to make up for the fact that we cannot count on individual economic actors to exercise sound moral judgement, and that the strand of conservatism inspired by commentators like Burke, Nisbet and Scruton is anti-individualistic in virtue of its emphasis on community. Hence, the inference from individualism to Conservatism doesn’t go through. Against the status quo bias criticism, I contend that it is unpredictable who will benefit from citizens being resistant to change. Hence, while it may be right to label such resistance ‘conservative’, such conservatism is not partisan.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"135 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48802543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-06-17DOI: 10.1177/14778785231180469
M. Merry
In this article, I examine a case involving an equity-minded parent caught in a quandary about which school to select for her child, knowing that her decision may have consequences for others. To do so, I heuristically construct a fictional portrait and explore the deliberative process a parent might have through a dialogue taking place among ‘friends’, where each friend personifies a different set of ethical considerations. I then briefly consider two competing philosophical assessments but argue that neither position helpfully assists in resolving the quandary. To conclude, I ask the provocative question whether parental motives – but also their school choices – actually matter if the inequitable outcomes seem to remain unchanged.
{"title":"Caught in a school choice quandary: What should an equity-minded parent do?","authors":"M. Merry","doi":"10.1177/14778785231180469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231180469","url":null,"abstract":"In this article, I examine a case involving an equity-minded parent caught in a quandary about which school to select for her child, knowing that her decision may have consequences for others. To do so, I heuristically construct a fictional portrait and explore the deliberative process a parent might have through a dialogue taking place among ‘friends’, where each friend personifies a different set of ethical considerations. I then briefly consider two competing philosophical assessments but argue that neither position helpfully assists in resolving the quandary. To conclude, I ask the provocative question whether parental motives – but also their school choices – actually matter if the inequitable outcomes seem to remain unchanged.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"155 - 175"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49428964","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-30DOI: 10.1177/14778785231178243
Cristina Miragaya-Casillas, Raimundo Aguayo-Estremera, A. Ruiz-Villaverde
Considerable academic debate exists as to whether students with a background in economics exhibit distinct behavioural patterns that set them apart from students in other academic disciplines. Primarily, the debate concerns whether students who fit the stereotype of the economist choose to study economics (the self-selection hypothesis) or whether economics students develop these behavioural patterns in the course of their university studies (the indoctrination hypothesis). We conducted a systematic literature review that examines both hypotheses. According to the literature reviewed, the majority of researchers find the self-selection hypothesis to be the best supported. However, findings remain inconclusive due to several methodological limitations. In spite of that, this study should facilitate a deeper understanding of what causes behavioural changes in economics students and what exactly these behavioural differences are, among other relevant hypotheses.
{"title":"Self-selection or indoctrination in the study of (standard) economics: A systematic literature review","authors":"Cristina Miragaya-Casillas, Raimundo Aguayo-Estremera, A. Ruiz-Villaverde","doi":"10.1177/14778785231178243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231178243","url":null,"abstract":"Considerable academic debate exists as to whether students with a background in economics exhibit distinct behavioural patterns that set them apart from students in other academic disciplines. Primarily, the debate concerns whether students who fit the stereotype of the economist choose to study economics (the self-selection hypothesis) or whether economics students develop these behavioural patterns in the course of their university studies (the indoctrination hypothesis). We conducted a systematic literature review that examines both hypotheses. According to the literature reviewed, the majority of researchers find the self-selection hypothesis to be the best supported. However, findings remain inconclusive due to several methodological limitations. In spite of that, this study should facilitate a deeper understanding of what causes behavioural changes in economics students and what exactly these behavioural differences are, among other relevant hypotheses.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"176 - 196"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-05-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46884169","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-30DOI: 10.1177/14778785231178363
