Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics最新文献

Theoretical studies question the ability of financial statement information to provide evidence about a firm’s economic performance, as the mathematical relation between a firm’s accounting and economic returns becomes intractable when economic depreciation is defined endogenously—as a function of the firm’s cash flow stream—and when its internal rate of return (IRR) and investment growth rate have not been constant. This paper derives a new equation, called the average internal rate of return (AIRR) estimation model, in which a firm’s AIRR is estimated as a function of its current-year accounting return, its current-year asset growth rate, a measure of accounting conservatism, and a term that identifies the firm’s historical investment growth rate trend. Because the model allows economic depreciation to be defined exogenously, non-constant returns and growth rates can be aggregated across investment cohorts, allowing a firm’s accounting return to be reconciled to its average economic return. One such exogenous schedule—called competitive market depreciation—is used to illustrate the model’s implications. The AIRR estimation model empowers analysts to identify the direction and magnitude of the potential difference between a firm’s accounting and economic return created by fixed asset depreciation, accounting accruals, and the immediate expensing of intangible assets.

We examine how acquirers’ political connections affect takeover bargaining that involves significant regulatory uncertainties, when the target’s options of putting itself to another bidder are restricted. Opposite to prior takeover theories, we show that a politically connected acquirer pays a lower (rather than higher) takeover premium to and shares a smaller portion of the takeover gains with the target in the context of antitrust reviews, consistent with a bargaining benefit for the connected acquirer. Corroborating this bargaining argument, we find that the results are more pronounced in situations where: (1) the antitrust concerns are more severe; (2) the targets have fewer outside options other than the connected acquirers; and (3) the acquirers’ political connections are more valuable. Our results highlight the value of political connections to shareholders in takeovers, affecting not only the likelihood of completion but also the bargaining outcomes of the deal under the shadow of costly regulation.

In this study, we investigate whether a firm’s opportunistic switching of auditors for a favorable audit opinion, known as opinion shopping (OS), affects its tax avoidance activities. Using a sample of Korean firms over the 2006–2018 period, we find that firms that switch auditors for OS purposes engage in more aggressive tax avoidance than other firms. The association between OS-driven auditor switches and tax avoidance is more pronounced for switches to non-Big 4 auditors than to Big 4 auditors. The results are robust to various robustness tests that attempt to control for differences in the characteristics of OS and non-OS firms. Collectively, the findings suggest that auditors hired as a result of OS allow their clients to engage in more aggressive tax avoidance, which is consistent with impaired auditor independence. We contribute to the literature on OS by documenting evidence of the negative consequence of OS on corporate tax compliance. In addition, our findings suggest that firms’ tax and audit behaviors need to be monitored concurrently.

We provide evidence that the investment horizons of institutional shareholders affect firms’ financing decisions. We find that short-term institutional ownership positively affects firms’ likelihood of equity relative to debt issues, the size of equity issues, and the likelihood of long-term relative to short-term debt issues. Firms held more by short-term institutions have lower financial leverage and longer debt maturities. These results suggest that short-horizon institutions, backed by buy-side research, improve the transparency of the information environment, which allows firms to issue more information-sensitive securities. Our findings suggest that institutional investor horizons influence firms’ financing decisions by shaping their information environment.

We examine whether the dispersion of pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) amongst the top management team (TMT) impacts the likelihood of firms disclosing non-GAAP earnings and the quality of non-GAAP earnings. Management compensation contracts are designed to incentivize executive team members individually and in the aggregate. By structuring these contracts to have similar PPS, those charged with governance can increase collaboration amongst the TMT. However, this collaboration can turn into the TMT colluding to make firm decisions that result in the highest compensation for the TMT. Thus, a greater dispersion of PPS can lead to less collusion. We find that the likelihood of firms reporting non-GAAP earnings decreases and the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures increases when there is a higher dispersion of PPS. These findings are consistent with executives that are less incentivized by temporary stock price increases suppressing other executives from eliciting firm scrutiny by disclosing non-GAAP earnings and releasing low-quality non-GAAP earnings. Additionally, we find these effects on non-GAAP earnings are more likely to occur in firms with weaker governance and when the management team has a shorter tenure of working together. Overall, our research provides evidence of the association between the dispersion of TMT PPS and non-GAAP earnings decisions.

This study investigates the influence of textual complexity in firms’ annual reports (Form 10-K) on financial analysts’ weighting of information. Drawing on a sample of U.S.-listed companies spanning from 1994 through 2020, we demonstrate that analysts tend to under-weight private information when 10-K reports are more readable, especially when the disclosed events indicate positive news, and when analysts face high workloads. Additionally, we find that analysts can identify managers’ opportunistic disclosure practices and rationally allocate weight between private and public information. Our findings suggest that analysts are affected by the underlying reporting and business complexity but not misled by the discretionary readability of 10-K reports when weighting information.

This study investigates the impact of trying economic times, i.e., periods of economic decline and uncertainty, on managerial ability. We find that trying economic times positively moderate the association between managerial ability and firm profitability. Consistent with these primary findings, we also find that the positive moderating role of economic decline and uncertainty on the ability-performance relationship is most salient in procyclical industries. Our results are robust across multiple measures of economically trying times and managerial ability. Further analyses indicate that in trying times more capable managers generate stronger performance through both improved asset turnover and profit margins.

This paper provides evidence on US airlines’ responses to the U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) mandated disclosure of non-financial performance. We find that while all three DOT measures are associated with customer complaints, airlines are more likely to improve on-time performance rather than mishandled bags and ticket over-sales following poor prior period performance. We also find that on-time performance is the only DOT measure that is associated with future accounting performance and is significantly associated with CEO compensation after controlling for financial performance and load factor. We also provide preliminary results to show that airlines incorporate the more informative component of the on-time measure in CEO compensation. Overall, we provide new understanding of how organizations react to the disclosure of non-financial performance and use incentives to improve these measures.

This study examines the impact of firms’ participation in an emissions trading scheme (ETS) on their debt financing. Using a unique quasi-natural experimental setting in China, we find that the cost of debt increases and firm access to debt decreases when firms participate in an ETS, which indicates that lenders interpret firms’ participation in an ETS as a potential risk compared to nonparticipation. Further analyses show that the negative effect of participation in an ETS on firm debt financing is more significant for ETS participants that are less able to pass costs on, that operate in regions with less financial marketization, and that are less innovative. For firms that are covered by the national ETS, the restricted access to debt is alleviated for those with experience in a pilot ETS.

Previous research indicates that historical institutions are crucial to the functioning and development of an economy. However, little is known about whether and how a historical institution affects current entrepreneurial activities. In ancient China, the Civil-service Examination (CSE), also known as keju, was the most important institution for selecting scholar-officials and had long-lasting effects. Using the variation in the historical success in keju across prefectures, this paper empirically examines the impact of the CSE on local corporate innovation. We find that the density of jinshi, which is the highest achievement in keju, is positively correlated with the innovation productivity of local firms as measured by patent applications and citations. To determine causality, we employ an instrumental variable and a quasi-experiment in early Qing period. Further tests suggest that the CSE promotes corporate innovation by fostering a forward-looking stance in firms, enhancing firms’ human capital level, and increasing local social capital. Overall, our results indicate that the CSE has a real and long-lasting impact on today’s firm innovation.