Z. Barber
Some of the most vexing issues in ethics revolve around tradeoffs between fundamental values such as individual rights and the greater good, privacy and security, freedom and equality. In contemporary politics, there is perhaps no better example of such a tradeoff than the one underlying the current conflicts that have roiled college campuses: the tradeoff between the value of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the values of inclusion, belonging, and social harmony on the other. Universities ought to host fierce debate and foster unfettered intellectual exploration. Yet in an increasingly diverse and polarizing society, we also want universities to be as inclusive and welcoming as possible – we want all members of the campus community to flourish. Since speech itself can powerfully exclude, we seem at a loss when it comes to reconciling these competing values. What is so compelling about Sigal Ben-Porath’s new book Cancel Wars is her meticulous, and largely successful, attempt to smooth out the apparent tension between them. She demonstrates that free speech and inclusion may not be so conflictual as we might have thought. Her project is rooted in the particularly democratic role she envisions for universities in the wider context of society. She announces on the first page that ‘colleges are laboratories in which democracy is learned, practiced, and enhanced’ (p. 1). Colleges and universities play this role in two key ways. First, they produce and disseminate the shared knowledge foundational for building policy and navigating governance in a complex world. Politics needs a commonly understood reality to operate successfully. Second, universities ‘seed democratic habits and practices’ by fostering the interactions necessary for building trust and mutual understanding across diverse individuals (p. 1). These dual functions are vital in our polarized times, Ben-Porath observes in chapter 1. We seem no longer to know what or whom to trust, but universities are well-positioned to help. In chapter 2, Ben-Porath considers, and ultimately rejects, three commonly proposed avenues for establishing a shared epistemic foundation for democracy. We cannot rely on (1) a clear delineation of fact from opinion, on (2) well-defined groups of experts and technocrats, nor on (3) public faith in institutional reliability. Rather, Ben-Porath 1178363 TRE0010.1177/14778785231178363Theory and Research in EducationBook reviews book-review2023
伦理学中一些最令人烦恼的问题围绕着个人权利和更大利益、隐私和安全、自由和平等等基本价值观之间的权衡。在当代政治中，也许没有比当前困扰大学校园的冲突更能说明这种权衡的例子了：一方面是言论自由的价值观，另一方面是包容、归属和社会和谐的价值观。大学应该举办激烈的辩论，培养自由的智力探索。然而，在一个日益多样化和两极分化的社会中，我们也希望大学尽可能包容和受欢迎——我们希望校园社区的所有成员都能蓬勃发展。由于言论本身可以有力地排除这种情况，当涉及到调和这些相互竞争的价值观时，我们似乎不知所措。西格尔·本·波拉斯（Sigal Ben Porath）的新书《取消战争》（Cancel Wars）之所以引人注目，是因为她细致而成功地试图缓和他们之间明显的紧张关系。她表明，言论自由和包容性可能并不像我们想象的那样矛盾。她的项目植根于她设想的大学在更广泛的社会背景下发挥的特别民主的作用。她在第一页上宣布，“大学是学习、实践和加强民主的实验室”（第1页）。高校在两个关键方面发挥着这种作用。首先，他们产生并传播共同的知识，这些知识是在复杂世界中制定政策和驾驭治理的基础。政治需要一个公认的现实才能成功运作。其次，大学通过培养不同个人之间建立信任和相互理解所需的互动，“培养民主习惯和实践”（第1页）。本·波拉斯在第一章中指出，在我们两极分化的时代，这些双重功能至关重要。我们似乎不再知道该信任什么或谁，但大学已经做好了提供帮助的准备。在第二章中，Ben Porath考虑并最终拒绝了为民主建立共同认识基础的三种常见途径。我们不能依赖（1）从意见中清楚地划分事实，不能依赖（2）明确的专家和技术官僚小组，也不能依赖（3）公众对制度可靠性的信心。相反，Ben Porath 1178363 TRE0010.1177/14778785231178363教育理论与研究书评2023
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Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231160062
Lauren Bialystok
Martin’s argument for the right to higher education is an exercise in ideal theory, which specifically distances itself from the familiar failings of compulsory education. I argue that even using sufficientarian criteria for admission to higher education would perpetuate non-ideal patterns of inequality and that reasonable forms of selectivity would still limit access to autonomy-promoting higher education. Martin’s case should prompt us to think about arbitrary divisions between compulsory and post-compulsory education in an autonomy-oriented system.
{"title":"Commentary on The Right to Higher Education","authors":"Lauren Bialystok","doi":"10.1177/14778785231160062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231160062","url":null,"abstract":"Martin’s argument for the right to higher education is an exercise in ideal theory, which specifically distances itself from the familiar failings of compulsory education. I argue that even using sufficientarian criteria for admission to higher education would perpetuate non-ideal patterns of inequality and that reasonable forms of selectivity would still limit access to autonomy-promoting higher education. Martin’s case should prompt us to think about arbitrary divisions between compulsory and post-compulsory education in an autonomy-oriented system.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"71 - 76"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45426912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231162088
Winston C. Thompson
Building on the careful racial analyses of Charles W. Mills, this article uses the example case of Black ethnics to illustrate the general plausibility of ethnic identity as a useful political analytic category, suggesting that the absence of ethnic identity in racial analyses mutes important aspects of the lived experiences of racialized persons as individuals and in aggregation. The article establishes the possibility of ethnicity as an identity modifier, providing additional specificity to racial identity narratives. Building on these positions, the article turns to educational contexts to explore the ways in which ethnicity (as introduced in the preceding sections) stands to offer additional specificity to justice-oriented analyses of educational policy and practice.
{"title":"More than race? Mills, ethnicity, and education","authors":"Winston C. Thompson","doi":"10.1177/14778785231162088","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231162088","url":null,"abstract":"Building on the careful racial analyses of Charles W. Mills, this article uses the example case of Black ethnics to illustrate the general plausibility of ethnic identity as a useful political analytic category, suggesting that the absence of ethnic identity in racial analyses mutes important aspects of the lived experiences of racialized persons as individuals and in aggregation. The article establishes the possibility of ethnicity as an identity modifier, providing additional specificity to racial identity narratives. Building on these positions, the article turns to educational contexts to explore the ways in which ethnicity (as introduced in the preceding sections) stands to offer additional specificity to justice-oriented analyses of educational policy and practice.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"3 - 17"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49342237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231162106
A. Nikolaidis
While white ignorance is primarily produced and reproduced through social-structural processes, philosophy of education scholarship has focused on agent-centered educational solutions. This article argues that agent-centered solutions are ineffective and that education for disrupting white ignorance must be structure-centered. Specifically, the article contends that (1) social-structural processes often render being in a state of white ignorance reasonable and that (2) assigning white ignorant agents individual responsibility for overcoming their ignorance is often unreasonable. Consequently, epistemic virtue-based approaches to education are insufficient and inappropriate. Instead, the author proposes prioritizing political forms of education. This includes educating students on how to participate in political action and using political action to educate the public.
{"title":"Structural white ignorance and education for racial justice","authors":"A. Nikolaidis","doi":"10.1177/14778785231162106","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231162106","url":null,"abstract":"While white ignorance is primarily produced and reproduced through social-structural processes, philosophy of education scholarship has focused on agent-centered educational solutions. This article argues that agent-centered solutions are ineffective and that education for disrupting white ignorance must be structure-centered. Specifically, the article contends that (1) social-structural processes often render being in a state of white ignorance reasonable and that (2) assigning white ignorant agents individual responsibility for overcoming their ignorance is often unreasonable. Consequently, epistemic virtue-based approaches to education are insufficient and inappropriate. Instead, the author proposes prioritizing political forms of education. This includes educating students on how to participate in political action and using political action to educate the public.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"52 - 70"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43551215","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-01DOI: 10.1177/14778785231160094
David O’Brien
In The Right to Higher Education, Christopher Martin develops a powerful, autonomy-based argument that there is a moral right to access to higher education. I raise three concerns about whether this argument succeeds. The first is a concern about the conception of autonomy at the heart of Martin’s argument; the second is a concern about possible overgeneralizations of the argument; and the third is a concern about whether Martin’s view is consonant with judgments about fairness.
{"title":"Fairness, autonomy, and a right to higher education","authors":"David O’Brien","doi":"10.1177/14778785231160094","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/14778785231160094","url":null,"abstract":"In The Right to Higher Education, Christopher Martin develops a powerful, autonomy-based argument that there is a moral right to access to higher education. I raise three concerns about whether this argument succeeds. The first is a concern about the conception of autonomy at the heart of Martin’s argument; the second is a concern about possible overgeneralizations of the argument; and the third is a concern about whether Martin’s view is consonant with judgments about fairness.","PeriodicalId":46679,"journal":{"name":"Theory and Research in Education","volume":"21 1","pages":"88 - 92"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41840848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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